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This thesis provides a political economy of electricity and housing provision in Turkey 
since the early 1980s. It discusses how the organisational relations in and around these 
sectors have changed over time towards market-based forms of provisioning. Focusing 
on the increasing scope and depth of commodity relations, it further investigates how 
this process contributes to financialisation defined as the increasing presence of 
interest-bearing capital. It argues that commodification of electricity and housing 
contribute to the restructuring of interest-bearing capital; first, by expanding the base 
for realisation of existing circuits, which might take place through credit expansion to 
new members of the society, and second, through creation of new circuits due to 
relative ease of capitalisation where there are regular payments.  
In line with its specific stage of development, financialised accumulation in Turkey has 
followed a different path than developed economies, which inform the majority of 
discussions on financialisation often around the destabilising impacts on production, 
growth and distribution. Focusing not solely on such impacts, but on the process of 
transformation itself, the thesis provides an empirical study conducted in electricity and 
housing provision systems in Turkey, in line with the systems of provision approach to 
the social reproduction of the labour force.  
It finds that the commodification of electricity and housing have negative impacts on 
social reproduction, which went hand-in-hand with the improvements in productive 
capacity and industrial investment, reflecting a broader capital restructuring from low-
technology labour-intensive sectors towards higher-technology capital-intensive sectors 
in Turkey. The inter-sectoral linkages between the construction and energy firms were 
both facilitated by, and conducive to these developments. These findings contribute to 
the literature on political economy and financialisation of social provision by confirming 
that the analysis of provision systems is context-specific and the focus needs to be 
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Chapter 1                                                                                
Introduction and Methodology 
 
In April, 2013, Erdogan drew a telling comparison between the [archaeological] findings at 
Yenikapı [metro station that has been under construction at the time] and a controversial new 
shopping centre that he was proposing to build in Gezi Park, near Istanbul’s Taksim Square. 
The shopping centre was to be housed in a replica of an Ottoman barracks that had been 
destroyed in 1940. At a press conference, a month before the Gezi plan sparked nationwide 
protests, Erdogan asked why Yenikapı’s Byzantine findings were more worthy of preservation 
than the Ottoman barracks. “Three or five pots and pans turned up from the bottom of the sea, 
a spoon turned up, and these have to be preserved,” he said. “But the barracks, which could 
save Taksim Square, it’s a perfectly good building, architecturally and aesthetically, and this 
you won’t preserve. If that’s not ideology, what is?” 
Batuman (2015), The New Yorker, August 31 
 
1.1. Introduction, Objectives and Contribution     
This thesis started as an attempt to understand the developments within the energy and 
construction sectors in Turkey, which have continued to be primary drivers of 
accumulation since the early 2000s. Among total project finance credits, which 
increased nominally by 7% from 208 billion TL (71 billion USD) in December 2015 to 
223 billion TL (77 billion USD) in June 2016, energy sector projects have received 52%, 
while the share of real estate and infrastructure has been 13% and 12%, respectively.1 
The success of these three sectors with strong inter-linkages in attracting credits in 
comparison to other sectors is striking, especially considering that the aggregate share of 
                                                 
1 Disaggregated biannual project finance statistics have started to be collected by The Banks 
Association of Turkey (BAT) in December 2014 (www.tbb.org.tr)  
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all other sectors in total project credits was 23% in June 2016, including traditionally 
powerful industries such as textiles of which credit share was 4%, decreasing from 13% 
in 2000.2  
The fast growth of these sectors drew attention, not least because such a corresponding 
transition has also been a primary source of social and political conflict and acquired a 
symbolic value in representing the fast pace of change the Republic has experienced 
since the election of the AKP government in 2002. At a time when the global direction 
of change had been associated with decreasing productive investment as opposed to the 
rising financial profits together with the emergence of a wide and segregated spectrum 
of consumption patterns, change in Turkey was mostly associated with rapid urban 
transformation, facilitated through a wide spectrum of construction projects, from 
residential houses to giant slum regenerations, roads, airports and bridges. The 
construction boom, however, did not remain limited to urban arena and, between 2003 
and 2016, 919 hydroelectric and 565 thermal power plants had been issued licences for 
electricity generation.  
The expansion of these two sectors was rapid, reflecting a wider organisational 
transformation of the economy than a secular boom in financial or consumption 
incomes. Indeed, these developments were in line with a relatively optimistic growth 
pattern with an inflation rate of 7.5 per cent in 2015, 2.5 percentage points above the 
target, in a period when many of the countries in the region, especially many East 
European countries such as Hungary and Poland, fell into a deflationary spiral (IMF, 
2015). The annual growth rates of both GDP per capita and GDP per worker improved 
significantly during the 2000-2008 period compared to the previous decade as shown by 
Rodrik (2009), in Figure 1-1 below. Gross fixed capital formation, which stayed at an 
annual average of 25.16% as a share of GDP, with an annual growth rate of 7% 
between 2001 and 2008, was promising and slightly above the world average of 24.58%, 
and 28.18% between 2009-2016, with an annual growth rate of 3.4%. This portrayed an 
optimistic outlook, although not comparable to the impressive levels of China for 
                                                 




which gross capital formation stayed above 35% on average during the period, reaching 
well above 45% of GDP during 2010-2016.3 
Figure 1-1: Comparison of productivity performance by period in Turkey 
Source: Rodrik (2009) 
On the other hand, other aggregate performance criteria were not as promising, 
especially considering that such relative success was achieved at the expense of a 
growing current account deficit, and were not translated as improvements in 
employment. Especially after the global crisis in 2008, the macroeconomic environment 
had the typical characteristics of many other developing countries which were defined 
by the IMF as “vulnerable to a credit pullback, especially in those cases where domestic 
credit growth has been fuelled from external funding sources and large current account 
deficits need to be financed” (cited in Demir, 2009b, p. 11) Unemployment also stayed 
persistently high above the 10-12% band during the entire post-2001 period. These 
aspects raised concerns whether the growth path in Turkey, sustained through incoming 
short-term capital flows following the gradual capital market opening since 1980s, was 
robust and sustainable in terms of contributing to employment and leading to 
                                                 
3 World Bank National Accounts Data (http://data.worldbank.org). Also see Table 1.1 for a 
comparison of select macroeconomic performance criteria of different middle-income countries.  
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significant structural change (Demir, 2009b; Onaran, 2006; Onaran & Stockhammer, 
2005; Onis, 2006; Yeldan, 2006; Yenturk, 1999).  
Meanwhile, in a globalised capital environment, it was also questioned whether the 
maintenance of the growth pattern through incoming capital flows came with a burden 
of increasing interest payments and posed a threat for macroeconomic stability. Turkey 
has been among the emerging countries which offered the highest interest rates and 
uncovered interest arbitrage returns, the latter increasing from 10 per cent between 
1989-1994 to 40 per cent during 2002-2007; as opposed to 8.5 per cent in Argentina 
and 3.6 per cent in Mexico during 2002 and 2007 (Demir, 2009b). This led many to 
question whether the high real interest rates to sustain incoming flows was channelling 
funds towards arbitrage income with greater returns than productive activities (Demir, 
2009b; Erturk, 2003; Gungen, 2012; Onaran, 2006; Yeldan, 2011), or whether this 
strategy was satisfied at the expense of worsening balance of power between financial 
institutions and the rest of the actors in the economy (Marois, 2011). 
In this light, the thesis also started as an attempt to understand how the developments 
within energy and construction sectors could be explained in a systemic manner that 
would also contribute to the understanding of the workings of the Turkish economy in 
particular, as a constituent part of the world economy in general. Among many other 
possible avenues, it was the thrust of the financialisation literature that provided the 
most systemic and critical insights into the issues at hand, especially with respect to the 
global developments taking place in financial markets and their impacts in general, and 
their ‘transmission’ through financial liberalisation in developing countries in particular. 
In line with global trends, there was an increasing orientation towards financial activities 
in the country, which led to the establishment of secondary asset markets in housing as 
well as electricity, combined with a boom in consumption credits rising as a share of 
GDP from 1.8% in 2002 to 18.7% in 2012, within which the share of personal loans 
increased from 4.7% in 2002 to 33.5% in 2012, reflecting financial deepening through 
an expansion of financial services to a broader base of population (Karacimen, 2014). 
There was, however, also substantial increase in credits expended for productive 
investment, resulting in an expansion of total loans given to non-financial corporations, 
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especially after 2010. 4  In aggregate, the non-financial corporations segment grew, 
increasing its share from 66.1 per cent of GDP in 1989 to 83.3 per cent in 2006, while 
the share of the public sector halved from 33.9 per cent to 16.7 per cent (Sengul, 2015). 
What was more important, it also signalled that capitalist accumulation was undergoing 
economy-wide technical change in line with the aggregate productivity improvements as 
pointed out by Rodrik (2009), and evident in the increase of the share of plant, 
machinery and equipment in private gross fixed capital formation, which almost 
doubled from 32.5 per cent in 1989 to 70.4 per cent in 2006.  
Figure 1-2: Disaggregation of Total Debts in Turkey according to Sectors 
Source: CBRT Financial Accounts Statistics 
*Total indebtedness is calculated as the sum of currency and deposits, debt securities and loans under total 
liabilities.  
This development was in line with the developments in the energy and construction 
sectors, which increased their credits shares substantially during the post-2001 crisis 
period. The total cash and non-cash loans of Turkey's energy sector given by domestic 
banks in Turkey, reached $36 billion at the end of 2014 with an annual growth of 
$6.5 billion. Between 2013 and 2015, the energy sector in total (including the electricity, 
petroleum and coal and mining industries) used on average 12.8% of all domestic TL 
                                                 
4 See Figure 1-2. 
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and FX credits issued. Similarly, the construction sector increased its share in total 
credits from 3.5% in 2004 to over 8% in early 2017, as seen in Figure 1-3 below. 
Figure 1-3: Comparison of Textiles, Electricity and Construction Industries according to their Shares 
in Total Domestic Credits 
Source: BRSA  
Therefore, as the research proceeded, some discrepancies became more evident 
between what was observed in Turkey and the postures of the financialisation literature. 
A primary problem in the existing literature can be identified as the existence of a 
reductionist and mechanistic approach towards the issues involved, which is manifested, 
first, in the geographical bias towards core economies. A second problematic feature of 
the literature is that it builds upon a dichotomous understanding of the interests of 
‘finance’ as a whole (including a variety of actors, motives with conflicting interests) as 
opposed to the real economy. The primary financialisation hypothesis5 suggests a global 
orientation of the non-financial sector towards financial activities which ultimately leads 
to lower levels of physical investment, hence to stagnant or fragile growth, as well as 
raising long-term concerns over productivity (Tori & Onaran, 2015).  
Indeed, there is a certain stream within the literature, combining the Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC) approach with the analytical focus of financialisation studies. This 
approach acknowledges that different institutional settings play a role in the emergence 
                                                 
5 Although the thesis acknowledges that financialisation is associated with many different definitions 
and arguments, it refers to the macroeconomic hypothesis summarised by Tori & Onaran (2015) as 
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of accumulation systems if, for example, the interests of ‘financial rentiers’ are 
conducive to production as long as ownership structures allow for a collusion of 
financial and productive activities with a close association of big banks and businesses 
in coordinated (export-led) as opposed to liberal (consumption-led) economies, or if 
financial centres with a stronger national or regional orientation have been successful in 
combining the two areas of activity (Engelen, Konings, & Fernandez, 2010; Gabor & 
Ban, 2013; P. A. Hall & Soskice, 2001).  
The VoC approach has been valuable in terms of rejecting a ‘convergence’ hypothesis 
with respect to the impacts of finance on different macroeconomic configurations and 
emphasising differentiated comparative performance. In the case of Turkey, which is far 
from being unique, the links between the big banks and businesses in Turkey have been 
traditionally strong, with the biggest conglomerates, attached to the Sabanci and Koc 
families, owning the biggest fourth and fifth banks after the three biggest publicly-
owned banks, respectively. After the restructuring of the financial system following the 
2001 crisis, and the elimination of small risky banks, this structure was more or less 
preserved, contributing to an accumulation system in which the characteristics of both 
comparative systems were present: while a decline in gross savings was followed by a 
consumption boom and increasing unemployment, export performance of especially 
manufacturing sector also improved despite the lack of capacity for strategic labour 
coordination that determines the ultimate success of export-led economies according to 
Gabor and Ban (2013), through diverting these gains into private savings. This thesis, 
nevertheless, investigates these two trends (financial and export orientation) 
simultaneously, without attempting to detect whether one predominates over the other, 
but rather putting the emphasis on the ways in which the financial system relates to the 
broader society, more nuanced in the actual operation of economies than a structural 
separation between those that lend and those that borrow money (Ashman & Fine, 
2013).  
A third problem with the literature on financialisation has been identified as the 
presence of dichotomous understanding of the state existing as an independent body 
with clear and unchanging objectives as opposed to those of businesses. Again, it 
should be noted that the literature acknowledges that the impacts of globalised 
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competition on welfare expenditures would be mixed, depending whether competition 
will lead to a shift from delivering of public goods to public inputs or increased social 
expenditures in order to compensate for increased social risks (P. A. Hall & Soskice, 
2001; Onaran & Boesch, 2014; Rodrik, 1998). Nevertheless, it is important to also 
acknowledge that these two trends have been going hand-in-hand in many countries, 
irrespective of which one dominates. Public expenditure as a ratio of GDP increased 
substantially after 1990 in Turkey; general government consumption increasing from 12% 
of GDP in 2000 to 16% in 2015, as Table 1.1. below shows. Meanwhile, the period also 
witnessed intensified privatisation experiences, electricity being among many of these 
such as telecommunications and mining, far from suggesting a clear pattern for the 
state’s involvement in the delivery of public goods.  


















Services Gross Savings 
 
2000 2015 2000 2015 2000 2015 2000 2015 2000 2015 2000 2015 
Turkey 71 69 12 16 18 27 20 28 23 31 18 14 
Latin 
America
n 66 65 15 17 20 20 19 20 20 23 17 17 
Lower 
Middle 
Income 66 66 11 11 22 27 27 24 26 27 25 28 
Upper 
Middle 
Income 54 51 16 16 26 31 27 26 23 24 28 32 
High 
Income 58 60 17 18 24 21 26 31 26 30 24 23 
Source: World Bank National Accounts Databank 
These observations led to a search for an alternative systemic explanation, as the main 
thrusts of the financialisation literature alone could not account for the developments 
within the energy and construction sectors in Turkey, or identify the wider 
organisational developments around them. Despite the problems identified, the 
financialisation literature has been incredibly helpful to connect what has been going on 
in core economies with respect to the emergence of “secondary” circuits of capital as in 
the proliferation of complex derivative financial assets and activities as well as rising 
inequality and segregation in consumption, which the literature has succeeded in 
highlighting and bringing together; meanwhile the developments in transition 
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economies such as Turkey have been increasing production going hand-in-hand with 
these developments.  
Here it is necessary to add that the existing empirical literature on financialisation does 
not sharply contrast with the arguments of this thesis, and the possible avenues for 
finance to facilitate output are acknowledged especially within the context of developing 
countries (Gabor, 2010; Stockhammer & Onaran, 2013). Nevertheless, the 
financialisation literature does theoretically favour the crowding-out of investment 
hypothesis with an emphasis on how unproductive channels of lending has been 
conducive to consumption-induced demand or how comparative advantage was 
achieved in many countries through export competitiveness based on wage suppression 
instead of structural change.  
To reflect these multifaceted processes, instead of breaking with the tradition of 
financialisation and rejecting the insights offered by the bulk of its contributions, 
financialisation is instead defined here within a Marxist political economy framework as 
the increasing presence of interest bearing capital, as the material basis for the current phase of 
capitalism (Fine, 2013). 
This definition necessarily carries the discussion to a higher level of abstraction, shifting 
the focus away from the issues of growth, stability, investment discussed above, as it is 
subject to multiple understandings. Fine (2013, p. 48) explains the issues that should be 
taken into consideration as following:  
One is the proliferation and expansion of financial markets themselves across 
circumstances differing in time, place, and application, from mortgages through 
pensions to futures markets in carbon emissions. The second is the equally 
multifarious conduits through which such finance is connected to the rest of the 
economy. And the third is how such developments in and around finance are 
attached to a more fundamental understanding of how the capitalist economy 
evolves systemically. From a Marxist perspective, taking the last issue as a critical 
point of departure, emphasis is placed upon the capitalist economy as organized 
around the accumulation of capital through the production, circulation, and 
distribution of (surplus) value as a totality of economic relations, processes, 
structures, dynamics, and corresponding agents.  
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As with any other category of Marxist political economy, its investigation is primarily 
concerned with the ways in which capitalist accumulation proceeds. This makes the 
approach distinct in principle from other approaches that may focus on one or more 
aspects of the economy and how they interact with what is taken to be financialisation 
(Fine, 2013). Instead, the financialisation process is conceptualised within a layered 
formation of accumulation: consisting of tendencies, counter-tendencies, as well as 
contingencies; and understood as operating on different levels of abstraction and 
interacting with one another. In that respect, it is concerned not only with the heavier 
presence of finance and its corresponding impacts on distribution, aggregate demand 
and/or investment and growth, but how the capitalist economy evolves with respect to 
structural as well as contingent forces, and identifying the areas of potential change 
where conflicting forces interact with each other. The potential for change is for 
example manifested through the risks that are associated with the restructuring of 
interest bearing capital: that once money is advanced to make more money in 
expectation of interest and there is an obligation to repay, it can take on a market life of 
its own, i.e. securities and derivate assets emerge which bear no relation to the original 
value of the debt/stock. The detrimental impacts of this process on the real economy 
were seen in the collapse of the housing asset bubble in the USA in 2008.  
Change however, does not only come in the form of a collapse of an overall 
accumulation process, which only constitutes a part of the picture when it comes to the 
restructuring of interest-bearing capital. This is especially relevant for developing 
economies where financial markets are not deep and broad enough to support extensive 
asset markets. They are, nevertheless changing, first of all, with respect to the global 
developments of the financial markets themselves. The literature on financialisation of 
developing economies has been interested in investigating such a transition facilitated 
through the changes in the core, by focusing also on the impacts of intensifying capital 
flows on the domestic exchange and interest rates which further affect the real economy 
determinants (Bonizzi, 2013; Kaltenbrunner, 2011; Kaltenbrunner & Painceira, 2015; 
Painceira, 2009; Powell, 2013). This thesis argues that the developing economies have 
been experiencing change not only as a transmission mechanism from the core, but also 
domestically their own right, visible in the increasing scope and depth of commodity relations 
across the economy.  
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Building upon these studies’ macro-level insights, this thesis investigates the processes 
of financialisation locally, through the investigation of increasing depth and scope of 
commodity relations in and around provision goods (housing and electricity in 
particular), while also placing it within a global context. The choice of provision goods 
as the location to look for this dynamic related to another crucial consideration of this 
thesis that is not discussed by the financialisation literature per se, but is a reflection of a 
deeper understanding of the capitalist accumulation process described above. 
This understanding concerns the impacts of financialisation on the value of labour power, 
which is not discussed by the financialisation literature directly, but is an important 
consideration of the particular understanding of financialisation conceptualised in this 
thesis. The value of labour power is defined as the collection of wage goods (use values) 
of which electricity and housing are examples, that are necessary for the labourers’ 
survival, and the money wages (values) that can buy the survival goods. As capitalist 
accumulation is conceptualised as the simultaneous production of use values and values, 
its analysis also involves a simultaneous investigation of, first, how labour-power and 
means of production are reproduced as use values after each successive circuit. Second, 
on the value side, it concerns how capital turns into money in order that it can be 
exchanged against use values to assume its (re)productive role (Weeks, 1983). To reflect 
this methodological concern, then: first of all, the sectoral focus on energy and 
construction has changed into a commodity-specific analytical focus specifically on 
electricity and housing, as these are wage goods that constitute the value of labour 
power (use values that are necessary for labourers’ survival).  
From that perspective, the analysis of financialisation with respect to the electricity and 
housing is interested in: first, how the labour power as a use value is reproduced 
through the wage goods of electricity and housing in Turkey; and, second, how the 
value relation is reproduced through the commodity production developments which 
might, for example, give way to a financialised accumulation pattern. As mentioned, this 
pattern is investigated through the continuum of commodity relations within and 
around these commodities. Commodification of electricity and housing is found to 
contribute to the restructuring of interest-bearing capital: first, through expanding the 
base for realisation of existing circuits, which might take place through new credit 
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expansion to members of society; and, second, through creation of new circuits due to 
relative ease of capitalisation where there are regular payments.  
In response, a financialised accumulation pattern also signals a process in which the 
value of labour power is both reduced (less value is embodied in use values) and 
redefined (monetary wages can buy more goods as the goods necessarily cheapen). Just 
as these two exist simultaneously, there is the historical and moral element concerning 
how these commodities are produced, consumed and distributed in certain historical 
contexts. This  means that capitalism does not only move in the direction of increased 
market relations in the production of these commodities, although this is the tendency, 
sometimes it also moves towards increased state intervention, potentially improving 
living conditions in some respects despite stagnant wages etc. Conceptualised by Fine 
and Leopold (1993), the systems of provision approach is interested in this multi-
layered analysis, and its application to financialisation will be explained in more detail in 
the second half of this chapter. The opening chapters aim at developing such a 
theoretical framework that contributes to the understanding of financialisation in the 
abstract, and how it impacts on the value of labour power, in line with the 
methodological principles outlined above. Later, these principles are underlined through 
the empirical studies which constitute the core empirical contribution of the thesis.  
As a result, this thesis is both highly abstract, with respect to the methodological and 
theoretical discussions, which will be pursued in Chapters 1 and 2, and highly concrete 
with respect to the conduct of individual empirical studies in Chapters 5 and 6. The 
conceptual framework on financialisation and the value of labour power has been 
indispensable for investigating the empirical studies with respect to their national and 
global context more fully, as well as framing them in a theoretical context. On the other 
hand, the individual political economy analyses of electricity and housing help us 
understand what is happening around these commodities in Turkey, which is a good 
exercise in examining change with respect to how it is occurring. The thesis seeks to hold 
its separate pieces together through this methodological thread, as much as it is about 
these separate pieces on financialisation and the political economy of electricity and 
housing in Turkey.  
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Thus, this thesis provides a political economy of electricity and housing provision in 
Turkey since the early 1980s. It has two interrelated objectives. The first is to 
understand how the organisational relations with respect to the production and 
consumption of these goods have changed over time. This refers to an investigation of 
the use value aspect of accumulation with respect to its material basis concerning the 
reproduction of labour power. Focusing on the increasing scope and depth of 
commodity relations, its second objective is to discuss how this process contributes to 
the value processes of financialisation defined as the increasing presence of interest-
bearing capital. As mentioned above, commodification of electricity and housing 
contribute to the restructuring of interest-bearing capital: first, through expanding the 
base for realisation of existing circuits, which might take place through credit expansion 
to new members of society; and, second, through creation of new circuits due to relative 
ease of capitalisation where there are regular payments.  
The thesis aims at understanding this process at its early stages in Turkey, through an 
investigation of the continuum of commodity relations, also in line with the specific 
development trajectory of Turkey as a transition economy. It emphasises that, in line 
with its specific stage of development, the trajectory of financialised accumulation in 
Turkey has followed a different path than developed economies, within the context of 
which financialisation is discussed mostly with respect to its destabilising and 
stagnationary impacts on production, growth and distribution. Focusing not on such 
impacts, but on the process of transformation itself, the thesis aims at bringing a 
commodity- and context-specific explanation to the developments concerning the 
sectors involved.  
This introduction aside, this chapter consists of another section on methodology and 
the structure of analysis, investigating the different methodologies employed in Marxist 
political economy and explaining the specific interpretation adopted in this thesis with 
respect to its relevance for the determination of the value of labour power and its place 
in the systems of provision approach. Starting with the widely-accepted interpretation 
named systematic dialectics, it discusses how the interpretation adopted in this thesis differs 
from systematic dialectics with respect to Marx’s materialism that brings a historical and 
empirical aspect to the analysis, on the basis of the concept of essence, unfolding within 
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a layered formation of causal structures, consisting of tendencies and counter-
tendencies and contingencies, interacting with each other at all times. It then describes 
the different ways in which the value of labour power can be determined. Drawing 
upon this, the last section describes how the systems of provision approach is interested 
in revealing the ways in which the value of power is lowered through commodification 
of provision goods, together with increasing (and changing) living standards 
differentiated within and across income groups.  
Chapter 2 will provide a literature review on financialisation with respect to the concerns 
raised, and the definition given above. On the basis of the methodological principles 
laid out in Chapter 1, it identifies two distinct methods for approaching financialisation 
and gives its own definition. By theorising financialisation along a continuum of 
increasing commodity relations leading to the restructuring of the circuits of interest-
bearing capital in overall accumulation, the thesis suggests that many definitions of 
financialisation with predetermined impacts on the overall accumulation patterns may 
or may not be present depending on the specific development trajectories, especially 
located within an uneven global context, which will be discussed in Chapter 3 on 
financialisation in developing and emerging economies.  
The emphasis of the financialisation in developing and emerging economies literature 
has been on the negative impacts of financial deepening through capital account 
liberalisation and the entrance of foreign actors on the scope of domestic policy options, 
together with widening opportunities for speculative activities such as carry-trade. The 
dependent nature of the integration of developing countries and the importance of 
uneven international relations are also emphasised.  
Locating Turkey in a comparative context, Chapter 4 will provide a political economy of 
Turkey since the 1980s. It is widely acknowledged in the literature that the gradual capital 
account liberalisation since the early 1980s gave rise to a secular increase in the net 
primary arbitrage gains, especially over dollar-denominated assets, the annual average 
uncovered interest arbitrage (UIA) gains reaching 10, 19 and 40 per cent during 1989-
1994, 1995-2001 and 2002-2007, respectively (Onis & Senses, 2009). However, this 
thesis argues that the financial deepening during the 1980s and 1990s also benefited the 
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restructuring of industrial capital in the following period, visible in the shift from low-
technology to higher-technology industries and productive techniques within 
manufacturing sector in the post-2001 crisis period.  
Specifically, Chapter 4 discusses how manufacturing firms could channel appreciated 
currency into capital deepening, while fiscal expansion contributed to aggregate demand 
during a period when private demand was not so strong. 2001 crisis and the subsequent 
financial sector restructuring process with the help of the IMF have constituted a 
historical turning point through its differentiated impacts on different actors in the 
economy. The crisis contributed to capital deepening through favouring internationally 
competitive large conglomerates with tight relations to the financial sector, over smaller 
enterprises, as their access to credit decreased significantly after the elimination of small 
and riskier banks during the financial sector restructuring.  
In short, Chapter 4 emphasises that through reinforcing the existing oligopolistic 
structure and protecting industrial mark-up rates, the policy practices that are readily 
associated with financialised accumulation, such as labour market and financial 
deregulation, were beneficial for both financial and industrial restructuring in Turkey. 
This aspect shows divergence from what is underlined by the financialisation literature 
with respect to the developments in the core, which suggests a crowding-out impact of 
the financial interests, with these developing at the expense of productive investment, 
or leading to an export boom through wage squeeze without significant structural 
change.   
Chapter 5 will move on to the first core empirical study of the thesis on electricity provision 
in Turkey. Together with the commodification process of electricity facilitated through 
gradual privatisation since the early 1980s, the restructuring process discussed in the 
previous chapter has been most relevant for the electricity system, as the increasing 
levels of productive investment mostly benefited the generation segment through 
accelerated construction of hydroelectric and thermal plants, associated with technical 
progress and economies of scale. The relevance of the finding that there was 
considerable increase in the productive capacity of this sector is discussed in relation to 
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the theoretical framework adopted in this thesis and the financialisation of nature 
literature.  
The sixth chapter is dedicated to the political economy of housing provision in Turkey. 
Housing markets are mostly discussed in the context of mature capitalist economies 
with respect to the possible impacts of increasing dependence on owner-occupation and 
corresponding increase in housing demand on overall accumulation through speculative 
price appreciations. Within the Turkish context, especially the path followed by the 
housing industry differed significantly from the developed country cases, where the 
housing sectors acquired an output-restricting character upon increasing consumption 
demand. In contrast, the housing industry in Turkey was characterised with a supply 
boom especially after the restructuring of a state institution, Housing Development 
Administration (TOKI), between 2002-2004, increasing the annual building permits 
from just over 40,000 in 2002 to over 140,000 in in 2014 (TURKSTAT). The reasons 
behind this phenomenon will be discussed in Chapter 6, especially in reference to the 
productive characteristics of the housing industry in general and the importance of the 
social relations surrounding landed property, by locating Turkey in a comparative 
context. 
 It is argued that some productive characteristics of housebuilding industry can be 
conducive to the emergence of speculative housing markets, in case the natural division 
due to different risk/return characteristics between capital-intensive land development 
and labour-intensive housebuilding industries are obstructed by the limited availability 
of land (Ball, 1983). By drawing upon Marx’s theory of agricultural rent, this thesis 
argues that the intervention of landed property might give rise to a speculative structure 
without this being necessarily reflected as output restriction and globalised price 
appreciations. In Turkey, both localised and sectoral level rent revenues facilitated 
through the state could be appropriated as capital gains by all the actors in the sector, 
although this process did not threaten overall accumulation as the consumer base as 
well as risk diversification of financial institutions stayed limited, and the supply boom 
prevented the sharp price increases. Moreover, the inter-sectoral linkages with the 
energy sector protected profitability for especially larger firms, which could continue 
operating within a highly competitive industry.  
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As a result, the empirical chapters underline the argument on financialisation that its 
impacts do not only depend on the overall accumulation patterns with respect to the 
wider organisational relations mentioned above, the parameters that determine the 
causes themselves (such as asset price inflation in housing market with respect to rising 
demand) may or may not be present depending on the specific development trajectories  
(in case the financial markets are shallow due to limited accumulation) as well as other 
contingent elements (if there is a simultaneous increase in supply in housing markets 
given the availability of land and reasonable profitability for both large and small firms, 
as in the case of Turkey).  
Chapter 7 concludes by outlining possible new research areas and emphasising that the 
findings further support the underlining methodology adopted in the thesis which 
implies that the analysis of provision systems, as well as financialisation, is context-
specific and the focus is analytically situated on the entirety of organisational relations 
including the economic, social and historical dimensions. 
1.2. Methodology and the Structure of Analysis 
The methodology adopted in this thesis is along the lines of a certain reading of 
Marxian methodology. As is general knowledge, Marx’s methodology has long been a 
subject of contested debates and there are many, sometimes conflicting interpretations. 
This chapter will not provide a comprehensive literature survey of such differences in 
interpretation as it is beyond the scope of this thesis. Some methodological aspects in 
different traditions will be selectively presented, however, throughout the chapter to 
clarify some disputed issues and their relevance for the methodology adopted.  
The methodological reading adopted in this thesis follows from Ilyenkov’s (1977) 
outline of Marx’s dialectical logic, along the lines of the interpretation presented by Fine 
and Harris (1979) and Fine (1982b) and later by Saad-Filho (2002). This interpretation is 
first based upon that Marx’s political economy concerning capitalism takes its departure 
from a more general understanding of human nature as fundamentally social and 
relational, i.e. not existing in isolation from its social surroundings. As this issue has 
been discussed widely, such as in the debates on Marx’s transition from his earlier works 
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to ‘mature’ works, it relates to his materialistic understanding of history. Such 
understanding of history first of all concerns the general laws of motion of human 
development, irrespective of particular modes of production such as capitalism.  
Briefly, it depends on the understanding of human beings with different, usually 
conflicting motives. As history has not existed since the beginning of time, it is 
determined by the contradictory interactions of human beings with nature, with their 
productive instincts and with their fellow human beings. There are three basic 
contradictions that lie behind the dynamics of history (Milonakis, 1997). First, there is 
the contradiction between nature and human beings, giving rise to the act of production 
and productive forces, as human beings transform nature with their productive forces. 
In this sense, capitalism is a mode of production. This relationship is mediated through 
the relations between human beings in the production process giving rise to production 
relations. In the capitalist mode of production, production relations take the form of 
class relations between wage-labour with no access to their means of production and 
capitalists who own the means of production. Methodologically speaking, this helps us 
explain why Marx’s analysis begins with class, rather than the individual. As Milonakis 
(1997) claims, there is also a third contradiction between productive forces and 
production relations depending on the outcomes of the first two, which defines the 
actual developmental course of history. While the relationship between human beings 
and nature leads to the development of productive forces, the relationship between 
classes leads to class conflict and the relationship between these two explains the 
existence of certain trajectories of development.  
It is important to emphasise that Marx’s analysis of capitalism in the three volumes of 
Capital is to provide a critique of capitalism based upon its understanding as a historical 
reality, which not only serves as a conditioning environment to humans, but also is 
conditioned by them. In that regard, political economy is not studied in isolation from 
history, but is an integral part of history. This is not to suggest a purely historical, 
inductive take on political economy but rather to accept that the laws of political 
economy work under the laws of motion of history in general as a product of collective 
human development. Along with his understanding of historical movement in general, 
there is another a priori consideration that the capitalist economy is a systemically 
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integrated whole that is both logically prior to, and greater than the sum of its parts. The 
analysis starts from this given whole, which is the capitalist economy as the simple 
abstract, as a mirror image of the concrete reality of capitalism. Then it proceeds 
towards the concrete material processes on the basis of an essence that is determined by 
this whole in order to reconstruct the concrete material in thought. So far, these aspects 
of Marx’s philosophy are not specific to his analysis of capitalism, but will be discussed 
very briefly in the next section to clarify some issues which are relevant for the purposes 
of this thesis. 
The aim of this chapter is to locate the following chapters on such an understanding of 
Marx’s method and his analysis of capitalism, first, on the basis of two overarching 
themes and then to move on to other closely related theoretical issues that are a primary 
consequence of his method, such as the conceptualisation of the value of labour power. 
The first theme concerns the dynamic change. The second concerns the incorporation 
of the empirical material into the theory. On the basis of these, the levels of abstraction 
and the tendencies and counter-tendencies of capitalism are discussed. Lastly, the 
notion of value of labour power is discussed.  
1.2.1. Systematic dialectics and Hegelian heritage 
As suggested above, Marx’s method first assumes there is a given totality and then aims 
at explaining this through its internal connections. The procedure based on the 
reconstruction of the concrete as a unity in thought with its own internal connections is 
accepted as the Hegelian heritage in Marx’s method. For Chris Arthur (1998, 2002) for 
example, Marx’s method follows Hegel’s closely in the sense that they both attempted 
to treat a pre-given whole in which the categories are ordered strictly logically. As Hegel 
claims there is no historical ordering of his categories, Marx’s conceptual development 
also is also not historical, although this has later been misrepresented by Engels. Chris 
Arthur (1998) claims that Engels’ misrepresentation gave the theory a historical content 
reducing the purpose of abstraction to disentangle the pure logical forms from historical 
contingencies. Such reading of Marx’s method along with Hegelian principles named by 
Arthur as new dialectic, also referred to as systematic dialectic in general, has been 
prominent among some scholars such as Murray (1988), Moseley (1993), Shamsavari 
(1991) and Smith (1998). Systematic dialectics is based on the principle of the 
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organisation of a system of categories in a definite sequence, deriving one concept from 
another purely logically.  
The first principle of the new dialectics is that the capitalist economy is a given whole 
with internal consistency, as stated above. Its reconstruction in thought requires 
abstraction, not on the basis of common attributes in things in order to derive concepts 
for categorisation, but rather on the basis of the essence which is the actual universal 
cause of the whole. The ordering of the concepts follows from more simple and 
abstract concepts containing the essence towards more complex and concrete concepts 
on the basis of the contradictions in simpler concepts. As the concepts become more 
concrete and refined, the analysis is also reproduced at more concrete levels of 
abstraction. This movement, however, does not resolve contradictions in the simple 
categories. As Shamsavari (1991, p. 42) notes, “the fixed opposition between simple and 
complex is reproduced rather than solved” and therefore simple categories and the 
contradictions within them continue to exist alongside the more complex categories. It 
is such existence of the contradictions that make the movement from the more abstract 
to the more concrete necessary and also sufficient for the derivation of the capitalist 
economy in thought as a system with internal consistency.  
On the basis of this consideration, the dialectic of value consists of three steps as in all 
dialectic movement (Arthur, 2002). First, the commodity appears as the initial concept 
introduced in the first chapter in Capital. The contradiction within it (use value as 
opposed to value) necessitates the introduction of money which moves the analysis to a 
more concrete level of abstraction. Later, the contradiction within money (quantity as 
opposed to quality) necessitates the introduction of the concept of capital. Capital 
represents the disclosure of the system by returning back to itself (money creating more 
money). It is only when the system discloses by returning to its starting point, a system 
is complete and therefore can be analysed systematically (T. Smith, 2003). This way of 
ordering of the categories according to levels abstraction also underlie the internal 
causal structure in terms of direction (from more abstract to the more concrete), 
although a contradiction cannot be reduced to a unilinear causality where cause and 
effect are ontologically independent entities.  
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Systematic dialectics offers a comprehensive interpretation of Marx’s method on the 
basis of development of more complex concepts with the help of contradictions in 
simpler versions of the same concepts. Although such movement of thought is helpful 
in terms of determining the direction of causal structure, it can be misleading as it is 
based upon an idealistic understanding of the concrete reality in which the movement 
between different levels of abstraction is done seamlessly with no regard to historical 
reality. This thesis is based on a reading of Marx that differs from Hegelian systematic 
dialectics, especially in light of the incorporation of the historical. The next section will 
focus upon how it differs and why such difference matters.  
1.2.2. Marx’s materialism and the incorporation of empirical material into theory 
As is well known, Marx rejects idealism in his very own famous words “ideal is nothing 
else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of 
thought.” The nature of the ideal and its place in Marx’s theory is a far-reaching 
philosophical issue that cannot be discussed in great detail here. Nevertheless, this 
section will provide a brief summary in order to discuss the issue which can clarify some 
methodological concerns such as the relationship between the empirical/historical 
content and the theory. 
The rejection of idealism does not imply that the starting point of a conceptual 
framework is the empirical reality as in induction, but rather to indicate that the ideal 
concepts existing in the human consciousness are based upon reflections of the material 
world. The conceptual procedure still moves from the ideal (abstract) towards the 
material (concrete), but it has a material basis in the sense that the ideal itself is just a 
reflection of the material. The ideal is understood on the basis of first, there is a priori 
consideration that thought and its concepts are distinct from the objects of the real 
world that are under the analysis. Second, human beings use their intellectual capacities 
in order to transform themselves and the external world through the means of thinking. 
The first is an ontological distinction. This means, the distance between a concept and 
its real life correspondence is independent of the level of complexity of the issue that is 
being conceptualised. Therefore it cannot be wiped away by means of refinement of the 
concept, although a more refined concept might represent the complexity in a brighter 
36 
 
light. As such, this does not contradict with an idealistic understanding of the world, but 
this needs more elaboration.  
In Hegel, idealism takes an objective form where all subjects and objects exist in an 
encompassing whole. While human beings (subjects) try to make sense of themselves 
and the real world, their thinking is first directed towards the objects in their 
surroundings. If thought in the broadest sense of the word is a capacity that creates 
knowledge in many forms, thinking first creates forms of thoughts (concepts) about 
things observed in nature as in contemplation, perception or imagination. This means 
that until the thought form itself appears, thinking can only make sense of things that 
already comes with a form of thought (concept). The thought form itself appears only 
in the course of thinking about thinking (thought) itself, which is the real source of all 
thinking. This nature of thought form gives it a peculiarly distinctive feature as pointed 
out by Ilyenkov (1977, p. 112):  
But before man began to think about thought, he had already to think, though 
still not realising the logical schemas and categories within which this thinking 
took place, but already embodying them in the form of the concrete statements 
and concepts of science, engineering, morals, and so on. Thought was thus 
realised at first as activity in all the diversity of its outward manifestations. The 
thought-form here was ‘sunk’ into the material of concrete thoughts, sense 
images, and ideas, was ‘sublated’ in them, and was therefore counterposed to 
conscious thinking as the form of external reality. 
In other words, thinking cannot be developed fully until the thinking subjects had 
already thought before with the help of concepts given in contemplation and 
imagination. This forms the basis of Hegel’s differentiation of simple-abstract 
universality (concepts given in contemplation) from the universal concept which is the 
actual origin of all concepts. For Hegel, the purpose of thinking is to achieve these 
universals, therefore a real abstraction is not done to categorise objects according to 
their common attributes, but rather to find the essential determinations in objects 
(particulars) from which the actual particulars emerge. This refers to essence in Marx’s 
philosophy on the basis of which abstraction proceeds.  
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Another important consideration to understand the ideal in Marx is that human beings 
transform the world and themselves through the means of their thinking. Referring 
back to Hegel and what has been discussed above, thinking first starts as an activity that 
is directed towards everything else which later moves towards itself. Subjectively, when 
thinking is first directed towards everything else but itself, thought can only mirror 
reality given in the forms that are already within consciousness. But thinking has an 
active side to it that human beings think and act on their thoughts without necessary 
correspondence in their subjective consciousness. Therefore, thought reveals itself not 
only in logic and its concepts, but also in what it creates in the external world through 
objective activity.  
So far, such conceptualising of thinking as a joint product of conscious and 
unconscious elements which are reflected in objective activity, referred by Marx as the 
investigation of the ‘active side’ of human thinking, does not contradict Hegel’s 
philosophy. Fundamentally, all thoughts mirror reality and are ideal in the sense that the 
gap between the thought and reality cannot be fully eliminated. For Marx however, the 
nature of the ideal is material as all ideal (logical) forms mirror images of universal 
forms of reality outside thought, reflected in human consciousness. As Balibar (1995, p. 
24) claims, Marx’s materialism has nothing to do with the matter, but he uses the term 
materialism in order to position itself as opposed to idealism “in which the world is an 
object of contemplation which seeks to perceive its coherence and its meaning thereby 
to impose an order on it.” In idealism, concrete is merely a manifestation of the abstract. 
For Marx, the representation of the order of the world is done by referring to the 
activity of the subject which constitutes both the order and its representation. In other 
words, there are mediations in the manifestation of the abstract as the concrete as such 
a process is only possible in the activity of the subject.   
The act of realising thought in objective activity in the forms of things and events 
outside consciousness makes thinking a real productive process, as the objects within 
consciousness can only be altered through the continuous incorporation of unconscious 
elements which can reflect back as objective activity. It also underpins the specific 
importance of collective forms of human creation and production in Marx’s philosophy 
in relation to human consciousness, the latter being a product of the former. Thought 
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(thinking) is first accepted as the ideal component of the real activity of social people 
transforming both external nature and themselves by their labour (Ilyenkov, 1974, p. 2). 
The ideal is the subjective image of objective reality, i.e. reflection of the external world 
in the forms of man’s activity, in the forms of his consciousness and will.  
Through an investigation of the active side of thinking, which is reflected in the whole 
inorganic body of man that includes the aggregate historical process of human production, 
Marxist methodology can move from being an analysis of subjective ideal forms 
towards being an analysis that is concerned with the substance of such ideal forms as 
part of an objective reality.  For example, in the context of the capitalist economy, the 
concept of price is ideal in the sense that it already exists in the consciousness of all 
operating agents.  This does not mean that price as an ideal form does not have real 
existence. Prices exist not only in the minds of operating agents, but they are first, a 
subjective reflection of an objective reality, namely values as abstract human labour. 
Prices are not merely reflections of values, however, as values only appear in their ideal 
form in exchange and the determination of future value relations is mediated not only 
through the values themselves, but also through their corresponding prices. 
Upon such considerations, Marx’s materialism is helpful in understanding why it is not 
possible to restrict scientific method to a pre-given set of rules as offered by the 
systematic dialectic method. In Marx, logic and history are inseparable not to imply that 
the empirical material constitutes a natural starting point as in induction, but rather to 
imply that the empirical material is a part of the theory which makes the method 
irreducible to a set of logical rules. This issue is also closely related with understanding 
the process of change which will be discussed in the next section through the concept 
of essence.   
1.2.3. Essence and the process of change 
As capitalism is a dynamic system, its nature is best understood with concepts that are 
sufficient to reflect and discuss change. It was argued in the previous section that 
Marxist methodology is interested in examining consciousness not fixed in the form of 
knowledge, but also in its expanded manifestations. This allows it to move from 
mirroring reality towards reconstructing reality in thought. Such process also represents 
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a movement from a static reflection of reality towards a dynamic reconstruction where 
things are not only represented in their present state, but in continuous change, i.e. in 
their becoming. This is a distinctive feature of Marxist methodology that has important 
implications for the development of theory and research design and is a direct 
implication of the dialectical as opposed to the formal logic employed.  
As Ollman (2003, p. 64) points out by quoting James Coleman (1968), there is an 
interesting status of the concept of change within formal logic: 
The concept of change in science is a special one… It is based on a comparison, 
or difference between two sense impressions, and simultaneously a comparison 
of the times at which the sense impressions occurred. 
That is because due to the principle of contradiction in formal logic, “the concept of 
change must, as any concept, itself reflect a state of an object at a point in time.” This 
indicates, change can only be conceptualised as more or less static comparisons between 
two different states of objects/conditions reflected at two different points in time. 
Because the theory is not interested in the process of change itself, change becomes a 
matter of empirical observation, which can only be examined after one 
object/condition has turned into another object/condition. This is also the method of 
examining change in contemporary mainstream economics. Because the logical schema 
does not allow the incorporation of the process of change as the beginning of a thing in 
consciousness, the real world that is always changing is represented with some facts 
external to the theory against which the theory can be tested for validity. This is 
observed for example the division of variables in economics into those that are 
exogenous and endogenous the latter being determined by the former (Milonakis & 
Fine, 2009). While the explanation is done through the help of external factors 
(exogenous), exogenous factors themselves stay unexplained by the theory.  
Marx’s analysis, however, is interested in the actual process of change itself. There is a 
systemic priority of movement over moment, as things do not simply exist and undergo 
change, but the transient movements are also part of their nature not less than their 
momentary existence (Ollman, 2003). This makes the theory adequate for grasping not 
only what things are, but also how things are changing and what they are changing into 
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(i.e their becoming things). Marx’s most important main abstractions about capitalism 
such as value, commodity, capital etc. incorporate processes (as well as relations) in 
themselves as part of their intrinsic nature. This is to suggest that things are presented in 
their organic continuation between as well as through their past, present and future 
states. For example, capital is in itself a process and relation. This indicates that capital 
is not an empty concept to be filled with empirical observation, but rather the path in 
which capital became (i.e. how it emerged historically as well as logically) is also a part 
of the concept of capital itself. This point will be further elaborated with a discussion of 
essence and how Marxist methodology is based upon the usage of abstraction with the 
help of such essence.  
Briefly, it is possible to talk about different ways of abstractions, the most common 
being the abstraction on the basis of common empirical attributes. In this way of 
abstraction, the observer/theorist creates a subjective structure of categorisation 
depending on the attributes of his/her choice. Economic categories such as 
employment, supply, trade are based on such method of abstraction. For Marx, the 
purpose of abstraction is not to categorise empirically common attributes, but rather to 
find the actual source of movement of things on the basis of their essence with both 
logical and historical determinations. It means, the structure of categorisation does not 
only exist in the mind of the theorist based on a conceptual derivation. It depends on 
real abstraction reconstructing reality in thought (i.e. disclose concrete universals) on the 
basis of their essence.  
In general, essence can be described as the most general feature of the particulars. The 
definition of general is important, as it does not refer to most common or observable 
feature, but rather the feature that determines the particulars both logically and 
historically. It is logical, as it allows for the reconstruction of the concrete particulars as 
a totality in thought. For Reuten (2003, p. 43), essence is fundamentally logical as it is 
“the interconnection of all the moments necessary for the reproduction of the object of 
inquiry.”  
It is also historical, as it is the actual source from which all particulars emerge. The 
essence appears as a single particular with a tendency to become general and develops 
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from itself (Ilyenkov, 1977, p. 232). It means, essence does not exist separately devoid 
of any form which is then later manifested in other particulars as a form. It always exists 
with a form, form being the mode of existence rather than the manifestation of essence 
(Saad-Filho, 2002). To give an example, in Marx’s analysis of capitalism, abstract labour 
is the essence of value. Does the generality of essence mean that abstract labour refers 
to the existence of human labour in all exchange relations? In the real world, labour 
always exists with a form, as concrete labour such as wall painting, tailoring, mining and 
so on. If we abstract from these concrete labours, we end up with a type of abstract 
labour that is a common element in all labours, which is the capacity to work, labour 
devoid of any form. However, although such abstraction is the first step for 
determining the essence, it is incomplete in the sense that it is ahistorical hence is not 
sufficient to explain why the abstract labour is the essence of value which is exclusive to 
capitalism. Abstract labour is also historical in the sense that it is also where value 
actually comes from. As Saad-Filho (2002, p. 12) argues, 
The claim that abstract labour is the substance of value is based upon three 
premises. First […] labour is a transhistorical condition for social and economic 
reproduction. Second, abstract labour is the typically capitalist form of labour, 
and it predominates over concrete labour. Third, value (or commodity) relations 
are the general form of human intercourse under capitalism, and in this mode of 
production value relations mediate social and economic reproduction. 
Capitalism developed historically through the generalisation of value relations, 
among them the monopoly of the means of production by a class of capitalists, 
the diffusion of commodity production through wage labour, the growth of 
commodity exchange, and the subordination of production by the profit motive. 
These value relations have established historically the predominance of abstract 
labour; conversely, the diffusion of abstract labour reinforces the 
commodification of human relations and production for profit. 
This paragraph summarizes how Marx’s analysis can develop through the determination 
of the essence. Because capitalism developed historically in the way of subordinating 
individual production to the profit motive through the emergence of wage labour and 
commodity production by capitalists, abstract labour has emerged as an essence with a 
tendency to develop from itself, self-expand, leading towards further dominance of 
abstract labour over concrete labours. Because essence is historical as well as logical, it 
emerges at a certain historical time, determining the particulars coming after itself. This 
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reflects the passage of historical time from past to present and future not as an 
empirical observation external to the theory, but within the theory itself. Upon this 
principle, the relationship between future and present can be conceptualised as different 
from the relationship between present and past, making the analysis dynamic, which is a 
crucial aspect of Marxist methodology that is absent in the case of static analyses (Fine, 
1982b).  
So far, this chapter provided some methodological guidelines for a general 
understanding of Marx’s theory concerning the general laws of motion of history which 
are not specific to capitalism as a particular mode of production. The next section will 
discuss the laws of motion that are specific to capitalism on the basis of tendencies and 
counter-tendencies.   
1.2.4. Levels of abstraction: tendencies and counter-tendencies  
What the previous sections attempted to clarify is the fact that Marxist methodology is 
not based upon pure conceptual development in which each time a more refined and 
complex concept introduced for the same phenomena, earlier simple ones are replaced. 
On the contrary, simple and complex concepts referring to same phenomena necessarily 
exist alongside each other in Marxist analysis. In fact, the direction of movement is 
determined by the interaction of corresponding forces operating simultaneously at 
different levels of abstraction.  
In the context of the capitalist economy, the world economy is considered to be a pre-
given whole, constituted by the coincidence of production, exchange and distribution as 
the different moments of the same whole. Although all moments are essential, 
production is accepted to be more determining. From the practical side of things, this 
can be explained by production being a pre-condition for moments of exchange and 
distribution. At a deeper level, the primacy of productive forces and relations in human 
development play a role. On the basis of this, the capitalist economy is defined by the 
continual production and appropriation of value through the cycle of production, 
exchange and distribution. Referring back to wider methodological issues discussed in 
the previous section, value is accepted as a concrete universal based on the essence of 
abstract labour. It means that it is an integrated, self-expanding system. Marx shows 
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value as self-expansion with the circuit of capital (M-C-M’) where money value in the 
beginning of the production process produces some surplus value and comes out of the 
production process as more money value. Marx’s analysis in Capital is interested in 
reconstructing such reality at increasingly more concrete and complex levels.  
While the entirety of all relationships of value are always context-specific, and as such 
irreducible to systemic level analysis, there are some structural forces determined by the 
relationships that are systemic at certain levels of abstraction. In principle, while a 
relationship that is most abstract, stemming from production and affecting the whole 
system is referred as a tendency (such as the law of the tendency of profits to fall), other 
structural relationships that work in opposition to tendencies at more concrete and 
complex levels are called counter-tendencies (all phenomena in exchange and 
distribution). The structure of abstraction allows for the system to be analysed not as a 
mere aggregation but as a totality in which what holds true from the view of individual 
capitalist does not hold from the view of all capitalists in competition, not only as an 
empirical observation, but as a theoretical necessity. Carchedi (2008) differentiates three 
types of tendencies in which a tendency can either dominate and operate at all times, 
operate cyclically or cannot dominate at all. This thesis is based on the notion that the 
tendencies and counter-tendencies operate simultaneously at all times, irrespective of 
what is observed empirically. Tendencies and counter-tendencies always interact with 
each other, but not at the expense of each other. There are also empirical contingencies 
interacting with the tendencies and counter-tendencies.6 
For example, although a contested topic of which discussion requires a much wider 
space than this, the law of the tendency of law of profits to fall can be shown as an 
example for a systemic level tendency. It concerns the production of value, implying 
that given competition and exchange, labour is continuously replaced with machinery, 
organic composition of capital rises for the overall level of economy leading to a fall in 
the profits. This seems to be in contradiction with the more concrete analyses of value, 
where the replacement of labour with machinery leads an increase in the profit rates 
because technological advancement decreases the unit production costs, given that 
                                                 
6 As Fracchia and Ryan (1992) suggest, a contingency possesses truth by virtue of its historical reality, 
hence is not simply an ‘error’ that is left behind unexplained by the abstract conceptual analysis 
(cited in Saad-Filho, 2002, p.117). 
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profits are determined by the total size of the capital regardless of its composition. This 
issue needs further elaboration as it relates directly to the changing interpretations of 
value at different levels of analysis.  
As pointed out by many, there are two different approaches to value in Marx. While the 
first can be named as the embedded (simple) labour approach, the second can be 
referred to as the reproduction (real cost) approach (Saad-Filho, 1997). In the simple 
labour approach, value is referred as the total abstract labour embodied in the 
commodity, including the past labours of inputs. In the reproduction approach, value is 
measured by the labour time necessary to reproduce the commodity, in other words, 
real costs of production in value terms. For Perelman (1999), rather than being 
confusion, both definitions hold true and the difference between them represents an 
important shift in the analysis from static to dynamic interpretation of value, although 
the differentiation between the two is not limited to this. Perelman (1999) argues that in 
the first chapters of Volume I of Capital, Marx assumes a simple reproduction scheme 
for the economy, meaning a static, or at least proportionally expanding economy with 
all inputs retaining their initial characteristics. This has important implications for the 
interpretation of value analysis as a whole, as in the static case, the commodities are 
assumed to exchange at prices proportional to their underlying labour values. In the 
case of simple values, value measurement takes place presuming that we can measure 
the previous inputs of abstract labour and calculate the transfer from inputs to outputs 
occurs irrespective of the depreciation of the capital goods. For example, if a machine 
lasts ten years, we can assume that one-tenth of its embodied value is transferred to 
commodities produced in a given year (Perelman, 1999). 
Later, the analysis necessarily moves towards expanded production, where the economy 
is growing exponentially with the help of technical innovation in production, and this 
move is also represented by the shift in the definition of value from simple values to 
reproduction values (although Perelman notes that Marx introduces reproduction values 
even before his dynamic analysis). In the case of a dynamic economy with technical 
change, the impact of new technology also has an impact on input values, their real 
costs reflecting not their underlying embodied labour times, but rather their current 
reproduction in value terms. This introduces certain complications to the analysis, 
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leading some to reject the existence of objective values altogether as it is not possible to 
know the real costs of inputs in terms of their reproduction values in the present period 
and the capitalists can only know the costs of capital goods at the time they are 
purchased.  
It is important to note that the difference between these two definitions of value is not 
simply a shift from static simple reproduction to expanded reproduction but a necessary 
interpretation of value at distinct levels of abstraction due to the requirement of the 
subject matter at hand. As widely known, while the analysis moves from the pre-
occupation with production in Volume I of Capital towards exchange and distribution 
in Volume II and III, the analysis gets more concrete because production and exchange 
and distribution are accepted as integral moments of a totality, situated at different 
levels of abstraction. At the most abstract level of production, the circuit of capital can 
be referred to in general, abstracted from the different individual capitals competing in 
exchange. At such an abstract level, the primary relation is the one between capital and 
labour, therefore it is possible to talk about the existence of simple, embodied values as 
labour is abstracted from the individual concrete labours. 7 Distinct from labour and 
capital’s share from the revenues as wages and profits, the relationship between the two 
at this level refers to a qualitative relationship where values are socially produced as a 
whole by labour through exploitation, surplus value is accumulated and capital relation 
is reproduced.  
At a more concrete level, it is shown that how such accumulation and reproduction is 
sustained through the intervention of money and competition. In Volume II, exchange 
issues are discussed to show how economic reproduction is simultaneously a balance 
between value magnitudes and a balance between use values across the sectors of means 
of production and means of consumption (Fine & Milonakis, 2009, p. 64). While the 
primary relation between capital and labour disrupts the balance towards a single 
production process, the balance between value magnitudes and use values is maintained 
                                                 
7 For the process of abstraction of labour from concrete labours, see Saad-Filho (1997). It takes 
place through the processes of normalisation, synchronisation and homogenisation. Individual 
concrete labours are first normalised across those producing the same commodity. Second, they are 
synchronised across those produced the same commodity in the past or with different technologies. 




through the social capacity of use values to command money through exchange on this 
level. Volume III moves on to the analysis of distribution and how surplus value takes 
the form of profits, wages and rent in total distribution of income. In exchange and 
distribution then, value relation moves away from the primary division between capital 
and labour while the exchange and distribution relations obscure this relationship, and 
capital exists as the sum of individual capitals in competition. The existence of 
individual capitals produced by individual concrete labours means that values also do 
exist not independently, but rather as a part of the social whole. This is also why the 
‘transformation’ process of values into prices of production takes place – to refer to 
individual firm or sectoral level values (prices of production) as distinct from social 
aggregate values. Counter-tendencies exist at this level of capitals in competition 
working in contradiction with the tendencies. In principle, tendencies are more 
determining than the counter-tendencies as they are more abstract and the product of 
the system in general.  
Within this context, it can be argued that the LTRPF operates at the level of capital in 
general and is concerned with the mass of surplus value produced and whether it can be 
accumulated through time. Briefly summarised, first there is the consideration that 
technical progress leads to the replacement of labour with capital goods and the ratio of 
constant capital to variable capital (c/v) in value terms increases over time. 8  This 
indicates as accumulation proceeds, less total surplus value is produced and embedded 
in the commodities, leading to a fall in the profits.  
At the level of capitals in competition, however, the intervention of money points out 
to the consideration of a different dynamic. At this level, there is tendency for capital to 
be equally rewarded according to the size of capital advanced, while productivity levels 
vary according to the level of technical progress in each sector. The incompatibility 
between these is mediated through the movement of capital in and out of sectors with 
the help of the money and credit system, allowing prices of production to be established 
for profitability to move towards equalisation. In that regard, prices of production as 
dynamic individual reproduction values systematically diverge from simple, embedded 
values. As an empirical reality, in the capitalist mode of production, capitalists receive an 
                                                 
8 See Saad-Filho (2002) and Fine & Saad-Filho (2010). 
47 
 
average rate of profit regardless of the ratio of constant to variable capital. Average 
prices (capitalist prices of production) systematically diverge from values as a result of 
the way value is produced (by wage labour) and is distributed (according to the capital 
advanced) which is made possible by the free mobility of capital and labour between 
sectors and occupations as while capital moves from less profitable to more profitable 
sectors, labour moves from less productive to more productive sectors (Milonakis, 
1995). 
This aspect of the theory has led to many criticisms including the famous critique of 
Okishio for example, where he shows that given Marx’s interpretation of dynamic 
reproduction values as prices of production, unlike what is suggested by the LTRPF, the 
introduction of new techniques will actually lead profit rates to go up as the unit cost of 
output will decrease. From the perspective of the simultaneous movement of tendencies 
and counter-tendencies, however, while the Okishio critique focuses on the effects of 
the introduction of the new techniques on unit costs and profit rates, it ignores that unit 
costs are necessarily reduced by replacing people with more productive machines, which 
is of primary importance for the sustainability of accumulation (Fine, 1982b, p. 119). 
Decreasing unit costs and decreasing production of the surplus value go hand in hand 
and the focus of the analysis concerning LTRPF is not to determine whether profits 
actually fall after the interaction of the law as such and the counteracting tendencies, but 
rather to find out whether these two influences can continue to co-exist as 
accumulation proceeds.  
The analysis is, therefore, interested in these double aspects of capital accumulation, 
which is both productivity-enhancing and labour-reducing in a self-disruptive manner 
that could be sustained through the systematic expansion of the capital relation towards 
new areas of social life. 9  Capitalism tends to expand the realm of commodity 
production so that the capital relation can afford the expansion of each tendency. This 
is sustained by the stock for accumulation made available by the concentration of 
capital ownership either through the reinvestment of profits, or through the merging of 
capitals, which is called as centralisation. Surely, this is a simplistic summary of the 
                                                 
9 This will be explained more in detail in the section on the systems of provision approach in the 
second half of this chapter and its relation to financialisation in Chapter 2.  
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extensive debates surrounding the transformation problem and the related issues, but it 
is included to emphasise how the tendencies and counter-tendencies refer to the 
changing interpretations of the value relations according to different levels of 
abstraction. Because the causal structure is designed in conjunction with the levels of 
abstraction in Marxist analysis, the abstract structure itself is explanatory in terms of 
giving an idea about the possible movements of value for each category of capitalist 
economy, with respect to the corresponding location of the concept within a layered 
formation.  
Let us consider the same issue from the angle of labour in order to determine the 
movements within the category of employment, for example. As summarised above, the 
most abstract level is the level of production where the relations of value are primarily 
concerned with the division between capital and labour and its reproduction. The 
tendency for aggregate division of labour then involves the reproduction of this relation 
towards the movement of individual productions towards a single production process 
reducing the minimum necessary labour time required for the reproduction of the 
aggregate relationship, at the expense of the social division of labour within the 
production process.  
The counter-tendency, on the other hand, takes the competition between individual 
capitalists into account within an existing labour process. Therefore, the social division 
of labour concerns the development of distinct production methods with varying 
productivity levels as a result of the competition to reduce the necessary labour time to 
produce certain commodities compared to rivals. Specialisation and co-operation of 
labour are among these methods contributing to the productivity levels within the 
workplace. Then, the observation of tendencies and counter-tendencies in the context 
of employment implies that while the former is directed towards de-skilling of the 
labour and the creation of more simple jobs, the latter is concerned with the increasing 
specialisation, co-operation of labour within the production process that results in the 
increased requirement for skilled labour. Because the expansion of the capital relation is 
at the same time labour-reducing and productivity-enhancing, each has different 
implications for the category of employment.  
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A Marxian analysis of employment is therefore, again, not concerned primarily with the 
development of one tendency over another, but rather with the compatibility of these 
two tendencies together through the self-expansion of capital relation. This is only 
accomplished through the simultaneous existence of simple, abstract concepts along 
with more complex and concrete ones within the theory itself as an important feature of 
Marx’s methodology. The next section will discuss tendencies and counter-tendencies in 
the context of value of labour power, which is a concept that has a primary importance 
for the purposes of this thesis.  
1.2.5. The value of labour power  
As with other commodities, this value [of labour power] was then further determined by the cost 
of production. But what is the cost of production …of the worker, i.e. the cost of producing or 
reproducing the worker himself? This question unconsciously substituted itself in Political 
Economy for the original one; for the search after the cost of production of labour as such turned 
in a circle and never left the spot. What economists therefore call value of labour, is in fact the 
value of labour-power, as it exists in the personality of the worker, which is as different from its 
function, labour, as a machine is from the work it performs. (Marx, 1981, p. 678) 
In his analysis of capitalist production, Marx distinguished between labour power as a 
commodity, which is the capacity of labourers to produce, and the labour activity itself 
as the actual act of producing certain commodities during a production process. Such 
differentiation is of crucial importance for the whole structure of the analysis and the 
theory of exploitation, as the usage of labour power as a commodity is actually where 
surplus value comes from, due to the non-corresponding relationship between the 
payment made for the commodity of labour power at the beginning of the production 
process and the actual value produced by the labour by the end of it. Therefore, the 
definition of the value of labour power distinct from the act of labour is an important 
issue for Marx with many important and direct implications, for example for the theory 
of exploitation. Its determination, however, has been subject to debate as with many 
other concepts in Marxist political economy.  
Broadly, there are two distinct ways of determining the value of labour power. The first 
is the product of the classical approach to the labour theory of value, where labour 
values are assumed to be proportional to embodied labour times in commodities. Hence, 
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the value of labour power is also determined by the labour time embodied in the 
commodity of labour power itself, which is equal to the total labour time embodied in 
the use values that are necessary for the reproduction of the labourer, such as clothing, 
food, shelter and so on (fixed bundle approach). In some later interpretations, where 
values are not necessarily accepted as proportional to embodied labour, but rather as the 
aggregate monetary equivalence to reproduce the commodities, value of labour power is 
determined differently. For example, see the definition of value of labour power from 
Foley (1986, pp. 35–36) below: 
The capitalist buys the worker’s capacity to produce for a certain sum of money 
– the wage, which is the price of labour power. […] Money is a form of value; 
thus we can regard the money paid in wages as the equivalent of a part of the 
social labour time expended by the society. The value of labour power in this 
sense is the labour time equivalent of the wage: w* = mw 
where w* is the value of labour-power, the number of hours of social labour a 
worker receives in exchange for an hour of his labour-power; m is the value of 
money;10 and w is the money wage, the amount of money the worker receives 
for an hour of labour-power.  
In this interpretation, the value of labour power is not determined through the 
embodied labour in the commodities consumed by labourers, but rather through the 
monetary equivalence of such value, which is represented by the workers’ wages given 
its unit value component in money. Developed by Foley (1982, 1986) and Duménil 
(1983) simultaneously, this approach to labour theory of value has been named as New 
Interpretation (NI) that has been prominent among many other scholars including Mohun 
(1994), Lipietz (1982), Moseley (2015), who also adopted approaches along similar lines 
with the NI - despite some differences especially with respect to the treatment of 
constant and variable capital, as Moseley (2015) argues.  
The core argument of the NI is that given the value of money as monetary expression 
of total labour time performed within a certain production process, and given the value 
                                                 
10 The value of money (also represented by λm or MEL) is the quantity of labour represented by one 
unit of money – the standard of price that translates a certain amount of money commodity into 
monetary units (Foley, 1986, p. 25). In other words, the value of money is ‘the ratio of the net 
domestic product at current prices to the living productive labour expended in an economy over a 
period of time’ (Foley, 1986). 
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of labour power as money wages in value terms, Marx's labour theory of value can be 
summarised as “the expenditure of living labour in production adds money value to the 
inputs in production’ because money value of the net output equals total living labour 
following the aggregate equality between total profits and total surplus value”.11 The NI 
accepts that because money can be used an immediate expression of abstract labour, the 
economy can be conceptualised as a ‘single system’, where values and prices do not 
exist as two different sets of relations, but rather as a single price system governed by 
the values. In Foley and Duménil’s (2008, p. 5) own words:  
[I]n the traditional approaches, two sets of prices are considered, one 
proportional to values (embodied labour times), and the other equalizing profit 
rates (a dual system), when only one price system prevails in real-world 
capitalism (a single system).  
This new definition to the value of labour power is also accepted to bring a ‘solution’ to 
the famous transformation problem between the values and prices of production by 
introducing a single system. In this single system, transformation procedure seems to be 
unnecessary, because the purpose of simple value analysis is assigned as the aggregate 
determination of the level of exploitation, to be replaced in more concrete analyses with 
a more refined value analysis (prices of production).  
The NI has certain important implications for the value theory, concerning the issues 
mentioned above: aggregate determinations such as exploitation as well as the 
relationship between values and prices. This chapter cannot provide a detailed treatment 
of NI, as it is only interested in its definition of the value of labour power, although this 
definition is in direct relationship with its treatment of other issues mentioned.12 The 
NI approach to the value of labour power could be named as the value form approach, 
which is in direct opposition with the fixed bundle interpretation. The value form 
approach introduces an ex-post identification of the workers’ share of wages from 
income with the value of labour power, after the production takes place and income is 
                                                 
11 Following from that, “the paid and unpaid portions of the total expended labour are definitionally 
equal to the wage and gross profit share in the net domestic product. As a result, the rate of 
exploitation measured as the ratio of the gross profit share in national income to the wage share in 
national income coincides with the corresponding ratio expressed in labour-time equivalents.” (Foley, 
1986, p. 19) 
12 See Fine et al. (2004) and Moseley (2000) for a detailed critique of NI.  
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distributed. This is different from the fixed bundle approach where the value of labour 
power is determined ex-ante by the total quantity of the labour values in the 
commodities necessary for the survival of the labourers. Obviously, these are very 
different conceptualisations of which implications are sharply revealed, for example, in 
the relation between the value of labour power and productivity increase (Fine, 
Lapavitsas, & Saad-Filho, 2004). In the fixed bundle case, if the value of labour power 
as a bundle of use values remains unchanged, increased productivity means the value of 
labour power decreases, because production of the bundle is less costly. On the other 
hand, money wages approach indicates that as the productivity increases, the value of 
labour power increases as the money wages can command more (cheaper) use values.  
Based upon the methodological preoccupations summarised so far, this chapter argues 
that the value of the labour power is both determined by the commodities consumed as 
well as the money wages at distinct levels of abstraction. From the perspective of 
tendencies and counter-tendencies, the contradictory implications of both 
determinations of the value of labour power implies a tendency to reduce the value of 
labour power by cheapening of the products (less value embedded) and the counter-
tendency that enables workers to buy more subsistence goods with their money wages. 
The value of labour power is a simple abstract concept, a quantity of value, of which 
determinations as a quantity of fixed bundle of goods or a quantity of money is not 
direct, but rather mediated through the relationship between values and prices.  
Conceptualised in this way, the value of labour power is not only concerned with how 
much workers get, but also how and what they get with their money wages. As a 
quantity, the value of labour power is determined at the beginning of each production 
process, concerning not only the shifting balance of forces between capital and labour, 
but also the relation of money wages to economic and social reproduction, of which the 
customary standard of living is one component (Fine et al., 2004). This issue is absent in 
the value form approach as the value represented by wages bears no relation to the 
value of the commodities consumed, given that prices and values diverge from one 
another. The customary standard of living is referred to in the fixed bundle approach, 
emphasising the role of moral and historical elements in the determination of the value 
of labour power, implying that the standard of workers’ sustainability is not entirely 
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capitalistically determined. The impact of moral and historical elements could be 
possibly seen for example in the impacts of the extent of domestic labour through 
family and kinship relations on social and economic reproduction, or, and increasingly, 
state provision. This refers to a use value analysis for the value of labour power, which 
is the indispensable half of an analysis of capitalist accumulation that concerns a 
simultaneous production of use values and values, while the former being subordinated 
by the latter as the accumulation proceeds. The next section will discuss systems of 
provision approach to the value of labour power to discuss these issues in greater detail.  
 1.2.6. The systems of provision (sop) approach to social reproduction  
The systems of provision approach to social reproduction was first developed by Fine 
and Leopold (1993) in The World of Consumption, to provide an alternative to 
consumption studies which was an emerging field of research during the period. Its 
approach to consumption is concerned with the dynamics of the capitalist accumulation 
summarised above, which involves a simultaneous production of use values and values. 
In that sense, it is used in this thesis to understand the composition of the value of 
labour power through the consumption of provision goods as use values, as well as to 
investigate the value relations in and around these sectors.  Although this may sound 
like an entirely theoretical preoccupation, as Weeks (1983, pp. 219-220) suggests, there 
is a very practical side to this exploration:  
The process of reproduction in capitalist economy is the circuit of capital. 
Fundamental to understanding of this circuit is the two-fold nature of 
commodities, for the reproduction involves both the reproduction of value 
relations and the reproduction of material wealth. That is, capital must be 
reproduced both in money form and material form. On the material side, labour-
power and means of production must be reunited in each successive circuit. On 
the value side, capital turns into money in order that it be exchanged against use 
values and assume its productive role. Marx’s analysis of circulation was precisely 
the study of this opposition and interaction of the abstract (value) and concrete 
(use value). This approach is not an obscure theoretical one, but a quite practical 
one: since value must have a material form (be objectified in a commodity), the 
real nature of circulation requires that we consider both the circulation of value 
and circulation of use values. 
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Therefore, the systems of provision approach is concerned with the ways in which this 
double circulation occurs, which is neither addressed by value form nor by the fixed 
bundle approach to the value of labour power. If the value of labour power is solely 
determined by the money wages, the analysis of the extent to which sustainability is 
determined through non-market elements is lost. In the fixed bundle approach, this is 
referred as the moral and historical element in workers’ sustainability implying that it is 
not entirely capitalistically determined, and how each good is produced and consumed 
differentially within and across different countries is determining in setting the 
standards for use value production. In other words, whether these goods are provided 
by the state, within the family or through the market, will determine what workers buy 
with their money wages to sustain themselves.  
In approaching the value of labour power, then, the issue is not only how much 
workers can consume on average, but also with the determination of final consumption 
standards that differs within and across different income groups as well as countries. 
From the perspective of tendencies and counter-tendencies, the process of the 
emergence of consumption standards for wage goods is in direct relations with the 
value relation, in line with the accumulation process itself, suggesting while certain 
customary consumption norms are left out by a single production process, new norms 
are continually established as production processes also move towards increased 
specialisation and refinement of the final consumption products. In other words, while 
value production processes lead towards the homogenisation of the production of 
different use values as commodities, such as housing and electricity analysed in this 
thesis, this process is far from linear as different customary standards for the 
consumption of use values will also emerge due to individualised consumption patterns. 
Weeks (1979, p. 278) explains this phenomenon as following:  
Accumulation is a process of qualitative change, in which the means of 
production are revolutionized and capital is redistributed. In the earliest 
moments of expansionary process, individual capitals cannot attract labour 
power at more or less constant wages, because of the size of the reserve army. 
But as the reserve army contracts, rising wages become the mechanism by which 
the existing labour power is redistributed (centralized) toward more effective 
capitals. In a capitalist economy, based as it is on free wage labour, rising wages 
are the only mechanism available to capital to make the division of society’s 
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labour power among branches of industry conform to the changing pattern of 
production within and between branches of industry. To effect this 
redistribution, rising wages must accompany the rapid expansion of capital. This 
reflects the unique role of the means of subsistence under capitalism. Under 
feudalism, the subsistence needs of the masses are merely the means by which 
labour power is reproduced. Under capitalism, subsistence needs take the wage 
form and serve not only to reproduce labour power, but also to regulate its 
social division. 
In other words, it suggests that how subsistence needs are satisfied under capitalism 
does not refer to an arbitrary process, but is itself a direct result of how the value of 
labour power is reproduced as a commodity, which also regulates its social division in 
the abstract. This is not to suggest a total subordination of consumption by production. 
On the contrary, it refers to how final consumption is increasingly removed from the 
consumption of means of production in capitalist mode of production, proportional to 
the extent that living labour is expelled from the production process.  
This point requires further elaboration, as it refers to one of the most distinguishing 
characteristics of capitalist commodity production from other modes of simple 
commodity production. Under the capitalist mode of production, there is a distinction 
between the production of means of production and the production of the value of 
labour power, as while the former is incorporated within the value relation, the latter is 
left for the workers’ final consumption. For Fine and Leopold (1993), this refers not 
only to a qualitative, but also a quantitative difference, as the buying and selling of 
means of production tend to dominate the process of circulation quantitatively, even if 
the majority of net income is consumed through wages. More significantly, this is only 
satisfied because: 
Final consumption involves the exit of its value from continuing circulation, its 
role is no longer defined by the internal logic of capital and its laws. Instead, it 
has a simple an undifferentiated relation to economic agents as purchasers. (Fine 
& Leopold, 1993, p. 262). 
This indicates, unlike other modes of production, such as feudalism in which the 
reproduction of labour power has to be maintained through the ruling class’ direct 
expenditure and as such not differentiated from the production of means of production, 
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under capitalism, no stereotypical pattern of final consumption is guaranteed, giving rise 
to increased differentiation of consumption standards, while the value of labour power 
is reduced through the intensified use of machinery in the production of these 
commodities.  
 Meanwhile, the extent of the discrepancy between these two simultaneous processes is 
proportional to the social division of labour as the accumulation proceeds. There are 
two aspects to this distribution: first capital flows to branches where the rate of profit is 
higher, and second, centralisation proper removes the labour from low-wage capitals 
(Weeks, 1979).  
On the basis of these, the systems of provision approach to social reproduction has two 
underlying theoretical premises. First, in line with the widening discrepancy between the 
production of use values and values, and the domination of the latter over the former, 
final consumption and productive consumption become more distinct, the former being 
increasingly individualised. Second, although the increasing scope of value relations 
leads to an inversion of the logic of value and define exchange relations for 
consumption purely as horizontal relations between use values -“x of commodity X 
exchanges for y of commodity Y” (Fine & Leopold, 1993, p. 266)- they also embody 
the underlining productive determinants together with the cultural and historical norms 
which governs who consumes what. In other words, the specific sectoral developments 
such as the levels of technical progress as well as wider national development 
trajectories will be determining for the analysis of individual wage goods.  
In light of these considerations, this thesis adopts a systems of provision approach to 
social reproduction; first, in order to understand how specific use values of electricity 
and housing is produced and consumed in Turkey. As suggested, this aspect is 
concerned with heterogeneous production processes and hence should be analysed 
accordingly, reflecting the specific characteristics of each good as well as country 
(namely, taking the moral and historical elements into account in determining the value 
of labour power). Second, however, use value production also refers to a value 
production process, the implications and dynamics of which can be used to understand 
wider processes in and around provision goods. The value implications might be 
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relevant, for example, the literature on financialisation that examines the destabilising 
impacts of the rising asset price inflation in financial markets in close affinity with the 
usage of such assets as a source of wealth by the households due to an individualised 
private consumption culture around housing, pension funds and so on (Toporowski, 
2000, 2009). The individualised private consumption culture is also relevant for the 
increasing levels of consumption indebtedness, irrespective of alternative views on the 
possible impacts of such increasing consumer debt levels (Barba & Pivetti, 2009; 
Lapavitsas, 2013). More importantly, it refers to how an intensified commodification of 
wage goods, reinforced by financialisation, reduces the value embedded in the wage 
commodities, hence the value of labour power in the abstract.  
In that sense, the systems of provision approach to electricity and housing in Turkey is 
also interested in identifying a common underlying causal factor in the production of 
these goods, which is the transition towards market-based provision forms alongside 
increasing differentiation in the ways in which such transition occurs. This is relevant 
for a transition to a financialised accumulation pattern, as the regular revenues on the 
basis of the existence of a broad base of customers might lead to increased financial 
gains and an emergence of secondary circuits of capital, depending on the availability of 
credit, specific consumption culture as well as how the sectors function in general, with 
respect to the improvements in productive investment together with technical progress 
and/or economies of scale. The next chapter will provide literature survey for 
financialisation in order to connect these wide ranging issues through the dominant 
literature on the issues relating to the latter aim of the thesis, described above.  
1.3. Conclusion 
This chapter provided a general introduction for the thesis, against a background of 
study and the identification of problematic issues in the existing literature. As explained, 
the thesis does not challenge the findings of the existing literature on financialisation, 
instead, it offers a deeper perspective that incorporates issues that have not been 
addressed by the literature directly, but is a result of an understanding that connects the 
concept of financialisation to the grand theories of capitalist accumulation, in line with 
the methodological principles of Marxist political economy. More specifically, it shifts 
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the attention away from the impacts of financialisation on aggregate categories of 
circulation such as investment, wage/profit share etc, towards a more direct 
investigation of capitalist accumulation as the simultaneous production of use values 
and values in general, and the production of the commodity of labour power both as a 
use value and value in particular, through an empirical investigation of electricity and 
housing systems in Turkey.  
There are two reasons for the particular choice of the commodities electricity and 
housing in Turkey. The first is contingent, as the fast development of the construction 
and energy sectors since the 2000s have been determining for the overall pattern of 
accumulation, as mentioned. Second, and from a more theoretical perspective, as these 
commodities constitute the value of labour power (necessary for the labourers’ survival) 
in light of the considerations above, their investigation across the chain of activities 
from production to final consumption directly refers to how the value of labour power 
is determined specifically, in line with the cultural and historical practices, but also 
reflecting the overall development trajectories of the particular economies. It is argued 
that the final consumption goods are increasingly produced as commodities as the 
accumulation proceeds, referring to a lowering of the value of labour power in the 
abstract. This argument is explained through a methodological discussion on the 
different conceptualisations of the value of labour power in general, and the 
conceptualisation of the systems of provision approach in particular. In that sense, the 
increasing commodification goes hand-in-hand with increased differentiation of 
consumption patterns, far from suggesting a uniformed process across and within 
countries, income groups and different wage goods.  
This discussion so far does not specifically address the process of financialisation, 
defined as the intensified restructuring of interest-bearing capital. Nevertheless, a 
financialised accumulation pattern also has further impacts on the value of labour 
power, by attaching the circuits of interest-bearing capital to the provision sectors and 
reducing the value embedded in these commodities. After providing a general literature 
survey on financialisation, the next chapter will discuss how the commodification of 
wage goods is reinforcing for such process through extending the base of circuits of 
interest-bearing capital.   
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Chapter 2                                                                                                   
A Literature Survey on Financialisation 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter explores the concept of financialisation with the help of an inter-
disciplinary literature survey covering the contributions from urban sociology, 
geography and primarily heterodox schools of thought within economics, namely 
contributions from French Regulation School, Post-Keynesian, New-Keynesian and 
Kaleckian economics as well as Marxist political economy. After a brief discussion of 
the selected theoretical views on financialisation, it gives its own definition as the 
increasing presence of interest-bearing capital as the material base of the current phase 
of capitalism, based on the methodological principles outlined in the previous chapter. 
Then, it moves the analysis to its investigation in developing and emerging countries, to 
be discussed in the following chapter.  
The literature on financialisation is extensive and the most widely accepted broad 
definition has come from Epstein (2005), as “the increasing role of financial motives, 
financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the 
domestic and international economies.” Such increasing role of finance has been 
documented and measured in different ways primarily using US data; such as the 
steadily increasing share of the financial sector’s fixed investment as a share of GDP, 
stock market capitalisation as a proportion of GDP, financial sector profits as a 
percentage of GDP, total debt to GDP, dividends as a proportion of total profits for 
non-financial companies etc. For example, Palley (2013) finds the US financial sector’s 
(including finance, insurance and real estate) output as a share of GDP increased from 
15 per cent in 1973 to 20.4 per cent in 2005. During the same period, the financial 
sector’s debt to total debt increased from 9.7 per cent to 31.5 per cent, while total credit 
as a share of GDP also increased three times.  
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The literature is however, more interested in the impacts of these on the workings of 
the economy than the secular expansion of the financial sector itself and the 
corresponding proliferation of financial activities and assets. According to the literature, 
the most evident of these impacts is the decreasing of productive investment due to the 
crowding-out of available funds for investment and increased availability for financial 
profits.  As Palley (2013) notes along with the developments within the financial sector 
summarised above, such an increase in the credits given by the US economy was not 
manifested in productive investment, as the gross fixed investment spending as a share 
of GDP decreased from 19.2 per cent in 1979 to 16.5 per cent in 2005. The quantitative 
expansion of financial assets, motives and actors is well-documented and has been 
widely accepted as an observable phenomenon especially in the context of developed 
countries and its possible impacts on investment levels, growth, accumulation and 
distribution have constituted the core focus of the financialisation literature especially 
between 2009 and 2014. 
Because this phenomenon as an empirical tendency has acquired global application, 
however, it has been argued by some, such as Christophers (2015) and Michell and 
Toporowski (2014) that financialisation is without analytical legitimacy in claiming any 
explanatory power. As argued, this has been because it has increasingly been used to 
refer to such empirical developments on a global scale, incorporating all empirical 
observations associated with the activities of financial markets in general, and therefore 
failing to identify a specific causal process whether taking place within the financial 
markets themselves or the mechanisms through which these developments have 
impacts on the rest of the economy. There are two aspects to this. The first concerns, as 
Michell and Toporowski (2014) argue, whether there is coherence and rigour within 
theorisation on financialisation with respect to the financial processes that goes beyond 
the evidence for increased financial activity and turnover. The second is about, as raised 
by Christophers (2015), irrespective of the internal coherence, rigour or sophistication 
of these explanations, whether financialisation as a concept can contribute to the 
understanding of the contemporary capitalist economies in general, especially given its 
nebulous character in expanding itself far and wide.  
61 
 
These concerns are far-reaching, also relating to the wider methodological issues 
surrounding the concept, which is the lens through which the literature is surveyed in 
this chapter. As Sawyer (2013) distinguishes, despite too many different answers, there 
are basically two primary ways of answering the question of what financialisation is. The 
first is to view financialisation as an object of study in the broad terms of evolution of 
the financial sector and the increasing importance of finance in general. For that, there 
is no single answer as the forms financialisation take differ from each time and place 
(Sawyer, 2013). In line with Michell and Toporowski’s (2014) primary preoccupation, 
this way of conceptualisation is aimed towards understanding of the causes and impacts 
of the increased financial activity, which is accepted to be historical in terms of its 
emergence, but is not theorised as such employing the categories of supply and demand 
analysis. The products of this methodological choice are outlined in the first half of the 
chapter, the majority of which came from the Post-Keynesian school of thought 
(despite some significant differences in interpretation).  
The second type of answer is more historical and it is to view financialisation as the 
present era of capitalism (or its material basis), coinciding broadly with neoliberalism 
since the late 1970s and early 1980s. Although it is not possible to draw a clear line 
between these two approaches, the primary preoccupations of these approaches signal 
important methodological differences that cut across disciplinary divides, especially with 
respect to different understandings of time and history as well as the methodological 
divide between history and abstract analysis, as briefly discussed in the previous chapter. 
If financialisation can be explained solely through the categories of supply and demand, 
what role is history to serve more than as a background? If, however, it is used to 
periodise with respect to real historical time, what distinguishes it from a historical 
account of chronology? If it implies a structural sequentiality, what parameters are 
selectively used to determine the phases? Does it imply that the parameters that are left 
behind, such as the parameters that account for national diversity, play a minor role for 
the global trajectory of capitalism? If no structural succession of events is assumed, on 
the other hand, what determines the coherence of various historical trajectories given 
the wide scope of contemporary national diversity? Although these questions are far 
broader than the scope of this thesis and will not be answered as such, this chapter will 
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address them cursorily through drawing a distinction between the two methods for 
approaching financialisation.  
With these considerations, this chapter provides a selective literature survey on 
financialisation, in light of the methodological distinction between different ways of 
conceptualisation, outlined by Sawyer (2013). Financialisation is then defined and 
discussed as the increasing presence of interest bearing capital as the material basis of 
the current stage of capitalism, to which a transition towards market-based provision of 
wage goods can contribute through a secure base of revenues available for the 
emergence of the secondary circuit of capital. The first section discusses the first stream 
of literature that approaches financialisation as an object of study broadly associated 
with the rise of finance and the theoretical and empirical developments taking place 
with respect to the evolving financial markets. Within this tradition are the Post-
Keynesian/Kaleckian, circuitist and some Marxist approaches to financialisation. The 
second section discusses French Regulation School, Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
approach, and some other Marxist interpretations, including the approach adopted in 
this thesis, as well as how some urban sociologists and human geographers have tended 
to define financialisation historically as the current phase of capitalism, associated with 
neoliberalism. The third section concludes by pointing towards the distinction between 
the two approaches, the latter’s advantage being to suggest a non-mechanical causality 
structure, shifting the emphasis away from the parameters through which causes lead to 
affect and towards the process of change itself.  
2.2. Financialisation as an Object of Study: The Rise of Finance and Its Impacts 
on the Economy 
This section will discuss how financialisation can be approached broadly as an object of 
study with respect to the rise of finance and its impacts on the rest of the economy 
since the early/mid-1980s. Within this tradition, the Post-Keynesian/Kaleckian 
literature and some Marxist interpretations on financialisation had addressed the 
majority of empirical processes that can be associated with financialisation, such as the 
increasing importance of shareholder value mostly associated with its impacts on real 
investment levels and slowing down of accumulation, as well as impacts and causes of 
increasing household indebtedness and inequality. The next section will give a brief 
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introduction to Cambridge theories of distribution, which has been influential in the 
emergence of these studies, reflecting their underlying preoccupations.  
2.2.1. Cambridge theories of distribution 
Cambridge theories of distribution can be considered as a fundamental building block 
for the following studies on financialisation especially with respect to the impacts of 
increasing levels of inequality on growth and accumulation. It first emerged as a distinct 
school of thought in response to dissatisfaction with the orthodox macroeconomic 
theories of distribution in the post-World War II period. The pioneers Kaldor, Kalecki, 
and Robinson, developed an alternative theory of distribution within the capitalist 
economy, in line with Keynesian principles suggesting that distribution matters in terms 
of having an impact on aggregate demand hence total output levels through the 
mechanisms of saving/consumption functions. Although Keynes himself was not 
preoccupied with distribution but rather with the impacts of investment on aggregate 
levels of output, the pioneering works of Kaldor, Kalecki and Robinson have been 
considered to be along Keynesian lines because of the emphasis on investment and 
saving functions, with the logical priority of investment over saving (in other words, 
investment determines savings rather than vice versa).  
The first and most important assumption that characterises the pioneers’ as well as the 
later works is that the economy operates according to the principle of scarcity of 
demand, rather than scarcity of supply. In that sense, there is a logical priority of 
demand over supply and this partially explains the importance given to macroeconomic 
analyses revolving around Post-Keynesian theories of business cycles and distribution 
aiming to look at the impacts of demand-driven fluctuations in these on accumulation. 
On the product side, the national output is disaggregated into consumption and 
investment. In line with the Keynesian analysis, Post-Keynesians also look at the 
expenditure side and disaggregate the total income into wages and profits (Y = W + P), 
and then, further into savings and consumption (Y = C + S), I = S = sp P + sw W. 
Here, not reflected in the equation where savings are equal to investment, there is an 
assumption that investment determines savings and not the other way around. Each 
class having different propensities to save, capitalists have a higher propensity to save 
(sp) than workers (sw). These equations hold for all levels of profits and wages and 
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important for all levels of Post-Keynesian analyses as through the saving functions, the 
aggregate output itself is determined by the by the relative balance between savings and 
investment and by the multiplier (Kregel, 1978). In this sense, Post-Keynesian analysis 
is in line with Keynes’ analysis by putting the emphasis on investment being 
determining for the economy, but also adds new insights to it by focusing on the macro 
impacts of distribution between wages and profits on overall output levels.  
Harcourt (2006) notes that Kaldor (1955) called his work Keynesian upon the principles 
summarised for three reasons: 
1) He located the origins of his theory in Keynes’ analogy of the widow’s cruse: 
The economy was structured in a way that the more profit-receivers spent, 
the more profits they received. Because profit receivers as a class can always 
decide what to spend on investment, but never the amount of profits they 
are going to receive, the causation always follows from investment towards 
profits (and therefore the more they invest, the more they receive as profits.) 
2) The first aspect implies that capitalist investment is determining for the 
economy in terms of aggregate output (income) and hence employment. In 
an economy, an exogenous planned investment (subject to animal spirits) 
determines income and distribution which further determines saving to 
respond to planned investment.  
3) Although Keynes himself was rather interested in the total level of activity 
and income determined by investment, the Keynesian multiplier can only be 
applied for that purpose in the short-run, with changes in income bringing 
planned investment and planned saving into equality, because money wages 
are sticky in the short period. In the long run, however, the multiplier is 
applied to income distribution rather than directly on output, assuming 
prices are more flexible than money wages and the propensity to save out of 
profits is greater than the propensity to save out of wages. 
In Kaldor’s model, the budget constraint of a firm plays an important role in 
determining the macroeconomic rate of profit, for a given accumulation. Through the 
‘valuation ratio’ (i.e. the ratio of the market value of the securities held by the public to 
the value of stock of capital goods, which is very similar to later what is known as 
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Tobin’s q ratio), he provides a link between the financial value of the firms and wealth 
of households in his distribution theory (Lavoie & Godley, 2001). 
Later, Kaldor incorporates the functional relationships of distribution into his theory of 
growth that implies the actual progress rate of an economy is dependent on the portion 
of the income saved, the growth of labour productivity and growth rate of population, 
none of which is an independent variable, but rather interact with one another (Kaldor, 
1957). By looking at the empirical constancies over long periods of historical time,1 he 
finds that while the capital/output ratio remains roughly constant, capital per worker grows 
over time, therefore technical progress is endogenous in capitalist accumulation.  
In Kalecki’s distribution model, on the other hand, there is also an investment function 
(that is absent from Kaldor’s model, determined by ‘animal spirits’), depending on the 
profit and saving levels of the firm, therefore on the mark-up (monopolistic firms 
imposing a mark-up level over their average costs to be reflected in final prices) levels. 
On the supply side, the economy is determined by the degree of monopoly, which is 
accepted as one of the primary factors in determining the price levels and therefore 
corresponding saving and output levels. In the Kaleckian model, firms are not price 
takers, but rather they have the ability to determine the margin of prices over costs, 
reflecting the degree of monopoly. Given the firms’ decisions over the level of prices 
relative to average costs, the equilibrium level of employment and expected profits 
would both be determined with the latter triggering the investment decisions by firms 
that would, in turn, determine the division of national income between wages and 
profits (Harcourt, 2006).  
In that sense, the Kaleckian model displaces the emphasis from the impacts of long-
term distribution trends towards short-term cyclical movements that are influential on 
the long-term trends (Carvalho, 1984). In such theorisation, higher mark-up levels and 
higher monopolisation has negative impacts on output levels as lesser amount of 
savings (hence investment in the long run) at the end of period is enough to match the 
                                                 
1 These are the share of national income between capital and labour, the rate of growth of the capital 
stock per worker, the rate of growth of output per worker, the capital/output ratio and the rate of 
return on investment. Kaldor observes these constancies by looking at the US and UK statistics over 
long periods of time. For example, for the United Kingdom, the share of wages has shown only 
small variations around the level of 40% of national income in the period 1840-1950 (Kaldor, 1957).  
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desired levels of planned investment in the next period, with higher retained earnings 
from sales from the previous period.  
Here, another disclaimer on the thesis’ limitations is necessary, as a detailed treatment of 
Cambridge theories of distribution with a greater depth cannot be offered. Instead, this 
summary is included to emphasise an important methodological principle developed by 
the Cambridge school of capital, which later has been influential on studies on 
financialisation. That is, the economy is conceptualised to be restricted by aggregate 
demand, on which the distribution of output between capitalists and workers plays an 
important role. The contribution of Cambridge capital theories has been to go one step 
further than the classical Keynesian analysis and to claim that investment determines 
output and employment, but it does so through the share of income between profits 
and wages. In the long run, this has impacts on the accumulation rate, as investment 
and saving levels are adjusted to changes in the short-run aggregate demand level; which 
is assumed to have an analytical priority over supply. On the supply side, the economy 
is restricted by the degree of monopolisation, as firms are able to set mark-up levels 
over the competitive market prices given their output restricting capacities. If a certain 
economy or sector is characterised by a high degree of monopolisation, this implies 
lesser amount of output produced (or in other words, higher profits returns and hence a 
lesser amount of savings necessary to match the current levels of investment).  
This theorisation differs from the orthodox theory in which the distribution of income 
is determined by the price at which the individual agent can sell and the economy is 
primarily governed by the supply side productivity improvements (Kregel, 1978). In the 
orthodox theory, as Kregel (1978, p. 38) argues, there is no ‘macro’ theory of 
distribution as “[a]ssuming initial factor endowments are equal, if the supplies of factor 
services can adjust to the differences in relative factor prices, then personal income will 
be equal - unless there are market imperfections and significant differences in innate 
skills. Thus, because the skills are distributed randomly across the population, income 
will also be random, or at least statistically randomly distributed.” Moreover, the 
demand for a factor is seen as ultimately deriving from the factors’ contribution to 
output at the margin of production (from its marginal productivity), including the price 
of an additional unit of labour being equal to its marginal productivity, given there is full 
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employment in labour markets. Post-Keynesian theory, on the other hand, attempts to 
explain the incomes earned in society independently of any direct relation to individual 
or class productivity, but rather to macroeconomic forces such as the rate of 
accumulation and saving and consumption behaviour (Kregel, 1978). This could be 
accepted as a unifying fundamental principle for later Post-Keynesian and Kaleckian 
interpretations of financialisation, despite considerable debate over other determinants. 
The next section will explain how this relates to later studies on financialisation 
specifically. 
2.2.2. How do the Cambridge theories of distribution relate to the theories of money 
and financialisation?  
In line with the emphasis put on the importance of aggregate effective demand, 
endogenous money appears as a conceptual necessity in this framework, because if the 
effective demand is determining for the economy, determined at the aggregate level, 
there should be a mechanism for the systematic transmission of that effect to the micro 
firm level. Endogenous money serves that purpose, by responding to facilitate supply 
meeting whatever level of effective demand is generated.  
Many scholars have described a Post-Keynesian economy as a monetary production economy, 
an expression that is used by Keynes himself (Carvalho, 1984; Chick & Dow, 2001; 
Kregel, 1976; Lavoie, 1984). For Lavoie (1984), a monetary economy underpins the 
fundamental uncertainty in economy, because of the inability to determine monetary 
aggregates (especially with respect to monetary wages), and as a result the economy 
being not a self-correcting but a cumulatively unfolding process that is non-ergodic 
(Arestis, 1996). The monetary wages play an important role, because payments to 
workers are made with money; neither the workers nor the capitalists know their final 
share of output meaning that the rewards to the factors of production are not set a 
priori in real terms. Lavoie (1984) claims that this contrasts with the orthodox 
theorisation where the integration of money into the economic system is done when the 
output is already specified, therefore the specificity of money comes from its stock 
scarcity (as with the other commodities). In the Post-Keynesian theorisation, however, 
the money is introduced in the beginning of the production process with the flow of 
new commodities. In that sense, all money is generated as credit money upon the 
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demand of producers and therefore any stock of money should be accepted as a residue 
which cannot play any causal role (Davidson & Weintraub, 1973). The residue of bank 
loans that has not yet been paid is reflected as the money stock (depending on liquidity 
preferences), therefore can neither explain prices nor employment as monetarists would 
suggest (Lavoie, 1984). 
The Post-Keynesian theorisation of money differs from the conceptualisation of money 
accepted in this thesis, for various reasons outlined by Saad-Filho (2002). First, for the 
Post-Keynesian theory of the business cycle, any expansion starts with the expansion of 
credits conceptualising all money as credit money, ignoring the theoretical relevance of 
fiat money created by the state. It also ignores the fact that, even when all money is 
credit money, there can be some discrepancies between the demand and supply of 
credit (Saad-Filho, 2002). That is because, even the supply of credit money necessarily 
corresponds to individual demand, the total supply of credit may not reflect the needs 
of the economy as a whole, for example visible in the case of speculative price increases 
in the asset markets when there is excess supply from the side of lenders facilitated by 
speculative borrowers. Money has an essence, and a distinct use value, which is the 
monopolisation of exchangeability, fulfilling various roles in the economy as a means of 
payments, as a store of value, as a unit of account, as world money, which sometimes 
conflict with each other (Saad-Filho, 2002).  The conflict is visible, for example, when 
there is a breakdown in the payments in moments of crisis, and money acts primarily as 
a means of payments to settle the existing transactions. In that moment, who gets paid 
and who does not is independent of the nature of the original individual demand 
generated, that might lead to an overall breakdown of revenues.  
These considerations are not raised to question whether credit money supply is 
endogenous or not, instead, to suggest that money cannot be defined on the basis of 
limited endogeneity. This thesis suggests that money’s role for the economy does not 
come from what it does (facilitating transmission from demand to supply is one of its 
functions, for example), but rather from what it is, in other words, its use value to 
monopolise exchangeability.  
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 A second difference can be found in the Post-Keynesian claim that money is 
introduced when revenues are being distributed in the form of wages (at the beginning 
of a production process), rather than when they are spent from the stock (at the end of 
a production process). This implies a simultaneous determination of profits and wages. 
According to the conceptualisation of the capitalist economy adopted in this thesis, 
wages and profits are not determined simultaneously and wages are determined before 
profits. The production process starts when the labourer sells his/her labour power for 
a wage (wages are determined at that moment irrespective of the time of payment) and 
that is a distinct moment from the distribution between wages and profit and the end of 
previous production process. In that sense, the wages are not determined by the share 
of labourers, but rather the share of labourers’ from the final surplus value (which is 
unknown at the beginning of the production process) is determined by the wages (Saad-
Filho, 2002). By introducing money when revenues are being distributed in the form of 
wages, the Post-Keynesian approach does not assign a specific use value to the labour 
power, distinct from the labour’s collective share at the end of the production process, 
when the output is already specified.  
Nevertheless, the Keynesian approaches are systemic in character, with money stock 
having some distributional (hence real) impacts by building upon the theories of 
distribution summarised in the previous section. In short, the money stock’s impacts are 
(Fine & Dimakou, 2016): 
1) It can lead to differential rewards for those owning financial assets: This has a 
corresponding implication for effective demand (lower) from redistributing 
towards those with lower propensities to consume. 
2) In the real sector, it can redistribute towards speculative investment again at 
the expense of effective demand.  
The existence of these channels implies that the financial sector is not theorised 
separately from the real economy with a primary function of channelling savings into 
investment, but has impacts on production, growth and accumulation. On the basis of 
these channels, there is an extensive literature on financialisation with respect to the 
endogenous impacts of finance on the rest of the economy coming from Post-
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Keynesian, new Keynesian and Kaleckian perspectives; explaining the impacts of a shift 
from bank-based to market-based financial systems on investment (Schaberg, 1999), the 
impacts of changing consumption expenditures and asset price inflation (Toporowski, 
2000, 2009), shareholder value orientation or ‘rise of the rentier’ due to changing firm 
behaviour (Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000), the negative impacts of shareholder corporate 
governance on real investment and accumulation (Orhangazi, 2008; Stockhammer, 2004, 
2005), increasing inequality as a response to shareholder value orientation and its 
negative effects on aggregate demand through decreasing wage share (Onaran, 
Stockhammer, & Grafl, 2011; Stockhammer & Onaran, 2013), as well as increasing 
household indebtedness as a result of increasing inequality in line with the rest of the 
developments mentioned above (Barba & Pivetti, 2009). 
Van Treeck (2009) divides the literature into two as the supply-side and demand-side 
analyses of financialisation. While the supply-side analyses concerns phenomena like the 
productivity impacts of rent-seeking activities or the impacts of the growth of 
unproductive sectors on technical change, this side is less developed, considering that 
Post-Keynesianism is primarily a demand-side, macro theory. On the demand-side, the 
focus is on the impacts of the changing firm behaviour on effective aggregate demand 
and accumulation with some other macro distributive constraints, such as firm 
indebtedness and the nature of saving and consumption behaviours. These are analysed 
by what Van Treeck (2009) classifies as the demand-side analyses of financialisation, 
preoccupied with macroeconomic (either at sectoral or national economy level) 
implications of the empirical developments associated with financialisation. These 
studies will be examined in greater detail in the following sections.   
2.2.3. Empirical analyses on firm-level data: decreasing real investment, slowing 
down of accumulation 
The empirical studies on firm level data reviewed in this section broadly draw upon the 
Post-Keynesian theory of the firm. This suggests, the individual firm will make 
investment decisions according to its individual ‘expansion frontier’ and ‘finance 
frontier’. Expansion frontier is based upon the notion of the ‘growth-profit trade-off’ at 
the firm level, suggesting that in the long run firms will favour growth over profitability 
(Lavoie, 1992). The finance-frontier, on the other hand, refers to the maximum rate of 
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accumulation with a given profit rate. While firms maximize profits, their investment 
decisions will be determined by the intersection of these two frontiers. However, as 
Crotty (1990) mentions, this dichotomous trade-off between growth and profits 
assumes that the managers and shareholders are primarily the same economic agents 
with more or less unified interests and strategies.  
As it is well documented, shareholders gained power in corporate governance after the 
shareholder revolution in the mid-1980s, which led many to argue that the result has 
been their imposing of higher profit pay-outs (through higher dividends or share 
buybacks), favouring short-term profitability over long term growth. In their well-
known work, revealing a historical analysis for the change in firm behaviour in the US 
from ‘retain and reinvest’ in 1960s-1970s to ‘downsize and redistribute’ in the mid-80s, 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) argue that the shareholder value orientation, also 
affected investment decisions of firms as well as employment levels. By the end of the 
1970s, when retain and reinvest strategy was prevalent, there were two problems faced 
by firms. First, through internal growth and mergers and acquisitions, corporations grew 
too big with too many divisions in activities, detaching central offices from the 
investment processes of their companies. Second, innovative competition was allowing 
only lowest cost suppliers with flexible employment structures to survive. Agency 
theory was developed to address the issue of over-centralisation and competition. The 
theory suggests that because the agents (managers) are not disciplined by the market, 
they would opportunistically use their control over the allocation of resources, leading 
to overinvestment. There was a need for a takeover market that would function as a 
market for corporate control on managers. This summarises why it is accepted that 
higher profitability demanded by the shareholders will eventually lead to higher growth 
in the orthodox literature. As the capital markets will operate as behaviour-correcting 
and reduce the risk of overinvestment and channel savings into most profitable 
investments. An OECD study summarises such developments as: 
One of the most significant structural changes in the economies of OECD 
countries in the 1980s and 1990s has been the emergence of increasingly 
efficient markets in corporate control and an attendant rise in shareholders’ 
capability to influence management of publicly held companies. In particular, 
owing to the expanded possibilities for investors to use the capital market to 
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measure and compare corporate performance of corporations and to discipline 
corporate management, the commitment of management to producing 
shareholder value has become perceptibly stronger; this represents a significant 
change in the behaviour of large corporations. (cited in Stockhammer, 2005, p. 
198) 
However, as Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) argue, the impacts of the diverging 
behaviour at the firm level have been negative at the macroeconomic level, especially on 
employment and investment levels. Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) find that between 
1979 and 1983, the number of people employed increased by 0.4 per cent, while 
employment in durable goods manufacturing declined by 15.9 per cent. Between 1983 
and 1987, 4.6 million workers lost their jobs, of which 40 per cent were from the 
manufacturing sector. Overall, the job loss in the first half of 1990s stood at about 14 
per cent. Even when the economy moved to recovery from 1991, the job-loss rate rose 
to ever higher levels through 1995.  
For Stockhammer (2004, 2005), two features of financialisation are striking. The first is 
the accumulation rates (that is the rate of retained profits) in OECD countries have 
reached their lowest points in the first half of 1990s since the hostile takeover 
movement whereas profitability was increasing (Stockhammer, 2005) 2  Second, the 
profits to investment ratio in most OECD countries show a declining trend. For 
example in Germany, the investment rate amounted to 80 per cent of profits in 1970, 
while the ratio has fallen to 60 per cent in 2000 (Stockhammer, 2005). Stockhammer 
defines accumulation as the rate of reinvested profits, as there is no assumption that all 
profits will be reinvested and investment is subject to ‘animal spirits’. According to 
Stockhammer (2012, p. 48), this definition is one of the distinguishing features of Post-
Keynesianism from Marxian and regulationist analyses of financialisation: 
In Marxian analysis there is a certain ambiguity in the term accumulation as it 
can refer to the growth of profits or to the growth of capital stock (i.e. 
reinvested profits). As we shall see financialisation drives a wedge between the 
two. One of the features of the finance-dominated accumulation regime is that 
                                                 
2 Stockhammer (2005) measures profitability by the profit share in the business sector and finds that 
in the United States, the profit shares have increased from 29.83 per cent between 1960-74 to 33.25 
between 1985 and 1999, using the OECD Employment Outlook Dataset.  
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there has been an increase in profits while, at the same time, there is sluggish 
growth of investment.3 
 By drawing the causality from investment to profits, Post-Keynesian theory draws 
causality between macro level investment instability, shareholder value orientation and 
accumulation, with careful consideration of the interactions between micro and macro 
as their interactions do not translate into straightforward mechanisms.  
For example, drawing upon Minsky, Crotty (1990) claims that an investment decline can 
never be initiated by a prior decline in the expected profitability of investment at the 
firm level. Rather, it takes an initial drop in investment to induce a subsequent decline in 
aggregate demand, through the multiplier. The decrease in aggregate demand will 
subsequently result in decreased profits. Any change in the level of investment triggers 
changes in the output that must continue until profits (a fixed percentage of income) 
change by enough to make savings balance the new investment levels (Crotty, 1990). 
The most famous example for the non-linear transferability of micro developments on 
macro outcomes being the ‘paradox of thrift’ (that is increasing household saving do 
not lead to increasing investment), Crotty’s suggested mechanism is one of the 
examples for how macro and micro might interact in the Post-Keynesian thought, 
although many different and sometimes contradicting the mechanisms are suggested to 
account for these interactions.  
In a well-known firm level study drawing upon the USA firm level data for the period 
between 1973 and 2003, Orhangazi (2008) also finds evidence for the negative impacts 
of financialisation on real investment and accumulation through two channels. First, the 
increased financial investment and increased financial profit opportunities crowd out 
real investment by changing the incentives of firm managers. Second, more indirectly, 
increased payments to financial markets in the form of dividends and stock buybacks 
decrease the available internal funds for investment, shortening the planning horizons. 
Onaran, Stockhammer and Grafl (2011) also presented econometric evidence for the 
negative effect of dividend and interest payments on firm level investment, giving rise 
                                                 
3 In Marxian analysis, accumulation refers to not to the rate of reinvested profits, but the rate of 
investment from surplus value that is newly created at the end of each production process. In that 
sense, it differs from the growth of capital stock. 
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to increases in ‘rentier’ income along with the rise of the profit share at the expense of 
wage share, which has been reflected in the worsening income distribution since the 
beginning of the neoliberal era. In a recent study by using panel data based upon 
financial statements of UK publicly listed non-financial companies, Tori and Onaran 
(2015) find further supportive evidence for the negative impacts of financial activity 
orientation on physical investment, hence stagnant and fragile growth. The next section 
will discuss how these processes identified at the firm level are translated into the 
national economy levels, also interacting with the wealth effects of increased 
consumption. 
2.2.4. Empirical analysis on aggregate level data and theorising at national 
economy level: Determination of different demand and accumulation regimes 
In line with the firm level analyses described in the previous section, Onaran and 
Galanis (2012), Onaran, Stockhammer and Grafl (2011), and Stockhammer and Onaran 
(2013) provided empirical analyses on national global economy levels. When theorising 
at this level, the final impact of financialisation on accumulation is not determined by 
investment alone, but also through consumption functions, which are not 
straightforward, given there are wealth effects. Wealth effect refers to the fact that 
consumption is also affected by the positive relation of wealth and holding of financial 
assets (such as the when households consume from their increasing wealth that are 
associated with increasing value of their financial assets) (Lavoie and Godley, 2001).  
Giving the example of the USA, Onaran et al. (2011) argue that the decreasing share of 
wages since the mid-1990s could support a consumption-boom, instead of leading to a 
decrease in consumption, only through increased borrowing and wealth effects of the 
stock market inflation, mostly associated with housing price increases during the same 
period.4 This has certain implications for accumulation, as the increase in wealth relative 
to income may lead to a decrease in the personal saving rate (consumption increases 
relative to income). 
                                                 
4 Consumption as a share of GDP has increased from 0.65 in 1988 to 0.7 in 2007 whereas gross 
operating surplus as a share of GDP (profit share) has also increased from above 0.3 to just above 
0.35, during the same period (Onaran, Stockhammer, & Grafl, 2011). 
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Their main objective being to determine the impacts of the changing income 
distribution on accumulation, Stockhammer and Onaran (2013) aggregate income and 
wealth effects into a consumption function. They also introduce investment (negatively 
related to worsening income distribution) and net export function (positively related to 
worsening income distribution). In short, the total effect of the decrease in the wage 
share on aggregate demand is found to be dependent on the relative size of the 
reactions of consumption, investment and net exports to changes in income distribution. 
If the total effect is negative, the demand regime is called wage-led; otherwise the 
regime is profit-led. Onaran and Galanis (2012) find that the demand regime in the 
aggregate Euro area (12 countries) is wage-led, indicating that a wage share decrease has 
negative impacts on total output. This is not a surprising result, as for a demand regime 
to be profit-led, the only channel is the positive impacts of inequality on exports to be 
greater than the negative impacts on consumption and investment.  
In other words, under a dynamically demand constrained global economy, two types of 
accumulation regimes emerge: while some countries maintain consumption-induced 
demand regimes through increased borrowing hence widening current account deficits, 
other countries maintain export surpluses through wage suppression, complementing 
each other. This approach acknowledges that the worsening income distribution might 
not lead to direct decreases in accumulation if the demand is profit-led. However, as 
demand is generally wage-led empirically, it is possible to argue that inequality is 
destabilising for the macroeconomy in itself by leading to decreasing aggregate demand 
levels as well as higher levels of debt (Stockhammer, 2012). 
Hein and Van Treeck (2008), Hein (2009) and Van Treeck (2009) also contributed to 
this stream of literature by providing several explanatory mechanisms for 
financialisation, starting from micro level developments and reflecting these upon the 
national macroeconomic level. By drawing upon the Post-Keynesian theory of the firm, 
Hein and Van Treeck (2008) suggest that firms are interested in maximizing their 
accumulation rate. They are only interested in the profit rate insofar as a higher profit 
rate eases the finance constraint, allowing for faster expansion. With financialisation, 
because the accumulation is below the maximum rate, profits appear to be no longer a 
means to an end, but rather they become an end in itself. They suggest that higher 
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profitability at the firm level could lead to higher growth in the long run, if demand was 
taken as given. However, because higher profitability constraints lead to decreasing 
shares of wages, this has an impact of decreasing aggregate demand and hence a lower 
rate of accumulation.  
Like Stockhammer and Onaran (2013), they also find a link between financialisation and 
increasing consumption expenditure. An increase in firms’ profit pay-out ratio might 
lead to more consumption from financial wealth, because distributed profits will partly 
be consumed by the profit receivers who have higher propensity to consume. The 
overall outlook of an accumulation regime is, again, dependent upon the aggregated 
interactions of the investment and consumption functions with macroeconomic 
repercussions through saving functions.  
In the absence of compensating macroeconomic forces (i.e. impacting on saving), a 
higher profitability scenario has contractionary impacts for accumulation. Clearly, this 
impact depends on the propensity to consume of the recipients of capital income. The 
deregulation of the credit market may lead to an increase in the overall propensity to 
consume out of both income and wealth as well as increasing indebtedness levels. 
Depending on whether the negative impact on investment or positive impact on 
consumption dominates, the economy can be characterised as either ‘debt-led’ (higher 
leverage stimulates the economy) or ‘debt-burdened’ (higher leverage is accompanied by 
weaker aggregate demand and/or financial distress. 
Van Treeck (2009) summarizes the possibility of mechanisms for determining the final 
impact of financialisation on accumulation as follows. Financialisation can be associated 
with two micro level developments, higher profit pay-out ratio for firms and easier 
access to credit for households. If higher profit pay-out ratio leads to higher personal 
income and wealth and therefore higher consumption, multiplier/accelerator effects 
might lead to higher investment, but a debt-led accumulation patterns. The same 
pattern also emerges if the other primary exogenous determinant, easier access to credit, 
distributes towards lower income groups and higher consumption through increased 
indebtedness. On the other hand, if higher profit pay-out ratio leads to lower preference 
for expansion, lower retained earnings and higher leverage, lower credit worthiness and 
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higher debt servicing might lead to lower levels of investment and higher risk of 
financial distress in a debt-burdened accumulation pattern. Again, the debt-burdened 
accumulation pattern also occurs if easier access to credit distributes towards higher 
income groups, followed by lower consumption together with higher debt servicing. 
In short, although there can be positive wealth effects and the availability of credit 
further affect the overall macroeconomic trajectory, these analyses emphasise that 
financial profit seeking leads to lower accumulation which then leads to lower profit 
rates, giving rise to a vicious circle in the long run. 
2.2.5. Emphasis upon increasing levels of debt and securitisation 
There is a certain tradition within the financialisation literature that puts the emphasis 
upon the increasing levels of indebtedness, especially within the household sector due 
to increased default risks associated with consumer borrowing. Contributions to this 
particular area came from different schools of thought including Marxists, Post-
Keynesians and circuitists, especially after the sub-prime mortgage crisis in 2009. The 
reason that they are discussed in this section is their emphasis on the portfolio choices 
of economic agents in terms of determining macro level instability provides another 
example for how financialisation can be defined as the variety of mechanisms based 
upon micro-macro interactions.  
For Barba and Pivetti (2009), rising household debts is a consequence of rising 
inequality as the households had to borrow for rising consumption expenditures along 
with increasing inequality. Because consumption tends to be inelastic with respect to 
reductions in income, given that wages have been stagnating since the beginning of the 
1980s, relative standards of consumption were sustained through increased borrowing 
from the side of households.  
Dymski (2010) also puts emphasis on the increasing bank lending to households, 
especially to lower income households, from a Minskyian framework of business cycles. 
Although Minsky himself focused the attention on the indebtedness levels of financial 
and non-financial firms, instead of households, Dymski (2010) claims that Minsky’s 
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theorisation of business cycles can be extended to incorporate the household sector as 
lending to households reached certain high levels. 
In a Minskyan business cycle, all economic agents behave like banks, acquiring assets by 
issuing liabilities. In the beginning of a cycle, leverage ratios throughout the economy 
are low. However, as profitability rises along with optimism, agents start issuing more 
liabilities that increase the overall indebtedness levels as well as individual leverage. This 
process also signals a transition from robust financial positions towards fragile, 
speculative Ponzi-financing in which the increasing levels of indebtedness are only 
sustained through the payment of interest without the ability of full repayment. As the 
increased demand for credit also puts liquidity constraints on banks, the cycle comes to 
an abrupt end when decreasing liquidity from the side of financial institutions triggers a 
crisis in payments. In the case of the subprime mortgage crisis in 2008, securitisation in 
mortgage bonds enabled banks to liquidate their financial positions and extend their 
lending to lower-income households at a period of speculative lending and borrowing 
that was reflected in housing asset price boom. Hence, what is specific about increasing 
household indebtedness levels is its ‘exploitative’ nature; as a strategy of banks to 
transfer the risks of inevitable bursts of speculative bubbles to lower-income 
households.  
The shift of banks towards households as an exploitative strategy is also a view adopted 
by Lapavitsas and dos Santos (2008) in a Marxian framework, where financial profit is 
theorised as a form of profit which appropriates surplus from future flows of value in 
the form of interest. In the case of household lending for consumption purposes, 
because no production process is involved in the repayment of debts, the extra interest 
payment is deducted directly from the wage share of labour, giving rise to ‘financial 
expropriation’ as the most striking feature of financialisation. This approach will be 
discussed further as ‘the financial expropriation approach’ in the second half of the 
chapter.   
Along similar lines, Sawyer (2013) adopts a circuitist framework and claims that 
increasing indebtedness levels of economic agents is significant in terms of leading to a 
macroeconomic instability, as the monetary circuit starts with the lending by banks, then 
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is expanded or closed according to the portfolio choices of agents. For example, if the 
household saving level is low and the predominant source of savings is profits (in the 
form of retained earnings), credit money is generated through the loan demand and 
these are paid off after the profits are received. However, in the opposite case, when 
savings are primarily coming from households, loans are generated with demand, firms 
have paid off loans for investment, but now are indebted to households. When credit is 
extended for consumption purposes, the circuit still operates whereas in the other case, 
it is closed after the debt is paid off. Initially, increased borrowing contributes to 
aggregate demand in both cases. However, when the demand is coming from debt 
financed consumption instead of productive investment, the repayment of debt is not 
directly related to an output-increasing productive activity. Moreover, the payment of 
additional interest requires a compensating loss in consumption spending or extra 
borrowing (Sawyer, 2013). Therefore, the final impact of increased borrowing for 
consumption purposes on aggregate demand is more ambiguous as it has to be 
sustained through an increase in wages or extra borrowing.  
2.2.6. Asset price inflation approach and ‘forced’ indebtedness  
The final stream of literature that will be discussed in this section is the asset price 
approach adopted by (Toporowski, 2000, 2009, 2010). Toporowski is careful in using 
the term ‘financialisation’, in fact, in his later works, he favours an abandonment of the 
concept altogether (Michell & Toporowski, 2014). Nevertheless, using the term or not, 
from a Kaleckian perspective, he emphasises the destabilising impacts of inflation in 
capital asset markets along with a change in the saving and consumption behaviour of 
households. This approach differs from others summarised above, by introducing 
cyclicality to the picture. Moreover, it differentiates voluntary and ‘enforced 
indebtedness’, a concept adopted from Steindl, in order to distinguish endogenous 
aspects of rising household indebtedness as a response to rising asset prices in capital 
markets due to changing saving behaviour of middle classes.  
In classical approaches to finance, Toporowski (2016) identifies two problems: which 
are first, a reduction of finance to credit in general, and second, the reduction of credit 
to saving or savings. While the latter is most prevalent within the neoclassical 
approaches, visible for example in attempts to reduce international debt problems to 
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trade imbalances, the former is prevalent in both neo-classical and heterodox 
approaches that adopt a tradition to reduce financial crises to general banking crises 
arising from standard banking activities, such as speculation. By focusing on the 
psychological characteristics of economic agents as ‘decision makers’, these approaches 
do not differentiate the capitalist firm and its financing decisions from other financing 
activities in the economy. His criticism to financialisation studies, such as the ones 
offered by Lapavitsas (2014) or Duménil and Lévy (2011), both of which will also be 
discussed in following sections, is that basic debt is incorporated into theories of 
production and distribution in an under-consumptionist framework, without an in 
depth understanding of capital markets.  
Instead, his framework of capital market inflation is as follows. From a Kaleckian 
perspective investment determines savings. In Steindl’s framework, household savings is 
a financial barrier to retained profits. If household saving exceeds the level of 
investment, then saving becomes a net financial deficit for firms (Toporowski, 2009). In 
other words, if investment falls below the level of household saving, firms find 
themselves paying to holders of their financial obligations and will borrow more to 
finance the deficit which will increase the indebtedness and further decrease the 
investment. This is a form of ‘enforced indebtedness’ as an initial decrease in 
investment (or increase in household savings) creates a cycle of decreasing investment 
as savings are accepted to be more inelastic with respect to investment. This describes a 
typical business cycle in a pre-financialised economy.  
With financial innovation and factors that affected the turnover in financial markets 
such as securitisation, active monetary policy that enhances liquidity, hedging operations 
and so on, the number of financial transactions and credit operations increases 
substantially. The ease of credit paves the way for a new saving opportunity for 
households in the form of borrowing and holding financial assets (Michell & 
Toporowski, 2014). Here, Michell and Toporowski (2014) argue that it is this aspect of 
changing middle-class behaviour for saving that is determining for a change in the 
accumulation patterns, and not the expansion of debt itself, as most of the expansion in 
consumer debt seem to be endogenous to the activities of the household sector. The 
change in the middle-class saving behaviour, on the other hand, refers to an increasing 
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dependence on consumption from wealth gains: while past savings are kept for future 
consumption, current consumption is financed through borrowing and from capital 
gains.  
When the behaviour of saving in the form of financial assets is adopted widely among 
the middle classes of a society, asset markets grow with a large base of agents where the 
capital gains are not paid by the firms (like in the form of dividends), but rather by the 
other agents in the market through price increases. In this schema, deposits of late-
comers (younger generation) provide the basis for repaying early savers and this creates 
a Ponzi-like capital market structure that leads to speculative prices (Toporowski, 2010).  
What is observed empirically is first, capital market prices increase, and second, saving 
and consumption from capital gains increase. Because the vast bulk of household 
savings come from middle and upper classes as they have higher propensities to save, 
drawing upon the Kaleckian relationship between investment and savings, investment is 
negatively affected.  Therefore, in a financialised business cycle, it is the high and stable 
form of middle class saving from capital gains that forces firms into enforced 
indebtedness, decreasing the investment levels. In Toporowski’s (2009, p. 145) words, 
this is “how financial inflation makes companies overcapitalised, resulting in a decline in 
the trend of long-term investment and how forced company indebtedness is modified 
as the middle classes extend their consumption financed through inflating asset markets.” 
As a result, an enhanced option to consume from wealth changes the character of 
capitalism and brings structural financial instability (Toporowski, 2010). 
By looking at the subprime mortgage crisis, Toporowski (2009) argues how the housing 
market in the USA functioned as a ‘welfare state of middle classes’, giving rise to 
overcapitalisation and increasing indebtedness. In the case of housing, there is a limit to 
the amount of additional debt that households are willing to incur. As that limit is 
approached, more households extract capital gains from the market either to sustain 
consumption in the face of rising debt repayments or to repay debts. In either case, 
when the rate of credit withdrawal from the housing market (equity withdrawal) exceeds 
the amount of new credit coming into the market, the rise in housing prices reverses 
itself, resulting in a new era of debt deflation and household saving (Toporowski, 2009). 
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This is different from the previous periods of financial inflation and the mechanism 
offered by the shareholder value approach, as the overvaluation of the financial assets 
are not obtained through draining the value of industry but rather by a general capital 
market inflation that is financed by the credit money that is put into the market by other 
participants (Michell & Toporowski, 2014).  
The approach presents itself as different from the consumer debt approach as it 
introduces the constraint of changing financing structures throughout a business cycle 
(towards Ponzi- financing) that limit the choices available to both firms and households. 
For this approach, the modern finance had changed the workings of the economy in 
general and an approach to financialisation should adequately address such a 
transformation instead of linking it to associated processes. In later works, such as in 
Michell and Toporowski (2014) mentioned before, the authors suggest that the term 
financialisation should be dropped altogether as what is needed is not a new definition 
for financialisation but rather a new theory that identifies the endogenous factors and 
key determinants of the new economy following the unprecedented rise of finance.  
2.2.7. Conclusion 
This section briefly summarised the Cambridge theories of distribution and the 
corresponding conceptualisation of money and finance in order to introduce a wide 
range of contributions to the financialisation literature, which are either directly based 
upon, or associated with the Cambridge School. It is important to note that not all the 
approaches discussed in this section follow closely what has been offered as the 
fundamentals in this school of thought. That is primarily because many scholars differ 
to a great extent in their interpretation of what financialisation is, as discussed above. 
There is a unifying notion in these approaches to financialisation however, and this is to 
define financialisation as a mechanism operating in the intersections of micro and 
macro developments, with the help of several transmission routes, such as the 
transmission of changing household and firm behaviour with regards to consumption 
and investment decisions as well as easier access to credit, to macro level developments 
such as overall accumulation and investment, and/or inequality.  
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The primary role of money and credit in this dynamic is to fulfil this transmission role; 
first, at the aggregate level, through distributing to those with lower propensities to 
consume (capitalists) and second, within the real sector, distributing to those with 
speculative profit motives. Both of these happen at the expense of aggregate demand 
and imply an endogenously created instability within the capitalist system, which is why 
financialisation is destabilising in general (whether endogenously or not). In the asset 
price inflation framework, destabilisation stems from the increasing prices in capital 
markets due to the increasing importance of the use of financial assets as a source of 
wealth. For Stockhammer (2013), inequality itself is destabilising for macroeconomy 
through the channels of decreasing levels of aggregate demand and higher levels of debt. 
The number of examples can be increased in light of what has been discussed before.  
Once again, it should be noted that this thesis has a different focus and emphasis in 
approaching the issue of financialisation, hence the literature survey on financialisation 
has been selective to the extent that it underlines how the approach adopted in this 
thesis differs, which lies at a methodological level in the formation of concepts 
appropriate for the analysis at hand. Referring back to the previous chapter, this thesis 
draws upon an analysis of capitalist accumulation with a two-fold nature, which involves 
the reproduction of both material (heterogeneous, context-specific) and value 
conditions. For that purpose, the circuit of capital is used for the analytical model to 
represent how labour and means of production is re-created as commodities at the end 
of each successive circuit while value also expands itself through money (Weeks, 1983). 
First, the Keynesian categories do not appropriately represent this dual nature by not 
differentiating a separate use value for labour power and treating the product of living 
labour as revenue share of workers. Second, from the perspective of value expansion, it 
assumes value created by living labour must be equal to the value of the consumption 
items plus the value of fixed means of consumption that can hold only under simple 
reproduction conditions (Weeks, 1983; Saad-Filho, 2002). Third, classes are identified 
according to revenues they share (with a unified motive in competition), but not 
according to the factors they supply during production process (with different motives) 
(Fine, 1982). The next section will introduce another method for conceptualising 
financialisation, as a reference point for periodisation. 
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2.3. Financialisation as a Reference Point for Periodisation 
The first section discussed how financialisation can be conceptualised as an 
accumulation pattern in which profits accrue primarily through financial rather than 
commodity production channels. As such, conceptualised within a framework of 
supply-demand, this process is not limited to a specific time or space theoretically, 
irrespective of the special empirical emphasis given to its actual emergence in history. 
Another method for conceptualising financialisation is more historical, to define it in 
association with the current period of capitalism, which is named as neoliberalism, 
emerged around the late 1970s and early 1980s.   
As pointed out by Jessop (2001, p. 285) periodisation is distinct from chronology in 
three particular ways:  
First, a chronology orders actions, events, or periods on a unilinear time scale 
that serves as a neutral parameter. Conversely, a periodisation uses several time 
scales that include the temporalities of the phenomena being periodised […] 
Second, a chronology recounts temporal coincidence or succession […] A 
periodisation focuses on conjunctures. It classifies actions, events, and periods 
into stages according to their conjunctural implications (as specific combinations 
of constraints and opportunities) for different social forces over different time 
horizons and/or for different sites of social action. Third, a chronology typically 
provides a simple narrative explanation, i.e., it refers to the temporal coincidence 
or succession of a single series of actions and events. Conversely, a periodisation 
presupposes an explanatory framework oriented to the contingent necessities 
generated by more than one series of events that unfold over different time 
horizons; it can therefore provide the basis for a complex narrative. 
This distinction in fact refers to an important methodological principle about 
periodisation in terms of how to theorise on the basis of real flow of time/history. 
Simultaneity of different temporalities requires that the observant abstracts from 
excessively concrete elements of the real succession of events to identify sequential 
periods of relative continuity or discontinuity (Jessop, 2001). As discussed in Fine and 
Saad-Filho (2016), in terms of periodising capitalism, despite differences in criteria that 
can be adopted, there seems to be a broad consensus on its stages from a laissez-faire 
period in the nineteenth century later to give way to a more monopolistic stage in the 
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first half of the twentieth century and then passes to a stage involving significant state 
intervention, named as the Keynesian or Fordist period, and finally the current stage, 
neoliberalism. This sequential structure is identified on a global level, by no means 
suggesting a convergence of different national economies, but rather identifying the 
common elements at a global level. The next sections will discuss how these issued are 
approached in different schools of thought, starting with the historical take of the 
Annales School and recurrent financialisation.  
2.3.1. Annales School and recurrent financialisation 
In line with Fernand Braudel’s notion of capitalism evolving in long-term historical 
cycles, longue durée, in which time is accepted as non-homogenous, bounded by non-
physical (conjunctural) and physical (geographical) space, Arrighi (1994) developed a 
notion of recurrent financialisation in his famous The Long Twentieth Century. In this well-
established historical study of long-cycles in capitalism, Arrighi’s emphasis is upon the 
internal relations between the states underpinned by the economic cycles of production, 
trade and finance. Each cycle is characterised by a hegemon, namely the dominant 
economic and political actor, evolving from an increase in productive activities at the 
beginning of each cycle. When the intensifying inter-state competition starts to threaten 
the profitability levels and new production cannot lead to higher profitability, capital 
naturally shifts from production to trade and finance. This marks the falling of a 
hegemon and end of an era, implying that the current financialisation is not a novel 
phenomenon, but is rather a recurrent event signalling the ‘autumn’ in the longue durée of 
capitalism. A financialised phase was for example observed in the falling of Dutch 
Empire in the late 17th century, and the falling of the British Empire from 1870 onwards, 
both were characterised by the substantial increases in volumes of trade and interstate 
competition as well as decreases in production (Arrighi, 1994).   
Arrighi’s study later inspired Krippner’s (2005) also well-known longitudinal work on 
financialisation of the American economy. She finds evidence for financialisation that 
the ratio of financial to non-financial profits in the USA increased from 0.1-0.2 band in 
1960s to just above 0.7 in 2001. Similarly, the ratio of financial cash flows to non-
financial cash flows increases three times from the 1960s until the end of the 1990s. For 
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Krippner (2005), such a rise of finance is accepted as the defining feature of current 
capitalism, which signalled the decline of the USA as a hegemon.  
2.3.2. Financialisation as coupon pool: Social accountancy and cultural economy 
approach 
This section will briefly discuss how financialisation is approached as observed in a 
more encompassing sense in everyday practices of contemporary capitalism from a 
social accountancy and cultural economy perspective, combining insights from 
economics, financial studies, as well as history, human geography and urban sociology. 
The common emphasis in these studies is on how capital markets abandon their 
intermediary role, and instead emerge as a powerful social construct and alter the 
household and firm behaviour in the current phase of capitalism. The advantage of this 
approach, as posed by Froud et al. (2002) is that instead of prioritising equity-based 
capital markets, which has been the emphasis of the literature under the influence of 
Anglo-Saxon economies, it conceptualises a generic ‘coupon pool’ system. 
In a coupon pool system, not only shares issued by private corporations, but all types of 
financial assets, such as debt obligations issued by the state are given importance as 
these securities equally contribute to the deepening of capital markets, which has 
acquired a dominant character to regulate firm and household behaviour.  
From a cultural economy perspective, Langley (2004) discusses the emergence of a new 
welfare system on the basis of individualised middle-class savings through the asset 
markets in Anglo-American economies. In a coupon-pool system, the entrance of 
finance into everyday life transforms the society in a way that credit borrowing becomes 
essential for sustaining living standards, reflected in the secular boom in the consumer 
debt levels. While savings are channelled into capital markets, in the form of pension 
funds or other financial assets, these savings are in turn used by the capital markets to 
create a volume of securities. In this way, the deepening of capital markets itself 
becomes a distributional issue, considering that the majority of lower-income 




In addition to great variation among different income groups’ individualised benefits 
from such a welfare system according to the extent of their contributions, Erturk et al. 
(2007) discusses how the complicated nature of the financial products with considerable 
degree of opacity adds to the negative distributional impacts, given that financial literacy 
is not high among the lower-income households. In addressing the issue of distribution, 
Erturk et al. (2004) emphasises how the existing rhetoric on corporate governance 
remains inadequate, as it ignores the interactions between the agencies and structures 
and reduces all structures to a collection of decisions of individual actors. Instead, they 
suggest that the financial system is in need of an overall democratisation, taking the 
structural factors into account.  
In later works, Engelen et al. (2010) further contribute to the critique on the rhetoric of 
corporate governance by emphasising the unruly nature of the financial markets 
depending heavily on financial innovation as bricolage. This refers to the fact that 
financial innovation does not progress in a predictable or rule-bound fashion, rather it 
takes the form of bricolage, in which the structures are created out of a collection of 
improvised events, without a central, scientific rationality (Engelen, Erturk, et al., 2010). 
Drawing upon such internal nature of financial systems, they argue that the regulation 
becomes not only a technical, but also a political issue, further complicating the picture.   
They argue that three fundamental internal challenges must be addressed by the 
regulators, which are high volume, complexity and opacity within the financial markets 
themselves. High volume mostly arises from the fact that many innovations are 
designed to manufacture risk and leverage, instead of hedging risk, while complexity 
exists not only at the level of product, but also at the level of market relations. Related 
to these two, there is considerable degree of opacity about the nature of the financial 
products and the interactions, considering that many interactions are carried out 
through off-balance sheet, over-the-counter methods. In addition to these, the 
fundamental challenge for regulation does not come from the technical aspects of the 
financial markets themselves, but rather from the relative autonomy of political and 
technocratic elites to carry out improvised financial innovation techniques without 
sufficient rational foundations. As a result, the nature of financial regulation in the 
current period of capitalism also differs from earlier periods as it requires also a political 
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solution. In this context, the fundamental principles of regulation revolve around 
reducing the detachment of technocratic elites and downsizing and simplifying finance 
as much as possible, in a transformative, rather than restorative attitude (Engelen et al., 
2012).  
The cultural economy approach prioritises the role of discourse and performativity in 
analyses of financialisation. It underlines how a new type of economy emerges through 
a discursive transformation. Erturk et al. (2008) locate the approach along a social 
constructivist line, and emphasise how the economy itself becomes a performance 
“which combines stories and enactment through saying and doing so that the world can 
become more like our theories (p. 34)”. Similarly, Haiven (2014) claims that this 
phenomenon results in a cultural climate where all aspects of social life, including the 
creative processes, are shaped by the codes and logic of financial markets. In Bryan and 
Rafferty’s (2006) conceptualisation, the performative aspect of the economy has much 
to do with the increasing importance of derivatives, as in a world without a single 
monetary unit backed up by gold or any other material resource, derivatives have come 
to be used as global tools to anchor prices and construct the value of capital invested. 
But given that secondary financial asset prices do not move to stable equilibria, they 
cannot truly constitute an alternative to establishing the so-called fundamentals (Bryan 
& Rafferty, 2006, pp. 35–36). 
For Leyshon and Thrift (1997), not only the process of determining the monetary value 
of financial assets, but the role of money in the economy itself is also a social process. 
The authors emphasise how the contemporary conceptualisations of money are mostly 
based on a structural separation of the economic sphere from other spheres, and how in 
reality monetary relations are maintained through and out of geographical 
configurations and the corresponding social power balances. They especially point out 
to modern money’s exceptional ability to co-ordinate different economic activity across 
geographies, rejecting a universal truth inherent in money existing in all times and 
spaces. Cutler (1978) also underlines the issue of the impossibility of a general theory 
for capitalist calculation, especially given the co-existence of various agents within the 
economy with different motives other than profit-maximisation.  
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Although the cultural economy approach offers exceptional insights, this thesis adopts a 
narrower and more specific definition for financialisation. In that sense, although the 
intensification of financial profit seeking and dominance of the logic of financial 
markets are instrumental in providing a base for the financialisation of the overall 
economy, the thesis examines the transformation of these social relations not in and of 
themselves, but within a more structured understanding of the economy as explained in 
the previous chapter.  
The next section will introduce the French Regulation School and discuss how 
financialisation is conceptualised in a regulationist framework.  
2.3.3. Finance-led accumulation regime as an alternative to Fordist regime: French 
Regulation School 
Although the Regulation School does not use the word ‘financialisation’ per se, its early 
conceptualisation of a finance-led growth regime replacing the previous Fordist regime 
contributed substantially to the financialisation literature. The framework for the 
Regulation theory was first developed by Michel Aglietta (1976) within a Marxist 
political economy analysis. Preoccupied with how different macroeconomic trajectories 
interact with already existing institutions and policy making practices to form 
distinguishable systems of accumulation, namely regulation modes, the contributors to 
the school such as Robert Boyer, Alain Lipietz, Antoine Reberioux, Francois Chesnais 
were among the first to claim the emergence of a new accumulation regime in the 1980s, 
replacing the Fordist regime.  
In 1990, Boyer (1990, p. 17) describes regulation theory as "[t]he study of the 
transformation of social relations, which creates new forms -both economic and non-
economic- organized in structures and reproducing a determinate structure, the mode of 
reproduction.” In that sense, the Regulation Theory offers a periodisation framework 
for capitalism based in, but not limited to, the changing macroeconomic structures at 
the level of national economies. In differentiating different macroeconomic 
configurations, the primary importance is given to changing demand or productivity 
regimes. In the case of a ‘timeless’ economy, these changes would alone be sufficient to 
determine how certain macroeconomic structures reproduce themselves through the 
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interplays between a variety of possible demand or productivity outcomes, given a 
passively responding social sphere as an aggregated mass of individuals. However, the 
Regulation approach claims that the interacting macroeconomic outcomes on the basis 
of demand and productivity are embedded within the existing structure of institutions 
and political traditions, which gives the capitalist economy a path-dependent nature 
with a notion of irreversible (real) time (Jessop, 1997). It is in fact, this temporal nature 
in the development of capitalism that is captured by attempts at periodisation. For 
example, for (Lipietz & Vale, 1988), forms of regulation must at the very least concern 
the regulation of the wage relation, which is highly historical and political, concerning a 
variety of parameters such as the establishment of norms for working time, work pace, 
value of labour power, consumption standards, hierarchy of skills, segmentation of 
labour markets, regulation of the reallocation of monetary capital, management of 
money and its circulation as well as the forms of state intervention from legal to 
economic. 
Although Regulation theory evolves through time with some changes in its methods 
and arguments, its primary emphasis stays on classification of capitalisms through time 
and space on the basis of dominant modes of regulation, which both refers to the 
combination of macroeconomic settings with the primary set of rules and 
corresponding policies within a specific period of time or national economy. In that 
configuration, a new accumulation regime only emerges, if a new set of institutions is 
being established or transformed in a way to allow for new regulation mechanisms, in 
line with the internal demands of a new macroeconomy, underpinned by its micro level 
determinants (Aglietta & Breton, 2001). 
Drawing upon the experience of the US, Aglietta (1976) conceptualised the Fordist 
regime as the dominant mode of regulation in the Post-World War II period, as an 
intensive, as opposed to extensive, regime of accumulation. Its intensive nature was due 
to its dependence on the intensification of production techniques as well as working 
hours that gave rise to a significant rise in productivity and increasing returns to scale. 
This was only a part of the picture, as the productivity gains and mass production were 
combined with mass consumption due to corresponding wage increases. Fordist 
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strategy came to an end from mid-1970s onwards with substantial slowing in 
productivity levels as well as labour’s organised power to sustain the wage share.   
Following the demise of the Fordist regime, the Regulation approach recognises a new 
dominant pattern in the social and economic relations giving rise to a finance-led 
growth regime that is substantially distinct from the previous period. According to 
Aglietta and Breton (2001), its distinction is first, due the change in the inner logic of 
the supply of new financial services, expanding the base of financial activities 
enormously, covering all economic agents instead of solely supplying credit to 
productive investors. Prior to the rise of the finance-led growth regime, finance was 
primarily in the form of bank finance, which is no longer the case. Second, this change 
in the supply of financial services in turn impacted upon corporate strategies, changing 
the interrelation between the capital accumulation and financial variables.  
The microeconomic underpinning of such an approach is then, the changing 
relationship between finance and the rest of the economy which in turn changes the 
nature of the business cycle by abolishing the traditional trade-off between profitability 
and growth -that is because the debt decision of the firms is no longer determined by 
the trade-off between growth and market valuation, but rather by the dividend share. 
Aglietta and Breton (2001, p. 455) describe such process of change as: 
The pursuit of higher share prices through dividend distribution raises the 
financial cost of capital, which leads firms to limit their indebtedness. Corporate 
debt is then determined by the return on equity requirement of the majority 
shareholders. It is possible to conclude, therefore, that the influence of majority 
shareholders and the momentum of the market for control go hand-in-hand: 
they can be viewed as the twin offspring of the new economy. 
The change in the financing structures means that asset price inflation becomes a 
determinant in the emergence of business cycles, as the companies’ future dividend 
distributions are dependent on the assumptions made about asset price expectations. As 
a result, the interactions between speculative bubbles in asset markets, credit growth 
and financial imbalances become important for the patterns of business cycles in a 
finance-led growth regime (Aglietta & Breton, 2001). In addition to the changes in the 
firm level dynamics, the integration of wage earning strata in such an asset-based 
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financial system introduces the household orientation towards wealth gains created by 
asset price increases, further re-imposing the importance of asset markets for the 
economy, leading to a virtuous cycle (Boyer, 2000). 
 In earlier studies discussed above, the Regulation School focuses upon the emergence 
of a finance-led regime as an alternative to the Fordist regime, based upon the 
experience of the US. Later, in order to incorporate other national economies as well as 
to address the persisting diversity among different macroeconomic trajectories, Boyer 
(2005) defines four types of capitalisms (market-led, meso-corporatist, social democrat 
and state-led) existing simultaneously in the current phase, suggesting that the 
emergence of a new accumulation regime does not lead to homogenisation in this 
theorisation, and diversity of different trajectories isunderlined strongly.  
According to Boyer (2005), it was the lack of this broader understanding that led to a 
premature generalisation of Keynesian policy suggestions on the basis of the context-
specific success of Fordist regimes based on the productivity gains. The success of the 
Keynesian period was context-specific because, first of all, there were loose profitability 
constraints imposed by shareholders and the productivity gains were reflected in the 
wage increases with the help of collective bargaining (Aglietta & Rebérioux, 2005). 
Second, the circuit of accumulation was operating within the national boundaries, 
increasing the scope for policy success. Even during the Fordist era, not all the gains 
were stemming from productivity gains and there were differences between national 
economies. For example, Germany and Japan were export-led economies and their 
competitiveness was mainly stemming from a price effect instead of a mechanized 
Fordist model in less-open national economy conditions compared to today (Boyer, 
2005). 
This implies, to understand the existence of different accumulation regimes, one should 
first distinguish demand and productivity regimes. On the one side, the rate of 
accumulation is dependent upon demand, which is now constrained by financial 
decisions such as indebtedness and dividend distributions. On the other side, it also 
depends in the productivity of capital, which is assumed to be exogenous (Aglietta & 
Reberioux, 2005).  
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Overall, the type of the accumulation regime will be determined by the speed of 
technical change captured by technical productivity increases (intensive as opposed to 
extensive), the nature of the demand (the distinction between wage-led and profit-led 
regimes), different finance regimes (bank-based as opposed to finance-based) and 
internationalization of capital. For example, Fordism was an intensive (increasing 
returns to scale), wage-led accumulation regime for which success was a combined 
product of its own conditions and therefore cannot now be simply replicated through 
following its policy schemata. The next section will introduce the Varieties of Capitalism 
approach that also underlines how the time and space-specific institutional settings are 
determining for the final macroeconomic trajectories.  
2.3.4. Determining institutions: Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach 
The Varieties of Capitalism approach developed by Hall and Soskice (2001), and later 
criticised and modified by others such as Peck and Theodore (2007) and Streeck (2011), 
has been another conceptualisation offered to understand contemporary capitalism on 
the basis of the rising importance of finance. Rejecting the homogenising impacts of 
finance over the economy, they offer a binary classification of national economies as 
Liberal and Coordinated Market Economies and try to explain why different economies 
adopted different corporate strategies and have not been converging given their 
operation under the imperatives of an apparently homogenous global financial system.  
Similar to the Post-Keynesian or regulationist approaches, the starting point of analysis 
for VoC approach is the microeconomic changes in the firm behaviour with respect to 
the rise of finance with repercussions at the level of national macroeconomies. At this 
macroeconomic level, new economics of organisation such as shareholder-value 
oriented firms, interact with the institutional forms such as the educational and training 
systems, intra-firm employee relations, inter-firm relations as well as the relations 
between financial and non-financial organisations. These relations are organised either 
through ‘markets’ or ‘hierarchies’, throughout different levels of organisation and while 
liberal market economies are characterised by market-based relations, coordinated 
market economies are characteristically dominated by hierarchical organisational 
structures (Hall & Soskice, 2001). However, Hall and Soskice (2001) also acknowledge 
that there is a range of relationships that are neither market-based nor hierarchical. In 
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coordinated market economies in particular, many firms develop close relationships 
with other firms as well as with their employees in a non-market and non-hierarchical 
‘third way’. In a restricted sense, however, the dominant form of relation determines the 
overarching institutional formation which in turn is impacted by the entrance of finance 
into the picture.  
What can be the differentiated impacts of finance in LMEs and CMEs? First is to make 
a comparison how corporate strategies can differ in LMEs and CMEs, as Knetter (1989) 
did with respect to the British and German firms. His argument was as following. 
Assume there is an exchange rate appreciation, making the country’s good more 
expensive in the international markets. British firms, operating in a good example of an 
LME, would sustain their profitability because the structure of financial markets in a 
liberal market economy links the firm’s access to capital and would favour resisting 
profitability over resisting the loss of market share (Hall & Soskice, 2001). That is 
because the fluid labour markets allow them to change employment structures 
according to the changing market share of firms. In contrast, firms in Germany, which 
is a coordinated economy, can afford a decline in returns because firms have access to 
capital, independent of current profitability, given the bank-based financial structure. 
They would however, attempt to retain the market share because the labour markets in 
coordinated market economies favour long term employment, making downscaling 
more difficult.  
The role of financialisation or finance in general, is introduced on top of this framework 
as a globally determining factor which can for example, disrupt the non-market based 
relations in coordinated market economies or have negative impacts on employment 
structures in liberal market economies due to turning away of capital from firms with 
productive investment, long-term employment capacities towards those with higher 
profitability and precarious employment structures. Especially for coordinated market 
economies, easier access to capital through financial markets can actually lead to 
unravelling of the national institutional structure by decreasing the reliance upon the 
long-term funds provided by banks. In that sense, financialisation as the global 
importance of finance is introduced as a primary factor in determining the performance 
of national economies. This approach shows similarity to the Regulation School in 
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terms of emphasising the impacts of different institutional configurations on 
accumulation patterns. However, it differs by placing the emphasis more on the intra-
class relations between financial and other industry actors instead of inter-class relations. 
The next section will discuss the tri-partite regime approach developed by Duménil & 
Lévy (2004, 2011), which focuses both upon the inter- and intra-class relations.  
2.3.5. Tri-partite class regime and the crisis of neoliberalism: Duménil and Lévy 
Bringing a Marxist interpretation, Duménil and Lévy (2004) describes the latest stage in 
capitalism as an emergence of tri-partite class regime, in which managerial classes 
acquire some degree of autonomy and form alliance with the capitalist class, at the 
expense of decreasing power of the popular class. In that sense, the current financial 
expansion is seen an attempt to restore the financial hegemony which was first 
established during the period between 1900-1929, with the help of three revolutions in 
the 1890s. These are first, the corporate revolution triggered by the growth in firm 
incorporations, financial corporation through a rapidly expanding banking system and a 
managerial revolution through the separation of ownership and control. This latter 
aspect had been fundamental in terms of giving way to a new capitalist class structure, 
where capitalists, managers and popular classes (production and clerical workers) 
constitute a tri-partite class configuration, different from the previous periods. It was 
only after the emergence of such a configuration, they claim that there was also a 
change in the nature of the crises as those of over-consumption and under-
accumulation, which previously fell into categories of either under-consumption or 
over-accumulation in traditional Marxist interpretations.  
The first financial hegemony (1900-1929) was characterised by the bourgeois class 
getting less connected to individual firms and more connected to financial institutions. 
There was also dramatic progress in the organisational structure within the firms. As a 
result, the 1929 crisis occurred not as a response to declining profitability, but as a result 
of the exercise of hegemony that pushed the economic mechanisms beyond the frontier 
of sustainability (Duménil & Lévy, 2011). In that respect, Keynesianism came as a post-
war compromise, which included the containment of finance, as well as the alliance of 
managerial and popular classes under managerial autonomy. During that period, the 
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economic climate in general was favourable for investment and technical change for 
example through low interest rate policies.  
Later, however, the authors claim that this period came to an end due to a declining rate 
of profits, by drawing upon the empirical developments in both the USA and Europe. 
While in the USA, the trend can be traced back to the end of the 1960s, when the 
slowdown of growth was accompanied by the rising inflation, stagflation; in Europe, it 
is dated to the 1974-1975 crisis, coinciding with the rise of oil prices. The rate of profit 
is accepted as the indicator of capital profitability, which relates “the mass of profits 
realized during a given period, one year, to the total sum of funds invested in a firm, 
sector or entire economy” (Duménil & Lévy, 2004, p. 22). Profits are calculated after all 
expenses (raw materials, depreciation, the cost of services and wages) are subtracted 
from the sales, but they might differ according to whether taxes and interest are paid. It 
is important to emphasise that the profitability is not measured by the share of profits 
(as opposed to that of wages) in the total revenue generated. That is because in Duménil 
and Lévy’s words, “what interests capitalists is not to know how much they are to pay 
for wages to obtain one million dollar profits, but rather how much total amount of 
capital to invest in order to turn a profit of that magnitude” (2004, p. 22). The rate of 
accumulation is calculated as the rate of growth of the net stock of fixed capital.  
On the basis of these, they find that the decline in the profit rate was coupled with the 
decline in investment (hence accumulation and employment) since the end of the 
‘Keynesian compromise’. In the USA, the profit rate is found to decrease from 20.6 per 
cent on average during the period 1965-1974 to 15.4 per cent during 1975-1984. 
Similarly, in Europe it is found to decrease from 18.1 to 13.8 per cent in the same time 
span. Unemployment rates on the other hand, increased from an average of 4.6 per cent 
between 1965 and 1974 to 7.7 per cent between 1975 and 1984 in the USA and from 
1.8 per cent to 6.1 per cent in Europe during the same time span (Duménil & Lévy, 
2004). The continuing fall of profitability resulted in the second hegemony of finance 
and the rise of neoliberalism. They claimed that it was the weakness of popular classes 
that played a role in why the former post-World War II compromise was not successful 
in dealing with the crisis. In later studies, Duménil and Lévy (2011) defined the latest 
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financial crisis in 2008 as a crisis of neoliberalism, signalling the structural 
unsustainability of the current configuration.   
The next section will introduce another Marxist interpretation by Lapavitsas (2009, 2013) 
and the financial expropriation approach. 
2.3.6. Financial expropriation and the rise of financial profit: Lapavitsas and Dos 
Santos 
Another well-established Marxist approach to financialisation has been Lapavitsas’ 
(2013) financial expropriation approach, which concerns first, the changing relationship 
between the banking system and the accumulation process, especially the shift to open 
market financing and the increasing reliance on the use of retained profits for 
investment. Second and more importantly, it theorises the rise of a new form of 
‘financial profit’ through the extension of interest bearing capital for consumption 
purposes since the 1980s that resulted in financial expropriation of workers. According 
to Lapavitsas (2013), credit extension for consumption purposes results in a direct 
deduction from workers’ wages, as without a productive activity that follows credit 
extension, interest payments deduce their share from future flows of value, which is 
wages in the workers’ case. Adopting the same theoretical framework, Dos Santos (2011) 
emphasises that the combination of households’ securing access to consumption 
through finance against financial enterprises’ maximising profits through interest rates 
created a context of social relations in which borrowers as ordinary households with no 
profit maximising orientation are structurally disadvantageous compared to lenders.  
Earlier, drawing upon Hilferding’s (1981) Finance Capital and collaborative works with 
Japanese Uno school,5 Lapavitsas had established a business cycle framework in which 
an upswing is characterised by a substantial reserve army of labour and high profit rates 
above the interest rates. As the accumulation proceeds, the volume of idle money that is 
necessary for the establishment of a financial system also increases. The increasing stock 
of capital available for credit, however, limits the incentives for technological innovation, 
resulting in unemployment to fall and wages to increase. This leads to an increasing 
                                                 
5 See Ito & Lapavitsas (1999) for more details. Also see Weeks (1979) for a critique of Itoh’s 
business cycle framework. 
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demand from the consumers together with the decreasing stock of idle money available 
for credit; resulting in a subsequent crisis (Itō & Lapavitsas, 1999). This can be accepted 
as an over-accumulation explanation to crises in general, as Argitis et al. (2014) argue, 
which later led Lapavitsas (2009) to develop a new theoretical framework for the 
current stage of capitalism, as the latest crisis in 2008 clearly did not follow a similar 
pattern. Lapavitsas (2009, p. 124) argues that “the crisis did not emerge because of over-
accumulation of capital, though it is already forcing capital restructuring on a large scale. 
Rather, this is an unusual crisis related to workers’ income, borrowing and consumption 
as well as to the transformation of finance in recent decades.”  
He argues that three historical aspects have been particularly relevant for financialisation. 
First, productivity growth has been problematic from the middle of the 1970s to the 
middle of the 1990s, most significantly in the USA. Second, labour practices have 
changed, characterised by intensification of casual work and increased entry of females 
into the labour force. Third, global production and trade have come to be dominated by 
giant multinational enterprises through a wave of mergers and acquisitions throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s (Lapavitsas, 2009). Against the background of these historical 
developments, what was however, uniquely peculiar about the recent crisis was financial 
expropriation. It refers to the banks’ increasing reliance on household credit extension, 
where capital is primarily extended for consumption rather than productive purposes, 
interfering with the ability of the credit system’s contribution to the generation of new 
surplus value and resulting in a generalised form of usury through profit appropriation 
in the form of interest on a global level. This approach was criticised by Fine (2013) 
with respect to a different understanding of interest on the basis of interest-bearing 
capital as a category, which will be discussed in the next section.  
2.3.7. The increasing presence of interest-bearing capital 
Conceptualised by Fine (2010, 2013), financialisation can also be defined as the 
increasing presence of interest bearing capital (IBC) at the level of capital in general, 
drawing upon Marx’s theories of money and finance. This is also the approach adopted 
in this thesis on the basis of a methodological concern over which concepts to use, 
which are appropriate for a theory of capitalist accumulation elaborated in Chapter 1. 
As explained, the accumulation is understood through a structured and layered 
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formation; consisting of the tendencies, counter-tendencies and contingencies, with 
categories of each layer coexisting and interacting with one another at all times. This 
means that although each category is specific to a level of abstraction and gets more 
complex as the analysis proceeds to more concrete levels, the simple concepts are not 
replaced with more complex ‘versions’. Along these lines, this approach treats interest 
bearing capital as a simple analytic category that is purely abstract which is not observed 
directly through, but interacts with, the categories of circulation, existing as monetary 
aggregates.  
First of all, as Lapavitsas (1997) argues, the possibility of IBC arises as a purely logical 
category, from the structural separation of the specialisation of ‘monied’ capitalists from 
‘functioning’ capitalists, which is a distinction not posed by Marx himself, but existed in 
classical political economy, for example in works of Smith and Ricardo. The distinction 
between monied and functioning capitalists is purely abstract and simple: while the 
former simply owns money and advances loans to the latter without being involved in 
productive processes, the latter borrows money for possessing an investment project, 
directly engaging in productive activity. After the production process takes place and 
surplus value is generated, total social surplus is distributed between monied and 
functioning capitalists with profits earned in the form of interest and the profit of 
enterprise, respectively.  
Without yet referring to the qualitative distinction between different uses of money lent 
and borrowed (for productive or other purposes including commercial activity), the 
division of total social surplus between interest and the profit of the enterprise refers to 
a quantitative one: the more one appropriates, the less remains for the other (Lapavitsas, 
1997). In other words, in order for IBC (or more appropriately, loanable money capital 
at this undifferentiated level) to be able to appropriate surplus without being involved in 
productive activity, it takes its share from the total social surplus produced elsewhere in 
the economy, in the form of interest, which also include financial transaction fees and 
so on (Fine, 2013). 
As mentioned before however, this separation is treated in purely abstract terms, 
without referring to empirical separation of different types of capitalists in the actual 
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operation of economies. This is for various reasons. First of all, in the actual operation 
of economies, there is no clear distinction between ‘monied’ and ‘functioning’ capitalists, 
especially the latter operating purely through borrowing and engaging in productive 
activity without owning any capital of their own (Lapavitsas, 1997). Second, although 
they might have different motives in the abstract, as theorised by the literature on 
separation of ownership of control, in practice, revenue in the form of interest accrues 
both to industrial and rentier capitalists, blurring the distinction at an empirical level.  
At this point, it is necessary to emphasise, however, there is a further distinction for 
IBC to appear as a separate category. The category of IBC does not simply arise from 
the existence of interest, but from the qualitative distinction of money lent specifically 
for productive purposes, which is when it requires a specific use value to function as 
capital (IBC) and expands itself through generation of new surplus value through 
productive activity. By possessing this use value, it also acquires the characteristics of a 
commodity, with an intrinsic ability to be bought and sold in the market with a price, 
which is interest. Lindo (2013) explains that the qualitative distinction arises from the 
dual aspect of capital as a both property and process, explained in Marx’s (1981, p. 497) 
own words as: 
Interest is the fruit of capital in itself, a property of capital, without reference to 
the production process, while profit of the enterprise is the fruit of capital 
actually in process, operating in production process (cited in Lindo, 2013, p. 120).  
In other words, the qualitative division between IBC and other types of capital refers to 
a split in capital as a property and a process, the distinction of the former being its 
disengagement from the process of capital without forming a direct relationship with 
labour.  This refers to the distinction between money-dealing capital (MDC) as money 
lent as money and interest-bearing capital as money lent as capital, both of which earns 
interest for different reasons. As Fine (1985) notes, however, the function of ownership 
of money is embodied in IBC on behalf of the society, and does not correspond to 
individual ownership of deposits. Fine (1985, pp. 398-399) summarises that IBC arises 
out of two factors: first, formation of hoards of temporarily idle money separates 
money from the mass of commodities and represents value in its purest form. Second, 
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money as such represents potential capital, with an ability to renew and expand the 
production of surplus value.  
Its separation form the sphere of production does not mean it is in no relationship to 
production, as the formation of a credit system is a precondition for the mobility of 
capital between sectors to form prices of production as opposed to values, which is an 
indispensable aspect for the rate of profit to be equalised across different sectors in an 
economy (Fine, 1985). Nevertheless, the important point is, because its formation does 
not depend upon systematic availability of money capital, but rather is contingent upon 
the actual hoards of money generated across the economy, the category of IBC (unlike 
money dealing capital), is formed outside the circuit of capital after money hoards leave 
the unity of production and circulation.  
Lapavitsas (1997) explains this procedure as follows. Industrial and commercial capital 
are integral to the circuits of capital, while the former engages directly in productive 
activity, the latter minimises the costs of exchange process (although it might not be the 
case empirically), which is integral to the unity of production and circulation 
represented by the circuit. This means, industrial and commercial capitals take part in 
the process of redistribution of total surplus value at the level of capitals in competition, 
which is the process that determines the average rate of profit. Because IBC is formed 
only after money hoards leave the circuit of capital, on the other hand, it is not involved 
in the formation of average profit rate, despite appropriating a share from the total 
surplus value in the form of interest. This distinction explains why interest rate is 
qualitatively distinct from the profit of enterprise, without a material basis that connects 
it directly to the tendencies and counter-tendencies of accumulation, governed by the 
organic composition of competing capitals, length of the turnover of capital, as well as 
length and division of the working day (Lapavitsas, 1997). In other words, interest 
becomes a pure price category, determined by supply and demand, without a direct 
relation to the value system (Lindo, 2013).  
Again, it is crucial to note that the division is a purely abstract one and the distinction 
between money lent as money and money lent as capital arises not from empirical 
validity, but from a logical possibility. That is because, the qualitative distinction of IBC 
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expanding itself at the expense of other capitals is not observed at the more concrete 
level of capitals in competition, where IBC exists in combination with money dealing 
capital under the category of loanable money capital (LMC), acting both as money as 
money as well as money as capital. In other words, while the former merely involves a 
redistribution of existing monetary wealth and the other depends upon the expansion of 
monetary wealth, the distinction cannot be made from the perspective of the lender as 
long as each of these forms require interest to be paid by the borrower (Fine, 2013). At 
this empirically observable level, borrowing and lending activities that accrue interest are 
made for both productive and simply purchasing purposes. This has certain 
implications for the restructuring of capital in general, and interest-bearing capital in 
particular.  
The important implication of this on accumulation is that once IBC requires its 
qualitative characteristic to expand itself to generate more money, there is an obligation 
to repay, irrespective of the success of the initial issuance of the money loan. In that 
case, the debt can take on a market life on its own through being bought and sold 
separately from the original debt. This explains why independent (secondary) circulation 
of IBC is called fictitious accumulation, not because it does not exist, but because it is 
not directly underpinned by productive value relations (Fine, 2010, 2013). In other 
words, it refers to the well-known fact that the value of mortgage-backed securities, for 
example, is determined irrespective of the value of the original debt it represents. Once 
accumulation acquires a fictitious character, it is subject to volatile boom and bust cycles 
as documented extensively, and discussed throughout this chapter. Nevertheless, 
because interest-bearing activities are made for both productive and purely money 
lending reasons, the expansion of IBC might as well contribute to real accumulation 
through facilitating capital mobility between individual circuits of industrial capital at an 
inter-sectoral level.  
For example, as discussed, the financialisation literature underlines how the deregulation 
of labour and financial markets benefits the expansion of a rentier layer at the expense 
of industrial capital (Stockhammer, 2005). From the Marxist political economy 
interpretation adopted in this thesis, these developments taking place at the level of 
capitals in competition may equally benefit financial and industrial interests (Fine, 2010). 
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In the case of financial deregulation, while leading to an increase in the formation of 
secondary circuits of capital, it might as well lead to an expansion of credit in general, 
including consumption credits for simple purchase purposes. Many scholars who 
contributed to the literature on financialisation acknowledge that the expansion of pure 
credit does not necessarily refer to financialisation (Gabor, 2010; Toporowski, 2000; 
Van Treeck, 2009). Nevertheless, it might contribute indirectly through expanding the 
base for future capitalisation through financial deepening. Or, it might equally lead an 
expansion of credit extended for productive purposes with positive impacts on real 
accumulation, which might in return contribute to the restructuring of IBC elsewhere, 
as long as newly-created secondary circuits are realised with successful productive 
activity pursued through initial credit expansion. Hence, at this more concrete empirical 
level, where sectors are differentiated and competition is taking place with the help of 
money going in and out of sectors, it is not possible to pursue a purely theoretical 
discussion on financialisation.  
It is, however, possible to talk about how a seemingly undifferentiated credit expansion 
has differential impacts on both production of individual wage goods, and their 
consumption across different income groups. In that sense, for example, the role of 
credit in electricity provision is differentiated from its role in housing, which will be 
discussed in the context of Turkey in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively. In the former case, 
it will be shown that the intervention of finance has facilitated productive investment. 
In the latter case, where the intervention of credit relations is usually linked to capital 
gains through asset price inflation in mortgage markets, Chapter 6 will show that the 
destabilising impacts of a strategy of boosting of overall revenues through price 
appreciations were limited, given the relatively limited intervention of landed property.  
In short, the emergence of secondary circuits of IBC in the form of equity or debt-
based securities taking a separate market life detached from the original values of loans 
(or shares) has been a common characteristic of the neoliberal period. Nevertheless, 
whether this emergence happens at the expense of production is an empirical question, 
depending on the success of the realisation of the circuits with surplus generated 
through productive activities elsewhere in the economy. In that sense, fictitious and real 
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accumulation can and does take place simultaneously, as in the case of Turkey which 
will be discussed in the following chapters.  
2.4. Conclusion 
This chapter provided a selective literature survey on financialisation, on the basis of a 
methodological distinction between approaching financialisation as an object of study 
and using it as a reference for periodisation of capitalism. The first half of the chapter 
discussed the primary financialisation argument suggesting a slowing down of 
accumulation and crowding-out of investment, mostly associated with Post-Keynesian 
school of thought, based upon the principles of the primacy of aggregate demand and 
the impacts of distribution, laid out by the school’s early pioneers. Some studies that 
find evidence for the negative impacts of increasing shareholder value orientation and 
short-termism on firm-level investment are discussed, together with the investigation of 
the impacts of the shifts in firm behaviour on the national accumulation level 
(Orhangazi, 2008, Stockhammer, 2004, 2005; Onaran et al., 2011, Stockhammer & 
Onaran, 2013). The asset price inflation approach (Toporowski, 2000, 2009, 2010) is 
also discussed with respect to its treatment of the impacts of changing household saving 
behaviour on financial instability.  
The second half of the chapter is on periodisation, on the basis of the intervention of 
finance. Specifically, contributions from cultural economy  and social accountancy 
approach (Froud et al., 2002; Langley, 2004, 2008; Erturk et al., 2007; Engelen et al., 
2010, 2012), Annales School (Arrighi, 1994; Krippner, 2005), Regulation School 
(Aglietta & Breton, 2001; Aglietta & Rebérioux, 2005; Boyer, 2000, 2005), Varieties of 
Capitalism approach (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Peck & Theodore, 2007), tri-partite class 
regime approach (Duménil & Lévy, 2004, 2011) and financial expropriation approach 
(Lapavitsas, 2009, 2013; Dos Santos, 2009, 2013) are discussed. Lastly, the approach 
adopted in this thesis, which is to explain it as the increasing presence of interest-
bearing capital (Fine, 2010, 2013) is introduced.  
It is argued that in line with Marx’s theory of money and finance, although IBC expands 
itself at the expense of other capitals in the abstract, what is observed empirically is not 
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a slowing down of accumulation, but rather an undifferentiated expansion of credit, 
appropriating interest both as capital and simple purchasing credit. Here, what this 
thesis suggests is a context-specific investigation of differentiated impacts of such an 
expansion on the provisioning of wage goods (specifically for an investigation of the 
impacts of this process on the value of labour power, which has been discussed in the 
previous chapter). The next chapter will move on to the discussion of financialisation 





Chapter 3                                                                          
Financialisation in Developing and Emerging Economies  
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides a selective review of literature on financialisation in developing 
and emerging economies in order to compare different developing country1 patterns in 
light of financialisation. As introduced and discussed in the previous chapter, the 
financialisation literature has expanded considerably especially during and after the 2008 
crisis, primarily focusing on the processes that led to the crash of financial markets 
triggered by the dysfunctional mortgage markets, starting in the USA. This particular 
focus had been biased towards developed country experiences where financial markets 
are well-integrated and deep enough with a wide pool of actors and institutions to 
sustain a growing volume of secondary markets, a considerable portion being mortgage-
backed securities. As a result, the literature on financialisation in developing countries 
emerged both to extend the scope of the existing literature and to introduce some of 
the aspects that are specific to them mostly due to the dependent nature of these 
economies on the core. This chapter aims at introducing the existing literature, which 
will provide a theoretical framework to discuss how the case of Turkey compares to 
other developing country experiences that will be outlined in the following chapter.  
During the late 1980s and 1990s, as the financialisation process accelerated, the world 
economy experienced more than seventy crises, about two-thirds of which hit the 
developing countries (Adelman, 2000). Historically, the process of financial integration 
of developing countries into global capital markets included experiencing systemic 
financial crises (Kaltenbrunner & Karacimen, 2016). For Dos Santos (2013), these crises 
are structural because of the very nature of the growth sustained through financial 
                                                 
1 Although the term “developing country” is broadly used here, throughout the chapter it mostly 
refers to the transition economies or emerging markets such as BRIC countries, Mexico, Indonesia 
and South Africa, among which Turkey also stands.  
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accumulation due to the source of profitability, which comes from future claims from 
net credit extension in the first place. As a result, the critical literature on the 
financialisation of developing countries has primarily focused on first, the destabilising 
impacts of increased financial integration such as the crowding-out of investment and 
the subsequent slowing-down of accumulation that have been discussed in the previous 
chapter, and also, the increasing need for costly financial reserves in response to the 
enhanced vulnerability to financial crises  (Ergunes, 2009; Painceira, 2012; Powell, 2013; 
Rodrik, 2006), as well as the narrowing down of the scope of domestic policy 
manoeuvre due to debt management and exchange rate requirements (Gabor, 2012a, 
2012b; Kaltenbrunner, 2011).   
Many suggested that similar to the path in developed country cases, the increasing 
importance of finance in developing economies imposes a minimum rate of return on 
production, which is ultimately determined by the return on securities. In other words, 
production decisions become dependent on shareholder value (Crotty, 1990; Boyer, 
2000). As a general trend, earlier studies on financialisation had observed that non-
financial institutions increasingly became more involved in stock accumulation which 
had crowding out effects on fixed investment with shortening time horizons within the 
firm (Stockhammer, 2004; Orhangazi, 2008). In the context of developing countries, the 
question was whether the same processes were to be observed given the shallow nature 
of primary financial markets and individual or firm-level access problems especially for 
lower- and middle-income groups as well as SMEs, although it is clear that the role of 
finance in developing countries has increased along their deeper integration into the 
world economy (Demir, 2009a; Karacimen, 2013; Painceira, 2009).  
At the micro level, it was emphasised that firms in both developed and developing 
countries were not able to make decisions independently of balance-sheet 
considerations. Drawing upon a firm- level empirical study on Mexico and Turkey, 
Demir (2009a) supported the argument that firms chose short-term financial over fixed 
investment especially during the 1990s where rate of return on financial investments 
had been higher than the productive investments given overall macroeconomic 
uncertainty. Karwowski (2015) supported the same argument by finding how South 
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African firms increasingly engaged in speculative stock market activities, turning away 
from productive investment.  
There were some significant macroeconomic distinctions, however, between the 
developing and developed country financialisation experiences, mostly due to the 
former’s dependent integration into the world economy. For Bonizzi (2013), for 
example, the most important distinction in developing country experiences in that 
respect has been the underdevelopment of the second circuits of securities to give rise 
to financial asset price inflation as in the case of mortgage markets prior to the 2008 
crisis. Instead, the main channel of financialisation has been the primary interest income 
which facilitated dependency on capital inflows through the sustained adoption of high 
interest rates. Similarly, Erturk (2003) emphasises that many developing countries are 
bank-based, contrary to equity-based financial systems of the Anglo-Saxon economies 
that dominate the literature on finance. Therefore, instead of carrying out speculative 
activities through buying and selling private corporation shares, many developing 
countries are now characterised by state-dominated bond markets through intensified 
issuance of government securities which regulate firm and household behaviour.  
As a general theme, the literature on financialisation in developing and emerging 
economies emphasised the structural dependency on capital inflows, which were mostly 
assumed to be destabilising in and of themselves due to their very short-term 
characteristics (Grabel, 1995, 2011; Vasudevan, 2009a, 2009b). Global capital inflows 
are believed to reinforce the structural dependency and unevenness, as while the 
maintenance of flows had huge impact on domestic economy choices, the direction of 
flows was influenced very little by the individual domestic policies. In that respect, the 
primary emphasis on developing country experiences has been on their 
disproportionate turn to foreign capital in an attempt to shield themselves against 
fluctuations in exchange rates together with the attempt to maintain a consumption- 
driven demand structure. While profit opportunities such as carry trade, or debt 
characteristics of domestic economies played a great role in the determination of 
exchange rates, they diverted from their corresponding levels in line with the 
macroeconomic fundamentals which, as a result, limited the domestic policy scope 
(Gabor, 2012a; Gabor & Ban, 2013; Kaltenbrunner & Painceira, 2015). 
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As Toporowski (2007) points out, while in advanced countries, the depth and range of 
financial institutions meant that debt management was not a constraint on government 
policies, developing economies which cannot easily take on debt in their domestic 
currencies become practically tied to international portfolio considerations. From a 
Minskyian perspective, Palma (2012) emphasises how a country’s outstanding stock of 
external liabilities can be the main determinant of structural vulnerability, as opposed to 
macroeconomic fundamentals, by investigating the commodity price-boom driven 
cycles in Latin America since the debt-crisis in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Levy-
Orlik (2012) argued that how the structurally high trade deficits in developing 
economies have contributed to the import of developed country experiences through 
macro mechanisms of intensified capital flows, and found evidence accordingly in the 
case of Mexico. Following the debt crisis in 1982, increased financial integration has 
resulted in Mexican firms’ participation in new global supply chains to provide high-
technology manufactured goods with lower prices which, as a result, lowered the gross 
capital formation necessary for investment.  
As argued in the previous chapter, this thesis accepts financialisation not as strictly 
destabilising an economy that is otherwise stable, but rather as an inherent feature of a 
certain stage of development of contemporary capitalism, on a global yet differentiated 
scale. As such, although it draws upon the literature covered here, it has a slightly 
different focus in terms of shifting it away from the destabilising impacts of 
financialisation on sectoral or national economy levels. Differentiated from the increase 
of credit as such, the investigation of increasing prominence of interest-bearing capital 
is concerned with the ways of attachment of credit to the rest of the economy which is 
itself attached to a particular understanding of the capitalist economy evolving 
systematically that is both productivity-enhancing and labour-reducing, as summarised 
in Chapter 1. The aim is, then, to understand financialisation as part and parcel of the 
workings of the economy as a whole, not a variable that simply has its own causes and 
consequences contingent on presence of other variables. The next chapter on the 
political economy of Turkey will discuss how the Turkish experience compares to the 
examples summarised in this chapter, with the emphasis being upon how the increases 
in productive investment went hand-in-hand with the policy and structural limitations 
imposed by capital account liberalisation since 1989.  
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Section 3.2 provides a historical narrative for the development of financialisation in 
developing countries, starting from the implementation of the Brady Plan in Latin 
America, in light of the literature mentioned above. Section 3.2.1 discusses reserve 
accumulation strategy and the narrowing down of the domestic policy scope in 
developing countries. Section 3.2.2 covers the majority of empirical findings with 
respect to the crowding-out of production. Section 3.3 concludes by providing a brief 
summary of the literature and introducing how it is related to the case of Turkey. 
3.2. Historical Development of Financialisation in Developing Countries 
When the term gained prominence in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the 
literature on developing country experiences stayed limited compared to those of 
developed countries, especially with respect to the developments related to the 
secondary financial market formations. Because the extent and depth of such 
formations in developing countries were limited, literature emphasised the possibility of 
‘contagion’ of financial instability through the increasing financial indebtedness of 
developing countries. Increasing financial indebtedness of developing countries 
coincided with the global movement of capital flows into developing countries, the first 
major wave of which occurred in the mid-1970s due to the USA’s efforts to sterilise 
OPEC surpluses through syndicated loan channels after the oil shock in 1973 
(Vasudevan, 2009a).  
During the 1970s, oil surpluses were absorbed by the international banking system and 
then were recycled in the form of sovereign debt to emerging economies, particularly to 
Latin America. As a result, syndicated loan lending to emerging economies has 
increased substantially, reaching from insignificant amounts to $46 billion in 1982, 
replacing bilateral lending (Gadanecz, 2004). As it is well known, this movement came 
to a halt with the USA’s attempts to stabilise the dollar during the last couple of years of 
the 1970s through increased interest rates, creating a sudden debt crisis in many 
developing economies that manifested itself first in Mexico’s suspension of interest 
payments on its sovereign debt in 1982. After the Volcker shock, the capital flows to 
emerging markets in the form of loans suddenly decreased to $9 billion in 1985 
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(Gadanecz, 2004). Following the crisis in Mexico, many Latin American countries were 
affected by the sudden stop of capital flows including Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela.  
Although financial indebtedness of developing countries precedes these developments, 
it can be argued that the introduction of the Brady Plan in 1989 as a response to 
alarming levels of sovereign debt after the oil shock marked the beginning of a 
‘financialised’ process through the creation of sophisticated financial markets for 
sovereign debt and further facilitating financial reforms, the establishment of stock 
markets and open capital markets (Painceira, 2009).  
The Brady Plan was implemented to provide sovereign debt relief to these countries 
through the diversification of risks. As mentioned above, Latin American debt was 
mostly in the form of syndicated loans, of which risks were very concentrated, 80% of 
sovereign debt was concentrated among nine big banks (Vasudevan, 2009a). The 
trading of such concentrated debt had started in a small secondary market among 
smaller commercial banks right after the beginning of the debt crisis in Latin America in 
1982. Trading activity was intensified in 1986 with the introduction of debt-for-equity 
exchange programs as part of debt restructuring programmes. The implementation of 
the Plan in 1989 was a formalisation of these trading activities within the framework of 
a two-step programme to allow debtor countries to experience debt relief from these 
interactions, instead of direct debt restructuring of the original loans which were highly 
illiquid.  
The logic behind the Plan was to offer creditors capital gains from the purchase of 
sovereign debt bonds from emerging economies, hence transferring the risk from 
domestic to international capital markets (Vasudevan, 2009b). Debt reduction came in 
two forms: as direct loans from international financial institutions and as trading of 
Brady bonds with different menus. The menus included a wide range of risks from 
creating new money/debt conversion to direct buyback options, and the overall 
observed impact for debtor countries has been a combination of partial debt buyback at 
market prices and a restructuring of the remainder (J. Clark, 1993). Mexico being the 
first country to adopt, the plan involved a two-step process. First, creditor banks and 
debtor countries negotiated the amount of discount to be applied to existing debt and 
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the availability of new money lending opportunities. Second, the individual creditor 
banks chose between the options to exchange their outstanding sovereign debt with 
bonds at a discount or lend new money or both. If they chose not to give new money, a 
portion of sovereign debt was ‘forgiven’, for which in return, creditor banks received 
US Treasury bonds which are less risky than debt bonds.2 Through this mechanism, the 
IMF and World Bank continued to provide loans to debtor countries, further 
contributing to the deepening of financial systems. In that sense, the Brady Plan was in 
accordance with the more or less unified global policy rhetoric of the time, which is 
famously known as the Washington Consensus that can be summarized as the pro-
market development strategy of the IMF and World Bank that offers reformative steps 
to developing economies such as opening domestic markets to international capital 
markets, full financial and capital account liberalisation and the abandonment of control 
over financial markets as well as the promotion of the establishment of national stock 
markets (Fine, 2001).   
Nevertheless, despite positive prospects and efforts, the Plan had heterogeneous impact 
on banks across the board with respect to their exposure levels to developing country 
debts. Moreover, its overall aim of reducing the sovereign debt to sustainable levels was 
unsuccessful (Unal, Demirguc-Kunt, & Leung, 1993). In some countries, such as 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, debt service payments even increased after the 
implementation of the Plan.  
In Clark’s words (1993, p. 47): 
Net cash flow impacts have varied, however, for different countries. Countries 
that were paying full interest before their Brady deals, that is countries not 
benefiting from new money loans nor incurring arrears, achieved the largest 
expected savings in cash outflows. In contrast, for Argentina and Brazil, 
restoring normal relations with creditors through Brady restructurings required 
significant increases in debt service payments […] For Mexico, which had 
benefited from large new money packages in 1983, 1984, and 1987, projected 
debt service payments after the Brady operation were slightly higher than the 
average net payments made in 1986-88. 
                                                 
2 For a more detailed explanation of how the Plan was implemented and how it worked, see (Unal, 
Demirguc-Kunt, & Leung, 1993) and Clark (1993).  
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Regardless of its mixed consequences, the nature of capital flows to developing 
countries has changed after the implementation of the Brady Plan. In line with the 
Washington Consensus, the Plan allowed banks to transfer debt from their balance 
sheets, while it also facilitated the deepening of the financial sector in many developing 
countries by creating an established market for debt securities, which was previously 
absent (Kaltenbrunner & Karacimen, 2016). During the 1990s, substantial capital flows 
from abroad primarily took the forms of private portfolio flows and direct investment 
instead of sovereign loans (Kaltenbrunner and Karacimen, 2016). Private equity flows 
to developing economies increased from $5 billion in 1989 to $25 billion in 1992 
(Vasudevan, 2009a). While the share of the bond market was insignificant during the 
1980s, outstanding bonds reached 24% of total GDP of emerging market economies in 
1994 (BIS, 2002). There was a substantial growth of domestic bond issuance as well. 
The outstanding stock of domestic bonds exceeded one trillion USD in the mid-1990s 
(Peiris, 2010). In the development of domestic bond markets, the participation of 
foreign investors has been crucial, which increased sevenfold between 2002 and 2006 
based on national data and information from the Emerging Markets Trade Association 
(EMTA) (Peiris, 2010).  
As a result, the financial sector continued to deepen in many developing countries 
during the 1990s, facilitated by the increased volume of capital flows. Nevertheless, 
throughout the period between 1987 and 1998, emerging economies experienced 44 
episodes of capital inflows with more than a third of these episodes ending abruptly in a 
currency crisis or a sudden stop (Vasudevan, 2009a). Mainstream theories assume that 
probability of a sudden stop of capital inflows initially increases in the early stages of 
financial integration but then gradually decreases (Calvo, Izquierdo, & Mejía, 2008). In 
general, it was argued that capital flows to emerging economies during the 1990s may 
have resulted in more vulnerability and financial instability due to three reasons 
explained by a BIS report (2009, p. 11) as follows: 
1) Local banks financed a major expansion of bank lending by short-term 
borrowing in foreign currency from international banks creating both 
maturity and currency mismatches. 
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2) The lack of long-term local currency debt markets resulted in the excessive 
accumulation of short term foreign currency denominated debt securities 
(hence contributing to their ‘original sin’).3 
3) Equity and other financial markets were thin which led to disruptive boom 
and bust cycles. In many cases, foreign capital was diverted into non-tradable 
instruments that were easily collateralised (such as real estate instruments).  
Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) emphasise the different theoretical nature of the 
changing views on the relationship between the exchange rate and financial fragility, 
arising either from moral hazard, original sin, or institutional weakness, all of which has 
different exchange-rate policy implications for emerging economies. For example, 
Demirgunc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) emphasised that although the mechanism 
behind such crises seemed to be triggered by the abandonment of control over capital 
accounts, the sole reason for the crises was a weak macroeconomic environment such 
as low growth, excessively high interest rates and high inflation. Although capital 
account liberalisation might have contributed to the adverse terms of trade and an 
increased risk of sudden capital flows, trade and fiscal deficits did not seem to play an 
independent role in the making of these crises, according to Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998).  
In general, Demirgic-Kunt and Detragiache’s (1998) approach can be generalised as the 
‘macroeconomic fundamentals first’ approach supported by the global policy 
institutions, especially by the IMF throughout the 1990s and 2000s (Gabor, 2010, 2012a; 
Grabel, 2011; Kaltenbrunner & Painceira, 2015). Gabor (2012a, p. 714), for example, 
emphasised how the IMF’s policy response to capital flows has followed a sequenced 
structure: “first, allow the exchange rate to appreciate to equilibrium levels, then lower 
domestic policy interest rates if no threats of overheating or use sterilised currency 
market interventions to bring foreign exchange reserves to adequate precautionary 
levels, and tighten fiscal policy”.  
                                                 
3  ‘Original sin’ hypothesis refers to an incompleteness in financial markets, which prevents the 
domestic currency from being used to borrow abroad or to borrow long-term domestically. For a 




Nevertheless, capital control measures taken by some countries, such as Malaysia after 
the Asian crisis, resulted in considerable policy debate whether there was room for 
other macroeconomic measures, other than correcting the macroeconomic 
fundamentals (Kaplan & Rodrik, 2001).  
Heterodox views on the issue, therefore, emphasised that a rising deficit in the balance 
of trade, non-residents’ involvement in domestic financial markets as well as residents’ 
acquisition of foreign currency denominated assets put speculative pressures on 
exchange rates and, as a result, exchange rate speculation becomes structural (Akyuz, 
1993; Kaltenbrunner, 2011). A structural implication of this process in developing 
countries is that, once a current account deficit occurs in a developing country, it is hard 
to maintain a stable foreign exchange regime given their limited foreign exchange 
reserves (Lapavitsas, 2013). In the absence of control over free capital flows, 
governments could not prevent speculative attacks and the foreign exchange outflows 
were followed by sharp devaluations of domestic currencies. As a result, especially 
countries with large current account deficits and huge amounts of foreign currency 
liabilities experienced frequent financial crises.  
It was argued that in accordance with the expansionary phase of a Minskyan cycle, such 
foreign exchange crises were easily translated into financial crises given high asset prices 
and financial crises were further translated to the real economy through the channel of a 
weak banking system (Palma, 2012). When faced with sudden stops of capital flows, 
banks with solvency problems started looking for immediate rescue loans which 
resulted in increased interest rates with seriously negative impacts for productive 
investment. Aybar and Lapavitsas (2001a) argued that it was through this channel that 
the increased financial integration through foreign capital movements led to more 
frequent financial crises in developing economies. As a result,  especially after the surge 
of capital flows came to another halt with the eruption of Asian Crisis in 1997-1998, 
many developing countries especially in Latin America adopted a reserve accumulation 
strategy mostly in the form of dollar to avoid sudden foreign exchange crises which 
were now structural (Painceira, 2009). The next section will discuss this strategy along 
with the narrowing down of the policy scope in developing countries.  
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3.2.1. Reserve accumulation strategy and the narrowing down of the policy scope  
From the perspective of international development, the primary argument of the 
advocates of the establishment of a global financial economy in which there are no 
controls over financial flows is that such a system would contribute to the equalisation 
of rates of return and capital-labour ratios throughout the world, hence helping 
developing countries benefit from the excess supply of capital in developed countries 
(McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). This interpretation is criticised theoretically in earlier 
studies on financialisation mentioned above for being based on an understanding of 
finance as a mediator for channelling savings into investment. In the context of 
developing economies, this argument has also been criticised on empirical grounds by 
studies that documented reverse trends of capital transfers from periphery to core. For 
Lapavitsas (2013), Painceira (2012) and Powell (2013), contrary to expectations, 
developing countries have started to systematically finance the increasing financial debts 
of core economies by accumulating high cost financial liabilities but earning much less 
on their low- return short-term financial assets which mostly consist of short-term USA 
Treasury securities.  
As pointed out by Feldstein (1999) and Rodrik (2006), in accordance with the Guidotti-
Greenspan rule, that was because countries with higher net levels of liquid assets were 
better able to cope with sudden capital flow reversals, which has been a costly strategy 
for many developing countries including Brazil, Argentina, South Korea and other 
Asian countries. During the 2000s, emerging economies have become net positive 
lenders after the return of private capital when the crisis in Asia came to an end.  
A new wave of capital inflows to emerging economies started in 2002, increasing the 
total volume of net private capital flows from $90 billion to $600 billion in 2007 (BIS, 
2009). During 2006-2007, the rapid rise of gross capital inflows peaked at over $1 
trillion compared to the previous peak of $300 billion in 1996 (BIS, 2009). Between 
2002 and 2007, developing countries accumulated short-term capital worth more than 
$2 trillion cumulatively (BIS, 2009). The inflow of capital mostly took the form of direct 
investment and portfolio flows.  
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Nevertheless, it is assumed that the sharp rise in capital flows took place in 
macroeconomic and financial circumstances that were quite different than in the past, 
therefore had different global implications than in the 1990s. First of all, such flows 
were not needed to supplement inadequate saving levels. From 1999, increases in saving 
rates outpaced investment while the current account balance of emerging economies as 
a whole was in surplus (BIS, 2009). This phenomenon is explained by the reserve 
accumulation strategy in the emerging economies. It was argued that in order to keep 
liquidity at sufficient amounts, these flows were used to purchase financial assets from 
the USA mostly in the form of short-term Treasury securities instead of being 
transferred to productive investment (Painceira, 2009; Powell, 2013; Lapavitsas, 2013).  
By 2006, reserves have climbed to almost to 30% of developing countries’ GDP from a 
range of 6-8% of GDP while the share in developed countries steadily remained below 
5% since the 1950s (Rodrik, 2006). These flows were held mostly in dollars. The dollar 
share of emerging economies’ external debt has risen from 49% in 1974 to 63.4% in 
1984, decreased to 43.4 in 1991 after the international flows dried up and then reached a 
peak in 1997 with 77% (Vasudevan, 2009a). Globally, while the USA absorbed 34% of 
capital imports in 1995, in 2009 it absorbed 65% of total capital imports indicating the 
dominance of its currency in circulation globally (Vasudevan, 2009a). 
For Lapavitsas (2013), a dependent reserve accumulation strategy is one of the most 
important explanations for the instability in developing economies that is facilitated by 
the role of the dollar as world money. Lapavitsas (2013) argues that since the collapse of 
the Breton Woods system, the world economy has been functioning without a ‘true’ 
world money, yet the dollar has been acting as the only monetary anchor. The USA 
took the role of the banker by borrowing short-term and lending long-term and as long 
as its economy was able to keep its external deficit under control and attract financial 
investments in dollar assets, the dollar could function as the monetary unit of the global 
world economy. Such a development, however, had an important implication for 
emerging economies, namely the structural requirement to accumulate dollar assets, 
intensified with financial deepening.  
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The hoarding of dollar increased the level of indebtedness in developing countries, 
which had already been systemically high, and ensured continual purchase of the USA 
public debts and a transfer of surplus from developing to developed countries. As a 
result, Powell (2013) argues that the uneven global development structure was further 
reinforced by the financialisation process, leading to a ‘subordinate’ form of 
financialised accumulation in developing economies. As Rodrik (2006) also argues, 
holding excess foreign currency reserves had significant social costs for developing 
countries. Representing the social cost by the spread between the yield on liquid reserve 
assets and external cost of funds, and assuming reasonable spreads between the yield on 
reserve assets and the cost of foreign borrowing, Rodrik (2006) calculated the income 
loss amounted to close to 1% of GDP.4  
It was argued that the mechanism of transferring financial risks to the periphery worked 
relatively well until the beginning of the 2000s. Nevertheless, when a currency functions 
as the world money, the hegemonic state faces a contradictory trend. While the 
continuation of the credit system lies in the hegemonic state’s ability to generate 
international liquidity in the form of debt, the growing debt burden threatens the 
hegemon to face speculative outflows of capital (Vasudevan, 2009b). The USA has been 
able to preserve its hegemonic position until the 2000s through the mechanism of 
countercyclical capital flows despite its external debt being over 25% of its GDP 
(Vasudevan, 2009b). After 2002, however, both flows to the USA and periphery have 
started to increase, breaking the countercyclical trend and therefore introducing the 
question whether the dollar’s ability to settle the debt globally as the world money was 
coming to an end (Vasudevan, 2009). For Lapavitsas (2013), this is due to the USA’s 
inability to control the flows given its huge external deficits and the existence of huge 
surplus countries such as China.  
The growth of financial assets held by peripheral countries was accompanied by the 
growth of public debt, a shift from foreign currency denominated debt to domestic 
                                                 
4 Rodrik (2006) explains that liquidity is achieved through three strategies which are reducing short-
term debt, creating a collateralised credit facility and increasing foreign exchange reserves of Central 
Banks. The socially optimal way of sustaining liquidity would be not just building up foreign assets, 
but also reducing short-term liabilities, therefore the question of why many developing countries 
chose solely to depend on increased foreign assets has stayed rather as a mystery, according to 
Rodrik (2006).  
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currency denominated debt with shorter maturity and a further growth of the financial 
sector (BIS, 2007). In accordance with the inflation-targeting strategies of the Central 
Banks of the periphery, large foreign exchange surpluses were sterilised through 
issuance of domestic government securities in order to avoid inflationary pressures. 
While the total financial assets in emerging economies rose from $3.9 trillion in 1995 to 
$23.6 trillion in 2006, domestic public sector debt rose from 8.8% of developed 
countries to 35.4% during the same period (Painceira, 2009). As documented 
extensively by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (2007), this refers to a carry-
trade position, a cross-currency investment strategy which involves leveraged borrowing 
in low-interest rate currencies to fund placements in high-yielding currencies without 
hedging the attending currency risk (Gabor, 2012a). As Gabor (2012a) argues, the carry-
trade contradicts with the dominant theoretical explanation for currency movements, as 
the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition traditionally predicts that under flexible 
exchange rate regimes, high interest rate countries normally experience depreciating 
exchange rates, offsetting speculative gains from interest rate differentials.  
Intensified carry-trade activity suggests that there is also a link between reserve 
accumulation strategy and increasing domestic debt levels, as the sterilisation of capital 
flows mostly took place through Central Banks’ issuance of public securities, held 
mostly by domestic financial institutions, which further contributed to the expansion of 
the financial system (Gungen, 2012). In the context of Eastern European countries, 
Gabor (2010) highlights how the Central Banks’ sterilisation attempts in creating the 
pool of liquidity resulted in financial institutions increased engagement with speculative 
activities such as carry-trade and currency arbitrage, as well as increased foreign 
currency denominated lending to households. As Rethel (2010) documents, a shift 
towards households to sustain consumption was evident in Malaysia. From 1999 to 
2006, total Malaysian household debt grew at an annual rate of 15%. In 2005, total 
household debt to GDP amounted to 72.6%. This is also discussed by Karacimen (2013) 
in the context of Turkey, as will be discussed in the following chapter.  
Nevertheless, not all capital flows took the form of financial assets and liabilities, as 
FDI flows also increased both from and to developing countries showing both an 
increased capacity for internationally competitive investment from the side of 
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developing countries as well as an increased placement of such capacity in non-domestic 
territories which might raise concerns for domestic regional growth and development. 
In 2014, outward FDI from middle income transition economies jumped by 84% 
reaching a peak at $99 billion, while FDI from developing countries also reached a peak 
at $454 billion (UNCTAD, 2014). Together, developing and transition economies were 
accountable for 39% of total FDI outflows compared to 12% at the beginning of the 
2000s (UNCTAD, 2014). Meanwhile, FDI inflows to developing countries also reached 
a new high of $778 billion, constituting 54% of the total. In total, the net balance of 
$108 billion went to transition economies, increasing by 28%.  
As pointed out by Powell (2013), capital flows do not account for systemic instability by 
themselvesand the quantity or direction of capital flows cannot be taken as an indicator 
of financialisation at any one time. That is because under flexible exchange rates, 
Central Banks take costly measures to manipulate the flows which can result in positive 
or negative cash flows at a given time period depending on the external availability of 
funds. Moreover, global production chains are so intertwined that most developing 
economies are structurally import-dependent which contributes to the foreign exchange 
inflows (Powell, 2013).  
Nevertheless, reserve accumulation has been an important empirical observation to 
underline the important implications of the volatile nature of capital flows in and out of 
developing countries and their correspondingly dependent foreign exchange policies. 
The literature on reverse capital flows emphasises three major implications for 
developing countries. First, it results in net capital transfers from developing to 
developed countries (Painceira, 2009; Lapavitsas, 2013). Second, it creates huge social 
costs by hampering investment and employment (Rodrik, 2006). Third, maintaining a 
stable foreign exchange regime becomes more difficult for countries with huge current 
account deficits and the efforts to prevent inflationary pressures increases the domestic 
public debt, leading to intensified carry-trade (Gabor, 2012a, 2012b). The next section 
will discuss the empirical findings in greater detail with respect to the changes in firm-
level and institutional dynamics.  
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3.2.2. Crowding out of investment interpretation and changes in firm and 
institutional behaviour 
As argued in the previous chapter, one of the primary arguments within the 
financialisation literature is that it has negative impacts on both aggregate and firm 
investment given the turn of individual firms to seek financial profits and governments’ 
strategies to sustain financial stability. The literature concerning the emerging 
economies has similar arguments in the sense that many studies have provided evidence 
for changes in the balance sheet structures of firms towards excessive holding of 
financial assets at the expense of fixed equipment purchases and productive investment, 
together with the governments’ efforts to maintain both financial profitability and 
liquidity in the form of incoming portfolio flows.  
As discussed before, Demir (2009a) uses micro-level data for Mexican and Turkish 
firms and finds that the increased availability of financial investment with higher returns 
than productive investment has a negative impact on productive investment. 
Karwowski (2015) conducts a similar study on South African firms and claims that there 
has been a tendency for South African firms to overcapitalise themselves and hold 
excessive financial assets which made them the largest holders of bank deposits. This 
trend was also visible in, for example, firms in Mexico which underwent transformation 
toward downsizing and distributing (Levy-Orlik, 2012). As firms were required to invest 
in financial services, they moved away from high-technology manufacturing and 
reduced their employment levels. Moreover, more profits generated in the previous 
period were distributed as dividends, decreasing fixed-capital consumption. On the asset 
side, firms turned towards more liquid, short-term financial assets and there was a 
decrease in fixed investment items such as net equipment. On the liability side, they 
tended to borrow more from open markets in the form of bonds and more complicated 
financial instruments, especially OTC derivatives, instead of long-term bank loans 
(Levy-Orlik, 2012; Powell, 2013). 
In Malaysia, Rethel (2010) finds that the country has shifted from a bank-based to a 
market based financial system in the post Asian crisis period (1997-1998). This affected 
both individual and corporate financial cultures, leading to the emergence of a new 
politics of debt which was embedded in the domestic system and reproduced itself. 
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Because a market-based system privileges firms over a certain size, this transformation 
exacerbated unevenness of access to credit. Levy-Orlik (2012) also emphasises Rethel’s 
(2010) point that financial integration brings unevenness in access to credit and foreign 
exchange reserves as a constraint and creates differentiation among firms according to 
size and international openness. High domestic interest rates in order to sustain 
attraction of foreign capital result in the decreased competitiveness of domestic 
small/medium enterprises with no international partnership since they lacked funds to 
borrow from expensive domestic credit markets. Because the SMEs traditionally rely 
more on bank lending, the increasing reliance on equity-based financing methods is 
found to affect their access to credit in a negative way (Levy-Orlik, 2012; Rethel, 2010). 
This resulted in large international corporations’ increased domination in domestic 
markets where they could access cheap international funds.  
Correa, Vidal and Marshall (2012) and Correa and Vidal (2012) also document that the 
financialisation process in Latin American countries resulted in the transformation and 
evolution of certain key institutions, such as the Central Banks and the commercial 
banking sectors which affected the ways in which the economy functioned. They claim, 
“[t]he ample accumulation of reserves in the region during the past years correlates to 
the ample issuance of non-resident actors in financial markets, as well as the balance 
sheet administration of foreign bank entities whose headquarters confront a process of 
deterioration of their capital, a growing need for reserves, and diverse programs of 
government bailouts.” (Correa & Vidal, 2012, p. 545).  
In line with the growing need for reserves, many Latin American countries witnessed 
huge capital inflows in the form of direct investment especially in energy and minerals, 
as well as the privatisations of select sectors of basic public services and 
telecommunications, especially during the second half of the 1990s. Meanwhile, the 
financial policies shifted towards those that respond to the needs of creditor banks such 
as a diversification of portfolios, widening the capacity of payments for debtor 
governments and sustaining stability through providing liquidity and depth in domestic 
currencies and widening the capacity to transfer earnings, dividends and interest 
payments. As a result, these requirements put considerable restraint on the autonomy of 
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central banks to finance structural public deficits (Correa & Vidal, 2012; Correa et al., 
2012).  
The limitation of the policy choices was especially visible, for example, in the inflation-
targeting strategy’s class dimension, manifested as the decreasing share of wages, 
especially as opposed to that of the ‘rentier’ layer with strong financial interests. Many 
argue that considering that inflation was already showing a downward trend in both 
inflation-targeting and non-inflation targeting countries in late 1990s and early 2000s, 
inflation-targeting strategy was not solely a price stability mechanism, but also another 
way to provide financial profitability through the deterioration of labour gains (Ergunes, 
2009; Papadatos, 2009).  
In many countries, it is argued that the cost of low inflation and high interest rates has 
been socialised through decreased labour costs by keeping wages low. Onaran (2009) 
finds in Korea, Mexico and Turkey that frequent crises of the 1990s and 2000s resulted 
in downward pressure on wages. This was especially through exchange rate depreciation 
and recession. In Turkey and Mexico, increased export intensity has led to a decline in 
the manufacturing wage share, although this had no significant impact in Korea. In all 
three countries, however, both recessions and nominal exchange rate depreciations had 
a negative impact on wages. The depreciation rates had reached up to 90.2% in Mexico 
in 1994, and 169.5% and 96.0% in Turkey in 1994 and 2001 respectively, 47.3% in 
Korea in 1998 (Onaran, 2009). Correspondingly, wage share in manufacturing industry 
decreased from approximately 50% in all countries during the late 1970s to 30% in 
Mexico, 20-25% in Turkey and 40-45% in the early 2000s. While labour costs were kept 
low, Marois (2011) argues that the financial interests were protected as seen in the bank 
rescues in the post-2001 crisis in Turkey.  
As argued in the previous chapter, this thesis does not support the theoretical argument 
that financialisation is straightforwardly associated with decreasing investment although 
such an outcome might be the predominant empirical observation. It is true that many 
studies acknowledge the fact that the implications of the intervention of finance on 
productive investment are inconclusive, as Kaltenbrunner and Karacimen (2016) 
emphasise that productive investment might fall (or indeed continue to grow) at the 
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aggregate level, dependent on the dynamics fundamentally differing according to the 
dominant firm size, sector and openness in an economy. As discussed briefly in the 
previous chapter, the Varieties of Capitalism approach also emphasises the positive 
impacts of financial expansion in case of a close link between big banks and businesses.  
The approach adopted in this thesis differs slightly from the VoC approach, however, 
as instead of identifying and comparing the pre-determined paths for the intervention 
of finance within the ideal types of coordinated or liberal market economies, it directly 
focuses on the contingent mechanisms through which finance is attached to the rest of 
economy, in a specific country. As Ashman and Fine (2013) show in the context of 
South Africa, the interventions of the financial system are not purely dependent upon 
the terms of its structural separation from industry and how they interact with one 
another, but rather is integrated into the specific systems of accumulation. Neither a 
coordinated nor a liberal market economy, South Africa has a well-developed and 
sophisticated financial sector with the dominance of London-based banks as a 
consequence of the particular pattern of its imperial past. These banks, however, neither 
primarily provide funds for accumulation nor expand their activities towards larger 
populations in a country where 37 per cent of the population do not even have a bank 
account.  
The Standard Bank of British South Africa and Barclays Bank Dominion Colonial and 
Overseas (BBDCO) held over 90 per cent of banking capital by 1910. The dominant 
industry, mining, however, was not dependent on the funds provided by these banks 
but rather their own capital provided by the establishment of a strong oligopolistic 
structure given the large amounts of capital necessary for the mining industry. The six 
mining houses which controlled the industry also had shares in the two imperial banks, 
indicating that the banking sector was intertwined with the mining industry. But as 
Ashman and Fine (2013) note, it was the productive industry which dominated the 
financial sector, and not vice versa.  
After financial deregulation in 1985, especially since around 2004, accumulation was 
characterised by a consumer boom, limited to the top 20 per cent of the population, 
fuelled by high commodity and asset prices and increased household borrowing which 
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amounts to up to 65 per cent of GDP. This is similar to many other developing country 
experiences. However, the oligopolistic structure in South African industry has also 
prevailed to the present, concentrated in energy and minerals and dependent upon 
internal funds. The oligopolistic structure in the financial sector remains as well, with 
the top five banks owning 90 per cent of all banking capital in 2010 (Ashman & Fine, 
2013). In short, the entrance of global finance into this picture did not result in the 
dissolution or transformation of existing relations, but rather exacerbated the 
oligopolistic, non-market and non-bank based structure. In that sense, the specific form 
of the concentration of power in the financial and corporate sector does not mean 
South Africa is historically unique, but rather shows that the role of finance in 
comparative economic performance could not be reduced to the changing relations 
between banks and industry, with predetermined patterns for funding investment.  
3.3. Conclusion 
This chapter provided a selective literature survey on financialisation in developing 
countries that first, primarily focused on their dependent nature due to the role of the 
dollar, exchange rate and debt management strategies and increased profit opportunities 
from speculative activities such as intensified carry-trade. Second, empirical evidence for 
decreasing investment levels in line with the developments in the core is discussed. The 
first half of the chapter focused on how capital flows played a determining role as while 
they reached unprecedented levels, helping the core countries sustain financial earnings, 
it also caused developing countries to import monetary policies directly from the core. 
Many developing countries in the 2000s adopted systematically tight monetary policies 
in order to prevent the inflationary effects that would arise from the excess liquidity of 
capital flows.  
As a result, exchange rate speculation has become structural and the excess 
accumulation of short-term debt securities mostly in the form of domestic bonds led to 
a growth of domestic public debt, capital transfer from periphery to the core and 
expansion of domestic financial systems (Gabor, 2010, 2012a, 2012b; Kaltenbrunner & 
Painceira, 2015; Painceira, 2012). It was argued that the import of the USA monetary 
policies, specifically, through reserve accumulation led to the emergence of a dependent 
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form of financialisation that is highly historical, political and institution-specific in 
nature (Powell, 2013). In the second half of the chapter, further empirical evidence for 
developing country financialisation is provided with respect to the decreasing levels of 
productive and fixed investment due to crowding out of available funds, further 
facilitated by the macroeconomic policy limitations (Demir, 2009a; Levy-Orlik, 2012; 
Karwowski, 2015).  
As will be discussed more in detail in the following chapter, the country case of Turkey 
also provides both an example and an exception to what has been described above. In 
line with other developing country experiences, Turkey has experienced increasing 
reserve accumulation due to requirements for banks and firms to hold foreign exchange 
in case of sudden exchange rate fluctuations. It experienced an export boom in the 
1980s which was sustained through wage suppression and exchange rate devaluation 
that was accompanied by increased public sector spending throughout the 1990s, also 
very much in line with other developing country experiences especially in Latin America 
(Onis, 2006). During the first half of the 2000s, consumption credits increased 
substantially, raising concerns over a consumption-driven demand path, which could 
lead to increased financial expropriation, as suggested by Karacimen (2014).  
Especially after the global financial crisis, however, the path in Turkey has not been 
accelerating levels of consumer debt and decreasing investment, but rather a shift of 
burden of indebtedness towards the corporate sector and banks. The financial inflows 
were concentrated mostly in the banking system along with FDI and capital imports, 
increasing the short-term external debt has sharply to 15% of GDP after 2008. 
Although the current account balance worsened, the increase in FDI eased concerns 
about financial instability. Also, banks’ productive lending has increased, and in general, 
loanable money capital entered the economy in the form of short-term portfolio flows, 
which were later lent by domestic banks to the private sector in the form of long-term 
TL loans. 
As a result, also pointed out by IMF (2015), while many well-performing economies in 
the region including Hungary and Poland joined the deflation wave in Europe, inflation 
and growth in Turkey in the last couple of years remained reasonably high although at a 
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slower pace of growth. It could be argued that the indebtedness along with FX open net 
position from the side of corporations was driven by their strategy to hold excessive 
reserves. However, their strategy to preserve existing production levels through turning 
towards export production in the face of shrinking domestic demand also resulted in a 
considerable degree of economy-wide capital restructuring processes, which will be 
discussed in the next chapter, with reference to the empirical evidence from the 
manufacturing sector (Taymaz & Voyvoda, 2009; Sengul, 2015).  
The next chapter is on the political economy of Turkey, in order to discuss how the 
Turkish case compares to the experiences summarised in this chapter, and to provide a 
bridge for the following chapters on the political economy of electricity and housing as 
contextually situated studies of financialisation. As will be discussed in more detail in 
the next chapter, the Turkish economy followed its own trajectory in which aggregate 
expenditure levels including investment were not adversely affected significantly by 
financialisation. Instead, a consumption-induced demand boom was accompanied by a 
restructuring in the manufacturing sector from low-technology labour-intensive 
industries to higher-technology capital-intensive ones. The construction and energy 
sectors also grew substantially, in relation to each other, which will be discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6. As argued before, these aspects are emphasised not to challenge the 
findings of the financialisation in developing countries literature, but to shift the focus 
away from the destabilising impacts on accumulation, and instead identify a more 
abstract pattern with implications for the value of labour power.  
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Chapter 4                                                                                              
The Political Economy of Turkey from 1980-2017: Towards 
Differentiated Global Integration 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides a political economy of Turkey since 1980, which broadly marks 
the beginning of the neoliberal period for which the materialist base can be referred to 
as financialisation. As argued in Chapter 2, periodisation of capitalism on the basis of 
Marxist political economy requires an understanding of the global economy in the 
abstract of which constituent parts are national economies which are neither mere 
manifestations of the global abstract nor separate subsets. In that sense, the analysis of 
the particular trajectory in Turkey is aimed neither to prove the existence of 
financialisation as a specific causal mechanism at the level of national economy nor to 
reject it as a rule. Instead, this chapter has two interrelated objectives. First, it has an aim 
in itself which is to give a detailed historical account of Turkish political economy that 
contributes to the understanding of how labour power is reproduced contextually 
through electricity and housing provision to be investigated in following chapters. 
Second, by drawing upon the historical formation of industry with respect to its actors, 
and investigating the impacts of 2001 crisis on this particular formation, it underlines 
the complex nature of the connections between finance and industry, and examines the 
developments in light of the previous discussion of financialisation. 
During and after the global financial crisis in 2008, the Turkish economy performed 
relatively well with an average growth rate of 5.4% between 2010 and 2014. After 2012, 
the growth started decelerating although it grew above expectations by 2.9% in 2016 
during a period of global subdued demand. This chapter aims at portraying how this 
was made possible in a period that is associated with slowdown of growth and 
accumulation. Similar to other developing country cases, Turkey’s integration process 
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has also been accompanied with greater instability and deep financial crises in 1994 and 
2001 both of which started as foreign exchange crises which later were translated into 
real economy busts. It also experienced, however, an increase in fixed capital formation 
especially during the 1990s which later constituted the base for a more stable growth 
after the financial crisis 2001,1 as opposed to the decreasing trend in the developed 
world. The next two sections will discuss these developments; first, during the 1980s 
and the 1990s, when accumulation stemmed from increased exports due to wage 
suppression and currency devaluation as well as government expenditures together with 
intensified speculative activities mostly through dependence on government bond 
markets. Second, during the 2000s, when the economy performed relatively well, 
despite the concerns with respect to decreases in gross savings, high unemployment, 
widening current account deficit and a consumption-induced demand structure (Rodrik, 
2009; Yeldan, 2007).  
As discussed in the previous chapter, there are conflicting theoretical views on the 
impacts of capital account openness on growth and development, reinforced by the 
inconclusive empirical results (Eichengreen, 2001; Rodrik & Velasco, 1999). 
Considering that the 2000s has been a period of deepening integration into the global 
economy, this picture can be another indication of the inconclusive impacts of capital-
openness on growth in developing countries. As Rodrik (2009) suggests, the results 
primarily depend on whether countries are constrained by finance or low returns on 
investment. Basically, while countries that are constrained by low savings and weak 
financial markets without structural return constraints on investment benefit from the 
increasing capital flows through directing them into productive investment; other 
countries where the costs of overvaluation outweighs the profitability of investment do 
not benefit much from capital flows through overcoming credit insufficiency. With the 
examples of Brazil and Argentina as constrained by finance and low returns, 
respectively, Rodrik (2009) shows that while capital inflows contributed to the 
investment levels in Brazil, exchange rate management of the overvalued peso has been 
more effective to maintain investment in Argentina, due its impacts on the profitability 
of tradables.  
                                                 
1 See Figure 4-1. 
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For Rodrik (2009), Turkey should be considered to have a finance-constrained 
macroeconomy, given its better performance with respect to increasing productivity 
levels. The annual rate of growth for both GDP per capita and GDP per worker have 
been higher during the 2000-2008 period compared to the previous two decades, with 
GDP per worker annual growth rate increasing from 0.02 during 1980-1990 to just 
below 0.025 during 1990-2000 and well above 0.035 during 2000-2008, as shown in 
Chapter 1.   
On the other hand, this came at the expense of a widening current account deficit and 
increasing unemployment which increased to a 9-12% plateau from an average of 7% 
during the 1990s (Onaran, 2006; Rodrik, 2009; Yeldan, 2006). Moreover, gross fixed 
capital formation did not substantially increase. Gross savings as a share of GDP 
decreased from 18% of GDP in 2000 to 14% of GDP by the end of 2015.2  
Table 4-1: Comparison of Selected Economic Performance Criteria in Middle Income Countries  
Source: World Bank 
From the 1980s onwards, the share of exports in GDP (94.4% of which is 
manufactured goods, in March 2017) has increased steadily after the boom in the first 
half of the 1980s.3 This resulted in many suggesting that the growth performance of 
Turkey following the 2001 crisis period was due to wage suppression and currency 
devaluation together with a consumption boom, instead of structural change (Demir, 
2009b; Onaran, 2009; Yeldan, 2011). However, in line with what Rodrik (2009) suggests, 
there is also evidence for a capital restructuring shift from labour-intensive industries 
                                                 
2 See Table 4-1 and Figure 4-1. 
3 See Figure 4-2. 
2000 2015 2000 2015 2000 2015 2000 2015 2000 2015 2000 2015
Turkey 71 69 12 16 21 18 20 28 23 31 18 14
Latin American & Cari 66 65 15 17 20 20 19 20 20 23 17 17
Lower middle 
income 66 66 11 11 22 27 27 24 26 27 25 28
Upper middle 
income 54 51 16 16 26 31 27 26 23 24 28 32
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towards capital-intensive industries within the manufacturing sector (Atiyas & Bakis, 
2013; Sengul, 2015; Taymaz & Voyvoda, 2009), followed by increasing private sector 
indebtedness facilitated by the incoming flows. The corporate sector’s external liabilities 
to GDP are relatively stable suggesting that the growing indebtedness was not 
disproportionate to the expanding economy.  
Figure 4-1: Gross Fixed Capital Formation in Turkey (% of GDP) 
Source: World Bank 
Figure 4-2: Exports of Goods and Services in Turkey (% of GDP) 
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The next section will give a brief historical account of the Turkish economy during the 
1980s and 1990s to discuss how an export-oriented accumulation regime was 
maintained through wage suppression and labour shedding practices. This is believed to 
be the counterpart of the expanding financial arbitrage opportunities, especially through 
the deepening of the short-term government securities market, in line with other 
developing country experiences covered in the previous chapter. Nevertheless, this 
chapter argues that there was also evidence for capital restructuring from labour-
intensive to capital-intensive industries within the manufacturing sector, signalling an 
economy-wide structural change. Section 4.3 will discuss how the 2001 crisis 
contributed to this, and constituted a turning point, by preventing the emergence of a 
fragmented financial structure through its differentiated impacts on different actors in 
the economy. By favouring the internationally competitive larger conglomerates with 
tight connections to the financial sector over smaller and financially constrained 
enterprises in Anatolia, it reinforced the existing oligopolistic structure with positive 
impacts on productive profitability, through maintenance of mark-up rates. In 
conditions of shrinking domestic demand, it also pushed less-flexible capital intensive 
firms towards export-orientation, contributing to the restructuring process. Section 4.4 
will discuss deepening of the financial sector and increasing indebtedness following the 
2001 crisis, while Section 4.5 will cover the corresponding expansion of consumption 
credit, which raised concerns over a consumption-induced demand structure.  
While acknowledging the increasing scope of speculative activities such as intensified 
carry-trade and simple arbitrage trading, as well as boosting of unproductive 
indebtedness through credit expansion to households, Section 4.6 will discuss the 
capital restructuring process within the manufacturing sector, to which financial 
deepening during the 1980s and 1990s has been conducive. In that sense, capital 
account liberalisation and enhanced access to credit facilitated not only speculative, but 
also industrial restructuring, as the manufacturing firms could channel appreciated 
currency into capital deepening, following the capital account liberalisation. Meanwhile, 
fiscal expansion contributed to aggregate demand during a period when private demand 
was not so strong. Section 4.7 will conclude by emphasising the methodological 
argument of the thesis, which is to shift attention away from identifying national 
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patterns and towards identification of a more abstract pattern (with implications for the 
value of labour power) with differentiated impacts on individual wage goods.  
4.2. 1980s and 1990s: Capital Account Liberalisation, Export Boom and Public 
Indebtedness  
Turkey followed an import substitution industrialisation strategy in the 1960s-1970s 
after it completed its transformation into a nation state from the remnants of an empire. 
By the end of 1970s, this strategy was no longer feasible in the face of increasing 
pressures for financial liberalisation which started as recycling of accumulated surplus in 
developed countries in the form of lending and borrowing. As a highly vulnerable 
economy, it was impossible to continue financing the industry for import substitution, 
since the firms were already mature, but not competitive enough internationally (Yeldan, 
1995). During the second half of the 1970s, there was a severe foreign exchange 
shortage after the oil crisis and the economy had high production costs due to 
protective tariffs and high labour costs due to the structure of the manufacturing 
industry consisting of low technology-intensive sectors with highly organised labour. 
The military coup in 1980 substantially suppressed wages through the dissolution of 
labour organisations and gave way to the replacement of the import-substitution 
strategy by an export-orientation programme in open economy conditions (Boratav, 
Yeldan, & Kose, 2000).  
The new development strategy resulted in substantially increased exports, which had 
taken place mostly through rising private manufacturing capacity utilisation observed as 
an increase of the manufacturing sector’s share in total exports from 55.3 per cent in 
1980 to 73.5 per cent in 1987 (Sengul, 2015). Total exports also increased from below 5 
per cent of total GDP in 1979 to almost 20 per cent of GDP in 1988. It has been well 
documented that the export orientation strategy was made possible not primarily 
through structural change, but through existing capacity utilisation as industry was 
extremely dependent on wage suppression and real devaluation of TL for exports, as 
well as import and export subsidies (Onaran, 2006; Senses, 1989; Voyvoda & Yeldan, 
2001; Yenturk, 1999).  
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Through making use of a Hodrick-Prescott filter to disintegrate the cyclical variations in 
productivity growth and wage rates from their historical trends, Voyvoda and Yeldan 
(2001) find the increases in labour productivity throughout the 1980s were only 
maintained with the help of the dissolution of powerful labour organisations after the 
military coup in 1980. They find that the average real value added per worker employed 
increased by 160 per cent from 1980 until 1996, with real wage earnings barely reaching 
the 1980 levels by 1996. Formal labour employment has increased by 31.8 per cent over 
the same period. On the other hand, the share of wage labour in manufacturing value 
added decreased from an average of 35.6% in 1977-1980 to 20.6% in 1988 (Voyvoda & 
Yeldan, 2001). Voyvoda and Yeldan (2001) argue that although it was theoretically 
expected from the process of outward orientation to contribute to both productivity 
and wage increases by exposing the sector to more competition and technological 
know-how of the global markets, this was not the case in the export-boom period 
during the 1980s in Turkey.  
Meanwhile, during the first half of the 1980s, Turkey received a substantial amount of 
foreign private credit as one of the first developing countries to implement structural 
adjustment policies. As a result, the primary sources of demand shifted from heavy 
public sector borrowing and spending, especially in the form of infrastructure 
investment, to private sector manufacturing. Throughout the decade, net domestic 
borrowings hovered around 50 per cent as a ratio of the stock of the existing debt 
(Boratav et al., 2000). Still, indebtedness stayed rather manageable with the ratio of 
domestic borrowing to GNP increasing from 1.1 per cent in 1980 to 2.9 per cent in 
1987 (Celasun & Rodrik, 1989).  
The size and importance of the financial sector was not so significant, and the ratio of 
total financial assets to GDP hovered around 25% of GDP in the late 1980s. Most of 
the securities comprised public securities, amounting in 1989 to 66% of all securities 
despite the rapid increase of private securities (Gungen, 2012). 1989 was an important 
year to mark the transition to full capital account liberalisation, although liberalisation 
took place step by step throughout the 1980s through liberalisation of the foreign trade 
regime, removal of exchange rate controls, adoption of special policies to attract FDI, 
liberalisation of market interest rates and shifting to income transfer through public 
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spending instead of price mechanisms (Demir, 2004). The classical strategy of surplus 
extraction through ‘labour shedding’ came to its natural limits in 1988, resulting in large 
current account deficits, high inflation and no significant real improvement in the 
overall competitive power of the economy in terms of global trade (Senses, 1989; 
Yeldan, 2006). 
Throughout the 1990s, the manufacturing exports continued to grow, reaching a peak 
in 1997, rising from 18.6% of GDP in 1988 to 24.5%. Throughout the 1990s, exports 
grew at an annual rate of 6% while GDP growth was 5%. The growth of fixed 
investment remained considerably lower at an average of 1.5%. In general, distinct from 
the 1980s, the 1990s has been characterised by high levels of domestic, especially public 
borrowing to sustain the economy. The ratio of net domestic borrowings to the stock 
of the existing debt increased from 50% level in 1980 to 105% in 1993 and 163.5% in 
1996 (Boratav et al., 2000). The share of the total public sector borrowing requirement 
(PSBR) increased from 4.7% of GNP in 1975 to 16.4% of GNP in 2001, while the 
share of interest payments in the consolidated budget increased from 0.5% to 23% 
during the same time period (Demir, 2004).  
Erturk (2003) pointed towards the speculative nature of this activity, facilitating a 
transition towards a ‘coupon-pool’ system, where the capital markets are no longer 
simply vehicles of financial intermediation but instead regulate firm and household 
behaviour in a destabilising manner. As mentioned in the previous chapter, many 
developing countries including Turkey are bank-based, therefore the establishment of a 
domestic debt market through the issuance of government securities increased the 
volume of speculative carry-trade activities in the overall economy.   
From 1989 onwards, domestic borrowing continued to increase significantly, the stock 
of domestic debt in GNP increased from 5.7% in 1988 to 14% in 1994, and to 28.7% in 
2000 (Yeldan, 2006). The indebtedness mostly took the form of short-term domestic 
public debt liabilities, mostly consisting of treasury bills with maturities less than a year. 
Between 1990 and 1999, the share of government bonds in the total assets of banks 
increased from 10% to 23%, while the share of loans to the private sector declined from 
36% to 24% (Erturk, 2003). According to Akyuz and Boratav (2003), during the 1990s, 
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the economy suffered from short-sided populist strategies such as Ponzi-financing 
debts and lack of fiscal discipline that resulted in unsustainable public indebtedness. For 
the Ponzi-financing strategy to work, domestic financial markets required the continued 
inflow of short-term capital to overcome the credit and monetary constraints. While the 
incoming flows were not sterilised by the Central Bank, they were used as a source for 
public expenditures by issuing short-term domestic debt (Yenturk, 1999).  
Gungen (2012) supports the same argument and claims that the 1990s were 
characterised by a speculative accumulation strategy where the private sector avoided 
productive investment and profited from the gradual financial deepening via public 
securities since government debt securities offered higher yields than the expected 
profits to be gained from investment. As a result, the primary channel for indebtedness 
has not been external debt although it increased nominally from 41,751 billion USD in 
1989 to 113,592 billion USD in 2001. Instead, the economy depended heavily on 
domestic borrowing, facilitated by the increase of total financial assets to GDP from 
31.5% in 1990 to 99.2% in 2001 (Gungen, 2012). Most of the domestic debt 
instruments consisted of government bonds and treasury bills, the share of which 
increased from 4% in 1990 to 50.9% in 2001. Meanwhile the private sector securities 
also increased, albeit much less significantly, from 3% of GDP in 1990 to 4.4% in 2001.  
In the face of such developments, Turkey experienced two big crises in the 1990s. The 
first severe financial crisis was faced in 1994, which was a traditional foreign exchange 
shortage crisis experienced by many developing countries during the period. The 
triggering of foreign exchange shortage was transmitted to the banking system through 
weak banks, which were becoming increasingly insolvent. Between 1992 and 1999, 
while the annual growth rate averaged less than 4%, the real interest rate paid on all 
domestic debts averaged 32%. By the end of 1999, the net open position of the Turkish 
banking system stood at 13.2 billion USD, showing the dependence of the banking 
sector on arbitrage income (Alper, 2001).  
The Ponzi-financing of debts through foreign funding continued until 1999, which was 
the year when unsustainability concerns about the path of indebtedness and increasing 
fragility led to the implementation of a three-year stand-by agreement with the IMF in 
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2000, amounting to 4 billion USD to combat the chronically high inflation. The 
programme was a standard currency-peg exchange rate package for inflationary 
developing countries that included tightening of fiscal policy, implementation of 
structural reforms and exchange rate stabilisation as its main pillars. Although it has 
been partially helpful for achieving some of these goals, it could not overcome the 
complications created by price stickiness and the downward pressure on interest rates in 
an economy dependent on capital inflows. As a result, the stabilisation Programme 
resulted in further deterioration of the economy that was signalled by the increase of the 
ratio of current account deficit to Central Bank’s international reserves from 5.9% by 
the end of 1999 to 29% in June 2000 and 49.7% by the end of the year (Yeldan, 2002). 
Just before the crisis erupted in 2001, the amount of net capital outflow reached a 
record level at 11.1 billion USD (Alper, 2001). It was classified as both a currency and 
banking sector crisis which was, again, similar to the crisis in 1994, and other developing 
country crisis experiences following capital account liberalisation, such as in Argentina 
in 2001 and in Mexico in 1994.  
For Onis (2006), the 2001 crisis was due to a policy design failure of the IMF 
stabilisation programme, based on strict fiscal and monetary control, which could not 
be maintained in an open capital environment. For Cizre and Yeldan (2005) and Yeldan 
(2006), it was not the policy design, but the premature liberalisation attempt itself that 
led to the crisis by leading to an overvaluation of TL and a loss of trade competitiveness 
in the international arena, as fiscal targets of the stabilisation programme could be 
reached despite ongoing difficulties. According to Alper and Onis (2003), especially in 
transitional financial systems in Turkey, Brazil or Argentina, the fundamental asymmetry 
between the liquidity structure of banks’ assets and liabilities as well as between real 
sector and financial sector brings a systemic risk of financial crises to turn into long-
lasting real economy crises. Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2000) argue, on the other hand, 
liquidity and banking crises that took place during the 1990s in developing countries did 
not have long-lasting negative impacts on the real economy and instead, had good 
prognosis in terms of rapid recovery by showing that although initially output levels 
declined sharply, they returned to pre-crisis levels in the second year after the crisis.  
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The 2001 crisis followed a similar trajectory described by Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2000), 
with the economy contracting by 5.7% in 2001 but recovering growth by 6.9% in 2002. 
Between 2002 and 2009, the structurally high inflation rate was finally reduced to stable 
levels and a relatively high growth rate was achieved at an annual level of 6.6% on 
average until 2009. 
The 2001 crisis has been analysed extensively (Akyuz & Boratav, 2003; Alper & Onis, 
2003; Celasun, 2002; Marois, 2011; Yeldan, 2002). This chapter will not go into further 
details with respect to how the chain of events unfolded. Nevertheless, as this thesis 
argues, it is important to investigate how the crisis had an impact on the specific 
development trajectory of Turkey, how it had differentiated impacts on different actors 
in the economy, especially with respect to the access to credit. The next section will 
discuss this issue from a political economy perspective.   
4.3. Political Economy of Transition: The Differentiated Impacts of the 2001 
Crisis  
In this section, I will briefly introduce the actors that played an active role in the 
establishment of the state apparatus and the design of social and economic policies as 
well as the productive relations in Turkey. This is to set a relational framework to 
understand how a global change has been incorporated into the specific set of 
productive relations in a particular domestic economy, and also to understand the 
differentiated impacts of the 2001 crisis on different actors.  
Turkey can be classified as a late-industrialising developing country in the sense that it 
heavily relied on a nationalist development agenda driven by the state in more or less 
closed economy conditions with very limited accumulation and productive capacities 
after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the end of World War I. From the 
1930s onwards, Turkey adopted an interventionist and protectionist development 
strategy for which the partnership between the members of the state apparatus and 
capitalist class was of great importance. At the early stages of primary capitalist 
accumulation, state intervention to the economy was direct in the form of étatist 
policies, which shaped the direction of the state’s position in the following stages. In 
that regard, the Turkish state shared many characteristics with East Asian late-comers 
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who successfully implemented such techniques towards a successfully growing economy. 
Yet, there was a marked difference that, while the role of the state in East Asia has 
always been market-augmenting, the state has been a major source of uncertainty for 
business with considerable variation in policy stances in Turkey (Bugra, 1994). 
When the Republic was founded in 1923, the political aim of creating a ‘classless society’ 
through giving the state the absolute power of social and economic organisation seemed 
in conformity with both the global nationalist movements of the time as well as the 
traditional productive relations in the Ottoman Empire, where the infrastructural 
mechanisms were deliberately designed to prevent and suppress any form of non-
political hierarchy. By the time the Empire came to its end, there was no significant 
capitalist accumulation and industrial production was confined to the limited number of 
small-scale establishments with an artisanal character.  
The Ottoman Census of Industry in 1915 states that the Empire had 14,060 employees 
and workers in 182 operating industries 70 per cent of which specialised in the 
production of wool, cotton, cloth, yarn, raw silk, flour and tobacco (Boratav, 1981). 
These industries were mostly based in Western Anatolia where transportation links were 
more developed, while the commodity flows between the cereal growing regions of 
inner Anatolia and big cities were almost non-existent due to poor transportation links. 
To indicate the severity of the infrastructure problem, Boratav (1981) compares that 
while transporting one tonne of wheat from central Anatolia to Istanbul cost $8.8 in 
1924, it cost only $5 from New York to Istanbul. The late Ottoman economy was 
operating in open economy conditions with no protective tariff rates for the industry 
due to the capitulations given to the European economies. Large-scale population 
transfers during and after wars and war losses had a serious negative impact on the 
existing labour force. 
The Lausanne Treaty in 1923 maintained that the Republic took the heritage of the 
Empire and continued operating in open economy conditions until the 1930s. Due to 
the increasing discontent among social classes and the state’s failure to establish 
productive capacity, the 1930s marked a distinctive difference for the Turkish economy 
in terms of the methods for capitalist accumulation. After the state had taken control of 
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its tariff rates, the economy swiftly went into an étatist phase with the aim of the state 
taking absolute control of the internal markets by giving it the rent of production as the 
only price setter for strategic commodities (wheat, cotton, tobacco). The Central Bank 
of Turkey was established in 1930 and two official economic policy programmes were 
prepared: The Report on the Economic Situation (Sakir Kesebir Plani) and The 
Economic Programme. The full transition to the étatist period was complete with the 
preparation of First Five Year Development Plan in 1932. The ultimate aim of such 
programmes was explicitly declared to achieve external and internal equilibrium via an 
import-substitution strategy. 
Despite the unfavourable conditions for the national economy, the programme was 
executed during the stagnant period of the Great Depression, and became successful in 
establishing infant industries and eliminating trade deficits in a protective environment. 
Between 1933 and 1939, the GNP growth rate was 9.1%, the industrial growth rate was 
10.2%, the share of industry in GNP rose to 16.9% from 11% in 1929, and the share of 
imports decreased to 6.6% from 14.5% in 1929. Protective tariffs were successful in 
that imports decreased from a level of 256 million TL in 1929 to 101 million TL in 1932, 
creating a positive trade balance for the first time (Boratav, 2012). To move the country 
from an agricultural based economy towards industrialism, 21 enterprises were decided 
to be opened under the First Five Year Development Plan, including a paper-mill in 
Izmit (Marmara Region), a cement plant in Sivas (inner Anatolia), an iron and steel plant 
in Karabuk (Northwest Anatolia), a brimstone factory in Keciborlu (Isparta, Western 
Anatolia) and a copper factory in Ergani (Diyarbakir, Southeast Anatolia).  
 In his well-known comparative historical study of industrialisation, Gerschenkron 
(1962) stated that étatist policies of the time were not entirely pragmatic measures taken 
at times of global uncertainty, but also had socio-political aspects which can be seen in 
the selection of sites in Turkey. Practically, étatism seemed to address primary capital 
accumulation for a state which only had a small entrepreneurial class. Nevertheless, 
according to the Thornburg report in 1949 on the Turkish planning experience, when 
the state started implementing investment projects in the form of State Owned 
Enterprises, social and political considerations played a greater role than economic 
considerations in selecting sites for the enterprises (Arnold, 2012). According to the 
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Report, the cities for the establishment of SOEs were chosen to help create an urban 
culture in Anatolia (the urbanisation rate was below 25%) while not disrupting the 
agricultural production through large-scale migration to big cities.4  
Establishing big industrial plants in scarcely populated cities required the state to create 
and regulate its own industrial workforce as well. For that purpose, Sumerbank and 
Etibank were founded in 1933 and 1935, respectively. While Sumerbank was in charge 
of the textile industry, Etibank was in charge of the mines; together they employed over 
8% of the industrial workforce during the 1940s. They also acted as commercial banks 
with opportunities to make loans, despite their primary duty staying to support the 
textile and mine industries. From 1940 onwards, Sumerbank and Etibank also started to 
provide social benefits such as housing, food, clothing, education and health services 
(Arnold, 2012).  
It was these conditions through which the capitalist accumulation was started with a 
small amount of internationally competitive big businesses in Istanbul, which had 
established powerful connections with the banks as well as the state elite, while the 
Anatolian economy was characterised by the monopolistic presence of the state (Aybar 
& Lapavitsas, 2001a). To a great extent, the actors in the financial and the real sector 
were the same. Large Turkish conglomerates competitive enough to survive in the 
world market had a variety of interests in banking and trading as well as industrial 
production, the most important examples being the Sabanci and Koc families, owning 
the majority of productive capital in refineries, automotive and metal industry as well as 
the fourth (Akbank) and fifth (Yapi Kredi) largest banks respectively.  
This structure had important implications for the development of the productive 
industry, as bank ownership provided great access to credit, sometimes even beyond 
legal limits (Ergunes, 2009). While the accumulation proceeded from the étatism of the 
1930s-1940s to the import-substitution strategy of the 1970s, the structure of the 
financial and the real sector with respect to their actors stayed more or less the same. It 
was only during the export orientation phase of the 1980s, some small and medium 
                                                 
4 The urbanisation project through the establishment of SOEs will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 6 on the political economy of housing provision.  
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enterprises in Anatolia had emerged by taking advantage of low wages and state support 
especially in textiles. These enterprises had limited access to credit, with a financial 
system in which the large banks were owned by the large conglomerates.  
During the stabilisation period after the crisis in 1994, extra-budgetary funds were kept 
under strict control and state-owned enterprises started to be privatised in an 
accelerating phase. The two public banks Ziraat Bank (State Agricultural Bank) and 
Halk Bank (People’s Bank) became channels for rent distribution with limited capacity 
for facilitating private entrepreneurship. While Ziraat Bank was the main channel to 
help agricultural producers, Halk Bank specialised in subsidising and lending to small 
and medium enterprises in cities. New bank entry was limited due to political limitations. 
Foreign bank presence, on the other hand, was almost absent.5 In this environment, the 
access to credit for Anatolian entrepreneurs was through two channels which were, first, 
to buy shares from privatised Etibank and Sumerbank and, second, to establish their 
own banks such as Egebank and Yurtbank, almost all of which were inadequately 
capitalised and engaged in highly risky operations which contributed to the making of 
the 2001 crisis (Aybar & Lapavitsas, 2001b).  
Throughout the 1990s, financing the public deficit through attracting foreign capital 
with high interest rates along with the low-risk lending to the state was sufficiently 
profitable for large firms and banks, as discussed in the previous section (Boratav, 
Yeldan and Kose, 2000). This created an opportunity for increased rentier income 
through the financial system throughout the 1990s which was exploited aggressively 
(Yeldan, 2006). In a disadvantageous environment dominated by huge public banks 
owning one third of all banking assets and big private banks with close links to large 
conglomerates, small private banks tried to maintain profitability through arbitrage 
opportunities and taking open positions by borrowing foreign currencies at high interest 
rates to capitalise TL denominated government securities in an open capital 
environment. These small banks were eliminated during the financial restructuring in 
the post-2001 crisis period.  
                                                 
5 Foreign bank entry stayed negligible in Turkey, with no entry during the 1990s and foreign bank 




As covered in the previous section, the decade of the 1990s is mostly discussed in the 
literature with respect to the establishment of a coupon pool system maintained through 
issuance of short-term government debt instruments. According to Sengul (2015), 
however, there were two important constituents of capital accumulation during the 
1990s that formed a basis towards structural change in the following decade. On the 
one hand, recently consolidated import-substitution oriented manufacturing sector 
enjoyed the benefits of capital account liberalisation by turning the appreciated currency 
into capital deepening. The manufacturing sector grew by an average of 6.8% between 
1990 and 1993, and by 5.7% between 1995 and 2000, with the exception of the 7.6% 
contraction during the 1994 crisis. The growth of the manufacturing sector was higher 
than the overall GDP growth, itself at an average of 5% during the decade. As 
mentioned above, the growth of exports also continued albeit through the help of wage 
suppression and currency depreciation after the 1994 crisis by 24%.  
On the other hand, fiscal expansion also continued contributing to aggregate demand 
when the manufacturing sector demand was not as strong. As Boratav and Yeldan 
(2006) report, from 1980 to 2000, the contribution of government expenditures to 
GDP outpaced the contribution of investment and exports. During the 1990-1999 
period, the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR)/GNP ratio had an average of 
9.4%, rising from an average of 4.5% from 1981 to 1988. Although this meant costly 
demand management, as by 2000, interest costs on domestic debt reached 80% of the 
overall tax income of the public sector (Boratav & Yeldan, 2006), it was helpful in 
providing a capital basis for private sector manufacturing growth.  
Meanwhile, the financial sector restructuring following the 2001 crisis further 
contributed to this, through elimination of smaller ‘risky’ banks hence restricting the 
access of credit for smaller enterprises. As mentioned above, large Istanbul actors had 
no problem in terms of access to credit; therefore such conglomerates were the 
advocates of financial liberalisation during the 1980s and onwards, which rescued them 
from the burden of public investment concerns of the nationalist governments (Aybar 
& Lapavitsas, 2001b). Therefore, an improved banking regulation and supervision that 
favoured big banks (Marois, 2011), also contributed to the maintenance of the existing 
oligopolistic structure, despite the emergence of new actors after the election of the 
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AKP government in 2002. This turned out to be a facilitating environment for 
productive investment, as it prevented the emergence of a fragmented financial sector 
with heavy reliance on foreign financing and open market liabilities, for example similar 
to the case of Mexico where the relationship between banks and large conglomerates 
were not tight prior to capital account liberalisation (Powell, 2013).  
In contrast, the banking sector in Turkey displayed traditional characteristics, with the 
primary function remaining to allocate financial resources for industry, especially in 
favour of larger industries given they could more easily maintain mark-up rates through 
the restriction of entry of smaller competitors. The 2001 crisis constituted a turning 
point for Turkey in many respects. First, it led to a substantial restructuring of the 
banking system and second, its differential impacts on different actors (along with the 
impacts of financial restructuring), reinforced the oligopolistic structure through 
elimination of small banks and tightened connections between big businesses and banks 
- which in the following period facilitated channelling of available funds into productive 
investment, to a certain extent. 
The next section will give an outline for the characteristics of the financial sector 
following the financial sector restructuring after the 2001 crisis.  
4.4. Deepening Integration after 2001: Restructuring of the Banking Sector  
In the aftermath of the crisis that erupted in February 2001 and resulted in the 
contraction of the economy by 5.7%, the IMF-led Transition to the Strong Economy Program 
was prepared to address the difficulties in the banking sector. The Program’s primary 
targets were disinflation, fiscal discipline and structural banking sector reforms. To 
address the chronic vulnerabilities in the banking sector, the Banking Sector 
Restructuring Program (BSRP) was prepared carried out by the Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency (BRSA). The programme had four pillars which were reforming the 
state banks, resolution of the banks under the management of the Savings Deposit 
Insurance Fund (SDIF), strengthening the private banks and strengthening the relevant 
legal and institutional environment.  
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It should be noted that a reform process in the financial sector had already started in the 
late 1990s, including the stabilisation programme based on a crawling peg exchange rate 
package in 1999/2000, mentioned before. The Transition to the Strong Economy Program 
was not dramatically different from these packages, although it put more emphasis on 
the financial sector directly in terms of regulation, transparency and accountability. 
Without doubt, the programme was more successful than its predecessors in terms of 
contributing to the deepening and widening of the financial sector with effective 
monetary and fiscal management as well as stronger banking regulation and supervision.  
Although the banking sector had grown and banking system assets in aggregate 
increased from 63% of GDP in 2005 to over 90% of GDP in 2012 reaching 1.4 trillion 
TL and 121% in 2016 reaching 2.5 trillion TL 6 , Turkey still can be considered as 
relatively unbanked with domestic credit to GDP ratio at 93%.7 The Turkish financial 
system is still considered to be a traditional bank-based system in which banks play the 
most dominant role and the primary channel of profitability for banks is lending for 
productive investment. Banks own 86% of total assets of the financial sector and stock 
market capitalisation does not exceed 50% of GDP while it has been above 100% of 
GDP in the US and the UK for the last 15 years, except the year 2008 when the 
financial crisis erupted.8 Even in 2008, however, the ratio did not decrease below the 50% 
of GDP level in developed countries, reflecting the relatively un-securitised nature of 
the Turkish financial system although the scope for market based financing in terms of 
securitisation, repo transactions and inter-bank money lending is increasing.  
By 2016, the largest share in Turkish banks’ total liabilities consisted of deposits at 53% 
and the largest share in total assets was credits at 62%. The first five banks held more 
than 50% of all banking assets, the largest three of which being public banks holding 32% 
of all banking sector assets.9 After the crisis, loans increased rapidly to 29% of all bank 
assets by the end of 2010 with a 25% annual rate of growth reaching 64% by the end of 
2016. Among total banking sector assets, 38.9% were foreign assets. While deposits also 
                                                 
6 BRSA (Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency in Turkey) statistics: www.bddk.org.tr. 
7 Domestic credit to GDP ratio is 237% in the US, 162% in the UK and 154% in Euro area, as an 
indicator of financial depth. In Brazil, it is 107% and 53% in Mexico (https://data.worldbank.org).  
8 The World Bank data on financial sector: https://data.worldbank.org/topic/financial-sector. 
9 CBRT (Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey) Statistics: www.tcmb.gov.tr. 
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grew, it was at a slightly slower pace, exposing the banks to greater liquidity risks, since 
this imbalance indicated a further reliance on foreign funding opportunities although 
the reliance on wholesale FX funding was low (13% of total liabilities) in 2012, 
compared to other countries in the region (IMF, 2012). 
As Figure 4-3 shows, the primary borrowers of the bank credits were the financial 
corporations, but the non-financial institutions’ long-term borrowing did not seem to 
decrease contrary to the latest trends in the developed world. Domestic bank credits 
mostly took the form of long-term TL loans and by March 2017 the share of TL loans 
in total loans was 66.3%10, while the share of long-term credits among total credits 
issued was almost 75%. Total credit liabilities increased for both the financial and non-
financial sectors, contributing to their increasing indebtedness. Credits given to the non-
financial sector increased from 462 billion TL in 2010 to 1.5 trillion TL by the end of 
2016.11 
Figure 4-3: Disaggregation of Total Debts in Turkey according to Sectors 
Source: CBRT Financial Accounts Statistics 
*Total indebtedness is calculated as the sum of currency and deposits, debt securities and loans under total 
liabilities.  
 
                                                 
10 See Figure 4-4. All domestic credit data are from the BRSA (Banking Regulation and Supervision 
Agency) website (www.bddk.org.tr), unless otherwise stated.  
11 See Figure 4-3. 
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Figure 4-4: Total Loans Issued by Domestic Banks in Turkey (according to currency types) 
Source: BRSA 
The share of the largest 25, 50 and 100 credits was decreasing, which could indicate a 
decrease in large-scale productive investment. The share of 25, 50 and 100 credits has 
declined from 14%, 19%, 25 % in 2011 to 13%, 17% and 25% in 2012, respectively 
(BRSA). Nevertheless, the share of investment funded by banks has been 7.4% in 2004, 
which increased to 38% in 2009 (although it decreased later to 31.4% in 2015). 12 
Investments funded by equity and sales, on the other hand, decreased from 33.4% in 
2004 to 4% in 2009 and stayed at that level until 2015. In Latin American countries, on 
the other hand, an opposite trend was observed and the share of investment funded by 
banks decreased from 23.8% in 2006 to 21% in 2010 on average.  
Although short-termism was not directly evident in borrowing practices of non-
financial firms, the increase in the private sector’s reliance on external funding might 
bring the new vulnerabilities, especially with respect to the increase in FX denominated 
borrowing. Figure 4-5 further shows that the private sector’s borrowing increased 
substantially after 2009. During the period, public sector borrowing stayed insignificant 
as the high yield of government securities declined gradually in domestic markets after 
the crisis in 2001, signalling a shift in the primary accumulation channel.  
 
                                                 
12 Investments funded by banks and investment funded by equity and sales ratios are from The 
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Figure 4-5: Total Credit Liabilities in Turkey (flow – million USD) 
Source: CBRT Balance of Payments Statistics 
Despite the improvements in productive lending capacity, it should be noted that the 
largest proportion of total credits was issued for trading and commercial reasons, 
constituting almost 40% of all credits by January 2017. Figure 4-6 demonstrates that 
credits to small and medium-enterprises also increased substantially, although their 
share in total credits declined from 27% in 2006 to 24% in March 2017. Still, 
considering that the SME credits are given in smaller quantities, the nominal increase in 
the amount of SME credits from 60 billion TL (40 billion USD) in 2006 to over 448 
billion TL (120 billion USD) in 2017 reflects the improvement in the total number of 
SME credits from 1.7 million in 2006 to just over 3 million in March 2017. 

























































































Total FX Loans Total TL Loans SME Loans as a share of total loans (right axis)
149 
 
Financial institutions, on the other hand, were mostly indebted in short-term FX 
denominated liabilities. As Figure 4-7 below illustrates, although the share of total FX 
liabilities in total liabilities stayed stable at around 40% during the period between 2003 
and 2017, the great majority of bank credits among bank liabilities was in FX and the 
share of total FX liabilities increases to over 70% when deposits are excluded which are 
almost exclusively in domestic currency.  
Figure 4-7: The Share of Foreign Exchange Liabilities in Total Liabilities of Financial Sector  
Source: BRSA 
This development is in line with the reserve accumulation trend, which suggests 
developing countries are structurally required to keep reserves of foreign exchange in 
the face of exchange rate volatilities and sudden capital inflows. The largest share of 
foreign currency denominated liabilities among non-deposits came from the payables to 
banks item, which indicates foreign currency came into domestic financial market 
mostly in the form of short-term interbank credits. Supply of foreign exchange credit 
mostly took the form of one year maturity participation loans from international banks 
and off balance sheet transactions. Figure 4-8 shows an increasing trend in the long-
term borrowing of the financial institutions during 2012-2015. Still, the majority of 
debts have been short-term, and as Figure 4-9 shows, banks absorbed most of the 
short-term external debt stock of Turkey. Figure 4-9 shows that especially after the 
global financial crisis in 2009, the short-term external debt stock of the banking sector 
increased dramatically, outpacing the debt stock of the non-financial sector, which has 










2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Total Foreign Exchange Liabilities Foreign Exchange Liabilities Excluding Deposits
150 
 
Figure 4-8: Turkish Financial Sector Credit Liabilities Maturity Structure (flow) 
Source: CBRT Balance of Payments 
Figure 4-9: Short-Term External Debt Stock of Banks and Non-Financial Corporations in Turkey 
Source: CBRT Short-Term External Debt Statistics 
Among total bank liabilities, credits have a share of around 20%, 80% of which have 
been in FX from 2005 onwards. In 2014, 20% of such credits have been syndication 
credits with an average maturity of 1 year and 11% are securitisation credits with an 
average maturity of 6.5 years.13 As a result, the net balance sheet open position of the 
financial sector reached a peak in 2015 at 92 billion TL.14  
                                                 
13 BRSA (2014), Turk Bankacilik Sektoru Genel Gorunumu. 














































































As Figure 4-10 shows, the open FX balance sheet position of financial institutions was 
balanced with positive off-balance sheet position. By the end of 2016, the net balance 
sheet foreign exchange position of the financial sector was around -64 billion TL, 
balanced by off balance sheet flows reducing the total net foreign exchange position to -
1.6 billion TL. The maturity structure of such off balance sheet structure is not officially 
known, but most of them are assumed to have short-term maturity. In the long term, 
the financial sector has a positive foreign exchange balance due to long-term investment 
loans.  
Figure 4-10: Financial Sector FX Position in Turkey (million TL) 
Source: BRSA 
Figure 4-11 provides a closer look into the maturity structure of the financial sector 
since 2010, and shows that both short-term and long-term credit liabilities have 
increased substantially. This indicates that the loanable money capital enters the country 
in the form of short-term credit which is then absorbed by the domestic banks. It is 
crucial to note that when loanable money capital is transferred to the private sector, it 
takes the form of long-term investment and commercial loans in TL (see Figure 4-12) 
which has positive impacts on real output growth while it also gives the advantage of 
profiting from exchange rate differences to the financial sector. As Figure 4-12 
illustrates, by the third quarter of 2016, two thirds of all credit liabilities of non-financial 




Figure 4-11: Turkish Financial Sector Credit Liabilities Maturity Structure (stock) 
Source: CBRT Financial Accounts 
Figure 4-12: Turkish Non-Financial Corporations Credit Liabilities Maturity Structure (stock) 
Source: CBRT Financial Accounts 
The IMF Financial System Stability Assessment in 2012 states that the CBRT’s financial 
stability approach in the post-crisis period had been quite unorthodox in the sense that 
it started differentiating and increasing TL and FX reserve requirements to lengthen 
maturities and increase the cost of funding. It widened the interest rate corridor and 
reduced the policy rate to lower the front end of the yield curve in order to discourage 
very short-term capital inflows. It increased reserve requirements, introduced tight rules 
for the FX open positions, liquidity and capital adequacy ratio (CAR requirement was 
increased from 8% to 12%, the absolute value of the foreign exchange net open 
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substantially, and the CBRT increased its reserves from 18,741 million USD in 2001 to 
87,128 million USD by March 2017. Nevertheless, the accumulation of short-term debt 
outpaced the growth of reserves, increasing the vulnerability of the financial sector to 
sudden stops of capital inflows which were otherwise relatively robust  (IMF, 2017) . 
Figure 4-13: Current Account Deficit Financing Items in Turkey 
Source: CBRT Balance of Payments Statistics 
*Current account deficit on the right axis, in reverse order 
Figure 4-13 shows that there were also net positive FDI inflows to the country, even 
during the period of financial crisis in 2009. During the 2000s, FDI inflows were the 
most important item in financing the current account deficit, until 2009. According to 
the IMF Financial System Stability Assessment in 2012 such financial inflows were the 
primary reason behind strong post-crisis recovery, despite an externally-financed boom 
presenting a very challenging macro financial environment given that domestic demand 
had been import-intensive and credit-dependent. Total FDI was only 10.6$ billion in 
aggregate during the period in between 1984-2001, it increased to 52.2$ billion between 
2002 and 2007, foreign portfolio inflows also increased to 32.4$ billion by 2007 15 . 
Between 2002 and 2009, the majority of capital flows took the form of foreign direct 
investment, after the global crisis, the primary source of flows has become portfolio 
investment instead of foreign direct investment. In 2012, when portfolio inflows 
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reached a peak, 75% of capital flows became portfolio instruments, more than 80% of 
which were debt instruments.  
These stylised facts have been well-documented especially with respect to the increasing 
risks that come with an increasing short-term debt stock in open market conditions. For 
example, in 2012 and 2017, the IMF’s Financial System Stability Assessment for Turkey 
emphasised the fundamental macroeconomic vulnerabilities as the high proportion of 
savings and debt held in foreign currency at short maturities, the dependence on cross-
border financing, and the risk of a large structural maturity mismatch, since the majority 
of deposits had maturities of less than three months and banks also relied on short-term 
CBRT funding. The average maturity of banking system deposits did exceed three 
months and banks held large amounts of government securities at longer maturities, 
although a BIS study in 2008 stressed that the risks are lower, as the share of securities 
decreased substantially from 41% in 2002 to 28% in 2007 (Yorukoglu & Cufadar, 2008). 
According to the same study, it was the participation of foreign investors that enabled 
the Treasury to issue longer-term debt securities and rely less on the domestic banking 
system which as a result reduced the domestic debt rollover ratios below 100% and 
increased the loanable funds available for credit. 
The Financial Stability report published by the CBRT in November 2014 stressed 
similar points but also indicated that the financial system had been under the threat of 
normalising monetary policies of the global economy triggered by the monetary 
measures taken by China, the European Central Bank as well as the Fed (CBRT, 2014). 
During 2012-2015, inflation levels had been below the targets for many advanced 
economies bringing the risk of a deflationary spiral. Rapidly depreciating interest rates 
and the weak outlook of economic activity in developed countries transferred the risk 
of financial instability from developed countries to emerging economies like Turkey 
which were extremely dependent on external borrowing.16 It was also stated by the IMF 
in 2015 that volatility in major exchange rates had also increased by more than during 
any similar period since the global financial crisis, which was another disadvantage for 
developing countries. Reduced liquidity in both the foreign exchange and fixed-income 
markets, as well as the changing composition of the investor bases in these markets, 
                                                 
16 IMF (2015), World Economic Outlook: Adjusting to Lower Commodity Prices.  
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added to the volatility level of portfolio flows. Oil prices declined sharply in 2014 by 
45%, largely due to the insufficient levels of demand in advanced economies together 
with the large gap between exchange rates creating a reallocation of real income 
between different actors but favouring advanced economies while extracting resources 
from developing countries (IMF, 2015).  
One interesting point made by the IMF’s 2017 country financial stability assessment, 
which has also been emphasised in this section,, concerns that the banks’ balance sheets 
show that the credit growth has shifted from households towards the corporate sector 
including small- and or medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) since 2012. This segment now 
in total constitutes over 75% of all loan issuance by domestic banks. As Karacimen 
(2014) emphasises, there has been a rapid loan increase during the post-crisis period 
especially in the household segment that can be seen in the increase of personal loans as 
a share of GDP from 1.8% in 2002 to 18.7% in 2012. Among total loans, the share of 
personal loans also increased from 4.7% of in 2002 to 33.5% in 2012.17 After 2012, 
indebtedness increased more substantially among the non-financial corporations. 
According to the IMF, this development is most probably due to a response in macro-
prudential measures (IMF, 2017). The next section will investigate the developments 
within the household sector. 
4.5. Developments within the Household Sector and Increasing Household 
Indebtedness 
As Painceira (2009) argues, in most of the developing countries, the 2000s have been 
characterised by growing internal public debt especially to sustain the flows of capital 
from developing to developed countries, external debt being held mostly in the form of 
US Treasury bills. Another important feature has been the accumulation of household 
debt, which has also been emphasised in the Turkish context by Karacimen (2014). As 
discussed before, household indebtedness has been a particular focus of the 
financialisation literature, due to its distinctive implications for demand, profitability, 
growth and financial stability, the most important being making a weaker contribution 
to capital outlays, according to Dos Santos (2013). 
                                                 
17 BRSA statistics (www.bddk.org)  
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After experiencing a decade of growing public indebtedness followed by a huge 
financial crisis in 2001, the Turkish economy has followed a similar path in terms of 
high levels of household indebtedness, to be later followed by a shift in the burden of 
indebtedness from public to the private sector. As Figure 4-14 shows, household credits 
as a share of all credits increased dramatically in 2004, after the legislation in 2003 that 
brought some regulatory arrangements for consumers to have greater access to credits 
such as outstanding debt relief, interest rate decreases and easier access to credit cards 
due to partial cancellation of extra fees involved and instalment policy in payments. As a 
result, in line with the general declining trend of interest rates due to deflationary 
pressures, monthly interest rates on housing loans declined from 2.57% in mid-2004 to 
0.99% by the end of 2005 (Karacimen, 2014).  
Figure 4-14: Credit Types Issued by Domestic Banks in Turkey as a ratio of Total Credits 
Source: BRSA 
After the rising trend, consumer credits as a share of total credits constituted 35% of all 
credits in 2012, reaching a peak. By March 2017, the share of consumer credits 
including credit card expenditures in all credits declined to 25%, although its share as a 
percentage of GDP increased steadily from just over 1% in 2004 to 15.9% by 2016.18 
Although the aggregate contribution of household credits to GDP stayed relatively 
lower than credits expended to the private sector for productive and commercial 
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purposes, considering the smaller size of household credits as opposed to productive 
and commercial credits, the increase has been substantial.  
Figure 4-15: Credit Types Issued by Domestic Banks in Turkey as a ratio of GDP 
Source: BRSA and CBRT (GDP nominal according to income method) 
Household balance sheets are still relatively strong, despite the rapid credit growth to 
the sector and households do not hold considerable debt instruments other than credits. 
They also do not hold FX debt, as since 2009 they are not permitted to borrow through 
FX indexed loans. Still, household liabilities are outpacing the growth of assets and loan 
defaults jumped in 2009, reflecting the high unemployment level. 19  As Figure 4-16 
illustrates, until 2009, the primary channel of increasing household indebtedness was 
through the increased use of credit cards. The total number of credit cards in use has 
been increased from 13,372,600 in 2000 to 44,392,600 in 2009. The credit card liabilities 
of the household sector as a whole increased from 33,990 billion TL in 2008 to 83,806 
billion TL by the end of 2013, which is more than triple the amount in the early 2000s.20 
In 2013, BRSA implemented a regulation regarding the credit card usage in order to 
prevent further indebtedness and credit defaults which was represented by a decrease in 
total credit card debts in 2014. After the mortgage regulation of 2004, housing credits 
increased substantially, reflecting the shift towards individualised housing provision that 
will be discussed in Chapter 6.  
                                                 
19 IMF (2017), Financial System Stability Statement.  
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Figure 4-16: Disaggregated Consumer Credits in Turkey (million TL) 
Source: BRSA 
Drawing upon the middle-income country examples of Brazil, Mexico, Turkey and 
Poland, Dos Santos (2013) claims that the expansion of consumer credit has some 
structural properties, because first, consumption credit makes a greater dynamic 
contribution to inflationary pressures than credit financing productive enterprise in 
closed economy conditions and second, consumption credit contributes to aggregate 
profitability by sustaining the systemic demand for credit through extracting profits 
from future income flows. As a result, this indicates that as long as sufficient levels of 
demand for household credit are present, competitive signals in the credit-market 
process will tend to push the economy to greater levels of consumption lending, 
increasing the susceptibility of the economy to financial crises due to an increasing level 
of indebtedness as opposed to capital formation (Dos Santos, 2013). The next section 
will investigate how such expansion in Turkey went hand-in-hand with improvements 
in productive capacity of the industry, manifested in capital restructuring in the 
manufacturing sector.   
4.6. Capital Restructuring in the Manufacturing Sector and Increasing Private 
Sector Indebtedness 
As mentioned in the previous sections, especially after the global financial crisis in 2008, 
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in financial sector indebtedness. Corporate sector debt rose by about 19% to 40% of 
GDP during 2010 and to over 150% by the end of 2016.21 It was argued that although 
non-financial corporations are profitable, increasing leverage also exposed them to FX 
risks. Although the majority of credits taken by the corporate sector are in the form of 
long-term TL credits, FX credits also increased substantially, 68% of which are issued 
by the domestic banks. Over 60% of FX credits are denominated in dollars. Both in the 
long and short terms, the real sector took a short position in foreign exchange with a 
net position of -200 billion USD.22  
Figure 4-17: Turkish Non-Financial Corporations Total FX Liabilities (million $) 
Source: CBRT (annual from 2002 to 2015-3, quarterly starting from 2015-3)  
*Net FX position on the right axis, in reverse order 
The aim of this section is, however, to emphasise how the structural need for holding 
FX reserves developed in a way in Turkey that was not hampering for productive 
investment. Indeed, the attempts of the higher-capital intensity sectors to protect their 
existing production levels pushed them towards increased export orientation, which was 
certainly a factor in their increasing indebtedness along with an economy-wide 
restructuring process. Such restructuring is reported in detail within the manufacturing 
sector in Atiyas &  Bakis (2013), Taymaz & Voyvoda (2009), and also in a recent PhD 
                                                 
21 See Figure 4-3. 
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study by Sengul (2015) manifested as a shift from labour-intensive low-technology 
industries towards higher-technology, capital-intensive industries.23  
The manufacturing sector has been a powerful segment in the Turkish economy 
especially in terms of export performance. In 2016, the manufactured exports to total 
exports ratio was 82.9%.24 Before 2002, the manufactured exports weredominated by 
labour-intensive industries such as textiles and the food industry. As mentioned above, 
after the crisis, the share of capital-intensive industries, such as motor vehicles or 
machinery production in total exports had remarkably increased.  
The industrial investment oriented strategy aiming for this goal had been explicitly 
declared as a state strategy in the 8th Five Year Development Plan in 2000, hence 
between 2001 and 2005, the state has been actively involved in industrial policy design 
despite the lack of a complete industrial programme (Oguz, 2009). There were some 
institutional attempts to provide incentives for technical change, and for example, the 
enactment of Law No: 5084 regarding investment and employment brought tax 
deductions as well as generous energy and land subsidies in the form of a 20% 
deduction in electricity bills and the free allocation of public land to enterprises 
employing more than ten employees for at least five years.25 Initially, the Law concerned 
36 provinces with an income per capita of 1500 USD or lower. Later in 2006, Law No: 
5350 was enacted adding thirteen more provinces to the jurisdiction of Law No: 5084. 
In 2009 and 2012, a more comprehensive incentives package program was introduced, 
named the General Investment Encouragement Program (GIEP). While preserving the 
subsidies offered by Law 5084 and 5350, GIEP also introduced other incentives such as 
exemption from customs duties, value added tax exemption for machinery and 
                                                 
23 According to CBRT classification, Manufacturing sector consists of Food Beverage and Tobacco 
Industry, Textile and Textile Products Industry, Leather and Leather Products Industry, Wood and 
Wood Products Industry, Paper, Raw Materials and Paper Products Industry, Nuclear Fuel and 
Refined Petroleum and Coke Coal Industry, Chemical Products Industry, Rubber and Plastic 
Products Industry, Other Mines Excluding Metal Industry, Main Metal Industry, Machine and 
Equipment Industry, Electrical and Optical Devices Industry, Transportation Vehicles Industry, and 
Manufacturing Industry not classified in other places.  
24 TURKSTAT, Foreign Exchange Statistics (www.tuik.gov.tr). 
25 For a full list of investment incentives legislation including foreign direct investment and bilateral 
investment treaties, see Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy website (www.ekonomi.gov.tr).  
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equipment industry and direct credit allocation from the budget up to 50% of total fixed 
investment costs (Acar & Caglar, 2012).  
Despite the state incentives listed above, however, the restructuring process should not 
be considered to be a result of a deliberate state initiative. It was rather a response to the 
crisis conditions. For, while lower-technology industries with flexible employment 
conditions continued to produce less for shrinking domestic demand through labour 
adjustments, medium-low and medium-high industries channelled capacities into export 
demand in order to preserve their pre-crisis production levels, which resulted in further 
increasing debt levels, together with the requirement to obtain foreign exchange to 
hedge against FX liabilities. An indispensable aspect of this has been low costs of labour, 
which has been well documented by Yeldan (2011) and Onaran (2006). There were 
however, also signs of technical progress which will be discussed in this section.  
The evidence for this improvement is documented by Taymaz and Voyvoda (2009) and 
Sengul (2015) as follows. Between 1998 and 2002, the share of textiles industry 
production in total output increased from 2.82% to 5.38%, while the share of the 
wearing apparel industry increased from 2.11% to 3.10%. Nevertheless, the remarkable 
change was in their decreasing exports share in production, as both almost halved from 
74.3% to 38.3% and from 41.2% to 20.8%, respectively (Sengul, 2015). It should be 
noted that these two industries had been the locomotive of the Turkish manufacturing 
sector in terms of exports especially during the export boom of the 1980s.  
Medium-low and medium-high technology industries such as basic metals, machinery 
equipment and transport equipment, on the other hand, increased their export shares 
substantially, although the increases in their total output share were less significant. 
Between 1998 and 2002, the basic metals and metal products sector increased its export 
share from 16.1% to 24.7%, the machinery and equipment sector from 13.2% to 21.6%, 
while the transport equipment sector increased its share from 19.9% to 44.2%. Their 
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shares in total production during the same time span only slightly decreased from 3.92% 
to 3.34%, from 1.97% to 1.79% and from 1.74% to 1.78%, respectively.26  
From 2002 to 2007, the restructuring had been more visible, also due to the crisis 
conditions. The share of the textiles sector in total output declined from almost 7% to 
5.2% while the decline in the share of the wearing apparel sector was from 4.6% in 2003 
to 3.7% in 2007. During the same time period, the machinery and equipment sector 
increased its share in total production from 2.8% to 3.4%, the electrical and optical 
sector from 2.6% to 3.1%, and the transport equipment sector from 4.4% to 5.7%. A 
more striking change has been in gross fixed real investment as a ratio of total 
production, as while almost all sectors experienced a decrease in their gross real 
investment shares, the machinery and equipment sector increased its share from 1.6% 
to 2%, the basic metals sector from 3.5% to 4.1%, and the transport equipment sector 
from 2.9% to 4.9%. It should be noted that the sectors with the highest share in total 
production performed weakly in terms of fixed investment. For example, the textiles 
sector decreased its investment share in total production from 7.8% to 4.3%, between 
2002 and 2007.  
The indicators of restructuring were best observed in the transport equipment sector, 
driven by the motor vehicles industry. The automotive sector’s export share of 
production tripled from 14.6% to 43.6%. It has been the fastest growing medium-high 
capital-intensive sector, with its share in total exports rising from 2.5% in 1993 to 16% 
in 2006, and its average growth rate being 10% between 1993 and 2001 (Taymaz & 
Yilmaz, 2008). Between 2001 and 2006, its growth rate has been even higher at 20%.  
For some, the success of the automotive sector is due to a considerable degree of 
import-dependency (Atiyas & Bakis, 2013; Gros & Selcuki, 2013; Taymaz, Voyvoda, & 
Yilmaz, 2008). In terms of global competitiveness, Turkey is still involved in the global 
supply chains with limited domestic value added capacity. By March 2017, low 
technology exports in total exports still have the highest share at 34.3% although 
                                                 
26  All data for sectoral comparison is from Sengul (2015) unless otherwise stated. For a more 
detailed comparison including all sectors and other criteria such as real growth production, value 
added and import/production ratios, see Atiyas & Bakis (2013), Taymaz & Voyvoda (2009) and 
Sengul (2015).  
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medium-high exports follow closely at 32.1%.27 Medium-low technology sectors had a 
share of 30% while the high technology sectors are only responsible for the 3.7% of all 
exports.  
For Taymaz & Yilmaz (2008) it was the successful trade links especially with the 
European Union and a high level of vertical integration as the primary driver of the 
growth of the automotive industry, which did not contribute significantly to increases in 
domestic value-added levels. Since automobile production is highly producer-driven 
(Ng & Kaminski, 2006), Turkey’s trade links with the European Union enabled it to be 
involved in the international automobile supply chains as an assembly point. The 
vertical integration ratio (value added/output) of Turkish automotive industry is 0.330, 
which is significantly high compared to its counterparts in East European countries and 
Spain (0.154), India (0.177), UK (0.183) indicating that the Turkish automobile industry 
engages in more manufacturing operations through intra-firm trade and production 
(Taymaz & Yilmaz, 2008).  
In 2012, the share of the automotive industry in total sales from production was 14%, 
and its share in total exports reached 24%, while the gross value added share only 
remained at 5% relative to total industry, showing the dominance of low value-added 
assembly practices. Overall, the economy has been highly import-dependent as the 
imported component of total manufacturing increased from 40% in 2010 to 43% in 
2011. The growth of imports for manufacturing was even higher than the growth rate 
of manufacturing itself, showing the great level of import dependency (Gros & Selcuki, 
2013). In a CBRT study, Saygili et al. (2010) also document that intermediate goods 
imports of Turkey have increased 2.5 times more than the increase in manufacturing 
output between 1994 and 2008. In 2011, total aggregate imports outpaced total exports 
– reaching $240 billion, compared to exports of $134 billion. Overall, imports of goods 
and services as a share of GDP has increased from 23% in 2000 to 31% in 2015, while 
gross savings decreased from 18% of GDP to 14% during the same time period.28 
                                                 
27 All foreign trade data are from TURKSTAT website (www.tuik.gov.tr), unless otherwise stated.  
28 World Bank Data (https://data.worldbank.org).  
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As a result, Taymaz and Voyvoda (2009, p. 167) argue that although the turn towards 
higher-technology sectors within the manufacturing was evident, it was unlikely to lead 
to economy-wide structural change, given that it was triggered by over-valued Turkish 
lira, rapid increases in intermediate imports to substitute domestic production and 
persistent dependence of the new production and export lines on imported components, 
which seriously restrained the economy’s capacity to generate value-added and 
employment.  
Although it cannot be disputed that there is a considerable degree of import-
dependency, it is important to address two issues that also reflect the focus of this 
chapter in line with how the workings of the economy are conceptualised in this thesis. 
First, it should be noted that the restructuring is in its early stages where total output 
levels were more or less preserved, therefore it was expected to see increasing 
import/production ratios. Despite this, the import ratio in total production decreased 
almost by a half in the transport equipment sector from 90.19% in 1998 to 52.17% in 
2002 (Sengul, 2015).  
Second, in addressing restructuring, this chapter is less concerned with its results with 
respect to improvements in international competitiveness or gross output increases, as 
such successes are dependent on many other considerations, but rather aims at 
understanding why such restructuring occurred in the first place, in a period of 
financialisation that is readily associated with low levels of accumulation and growth. 
Surely, one important constituent part of this strategy was the fact that the medium-low 
and medium-high technology sectors had to channel their production into exports given 
they required FX reserves to hedge against currency fluctuations. More importantly, 
however, given their capital structure with higher concentration of constant capital and 
less flexible productive techniques, their strategy to turn towards export demand was to 
maintain existing production levels in a competitive environment, which was conducive 
to the overall real accumulation. This, however, does not suggest a novel phenomenon, 
but explains how systematic productivity increases occur, in line with the 
conceptualisation of the capitalist economy outlined in the previous chapters.  
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As mentioned above, the change was more visible in the increasing export shares in 
production of different sectors rather than shares in total production, because it was 
easier for the lower-technology sectors to preserve their production levels in response 
to demand shocks given their flexible employment conditions. The increasing flexibility 
in low-technology industries was for example documented in considerable 
informalisation and subcontracting practices within labour-intensive sectors especially in 
textiles in the aftermath of the crisis (Demir & Erdem, 2010; Taymaz & Kilicaslan, 
2005).  
In a recent study with a broad dataset including Turkey as well as Latin American and 
African countries, McMillan, Rodrik & Inigo (2014) reported that labour productivity 
increased as a trend due to reallocation of labour from low productivity industries to 
higher productivity ones during the period 1990-2005. In countries such as Turkey 
however, there were huge productivity gaps, as productivity in construction was more 
than twice the productivity in agriculture, and productivity in manufacturing was almost 
three times as large (McMillan, Rodrik, & Verduzco-Gallo, 2014). This was accepted as 
a sign of underdevelopment, as in such economies with large inter-sectoral productivity 
gaps, it was found that structural change did not always go towards the desirable 
direction of contributing to overall productivity growth, as displaced labour from high-
technology industries would easily go to lower productivity activities, also given the 
expansion of services or informality. The contribution of the Marxist political economy 
analysis is to put the emphasis upon how these differences in productivity occur 
systematically, in line with such internal division of labour between different sectors, 
itself subject to change as accumulation proceeds. In that sense, it suggests a different 
focus than that is offered by McMillan et al. (2014), for whom the emphasis is not 
where systematic productivity increases come from, but rather how structural change 
follows from more or less arbitrary changes in productivity.  
In short, the purpose of examining the restructuring within the manufacturing industry 
is not to draw a conclusion over whether the Turkish economy has been successful or 
not, especially considering that the aggregate investment level stayed stagnant, short-
term external debts increased sharply, gross savings decreased from 18% of GDP in 
2000 to 14% in 2015, and the unemployment rate increased from below 8% during the 
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1990s to well above 10% during the 2000s on average. Nor it is to examine if the 
restructuring has been successful in terms of cutting down import dependency or 
contributing to international competitiveness, as questioned by Taymaz & Voyvoda 
(2009) and Taymaz & Yilmaz (2008). 
It does, however, instead underline how restructuring took place simultaneously 
together with increasing informalisation in labour-intensive industries. Although the 
financialised accumulation path since the 2000s intensified speculative activities such as 
carry trade and boosted consumption demand, it also contributed to industrial 
restructuring through increased availability of funds, especially for larger industries with 
higher levels of capital-intensity through reinforcing tight connections between banks 
and businesses after the financial sector restructuring in the post-2001 period. The next 
section will conclude this chapter in light of what has been discussed before.  
4.7. Conclusion 
This chapter provided a political economy of Turkey since the early 1980s. It outlined 
how the economy transitioned from an export-orientation strategy during the 1980s, 
maintained by wage suppression and domestic currency devaluation, towards structural 
change during the 2000s, especially following the developments within the 
manufacturing sector.  
As suggested by the financialisation literature, throughout the 2000s, there was a 
considerable degree of increasing reserve accumulation due to requirements for banks 
and firms to hold foreign exchange in case of exchange rate fluctuations together with 
increasing volume speculative activities such as carry trade (Erturk, 2003; Gabor, 2010; 
Gungen, 2012; Kaltenbrunner & Painceira, 2015). Also, during the first half of the 
2000s, consumption credits increased substantially, raising concerns over a 
consumption-driven demand structure (Karacimen, 2013). Nevertheless, the non-
financial corporations segment’s indebtedness also increased especially after 2012, their 
total debt almost tripling nominally from 463 billion TL in 2010 to 1563 billion TL in 
2016. The structural fragilities summarised above have raised the question whether 
increasing indebtedness on the side of non-financial corporations was signalling an 
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unsustainable pattern of unproductive indebtedness, with the available funds not being 
used for long-term investment. 
As a result, the nature of the growth path during the post-2001 crisis period in Turkey 
has been subject to considerable debate, and many suggested that it was maintained 
through a demand structure based on export-orientation through wage suppression and 
a consumption-induced demand without overcoming previous fragilities (Demir, 2009b; 
Onaran, 2006; Taymaz & Voyvoda, 2009; Yeldan, 2011). This chapter suggests that 
despite the existence of fragilities emphasised by Demir (2009b) as sky-rocketing 
external debt, extremely high and worsening current account deficit, high country risk, 
low fixed capital formation rates, and falling industrial and manufacturing value added 
in GDP, there were also some developments within the manufacturing sector that 
signalled early stages of capital restructuring from low-technology labour-intensive 
sectors to higher-technology capital-intensive sectors visible especially in the growth of 
automotive sector (Sengul, 2015; Taymaz & Voyvoda, 2009; Taymaz & Yilmaz, 2008). 
As mentioned, the first purpose of examining capital restructuring is to theoretically 
underline that it took place, irrespective of its consequences, during a period that is 
associated with the slowing down of accumulation. This is to suggest a different place 
than national economies, as well as a different plane of abstraction, to find a pattern 
that could be associated with financialisation. Second and following from the first 
purpose, by drawing upon the specific historical formation of the relations between the 
industry and finance, it underlines how restructuring could take place given the 
differentiated impacts of the 2001 crisis and the subsequent banking sector restructuring 
on different actors.  
In that sense, the elimination of the small banks restricted the credit access for smaller 
industrial producers in Anatolia, and contributed to the profitability of larger, 
internationally competitive industries incorporating capital-intensive activities in 
Istanbul, while labour-intensive sectors turned towards increased informality. As a result, 
the historically close connections between the big conglomerates and banks maintained 
a traditional financial sector in Turkey, which continued to provide ‘patient’ finance for 
the industry, while also profiting from primary interest and foreign exchange arbitrage 
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opportunities. The share of investments funded by banks has been 7.4% in 2004, 
increasing to 38% in 2009 although it decreased later to 31.4% in 2015.29 Investments 
funded by equity and sales, on the other hand, decreased from 33.4% in 2004 to 4% in 
2009 and stayed on that level until 2015. This contrasts with what is suggested by the 
financialisation literature, predicting a move towards equity-based financing techniques 
for all actors in the economy (Boyer, 2000).  
This indicated that loanable money capital entered the economy in the form of short-
term portfolio flows and bank credits, which were later used for speculative purposes by 
domestic banks in the interbank money market, but also lent to the private sector in the 
form of long-term TL loans. The following chapters will investigate how they are used 
by the energy and construction sectors specifically, which contributed to the 
restructuring of capital (including the industrial capital) in general and interest-bearing 
capital in particular, with negative impacts on the value of labour power in the abstract.  
                                                 




Chapter 5                                                                                                  
The Political Economy of Electricity Provision in Turkey 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides a political economy of electricity provision in Turkey since the 
1980s. Its aim is twofold. First, it explains how electricity is produced and consumed as 
a wage good, with an importance in and of itself in investigating transitional change 
over time. Second, it investigates recent developments in electricity provision to provide 
an empirical example for two interrelated aspects of financialisation that have been 
discussed in earlier chapters. The first concerns how the process initially involves the 
extension of commodity relations to a broader base of the population. At a later stage, 
regular payments from this base contribute to the emergence of a secondary circuit of 
capital through securitisation of stable revenue streams. Another aspect is to show how 
the expansion and intensification of commodity relations can go hand-in-hand with 
increases in productive capacity. In Turkey, after a long period of a state-owned 
vertically integrated structure, both electricity distribution and generation segments were 
gradually privatised, starting from 1984.  
Private sector investments were mostly made in electricity generation infrastructure. 
Given the high start-up costs, private sector participation in electricity generation was 
facilitated by the state through take-or-pay agreements which were reflected in higher 
end prices as well as higher transfers from the public budget. Privatisation of 
distribution, on the other hand, has been completed through the introduction of cost-
reflecting pricing system which was designed to reflect the increases of costs directly in 
consumer prices while allowing any improvement in performance to be appropriated by 
private firms, protecting and sustaining their profitability. Although securitisation has so 
far remained negligible, these developments signal a considerable movement towards 
market-based forms of electricity provision. An important point to emphasise is that 
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these developments took place alongside the increases in long-term productive 
investment levels, mostly financed by long-term foreign exchange credits provided 
through domestic banks.  
There is a wide literature on financialisation of natural resources especially in the 
context of water, although the literature on electricity per se is comparatively limited. 
Within the financialisation of natural resources literature itself, there are different 
streams that show some differences in terms of the place of emphasis as well as method. 
The distinction is most visible in how finance is addressed in economics and other 
social sciences. As discussed in detail in earlier chapters, within economics, there is 
considerable emphasis on the impacts of short-termism that is readily associated with 
financialisation, on sectoral and aggregate production and hence accumulation levels. In 
the context of natural resources, the impacts of short-termism on production are more 
direct and easily captured due to the involvement of long-term infrastructural 
investments. As a result, critical economics literature on energy industries including 
electricity, discusses the impacts of different types of investors and ownership structures 
that might offset the short-termist production strategies following the developments 
within the financial sector itself.  
Haldane (2015) finds that because the short-termism distorted the perception of long-
term projects’ net present value in investors’ eyes, projects that take a long time to 
mature, such as energy and infrastructure, are under-financed by the private banking 
system in the US and UK (Haldane, 2015). For the OECD in 2015, this observation 
could contribute to the acknowledgment that alternative sources and strategies are 
needed to finance infrastructural investment which necessitates a long-term asset 
structure from the side of investors given the long-term liabilities undertaken to finance 
projects. Mazzucato & Semieniuk (2016), however, emphasise that finance is not neutral 
and especially as the newer technologies in energy towards lower-carbon emission are 
adopted, traditional ‘patient’ finance might be necessary to support the high risks 
involved. Based on a global dataset on renewable energy asset finance from 2004 to 
2014, they find that when there are high risks involved, the involvement of finance is 
more traditional and the funding is more likely to be provided through state banks and 
utilities. This is because where there is a considerable degree of capital-intensive, non-
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incremental technological innovation; the industry goes through two distinctive phases 
where the first is the deployment of new innovational technologies with higher risks and 
the second is the diffusion of mature technologies in incremental and less-risky ways. 
During the initial high-risk period, especially in countries such as Germany, China and 
Brazil, state investment banks have been providing patient finance for the energy sector. 
In fact, the state’s involvement has stayed rather huge for both high risk and low risk 
phases and for example in 2014, 58% of all deployment investment is done by public 
investors. The difference between the two approaches underlines a recent 
preoccupation within economics with respect to the increasing importance attached to 
the financing practices of the projects.  
In human geography literature, the involvement of finance in natural resources sectors 
also has been discussed in the context of privatisation and the incompatibility of public 
good provision through market with profit seeking motives with the human right to 
have access to the resources as well as the characteristics of the commodities involved 
as natural public goods. Bakker (2004, 2005, 2007) emphasised that in the case of water 
privatisation, attempts in England and Wales have been unsuccessful in commodifying 
water that is for example visible in the retreat of government from full competition 
attempts such as tradeable water abstraction permits in 2001. This failure was due to 
water’s public good characteristics. She claims that market failures and common 
property rights make water an ‘uncooperative’ commodity that is resistant to short-
termist reforms (Bakker, 2004). In the end, water privatisation experience in the UK has 
been heterogeneous in its impacts as citizens had both gains and losses. While water 
quality has improved and the aggregate water losses have decreased, poorer households 
suffered more water cut offs after the privatisation (Bakker, 2005).  
Castree (2008a, 2008b) and Swyngedouw (2005) emphasise similar aspects that are 
associated with the increasing marketization of nature and natural resources. 
Swyngedouw (2005) points out how some hybrid forms of regulation in water emerged 
after the failure of privatisation attempts. In these forms, the state has been actively 
involved in the infrastructure investment in the presence of private companies which 
made sure that the companies enjoyed the natural monopolistic conditions of the water 
supply sector with limited conditions. For Castree (2008a), the single case studies on 
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varieties of privatisation or natural resources termed as ‘neoliberalisation of nature’ 
signal how certain commonalities operate among these cases, although the outcome 
depends upon the local institutional context in the last instance. In a table of 
comparison, he contrasts the different outcomes of privatisation from price increases 
for water in Buenos Aires to erosion of peasant livelihoods in Bolivia due to water and 
gas privatisation (Castree, 2008b). Bayliss (2014b) detects a similar trend in UK water 
companies, where a byzantine structure of complicated corporate mechanisms after 
privatisation has resulted in a ‘financialised’ water provision in which water is sold and 
traded as a commodity.  
In line with the ‘systems of provision’ methodology outlined in Fine and Leopold 
(1993), this chapter provides a political economy of electricity provision with a twofold 
aim. First, it examines how the commodity relations for electricity, distinct from 
financialisation as such, developed in Turkey that might give rise to the emergence of a 
secondary circuit of capital through the securitisation of long-term bank loans. In the 
case of electricity and infrastructure in general, securitisation requires, initially, the 
simultaneous creation of markets through privatisation on the production side and the 
promotion of these markets through commodification on the consumption side, mostly 
achieved through the help of the state. At a later stage, the existence of regular 
payments from a large consumer base is conducive to the emergence of secondary 
circuits out of which possible outcomes such as short-termism are discussed extensively 
by the financialisation literature, as indicated in Chapter 2.  
This is however, only a partial picture as far as Turkey is concerned. In line with its 
current developmental stage, as discussed in Chapter 3, financial markets in Turkey are 
relatively shallow with a limited scope for asset securitisation. Therefore, the electricity 
markets in Turkey do not provide a sufficient base for examining the changing nature of 
financial relations directly through the extent of asset securitisation. There is, however, a 
striking increase in the degree and scope of commercial relations within the sector that 
is in line with the developments around the world, which might result in a fully 
financialised picture discussed extensively in Chapter 2, in which the extent of asset 
securitisation leads to destabilising asset price appreciations. In this light, the second 
aim of this chapter is to investigate how these commercial relations evolve through time 
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in the context of electricity provision in Turkey, where there is also considerable growth 
in the long-term productive investment, because of the increased availability of finance.  
As Castree (2008a) argues in the context of ‘neoliberalisation of nature’, the ‘case studies’ 
are areas of analysis in their own right, which is qualitatively distinct from the more 
abstract analysis. In earlier chapters, it was claimed that financialisation is the increasing 
presence of interest bearing capital (IBC) at the level of capital in general (Fine, 2013). 
At this level, interest bearing capital feeds upon other types of capital due to the 
requirement of interest, for which the payment is dependent upon successful productive 
activity elsewhere. This is however, a purely abstract category and the profitability of 
IBC depends on how the economy functions and pursues productive activities as a 
whole (Fine, 2013). At the level of all capitals in competition, IBC exists as loanable 
money capital (LMC), acting both as money as money as well as money as capital, the 
distinction of which cannot be made from the perspective of the lender. There, the 
borrowing and lending activities are made both for productive and simply purchasing 
purposes, as in the case of expansion of LMC as simple credit, which might act as a 
facilitator for competition with positive impacts on accumulation as long as the newly 
created secondary circuits are successfully realized with productive activity pursued 
elsewhere in the economy. In that sense, the privatisation of electricity provisioning in 
Turkey, distinct from financialisation as such, contributes to an understanding of a 
more abstract process along a continuum of commodity relations involved along the 
chain of activities in provision sectors (Bayliss, Fine, & Robertson, 2013). 
Along these lines, Section 5.2 introduces the policy rhetoric for privatisation and a brief 
historical summary of privatisation of electricity experiences around the world. The 
changing theoretical rationale behind privatisation that paved the way for these 
experiences is briefly explained, which shifted from emphasising ownership transfer as 
an end itself to emphasising the nature and extent of competition within the sector. 
While the state’s presence within the utilities sectors including electricity has stayed 
rather constant throughout, the radically shifting rhetoric and scholarship of 
privatisation demonstrate a relative detachment of these from the actual practices in and 
around these sectors. The actual practice has been the increasing degree and scope of 
commodity relations around these sectors alongside the state’s involvement, the degree 
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of which changing according to the relative success of the production of these goods as 
use values as well as values.  
Section 5.3 moves on to the Turkish case. After giving a general outlook of the energy 
sector, the political economy of electricity provision in Turkey is discussed. It shows 
how the industry has been transformed with the gradual privatisation of the sector 
starting from 1984 along the lines mentioned above. Section 5.4 investigates the extent 
and sources of finance within the sector with the help of balance sheet data obtained 
from The Central Bank Company Account Statistics in order to show that the 
increasing degree of commodification and subsequent emergence of a secondary circuit 
of capital can take place alongside the increases in productive capacity.  Section 5.5 
concludes by underlining the theoretical premise that the global trend towards a market-
based provisioning of wage goods such as electricity provides a base for future 
capitalisation of revenues with ambiguous impacts on sectoral levels of production due 
to the possibility of sustained profitability for both productive and financial interests.  
5.2. Privatisation of Electricity Provision: Rhetoric and Experiences around the 
World 
Electricity sectors have been dominated by the state owned vertically integrated 
institutions which were considered natural monopolies worldwide until the 1980s 
because of sunk costs, inelastic demand and coordination problems with generation, 
transmission and distribution systems (Dagdeviren, 2009). During the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, the rationale for vertical integration and public ownership has weakened 
following the technological progress that eased the conditions of entry that were 
assumed to make the sector a naturally monopolistic one. Privatisation of the electricity 
sector usually follows a process in which first state-owned vertically integrated 
enterprises are unbundled according to type of activities, namely generation, wholesale, 
distribution and retail, and then each segment is privatised. Electricity generation is 
considered to create the largest potential gains from competition given the capital 
intensive structure of its production methods. It is assumed that with the withdrawal of 
the state as the single producer, the output restricting monopolistic structure will erode 
with the help of stricter contracting of generators with profit motive. The only obstacle 
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to such gains in efficiency is considered to be the entry conditions, big infrastructural 
investments, which is to be overcome with the help of state subsidies.  
The pioneers being the UK and Argentina, the early 1990s was a period during which 
almost all countries attempted to privatise their electricity sectors with specific emphasis 
on the privatisation of the generation segment. During the early phase of privatisation, 
along with the Washington Consensus principles in policy making, the rhetoric on 
privatisation was one that perceived private ownership as an end in itself, with 
anticipation of increased efficiency following the transfer of ownership from the public 
to the private sector. A World Bank document in 1991 explicitly states that: 
Ownership matters. In theory, ownership may not affect efficiency, but in 
practice it almost always does –because governments tend to tilt the 
economic/financial playing field toward ‘their’ firms in ways that are difficult to 
perceive and harder to correct. Thus, the telling argument for privatisation is 
that it enhances competition.” (cited in Bayliss & Fine, 2008, p. 60).  
In accordance with this policy rhetoric of the World Bank, the UK has privatised all of 
its state owned electricity distribution and generation between 1990 and 1992. After the 
government sold its golden shares in 1995, a huge takeover wave, mostly from the US 
companies, started. Some have pointed at some negative outcomes of this experience 
especially with respect to the failures in implementation. Wholesale and retail markets 
were created, but until 2005 the share of total electricity traded in the markets stayed 
only at 1% (Thomas, 2004). In general, there were serious miscalculations in 
privatisation investments. In 2001 four US companies (AES, AEP, NRG and Mission 
Edison) purchased 20% of British generation capacity which were based on an 
inaccurate forecast of wholesale prices and therefore within 18 months the investments 
had failed (Thomas, 2004). UK investments also played a role in Enron’s bankruptcy in 
2002 by financially overstretching and therefore contributing to the collapse of the 
parent company (Pond, 2006). Nevertheless, between 1990 and 2005, significant price 
cuts were made to customers, reaching to 30% in transmission and 50% in distribution 
(Pollitt, 2007). For Pond (2006), this was due to a major switch to lower cost long-term 
gas contracts instead of increased competition. Moreover, price reductions were made 
possible also because the industry was sold for only a fraction of its accounting value 
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which effectively wrote off much of the costs. Still, despite the failures in 
implementation, the UK has been one of the few countries that were able to decrease 
end-user prices after power reforms.  
In general, the privatisation process has been followed by increased prices, especially in 
developing countries (Bayliss & Fine, 2008; Erdogdu, 2013; D. Hall, van Niekerk, 
Nguyen, & Thomas, 2013; Nagayama, 2007; Steiner, 2000). An OECD study following 
the period of rapid privatisation based on 19 OECD countries over a 10 year time 
period also showed that, although there were differences in the relative efficacy of 
different reform strategies across countries and time, retail prices for electricity 
especially for industry increased after privatisation (Steiner, 2000). Considering the high 
start-up costs of these systems, an initial increase in the prices was expected only to 
decrease later through increased competitiveness. Contrary to expectations, in many of 
the developing countries, the result has been increasing prices despite years of reform 
(Bayliss & Fine, 2008).  
In Latin America, retail competition raised prices for industry, while in ex-members of 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, higher energy tariffs were needed to secure the 
return on investment (Nagayama, 2007). Some developing countries, such as Australia, 
also experienced 40% higher prices since the privatisation of the sector in 1994 (Cahill 
& Beder, 2005). Especially in low income countries, high prices led to a decrease in 
services provided by the private sector, because where the majority of consumers are 
unable to afford a full transition, privatisation actually resulted in increased state 
subsidies to keep the sector alive for private investors. In order to attract private 
investors, governments had to make power purchase agreements such as fixed prices, 
foreign currency agreements and take-or-pay agreements. For example in Tanzania, 
privatisation of the vertically integrated electricity company TANESCO resulted in 
transmission and generation expenses tripling between 2001 and 2003, primarily due to 
huge state payments to two thermal IPPs (Bayliss, 2008). In general, during the first 
wave of privatisation, the shift to private ownership did not result in a retreat of the 
state, but rather directed the state to take on new responsibilities. By the mid-2000s, 
approximately 70 per cent of infrastructure investment in developing countries was still 
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financed by governments or public utilities either from their own resources or from 
non-concessional borrowing (Bayliss & Fine, 2008). 
These examples emphasise how the policy rhetoric was not in line with the practices 
and how the issues that are associated with privatisation required a much wider debate 
than the ownership debate itself. Following the shift from Washington Consensus to 
Post-Washington Consensus in the beginning of 2000s, there was also a shift in the 
global policy rhetoric with respect to privatisation, favouring public private partnerships 
(PPP) instead of full privatisation (Fine, 2008). The increasing dissatisfaction and failure 
stories related to fully liberalised energy markets were shown as the reason behind this 
shift, although the state’s involvement has been more continuity than a break in reality. 
Despite substantial efforts for privatisation, the state had continued to stay in the sector 
as generator, regulator and/or financier. By 2004, the private sector’s participation in 
electricity generation was not more than 41% in low income countries and 58% in 
upper middle income countries (Bayliss & Fine, 2008).  
As Fine (2008) notes, a World Bank document in 2004 (p. 6) claims:  
As with all economic elixirs, privatisation has been oversimplified, oversold, and 
ultimately disappointing –delivering less than promised. 1 
The same document also reports (p. 43): 
The limits of state ownership are numerous and widely accepted. But that does 
not imply that private enterprise is a superior organisational form for all 
infrastructure activities and in every country. Before state ownership is replaced, 
the properties and requirements of the proposed alternative must be carefully 
assessed –not just generally but also specifically for the activity and country in 
question. 
In 2013, however, another World Bank document concluded that (pp. xiii-xv): 
It is difficult to find conclusive evidence of the consistently beneficial effects of 
the reforms actually implemented in many countries.2 
                                                 




Therefore, in line with the shift in the theoretical emphasis from ownership structures 
to the degree and extent of competition within the sectors, the policy recommendation 
for privatisation has become the promotion of public private ownership schemes 
instead of full liberalisation, beginning from the second half of the 2000s. Investment 
commitments to PPP electricity projects in developing countries reached $46.5 billion in 
2007, about double that of the previous year which represents an increase of over 150 
per cent from the level in 2004, and brings investment just 17 per cent below the peak 
level reached in 1997.3 
Due to privatisation related problems such as increased social opposition, increased 
prices, oligopoly, increased state subsidies, in some countries there was even a tendency 
for full re-nationalisation especially in electricity services since the mid-2000s (D. Hall et 
al., 2013). Several studies conducted by PSIRU (Public Services International Research 
Unit) in 2009, 2012 and 2013 reveal that nationalisation was very common especially in 
Latin American countries, because while the prices increased, investments did not 
increase to decrease prices and meet the demand (D. Hall, 2012; D. Hall, Thomas, & 
Corral, 2009; D. Hall et al., 2013; Thomas, 2009).4 
Between 2007 and 2012, Germany has set up over 60 local public utilities for electricity 
distribution while cancelling 190 concessions for private distributors (D. Hall, 2012). 
The key motive for that was to break up the existing oligopoly in the electricity market, 
which was dominated by the four corporations, E.ON, RWE, Vattenfall and EnBW, 
since the liberalisation in 1999. Argentina ended market-based pricing and the gas 
distributor Metrogas was nationalised in May 2013 (D. Hall et al, 2013). Bolivia 
nationalised two major electricity distributors in 2013, as well as four generation 
companies in 2010 (D. Hall et al., 2013). The Dominican Republic nationalised all of its 
distribution companies in 2003 because of social opposition to increased prices. There 
were also extensive problems in Brazil, which resulted in a demand crisis and a 
subsequent reduction programme called Apagão which aimed at reducing the demand 
                                                                                                                                          
2 See Vagliasindi (2013) “Revisiting Public-Private Partnerships in the Power Sector” 
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/978-0-8213-9762-6 
3 Vagliasindi (2013) “Revisiting Public-Private Partnerships in the Power Sector” 
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/978-0-8213-9762-6 
4 See PSIRU website (www.psiru.org) for a full list of publications on privatisation, re-
nationalisation/re-municipalisation experiences by PSIRU. 
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by 25% in 2000-2001 (Thomas, 2009). Supply shortages had become an issue for the 
Brazilian liberalisation experience, because although the demand was growing 5% per 
year, there was limited new capacity built by the private investors since the privatisation 
in 1995. After Apagão, nearly all European and US utilities withdrew from Brazil 
leading the state to repossess some of the distribution facilities. In 2012, the distribution 
companies owned by Rede Group were taken over by the regulatory body Aneel, as the 
danger of bankruptcy threatened the power supply in five states (D. Hall et al, 2013).  
By the time of the acquisition, the net debts of the Rede companies were amounting to 
$3.9 billion, owed to both banks and companies. While companies received capital 
contributions roughly amounting to $1.2 billion, the maturities were lengthened for the 
rest of the debts. 5  This experience cannot be shown as an example for a re-
nationalisation tendency, however, as the eight distribution companies owned 
previously by Rede Group was acquired by Energisa Group in April 2014, making 
Energisa the sixth largest electricity distribution group in Brazil, with approximately 6.5 
million consumers.  
As of today, both re-nationalisation and privatisation trends are observed. In some cases, 
privatisation accelerated. For example, Honduras decided to fully privatise its state-
owned distribution company, ENEE, in 2014, because the payment agreements with 
private producers were taking 90% of its total revenues (D. Hall et al., 2013). Turkey 
has been one of the countries that privatized both generation and distribution segments 
gradually on the basis of a mixed regulatory mechanism since 1984. The next section 
will briefly discuss the scholarship with respect to the changing theoretical debates on 
privatisation of electricity utilities, the emphasis being on different modes of regulation.  
5.2.1. Scholarship on privatisation of electricity provision: How and what to 
regulate? 
Most of the scholarship shown responsible for the shifts in the policy rhetoric on 
privatisation of electricity and utilities in general has centred upon the choice of 
principles with respect to regulation: how and what to regulate? Historically, utility 
                                                 




regulation has been based upon a rate of return principle. In this mechanism, rate of 
return objectives are set both on invested capital and sales revenues, allowing investors 
to recover the costs of their incurred expenses. Starting from 1970s and throughout the 
1980s, this structure has been criticized by many from both neoclassical and neo-
Austrian schools on the basis of decreased efficiency and excess capacity as it did not 
include an incentive for investors to reduce costs. Littlechild (1970), Baumol (1971, 
1975), Joskow (1976), Joskow & Schmalensee (1986), Kay & Vickers (1988) and Kahn 
(1988) 6  were among the first to discuss the introduction of marginal cost pricing 
mechanism in the utilities sector which also formed the theoretical rationale behind the 
extensive privatisations of the UK utility services during the 1980s. Electricity and 
telecommunications were given primary importance, as prior to these discussions, these 
sectors were to be accepted as naturally monopolistic due to the existence of network 
transmission costs.7 
The marginal cost pricing mechanism was based on a very simple principle. Given a set 
of depreciation rules, the cost of added capacity will determine the optimal firm (and 
market) price for continuation of production. Three sets of magnitudes need to be 
known in each period: the firm’s investment outlays, the prices of production and the 
depreciation payments on these investments (Baumol, 1971). Like any other cost 
functions, however, this cost structure corresponds to an implicit production behaviour 
where it exhibits constant or strict economies of scale, as emphasised by Baumol (1975). 
A price regulation mechanism where a price cap on the basis of the above criteria is 
believed to reflect the efficiency gains from cost reduction to end user tariffs. The 
general formula for a price cap is given below: 
RPI – X + K 
Where RPI is the retail prices index, X refers to the price decreases stemming from 
efficiency gains from increased productivity and K refers to price changes due to 
changes in the prices of inputs. Crudely, the primary advantage of this model over a 
                                                 
6 See also Newberry (2001) and (1995) for a detailed discussion of electricity privatisation in the UK.  
7 Kay and Vickers (1988) argue that natural monopoly was one reason why they were taken into 
public ownership in the first place. This argument is criticised by Fine (1990) in the context of 
British coal industry by showing that there was a fragmented rather than a monopolistic structure 
prior to privatisation.  
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revenue cap model is that firms have an incentive to reduce costs where efficiency gains 
are reflected on end prices, which also benefits consumers. There is assumed to be a 
duality between an optimal pricing and optimal investment structure, as over-
investment will be punished in such a setting where the firms will be forced to reduce 
prices and end up failing to cover both current and incurred costs. On a revenue based 
rate of return regulation mechanism, the duality between optimal pricing and 
investment is assumed to lead towards excess capacity as there is a monopolistic, non-
competitive mark-up incentive for all investments. Throughout the 1980s, regulation 
discussions have focused on this axis of regulation corresponding to different degrees 
of competition (Joskow & Schmalansee, 1986; Kay & Vickers, 1988). What was 
considered important was the extent of competition while regulation being a tool for 
achieving more competitive market structures by removing the monopolistic incentives 
such as mark-up. As a result of this, there was a shift in the emphasis from an 
evaluation of different ownership structures to a comparison of different degrees of 
competition in privatisation scholarship especially from the 2000s onwards.  
How are we to understand these developments with respect to the actual electricity 
industry privatisation experiences around the world? First of all, it should be noted that 
the dramatic shifts in the scholarship as well as policy rhetoric does not correspond to 
the actual practice surrounding the electricity markets, which has been the increasing the 
extent and scope of commodity relations with the state, in principle, interfering on 
behalf and not at the expense of these. Second, the analytical focus on regulation and 
the choice between optimal pricing and revenue levels reveals little about the nature of 
the organisational relations involved upon which the levels of inter- and intra-sectoral 
competition as well as investment depend upon. These organisational relations involve 
the degree of national as well as international cartelisation, the conditions of labour that 
concerns overall wage levels or sectoral developments, for example whether sub-
contracting exists, and also the impacts of technical progress on competition and 
sectoral boundaries. In the context of coal industry privatisation in the UK, Fine (1990) 
noted that the rhetoric around privatisation has focused upon power station 
construction industry’s has long being unsatisfactory with substantial cost over-runs and 
delays in competition (p. 148). The vertically integrated nature of the industry was held 
responsible for the inefficiencies given the naturally monopolistic conditions of 
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competition. 8  It was privatised in 1989, on the basis of the theoretical rationale 
explained above, without much attention being paid to the wider surrounding issues.  
These issues can be summarised as follows. In the process of restructuring of power 
station supply in the UK, there were also at least four major industries that were 
involved, which were defence, electrical consumer durables, telecommunications and 
power engineering (Fine, 1990). During the privatisation process, all of these sectors 
were going through a restructuring in which the technical progress played a role to 
lower the boundaries between the sectors and led to intensified inter-sectoral 
acquisitions and mergers, as seen for example in the merger between General Electric 
Company (GEC) and Plessey, a British-based international electronics, defence and 
telecommunications company, in 1988. The issues related to telecommunications as well 
as other sectors mentioned above were mostly ignored during the design of electricity 
privatisation however important they might be in the implementation, given the close 
links between the sectors. The other issue, quite independent of the domestic 
privatisation experiences, was related to international cartelisation closely associated 
with increasing economies of scale. When privatisation of electricity was in its initial 
steps in the UK in 1990, there was considerable cartelisation in the international market, 
with six or seven giant companies including General Electric Company (GEC) of the 
UK, Alsthom of France and General Electric and Combustion Engineering of the 
United States dominating the market. Fine (1990) emphasises that this structure is likely 
to prevail because of international economies of scale following technical progress, 
independent of domestic ownership structures. Once it occurs, privatisation might 
actually contribute to it in the international market, as smaller privatised companies 
would have more difficulties in enjoying the advantages of economies of scale 
                                                 
8 In the context of the coal industry, Fine (1990) shows that it was the absence of these monopolistic 
conditions, with a fragmented structured of the construction sector depending upon sub-contracting 
and a causalised workforce, which prevented firms enjoying the benefits of economies of scale and 
required the nationalisation of the industry in the first place throughout the 1930s. The privatisation 
attempted to reduce the inefficiencies, such as over-capacity and limited mechanisation, believed to 
be created by this structure. Fine (1990) shows evidence that mechanisation and economies of scale 
existed in the presence of the state cartel and it was the tendency of concentration of production in 
larger and fewer (core) units that created the over-capacity problem. Privatisation came as a political 
choice to maintain the profitability for larger units arising from economies of scale, as the over-
capacity problem could also be addressed by increasing investment levels in smaller ‘uneconomic’ 
units in the periphery.  
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compared to single state-owned utilities (Fine, 1990). This is especially relevant for 
lower income countries.  
In line with the methodology outlined in Chapter 1, capitalism develops towards the 
concentration of capital in fewer and larger units together with the increases in 
productivity. In this context, a highly concentrated production process in an industry 
with firms of high levels of productivity and investment is challenged by the smaller 
units as long as the availability of cheaper labour satisfies profitability for smaller units 
which have lower levels of productivity as well as investment. In a privatisation 
experience, these structures play a more important role in addressing the issues of 
efficiency and competition than the mode of regulation itself, which has been the 
primary focus in policy making. Section 3 will address these issues in the context of 
electricity privatisation experience in Turkey. The first section will give a general picture 
of the energy sector, including the electricity industry.  
5.3. Energy Sector Outlook in Turkey 
Turkey’s total electricity production has doubled in the last ten years in line with the 
growth of the economy. Energy, along with its infrastructure, and financial services 
received the highest sectoral share (74%)in total M&A volume in 2012.9  Between 2009-
2014, the energy sector received an average of 10% of total public investments. In terms 
of asset size, the energy sector is the second biggest sector in the real economy after 
manufacturing with a share of 10% of total assets.10  
Annual electricity generation is approximately 179.5 billion kWh, and it had a fast 
growing rate with an average of 9% in 2010 and 2011. In 2009, Turkish Electrical 
Energy 10 Year Generation Capacity Projection Report (2009-2018) published by 
TEIAS (Turkish Electricity Transmission Company) expected that total electricity 
demand was to reach 336 TWh with a 6.3% compound annual growth rate in a base 
scenario in 2018, and 357 TWh with a 7% compound annual growth rate in a high 
                                                 
9 Deloitte Energy Sector Report, 2013. 
10 TURKSTAT (www.tuik.org.tr)  
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scenario. In 2016, total gross electricity use has been 278.3 TWh, growing by 3.3% from 
2015.11  





Coal Liquid fuels Natural Gas Hydro 
Renewable 
Energy* 
    (GWh)   (%) 
1995  86 247  32.5 6.7 19.2 41.2 0.4 
1996  94 862  32.1 6.9 18.1 42.7 0.3 
1997  103 296  32.8 6.9 21.4 38.5 0.4 
1998  111 022  32.1 7.1 22.4 38.0 0.3 
1999  116 440  31.8 6.9 31.2 29.8 0.3 
2000  124 922  30.6 7.5 37.0 24.7 0.3 
2001  122 725  31.3 8.4 40.4 19.6 0.3 
2002  129 400  24.8 8.3 40.6 26.0 0.3 
2003  140 581  22.9 6.5 45.2 25.1 0.2 
2004  150 698  22.9 5.1 41.3 30.6 0.2 
2005  161 956  26.7 3.4 45.3 24.4 0.2 
2006  176 300  26.5 2.5 45.8 25.1 0.2 
2007  191 558  27.9 3.4 49.6 18.7 0.4 
2008  198 418  29.1 3.8 49.7 16.8 0.6 
2009  194 813  28.6 2.5 49.3 18.5 1.2 
2010  211 208  26.1 1.0 46.5 24.5 1.9 
2011  229 395  28.9 0.4 45.4 22.8 2.6 
















         *Renewable energy and waste includes geothermal, wind, solid biomass, biogas and waste. 
  Source: TEIAS, Electricity Generation – Transmission Statistics of Turkey 
As electricity demand is in tight correlation with aggregate demand, the World Bank 
(2015) warns that the fast growth of the installed capacity might signal an overcapacity 
problem following the slowing down of the growth levels since 2010. Since 2010, 
economic growth has settled at 3–4% and electricity demand growth settled at 4-5% 
annually (well below the 6–7% annualised rates of the previous decade). Power 
generation investments have continued and capacity additions peaked in 2013. 
                                                 
11  All electricity instalment and transmission statistics are from TEIAS (Turkish Electricity 
Transmission Company) website (www.teias.gov.tr) unless otherwise stated. The latest release of 
annual statistics has been in 2015 at the time of writing.  
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Generation capacity margin has reached 70%. The market would be over-supplied were 
it not for the severe drought that affected hydro generation in 2014. 
In terms of total energy demand, Turkey is a net energy importer, with approximately 
70% of its total energy demand coming from imports of primary resources petroleum, 
coal and especially natural gas. In 2014, 35% of all energy demand came from natural 
gas, 28.5% from coal, 27% from petroleum and 7% from hydroelectric sources.12 The 
contribution of renewable energy resources to total electricity demand has been rather 
low, at 3%, although it is increasing. What is striking is the increasing importance of 
natural gas in terms of contribution to total energy demand, from 5% in 1990. In terms 
of electricity generation, the breakdown of electricity generation by primary energy 
resources also shows that the share of natural gas increased from 19.2% in 1995 to 47.9% 
in 2014.13  
This rise is important for signalling increasing import dependency, as all natural gas is 
imported. In 2012, Turkey imported approximately 1.6 Tcf of natural gas, 58% coming 
from Russia. Another 18% of the total came from Iran, while the rest of was imported 
from Azerbaijan, Algeria and Nigeria. 91% of the natural gas imported is sold to 
BOTAS Petroleum Pipeline Corporation, which is a state-owned subsidiary operating 
under TPAO (Turkish Petroleum Corporation). In 2014, 19% of natural gas was 
directly used by households for heating and other purposes, while 25.4% was used by 
industry and 48.1% was used for electricity generation. Turkey also imports about 90% 
of its hard coal consumption mainly from Russia, Australia and United States. In fact, 
imports of energy products, which account for more than $50 billion in total, is the 
largest single item in Turkey's budget deficit (CBRT Turkey, 2014). 
Being a net importer of natural gas makes Turkey vulnerable to supply disruptions and 
pipeline capacity is suspected to be insufficient to keep up with the increasing domestic 
demand. Moreover, the expansion of natural gas occurred at the expense of coal, fuel 
oil, and especially hydro facilities that were already in use (Atiyas, Cetin, & Gulen, 2012). 
In terms of installed capacity, 60% of total electricity installation power is based on 
                                                 
12 BOTAS (Petroleum Pipeline Corporation) Annual Sectoral Report, (2014) (www.botas.gov.tr)  
13 See Table 5-1. 
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thermal plants in 2014, while 34% is based on hydroelectric facilities. Considering that 
the contribution of hydroelectric facilities to total electricity generation has been 16.1%, 
these facilities have provided a contribution below their capacities. The Electricity 
Market Law (EML) passed in 2013 has aimed to decrease the share of electricity 
generation based on natural gas to 30% by 2020 to reduce the dependency on natural 
gas imports, to increase the share of renewable resources up to 30% by 2023, to utilize 
domestic lignite and hard coal resources as well as hydroelectric potential by 2023 and 
to ensure 5% of generation is based on nuclear power.  
5.4. Historical Background and Institutional Framework for Electricity Provision 
in Turkey 
As explained above, electricity generation, transmission and distribution have been 
traditionally provided by the state in vertically integrated structures, in almost all 
countries. Turkey has been no exception to that rule. Attempts at privatisation of the 
state-owned electricity sector in Turkey started in the 1980s and accelerated in the 1990s. 
At the beginning of the 2000s, in accordance with the IMF stabilisation programme 
designed to address the wider macroeconomic instabilities, a full liberalisation package 
for electricity provision was adopted. By the end of 2014, the privatisation of electricity 
provision including the dismantling of generation from distribution and privatisation of 
each was almost complete.  
Public provision of electricity in Turkey started with the establishment of Etibank in 
1935. Starting from the 1950s, construction of thermal and hydroelectric power plants 
started with collaborative work of the DSI (The General Directorate of State Hydraulic 
Works), the EIE (The General Directorate of Electric Power), the MTA (The General Directorate 
of Mineral Research and Exploration), and Iller Bankasi (Provincial Bank). According to the 
First Five Year Development Plan (1963-1967), TEK (Turkish Electricity Institution) was 
established as a vertically integrated state-owned enterprise. Between 1970 and 1993, 





Figure 5-1: The Institutional Structure of Electricity Provision in Turkey 
 
The first step towards privatisation was in 1984, when actors other than Turkish 
Electricity Institution were allowed to enter the market through the Build-Operate-
Transfer (BOT) and Transfer of Rights (TOR) schemes. In 1994, TEK was abolished 
and TEAS (The Turkish Electricity Generation and Transmission Company) and TEDAS (The 
Turkish Electricity Distribution Company) were established. During the 1990s, most 
privatisation legislation concerned generation as the potentially most competitive 
segment. After the dismantling of the generation and distribution from transmission, 
which is considered to be unsuitable for privatisation, full privatisation of the electricity 
provision in Turkey has been one of the steps for the harmonisation with EU 
regulations. 
In 2001, Electricity Market Law No: 4628 (EML) was prepared in line with the EU 
Energy Acquis. Within the framework of EML, The Energy Markets Regulatory 
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Authority (EMRA) was established and TEAS was further unbundled into three 
companies: EUAS for generation, TEIAS for transmission, and TETAS for wholesale, 
while TEDAS remaining as the regulatory body for the distribution and retail. The 
whole electricity market is regulated by EMRA, whose task is to issue licences for all 
market activities, determine and approve regulated tariffs, monitor market performance, 
settle the eligibility limits for market access and impose fines and sanctions on the legal 
entities operating in the market. Below, Table 5-2 provides a timeline for privatisation 
of electricity segments in Turkey since 1984. 
Table 5-2: Privatisation of Electricity Industry Timeline 
  
Turkey has neither signed the Energy Community Treaty of 2005 nor participated in the 
South East Europe Electricity Market (SEEEM), but it has signalled its intention to 
participate in the European market for electricity in its Energy Sector Reform and 
Privatisation Strategy Paper in 2004, along with detailed instructions for further 
liberalisation of the sector (Bagdadioglu & Odyakmaz, 2009). The Strategy Paper 
anticipated that the privatisation process of twenty-one distribution and retail 
companies were to be started by the end of 2006 and completed by 2011.  
Although the privatisation of distribution and retail could not start before 2008 due to 
some financing and implementation problems, which will be discussed in the following 
sections, it was completed in 2013. In 2013, the new EML (Law No: 6446) was also 
amended. In order to complete the liberalisation process of the sector, the new EML 
1984 Law No: 3096, Authorization for Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) and Transfer of Rights 
(TOR)
1994 Law No: 3996, Unbundling of Generation and Transmission from Distribution and Retail, 
Introduction of BOT and TOR 
1997 Law No: 4283, Introduction of Build-Operate (BO) Scheme
2001 Law No: 4628 (Electricity Market Law), Unbundling of Generation and Wholesale from 
Transmission
2004 Privatisation Strategy Paper
2008 Privatisation of Distribution Started
2012 Sector Opennes Reached 84%
2013 Law No: 6446 (New EML), Privatisation of Distribution Completed
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changed the licence types, and set a pre-licensing process that had been absent in the 
previous legislative framework. It also extended some deadlines set by the previous law, 
such as the price equalisation mechanism for distribution and supply companies, 
corporate tax, stamp tax and VAT exemption, 50% discount on system utilization fees 
during investment periods and for five years from the operation start date.  
Contrary to the previous law, the new EML is structured around types of activities 
rather than licences, and the activities are listed as generation, distribution, wholesale, 
retail sale, market operation, export and import. Market operation is a new type of 
activity that had not been listed in the previous law and involves the operation of 
organised wholesale electricity markets and financial settlements of activities conducted 
in these markets. The Regulation on Unlicensed Electricity Production and Electricity 
Market Licensing Regulation came into force in the same year.  
The new Law also enabled share transfers of companies in the energy market. From 
September 1st 2015, the market regulation for electricity generation is to be carried out 
by EPIAS (Electricity Market Management Company). EPIAS has been established as a 
joint stock company to manage and control electricity merchandise nationwide. The 
main activities and duties of EPIAS are as follows: operating electricity transaction both 
in day-ahead markets and daily markets, invoicing and other financial activities in the 
market, operating financial activities in stabilisation and reconciliation market and 
ancillary services markets together with TEIAS, working through establishing newly 
organised whole-sale energy markets, if necessary; representing the state as a party in 
international financial energy conventions or agreements as a member of international 
energy markets.14 
Its company shares are divided into three parts: Type A shares are bought by TEIAS 
and BOTAS (The  Petroleum and Pipeline Corporation) making up 30% of the shares, 
Type B shares are bought by BIST (Istanbul Stock Exchange), 30% while the remaining 
40% of shares are bought by private energy companies. Shareholder companies are 
obliged to obtain supplying or generation licences in the electricity market, a wholesale-
retail sale licence or import-export licence. Electricity companies can only engage in 
                                                 




activities indicated in their licence and cannot directly become a shareholder in other 
legal activities in the market. Each company is allowed to obtain 4% of total shares at 
most in order to avoid monopolisation. A share of profits equal to 10% on capital is to 
be retained as a reserve fund, with the rest to be paid as dividends to shareholders. A 
futures exchange option is also being set up. Tariffs on electricity are to be determined 
transparently in the EPIAS stock market. While transmission, distribution and retail 
tariffs are still regulated by EMRA, the generation tariff is completely determined by the 
market.  
5.4.1. Privatisation process I: Policy design and price regulation 
As summarised in the previous section, all public electricity utilities concerning 
generation and distribution had been corporatized in Turkey, by the end of 2015. It has 
been one of the first developing countries to finalise the full transition process gradually 
(Atiyas et al., 2012). The privatisation agenda was inspired by the UK model that was 
implemented by the legislation of the Electricity Act of 1989. As discussed briefly with 
respect to its implementation and outcomes in the previous sections, the privatisation of 
electricity in the UK aimed at increasing competition through various mechanisms. The 
most important one was the introduction of a wholesale market, Electricity Pool, which 
functioned as the unified electricity market for all public and private generators. From 
that pool, customers with more than 1 MW demand (the threshold to be lowered to 
zero until 1998) were free to choose their contractors.  
The same policy design was implemented in Turkey. First, the areas of generation and 
transmission were unbundled from distribution and retail, and generation was gradually 
privatised. Finally, distribution and retail were further unbundled and privatised. There 
was no privatisation attempt for transmission as it is still classified as naturally 
monopolistic. Figure 5-2 shows the declining share of the public sector in generation, 





Figure 5-2: The Share of the Public Sector in Electricity Segments (2001-2014) 
Source: TEIAS 
As mentioned in the previous section, Law No: 3096 in 1984 gave authorisation for a 
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme for new generation facilities and a Transfer of 
Rights (TOR) scheme for existing facilities. In the beginning, BOT agreements were 
designed as concessions for companies to build and operate a generation plant for 99 
years (it was renegotiated to 49 years in 2013), with transfer of the plant to the state at 
no cost after the concession period ends.  
The World Bank defines the difference between BOT agreements and concessions as 
follows. In concessions, the concessionaires can operate the existing assets, therefore 
there will be immediate cash flows from the customers as the main source of revenues. 
In a BOT Project, on the other hand, there are no immediate cash flows from existing 
revenue streams and the project company or operator generally obtains its revenues 
through a fee charged to the utility/government rather than tariffs charged to 
consumers. In the power sector, this usually takes the form of a Power Purchase 
Agreement. In a power purchase agreement, there is likely to be a minimum payment 
that is required to be paid by the contractor, provided that the operator can deliver the 
service (availability payment) as well as a volumetric payment for quantities delivered 
above that level.15  
                                                 
15 From World Bank Group Public Private Partnership in Infrastructure Resource Centre website: 















Although the BOT scheme in Turkey was arranged as a concession to allow investors to 
benefit from existing revenue streams, the process was subject to the review of the 
Council of State (Danistay) under the Administrative Law which involved a lengthy 
process that discouraged private investors (Atiyas et al., 2012). However, it should be 
noted that the privatisation took place at a time of limited primary accumulation in the 
energy sector, when firms did not have enough capacity for big infrastructural 
investments. Therefore, the state has been heavily involved in the financing of the 
sector before and during the transition phase (Bagdadioglu & Odyakmaz, 2009). In 
1994 a Decree was passed to grant tax exemptions and Treasury guarantees for BOT 
agreements. In 1997, a BO model was also introduced.  
The Treasury guarantees were based on a take-or-pay principle. After 1994 until 2001, 
TEAS bought 85% of the total electricity produced under BOT contracts and 100% of 
production under BO contracts (Cakarel & House, 2004). In 2000, there were twenty-
four power plants under BOT and five plants under BO all of which were protected by 
Treasury guarantees. TEAS was responsible for buying all of the produced electricity. 
Nevertheless, the prices were so high that in 2000 and 2001 it could not pay the full 
amount and needed a net capital increase from the Treasury worth $87 million 
according to a report prepared by the Turkish Court of Accounts in 2004. The same 
report also revealed that between 2000 and 2004, public losses related to increased 
Treasury payments to private companies reached $2.3 billion while the profit rate of 
private firms was over 85%.16  
The report concluded that BOT and BO agreements overall resulted in increased public 
losses because of the fallacies in both design and implementation of the scheme. First, 
auctions were not designed in a competitive way. In many cases, public tenders were 
not made and bids were collected from companies operating in the sector, although the 
design of the scheme held the Ministry of Energy responsible for choosing the location 
of the plants, in the actual implementation the location of the plants were chosen by the 
firms. This resulted in excess electricity supply in certain regions which further 
contributed to public losses due to increased transmission costs and loss ratios in 
                                                                                                                                          
website for more information on the details of concessions, BOT contracts and power purchase 
agreements.  
16 Turkish Court of Accounts, Report on Energy No: 5088/1, (2004). 
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distribution. Third, the prices were predetermined by the firms over the duration of 15-
30 years and this resulted in the state buying expensive electricity in dollars. Fourth, 
some contracts were signed despite having poor feasibility reports according to third 
party investigations.  
Despite substantial efforts by the state to make the electricity sector attractive to private 
investors, participation of the private sector has remained low until full privatisation 
(Karahan & Toptas, 2013). When EML was passed in 2001, the share of the public 
sector in electricity generation was still over 70%. Attempts were especially unsuccessful 
in terms of attracting foreign investment, considering the volatile macroeconomic 
environment of the time. Especially during the first half of the 2000s, there is emphasis 
in the literature on how the state’s involvement in the sector in the form of a take-or-
pay model had a limiting impact on competition  and this is because the sector remains 
more or less monopolistic before and after privatisation (Atiyas & Dutz, 2005; Cakarel 
& House, 2004; Dagdeviren, 2009). Atiyas and Dutz (2005) claim that the existence of 
take-or-pay agreements created competition not in the market but rather for the market 
of which costs are burdened by the public and consumers, while benefits go to the 
private companies.  
Until the amendment of Law No: 4628 in 2001, TEK distributed electricity according to 
a single tariff system. The tariff reflected the costs of production and the excise and 
value added taxes, but there was no unbundled tariff system according to different areas 
of activities. When the EML established electricity markets, the supply side was fully 
liberalised through a licensing regime. Generated electricity by EUAS and licensed 
generators could be sold in the market, and auto-producers could also sell surplus. Then, 
21 regional distribution companies could also engage in the market and they were 
allowed to take part in retail supply as long as they had a retail licence. Between 2001 
and 2013, while the free consumer limits were decreasing periodically, there was a 
hybrid system based a single buyer model. TETAS (Turkish Electricity Trade and 
Contracting Corporation) has been the state-owned electricity wholesale company 
responsible as the single buyer from private and public electricity generating companies 
during the period.  
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The wholesale market consisted of a bilateral contracting market complemented by a 
residual balancing market that was launched in 2006. From 2006 onwards, TETAS 
regulated tariffs according to a price equalisation scheme. It employed bilateral contracts, 
bought electricity from EUAS, from private companies work under the principles of 
BO, BOT and TOR, from settlement market that is under the regulation of MFSC 
(Market Financial Settlement Centre), determined tariffs according to a cost-reflective, 
incentive-based pricing mechanism and then sold it to electricity transmission 
companies, customers that are directly linked to electricity distribution, distribution and 
retail companies and to settlement market where any excess supply of electricity can be 
traded daily. It has also been in charge for imports and exports and it is the regulatory 
body for Market Financial Settlement Centre (MFSC).  
Figure 5-3: Public Sector (TETAS) Electricity Trade 
Source: TETAS 
*TETAS’s share is shown on the right axis. 
Because TETAS’ costs had a large take-or-pay component, the prices of TETAS 
remained initially very high at a fixed price, so it could not afford a competitive price 
over the one determined by the market (Atiyas & Dutz, 2005). Figure 5-4 illustrates the 
change in TETAS wholesale prices since 2001.  
Today, price determination for the wholesale market takes place in the day-ahead 
market where participation is not compulsory and any agent can participate by signing 
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demand and supply meets, the Market Exchange Price is determined. Any imbalances 
that can occur are handled by the Market Financial Settlement Centre (MFSC). The 
balancing market was introduced as a complementary mechanism but later turned into 
an electricity spot market. In a balancing market-bilateral contracts model, it is expected 
that a small portion of electricity (10%-15%) would be traded for balancing purposes, 
but the balancing market in Turkey attracted almost all electricity generation.17 This was 
because it reflected better prices for marginal generation capacity and as a result most 
generators cancelled their bilateral contracts and started selling in the balancing market 
(Atiyas et al., 2012).  
Figure 5-4: TETAS Average Wholesale Prices 
 Source: TETAS 
In retail and distribution markets, first, a threshold was put on consumption and 
consumers exceeding the threshold consumption levels were considered to be eligible to 
choose their distributors. As of 2014, after privatisation of all 21 retailers was completed, 
the sector openness ratio has reached 85%, indicating 85% of consumers were eligible 
to choose their electricity contractors. High sector openness is one of the most 
important indicators of successfully liberalised markets, but in practice over 40% of free 
                                                 


















consumers did not use their opportunity to choose their retailers and stayed with their 
regional distributors18.  
Figure 5-5: Electricity Sector Openness Ratio and Free Consumer Limits through Time 
Source: TEDAS 
*Free consumer limits item is shown on the right axis. 
As mentioned earlier, the regulatory framework for electricity in Turkey is hybrid and it 
tries to address both revenues and prices, based on rate of return and marginal cost 
principles, respectively. These principles were adopted prior to the privatisation of 
distribution and retail, in a transition scheme without reflecting the changes on end-user 
tariffs. According to this scheme, distribution was unbundled into four segments: retail 
sales, retail services, distribution and transmission. While retail services and distribution 
segments continued to operate under a revenue cap, a price cap was introduced to retail 
sales. In the transmission segments, prices were determined on a cost-plus basis. As the 
2004 Privatisation Strategy Paper revealed, the recovery of stranded costs has been an 
important policy consideration and been a determining factor for such a transitionary 
period.  
As Guney (2005, p. 99) points out, there could be three possible methods for cost 
recovery in Turkish electricity markets:  
                                                 
18 TEDAS Company Report (2013). See Figure 5-5 for sector openness ratios and free consumer 
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1) The state could continue to subsidize BOT and BO contracts via mostly low-
cost, state-owned hydroelectric generation, 
2) The state could buy out contracts (either at book value or through negotiated 
securitization, a process in which savings can be obtained on the financing cost 
of initial generation investments), then release the power and the capacity set 
forth in the contracts into the market at a price that the market can bear. The 
resulting costs (the difference between buyout value and market value) can be 
recovered over time through transition surcharges on customer bills; or 
3) The state could release the power and the capacity set forth in the contracts 
into the market without a buy-out option and levy a transition surcharge on 
customer bills until the end of the contracts. 
The first option would have been the continuation of the traditional subsidy scheme 
through mixing the costs of BOT and BO contracts with the benefits of state-owned, 
low-cost hydroelectric generation. In a policy paper prepared for Turkey in 2002, the 
OECD also recommends this option in which the bundling continues until stranded 
costs are fully recovered. By this method, the political risk of a transition surcharge on 
electricity bills is also avoided. In fact, Turkey has followed a mixed approach between 
the first and second options. The state owned hydro-electric facilities with much lower 
operating costs than the new facilities were gradually privatised under TOR with a 
gradual opening of the market. The regulatory mechanism for achieving the gradual 
liberalisation has been allowing for all stranded costs to be recovered through revenue 
cap guarantees while there was also a pass through mechanism to reflect changes in the 
price cap in case there were improvements in the cost structure. This incentive-based 
rate of return formulation is applied by the EMRA for all segments including storage, 
transmission, wholesale, distribution and retail. The first implementation period being 
between 2006-2010, this is a common example of a global public-private partnership 
practice where if the revenues fall below the minimum revenue guarantees, the 
government subsidizes, and any excess revenue is either retained by the investors or 
transferred to public budget.19  
                                                 
19 In Turkey, the excess revenues are retained by the firms but any excess amounting over 105% of 
the revenue cap is deducted from the calculations for the following period (EMRA, 2015, Electricity 




Among many other examples, India has been one of the countries to adopt an annual 
revenue and price based regulation mechanism through the unbundling of Delhi’s 
vertically integrated electricity company, Delhi Vidyut Board in 2002 (Pargal & Banerjee, 
2014). In terms of the regulatory structure, the Turkish electricity system can be 
considered to be along the same lines with the rest of the developing world, for which a 
hybrid system of regulation is encouraged.  
As mentioned, the privatisation experience has been successful in encouraging private 
sector participation, especially in the generation segment. The share of private 
producers in total generation has increased from less than 20% in 2002 to over 80% by 
the end of 2016. 20  In 2011, the state’s generation company EUAS’s share in total 
installed capacity was 38.3%, while its share in total generation was 32.1%. By the end 
of 2016, EUAS’s market power in total electricity installed power capacity and 
generation has decreased to 25.7% and 17.1%, respectively.  
Nevertheless, this section emphasised the choice of regulation mechanisms that 
reflected the initial costs on the public budget and consumer bills to encourage the 
private sector participation. The next section will address the problem of losses and 
theft in transmission and distribution, which played an important role in the 
implementation of the privatisation plan, along with other implementation problems. 
5.4.2. Privatisation process II: Addressing losses and theft and problems in 
implementation 
Prior to privatisation, a major problem of Turkish electricity provision has been the 
high ratio of distribution losses and theft. As a percentage of total consumption, it has 
been consistently over 10% since the early 1990s, reaching a peak of 20% in 2000, while 
the average OECD loss ratio has been around 7% over the same period. Although the 
reasons behind the losses are not well known, they are substantially higher in the east 
and southeast regions which suggests that the violence related to political problems in 
these regions is liable to have been a contributory factor (Atiyas et al., 2012). By 2017, 
transmission losses and theft still constitute an important problem for the prospects of 
the Turkish electricity industry. 
                                                 
20 EUAS, Annual Activity Report (2016). 
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Figure 5-6: Electric Power Transmission and Distribution Losses (% of total output) 
 
Instead of offering direct cash subsidies to distribution companies with the highest loss 
ratios, EMRA introduced a price equalisation scheme in 2006 in accordance with the 
cost recovery principle. The scheme is based on a national tariff structure that is 
uniform across regions but differentiated according to consumers. Specific target losses 
are set for each distributional company, and any improvement beyond target losses can 
be appropriated by the company. If companies make improvements beyond their target 
losses, the difference is paid by TETAS. If companies’ costs stay high due to losses, 
these costs are directly reflected on end user prices. There is no mechanism however, to 
reflect the cost improvements on the end user tariffs for ineligible consumers. The total 
cost for losses have increased to 5.9 billion TL in 2012,21 and this has been deducted 
from consumers in the form of a cost item in retail tariffs.  
As Table 5-3 illustrates, the regional discrepancy is striking with the losses of the 
company responsible for electricity distribution in the southeast region, Dicle EDAS, 
                                                 
21 Turkish Court of Accounts, TEDAS Report (2012) (Note: This individual Turkish Court of 
Accounts Report on TEDAS could not be accessed from Turkish Court of Accounts website 
(www.sayistay.gov.tr) as of July 2017. Instead, some of its findings are summarised in Turkish Court 
of Accounts general report on Public Enterprises: T.C. Sayistay Bakanligi Kamu Isletmeleri 2012 Yili 





amounting to 3.4 billion TL in the same year, constituting 57.6% of total losses 
nationwide.22 The state’s response to the failure in meeting the target losses has been to 
raise the targets instead of offering a long-term solution for decreasing losses. For 
example, in the case of Dicle EDAS, the target loss ratios were set at 42.06%, 34.93% 
and 29.01% for 2013, 2014, respectively, in the initial privatisation plan in 2009. 
Nevertheless, the actual losses could not be reduced below 70%, putting serious 
financial constraint on the company. In 2009, Dicle EDAS and Vangolu EDAS, two 
distributional companies from the southeast and east regions, reported 73% and 55% 
loss ratios, respectively. The loss ratio has even increased to 75% in 201423. Despite the 
incentives given by the state for cost reduction in the form of higher loss targets, the 
distribution company was not able to reduce losses.  
Table 5-3: Loss-Theft Aim Ratios of Selected Regional Distribution-Retail Companies 
Loss-Theft Aim Ratios according 
to regions 
2013 2014 2015 






Vangolu 52.1% 43.27% 35.94% 
Aras 25.7% 21.35% 17.73% 
Toroslar 11.8% 11.25% 10.72% 
Bogazici 10.76% 10.26% 9.78% 
Uludag 6.96% 6.90% 6.90% 
Source: TMMOB 
An important reason for high loss ratios might be long transmission lines to transfer 
energy. Private electricity generators are free to choose the geographical locations of 
their activity, which requires longer transmission lines. This both increases transmission 
losses and also the transfers from the public budget as the transmission costs are 
covered by the state owned company TEIAS. While large industrial cities, such as 
Istanbul, have excess electricity demand compared to regionally installed capacity 
(excess demand for electricity in Istanbul is expected to exceed 8500MW by 2022), 
                                                 
22 Turkish Court of Accounts, TEDAS Report (2012). 
23 Turkish Court of Accounts, TEDAS Report (2012). 
24 The numbers in brackets are the unrevised aim ratios determined by Electricity Sector Reform and 
Privatization Strategy Document in 2009 (TMMOB (2012), The Union of Chambers of Turkish 
Engineers and Architects, The Chamber of Electrical Engineers. Privatisation of Electricity 
Distribution Report, accessed from http://www.emo.org.tr/ekler/e59e00fdeea8fea_ek.pdf).  
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some regions such as Eastern Anatolia and Black Sea demand significantly less than 
they generate. In 2022, excess supply in Cukurova region is expected to increase to 
15000MW.25 In order to transfer electricity from low demand regions to high demand 
regions, new investments had to be made to increase the capacity for power distribution 
units and lengthening transmission lines. As Figure 5-7 shows, TEIAS’s investment 
costs for the maintenance and improvement of the transmission system have exceeded 
the projected costs declared by its investment program since 2011, implying that there 
were unanticipated systemic problems such as frequent nationwide power outages,26 as 
well as extra system requirements such as increased capacity for transmission network.   
Figure 5-7: TEIAS Investment Program Costs and Actual Costs 
Source: TEIAS 
In general, there were extensive financing problems in the implementation of the 
privatisation plan, as a report prepared by the Turkish Court of Accounts in 2012 
revealed that there was malpractice in the application that resulted in a TEDAS loss of 
                                                 
25 TEIAS & TUBITAK MAM Report (2013), “2013-2022 Yillari Turkiye Iletim Sistemi Bolgesel 
Talep Tahmin ve Sebeke Analiz Calismasi”. This report is a 10 year regional demand forecast, which 
has been replaced in 2017 by TEIAS with a new forecast for 2017-2026 period, can be accessed 
from https://teias.gov.tr/sites/default/files/2017-
06/10Y%C4%B1ll%C4%B1kTalepTahminleriRaporu2016%282%29.pdf.  
The reference is made to the previous forecast, as the new forecast only reports expected changes in 
demand without reference to supply capacity of regions.  
26 The number of power outages firms suffer in a typical month is 1.7 in 2013, while the number is 
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126 million TL. 27 During the handover process of Meram and Firat distribution 
companies in 2009 and 2010, respectively, due to miscalculations of company assets, 
TEDAS’s holdings of cash and cash equivalences worth 14.6 and 7 million TL were 
transferred to the private firms. The same process of illegal cash transfer was also 
repeated in the privatisation of Baskent, Sakarya, Osmangazi, Camlibel, Uludag, Coruh, 
Yesilirmak and Trakya regions. The Ministry of Energy of Natural Resources decided in 
2013 that out of the losses reported by the Court of Accounts at 126 million TL, there 
was no mechanism for the retrieval of 82 million TL, which was cut from the public 
budget.   
Table 5-4: Actors and Tender Values in Electricity Distribution-Retail Segments 
Distribution Company 
 
TOR Agreement Tender Value (million $) 
Baskent EnerjiSA 1225 
Sakarya Ak Enerji 600 
Meram Alarko-Cengiz 400 
Aras Kiler Holding 128 
Coruh Aksa Enerji 227 
Firat Aksa Enerji 230 
Trakya IC Holding 575 
Osmangazi Yildizlar SSS 485 
Yesilirmak Calik Holding 441 
Camlibel Limak-Kolin-Cengiz 258 
Uludag Limak-Kolin-Cengiz 940 
Gediz Elsan-Tumas-Karacay 1231 
Bogazici Limak-Kolin-Cengiz 1960 
Goksu AKEDAS 60 
Akdeniz Limak-Kolin-Cengiz 546 
Menderes Aydem-Bereket 110 
Anadolu Yakasi EnerjiSA 1227 
Dicle Iskaya Dogu OGG 387 
Vangolu Turkerler Insaat 118 
Toroslar EnerjiSA 1725 
Table 5-4 shows the actors in electricity distribution, almost all of which are big 
conglomerates with substantial investments in other sectors, especially construction. 
According to the Competition Law, a single company can hold only up to 30% of all 
                                                 
27 Turkish Court of Accounts (2012). 
203 
 
distribution assets to avoid oligopolisation. Nevertheless, the cross-sectoral linkages are 
unexamined.28  
As one of the major goals of a competitive electricity market is reduction of end-user 
tariffs, the privatisation of retail and distribution companies according to the cost 
recovery principle has been one of the most important steps of the privatisation process. 
Between 2003 and 2008, prices were kept constant despite the high increase in gas costs. 
That was mostly for political reasons, as the government did not want to pass increased 
costs onto consumers before the general elections in 2007 (Atiyas et al., 2012; 
Bagdadioglu & Odyakmaz, 2009). In January 2008, electricity retail prices were raised by 
EMRA for the first time for 5 years, and prices almost doubled between 2008 and 2010 
(Atiyas et al., 2012). As Figure 5-8 shows, after the transition to a cost-based pricing 
regulation in 2006, the electricity tariffs increased substantially both for industry and 
households. 
Figure 5-8: Domestic Electricity Prices According to Sectors 
Source: TETAS 
Among OECD countries, Turkey has the fourth highest electricity prices for industry, 
while household prices are only slightly higher than the OECD average. Prices reflect 
                                                 
28 Almost all of the actors in electricity distribution displayed in Table 5-4 also have operations in the 
construction sector. Limak-Kolin-Cengiz consortium is also responsible for the construction of the 
third airport in Istanbul by the Black Sea coast. Its tender worth is 22 billion Euros, making it the 
most expensive single investment project in Turkey until now. Its construction started in 2014 and is 





















primary product costs such as fuel and natural gas, but also taxes. Taxes on electricity 
for industry are very high in Turkey (18.5%) compared to the OECD average of about 
9%. While for households taxes amounted to 21.5% and the average for OECD 
countries is 19.7% (Guney, 2005). It should be noted that higher prices are expected to 
be observed in the beginning of a privatisation period when the initial costs are higher 
and are not necessarily problematic in and of themselves. What is important, however, 
is the distributional choice over the reflection of the initial costs due to already existing 
factors such as losses and theft or other implementation problems.  
This section examined some of features of the Turkish electricity system, such as losses 
and theft, which have existed prior to the privatisation process, but affected its 
implementation. The emphasis is on the fact that different actors were affected by such 
problems differentially, depending on the policy design choice of the regulatory body. 
In terms of cost reduction, the main strategy of the state has been mixing the low-cost 
state-owned hydroelectric power with the power generated by the new contracts in a 
common pool. The next section will discuss these implementation problems more 
closely through the investigation of the construction of hydroelectric power plants.  
5.5. The Case of Hydroelectric Power Plants (HEPPs) in Turkey: How They are 
Built and Financed 
This section will discuss the increasing importance given to the hydroelectric power 
plant construction since 2003, along with a broader restructuring of the economy that 
has been discussed in Chapter 3. As explained in Chapter 1, this thesis locates the 
developments in and around electricity within a broader understanding of a capitalist 
economy with the tendency to increase capital intensity of production along with the 
concentration of ownership at the level of production and the counter-tendencies that 
involve changes in the interests of competitiveness and technical change. In the case of 
welfare provision, there have been wider societal concerns involved that interfered with 
the development of these sectors along the lines summarised above. As a result, the 
state has been directly involved in both production and regulation processes that 
allowed for commercial relations to exist along with the concerns for the delivery of the 
products of these sectors as indispensable use values for human survival.  
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This section is about how the involvement of the private sector within the electricity 
system in Turkey developed. First of all, a major factor is associated with the 
development of new technology and its diffusion. The economy was going through a 
period of restructuring in which new technology became more available which broke 
down the traditional barriers between the sectors. Such an interest in energy production 
through hydro facilities brought energy and construction sectors together, and this has 
been made easier through liberalised energy markets. Big-scale investments in 
hydroelectric facilities increased substantially, which has been made by big 
conglomerates with joint engagement in both energy and construction sectors. On the 
other hand, the availability of cheaper new technology was also made profitable for 
small competitors (mostly operating in run-of-river hydro facilities)given the availability 
of cheap labour force in an environment of worsening labour conditions.  
In 2003, the “Regulation on principles and procedures relating to the signing of water 
right agreements in the field of electricity production” was put into force, marking the 
increased importance given to the construction of hydroelectric power plants in Turkey. 
The Regulation determines the principles and procedures to be implemented by the 
General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works when signing a water right agreement 
with corporate bodies operating in hydroelectric energy production. The Regulation also 
covers the mandatory provisions to be included in such agreements and the principles 
and procedures of the application process, preparing and delivering feasibility reports, 
evaluation of the reports, and signing water rights agreements. HEPP licence 
applications are made to the EMRA and licences are issued for 49 years. 
Establishment and operation of HEPPs have been one of the main investment areas for 
big businesses that have already been operating in a variety of other sectors in Turkey 
after the legislation in 2003. In 2009, the tender process for 52 new small scale run-of-
river hydroelectric power plants started. The tenders for the privatisation of existing 
hydro plants were completed by 2011. By 2012, out of 1547 new HEPP applications, 
701 were accepted. According to EMRA numbers, 600 HEPP projects have been 
implemented, 250 of which are concentrated in the Black Sea region.29 According to 
DSI reports HEPPs are economically profitable investments and they amortise 
                                                 
29 EMRA (Republic of Turkey, Energy Market Regulatory Board) website: www.emra.org.tr  
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themselves within 4-9 years. A survey carried out in Marmara region reveals that 45% of 
the investors have made more profits than they anticipated, while 35% of the investors 
stated their profit levels matched their expectations (Aktaş & Alı̇oğlu, 2013). In its 
strategic plan for 2015-2019, The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources anticipates 
a 36% increase in the total capacity of hydro plants through new construction, and a 
125% increase in total generation through increased efficiency by the end of 2019.30 The 
economic rationale behind this strategy is explained as lower operational costs and 
decreased import dependency, as hydroelectric power units do not depend on fuel 
which is mostly imported. 
The early policy papers by the World Bank (1966; 1957) on the choice between hydro 
and thermal power reveal a complicated cost structure in which although hydro power 
plants require higher irreversible infrastructure investment in the beginning, they have 
lower operational costs due to the lack of fuel costs and also because they are relatively 
more simple in terms of technical design and operating and maintaining requirements 
once they are constructed (World Bank, 1966; 1957). Although a lot has changed quite 
dramatically since the time these reports were written, dam technology stays more or 
less similar in terms of its fundamental principles and the choice of inputs.  
The components of a hydroelectric power plant that require the bulk of investment are 
the civil works that can be grouped into the following: headworks (extracts water from 
the river course), waterway (conveys water to powerhouse), powerhouse (hosts the 
turbine and generator, converts water first into mechanical and then into electrical 
energy) and tailrace (discharges turbine water into a receiver, lake, river or ocean). 
Within headworks; there is the dam and water intake. Waterway consists of headrace 
(takes the water from headworks to forebay or the surge tank with minimum head 
losses), forebay (connects the headrace with the penstock, preventing air efflux into 
penstock), surge chamber (controls pressure in the penstock and headrace), penstock 
(pressure pipes, conveys pressurized water from the surge tank to the turbine). 
Powerhouse is the segment where the turbine and the generator convert the pressurised 
water energy into electrical energy. Tailrace discharges water coming from the 
powerhouse (IFC, 2015). 
                                                 




Figure 5-9: Sample Hydroelectric Power Plant Model 
 
Source: Khan et al., 2012 
These units require steel, iron, plastics, concrete/rock or wood as primary materials, 
depending on choice. In run-of-river type of hydro plants, where there is not water 
storage hence the construction of a dam, the up-front costs are significantly reduced 
and the start-up investment is much smaller. Run-of-river type hydro projects are 
classified as ‘micro’ or ‘mini’ sized hydroelectric facilities, their power capacity ranging 
between 5 kW to 1 MW (as opposed to small sized facilities 1 MW-10 MW, medium 
sized 10 MW-100 MW and large size 100+ MW). Nevertheless, many hydropower cost 
components are assumed to be fixed regardless of the project scale, therefore the larger 
facilities have lower costs in the long-run. For example, a typical feasibility report might 
account for 1-2 per cent of total costs of a large hydro facility, while for a small hydro 
plant the study might account for up to 5% (IFC, 2015).31 In 2009, the run-of-river 
projects have constituted the largest portion of the portfolio of World Bank 
hydropower projects in both value and number of projects. In terms of value, run-of-
river projects constituted 48% of all World Bank investment projects in hydro power.32 
                                                 
31 For more on the cost structures and financing of hydro power facilities, see Head (2000) and 
Head (2006).  
32  World Bank Group Report (2009), Directions in Hydropower. Also see World Bank (2013), 
Toward a Sustainable Energy Future For All: Directions for the World Bank Group’s Energy Sector.  
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Electricity generation is a capital intensive sector with a 50% investment share in total 
expenditures in 2007 (Bhattacharyya, 2011). 33 Among different technologies, 
conventional hydropower technology as explained above has a higher capital intensity 
than gas and oil combined cycle thermal plants with a unit variable cost of 2.62$ per 
unit of MWh as opposed to 14.7$ fixed operating costs per one MWh.34  
Table 5-5: Fixed and Variable Cost Characteristics of Various Electricity Generation Technologies 
Technology Size (MW) 
Variable Operating & 
Management Costs 2015 
($/MWh) 
Fixed Operating & 
Management Costs 
2015 ($/MWh) 
Coal with 30% carbon 
sequestration (CCS) 650 6.95 68.49 
Conv Gas/Oil Comb Cycle 702 3.42 10.76 
Adv Gas/Oil comb Cycle 
(CC) 429 1.96 9.78 
Adv CC with CCS 340 6.97 32.69 
Conv Comb Turbine 100 3.42 17.12 
Adv Comb Turbine 237 10.46 6.65 
Fuel Cells 10 44.21 0 
Adv Nuclear 2234 2.25 98.11 
Distributed Generation-Base 2 7.98 17.94 
Distributed Generation-Peak 1 7.98 17.94 
Biomass 50 5.41 108.63 
Geothermal 50 0 116.12 
MSW Landfill Gas 50 9 403.97 
Conventional Hydropower* 500 2.62 14.7 
Wind 100 0 45.98 
Wind Offshore 400 0 76.1 
Solar Thermal 100 0 69.17 
Photovoltaic 150 0 21.33 
Source: EIA (2017), Assumptions to the Annual Energy Outlook 
As a crude rule of thumb, in order to cover the early costs that might span a period of 
five to fifteen years, a more rapid expansion of the market will favour hydro which 
might explain its increasing importance in Turkey during a process of macreconomic 
expansion which could provide the necessary demand for financing big infrastructural 
investment. The big infrastructural investments went hand-in-hand with smaller scale 
investments in run-of-river hydro facilities given the depressed wages which could allow 
                                                 
33 The investment share in total expenditures is as high as 91% in the coal industry in the same year 
(Bhattacharya, 2011).  
34 See Table 5-5. 
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for a high productivity-high investment and low productivity-low investment structures 
to exist alongside each other. As explained above, the bulk of investments in 
hydroelectric facilities require civil work. Therefore the development of the energy 
sector in Turkey went hand-in-hand with the developments in the construction sector, 
which will be discussed more in detail in the following chapter on the political economy 
of the housing provision.  
Figure 5-10: The Share of Electricity Generated by HEPPs in Turkey (%) 
Source: TEIAS 
By the end of 2016, the installed capacity for electricity generation in Turkey is 79621 
MW, 26919 MW of which is based on hydroelectric power plants. Among hydroelectric 
power plants, 19680 MW worth of power comes from hydroelectric plants with 
reservation (dam) and 7239 MW comes from hydroelectric plants with no reservation 
(run-of-the-river electricity). The hydroelectric plants’ share in total installed capacity is 
33.8%, while its contribution to total generation did not exceed 20% between 2010 and 
2015.35  
On the other hand, the investments made in hydroelectric power plants since 2003 
increased steadily almost achieving 40% of all investments made in the energy sector in 
                                                 











terms of total installed electricity power in 2016.36 In 2003, the investments made in 
thermal power plants contributed to the total installed power capacity by 3241.791 MW, 
while hydro investments’ contribution stayed at 360.447 MW. From 2003 to 2016, the 
cumulative investments in hydro plants contributed by 14475.483 MW, growing much 
faster than investments made in thermal power, which contributed to total installed 
power by 28276.147 MW during the same time span. 
Figure 5-11: The Shares of Different Types of Electricity Generation Facilities in Total Industry 
Investments 
Source: TEIAS Electricity Statistics 
Among the biggest investment projects in the power sector was the Coruh 
Development Plan that included the construction of five big scale HEPPs in the Black 
Sea Region, and also the Ilisu HEPP in the Southeast Region as well as the construction 
of the first nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, Mersin (Mediterranean Region). In practice, 
there were extensive problems with the implementation of these projects in particular, 
and the electricity privatisation process in general. Especially during the introduction of 
build and operate systems concerning the already operating hydro units that have been 
                                                 
36 See Figure 5-11. The comparison between different types of investments is made in terms of their 
contribution to the total installed capacity and not in terms of total value of investment, as there are 
considerable cost differences between building thermal and hydro plants. Typically, the cost of a 
hydro power plant is 100 to 200 per cent more than a thermal power station (Head, 2000). However, 
the cost of constructing hydro power plants is only higher in the beginning (if it involves the 
construction of a dam), and it has much lower long-term operating costs (the absence of fuel cost 


















under the ownership and management of DSI (State Hydraulic Works), serious 
financing problems occurred. Seven tenders, notably in Istanbul and Izmir in 2010 and 
2011, have been annulled after winning bidders failed to provide the finance to back 
their high bidding prices (ESMAP, 2015). Second, many projects were implemented 
despite poor feasibility reports. Third, some of the projects had negative impacts on 
society and the environment, as their implementation resulted inforced resettlement, 
destruction of agricultural land and permanent environmental damage.  
Since the signing of the water usage agreement in 2003, 65 lawsuits were filed due to 
environmental reasons by 2013. In 39 cases, the Council of State decided on 
cancellation or suspension of the projects. A report prepared by TMMOB (The Union 
of Chambers of Engineers and Architects, The Chamber of Mechanical Engineers) in 
February 2015 reveals that among the projects that obtained licences from the EMRA 
to invest in hydro infrastructure within the last five years, only 14% were able to pass 
the 70% completion rate (Turkyilmaz, 2015). In order to achieve the target installed 
capacity determined by the Ministry of Energy’s 2015-2019 Strategy Plan, over 60% of 
the projects need to be completed by 2019, which does not seem realistic given the 
current pace. The next two sections will give some details about the financing processes 
of the two biggest HEPP projects. 
5.5.1. Ilisu Dam: a HEPP Project 
Ilisu Dam is one of the biggest and most controversial HEPP Projects on the Tigris 
River in the southeast region of Turkey. Its initial design was made by DSI in 1954 as 
part of the South East Turkey Development Project (GAP). The controversy mostly 
arises from environmental and cultural concerns; since after its construction a 
UNESCO protected cultural heritage site, Hasankeyf, would be flooded affecting more 
than 50.000 people living in the area. Despite the government’s continual efforts to seek 
international funding for the huge investment project, the construction process that 
started in 2006 has been interrupted several times and it still has not been completed. 
The first consortium supplied credit from German, Swiss and Austrian export credit 
agencies worth $610 million, and the investment was to be completed with 100% 
foreign credit. In 2000, the British Government refused to provide $236 million funding. 
In December 2008, the involved European firms suspended funds for the dam and gave 
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Turkey a 180-day period to comply with over 150 international standards.37 In June 
2009, after failing to meet the standards, the European firms officially cut their funding.  
Nevertheless, the government was determined to continue with the construction of the 
dam despite social and economic problems. Shortly after the announcement of the 
funding loss, the Minister of Environment Veysel Eroğlu said “Let me tell you this, 
these power plants will be built. No one can stop it. This is the decision of the state and 
the government.”38 Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that necessary funds 
would be supplied internally in case of a loss of international funding. In December 
2010, the Ministry of Environment announced that loans had been granted by three 
Turkish banks, and the project would continue with a new consortium led by Nurol 
Holding. On 15 July 2010, the Austrian member of the consortium, Andritz 
Hydro, lifted a temporary suspension on supplying parts to the project and announced 
it would provide the six 200 MW Francis turbines for the power plant worth $421 
million dollars. Its investment is guaranteed by the Treasury within the scope of the 
‘Treasury Guaranteed Export Credits’ scheme.   
5.5.2. Coruh Development Plan 
This plan has been one of the most important comprehensive parts of energy policies in 
Turkey. The master plan for the project was completed in 1982, including the 
construction of 10 dams on the Coruh River in a cascade style. It consists of three 
groups of projects: lower Coruh (Muratli, Borcka and Deriner); middle Coruh (Yusufeli 
and Artvin); and upper Coruh (Laleli, Ispir, Gullubag, Aksu and Arkun). The feasibility 
studies of these projects were not made separately, but as a package of projects 
proposed for the Coruh Basin. The preparation of the feasibility report by the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) started in 1986, and was completed in 1997. 
The plan was put into the 1997 Investment Programme by the Turkish government.  
The individual projects in the Coruh Development Project are as follows. The Deriner 
HEPP was designed by the original Development Plan as an arch dam of which 
construction began in 1998. Nevertheless, due to delays in funding, the reservoir began 
                                                 
37 http://www.hydroworld.com/articles/2009/07/european-export-credit.html  
38 http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/ilisu-ya-yapilacak-ya-yapilacak-940770/  
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to fill in February 2012 and its power station was completed by February 2013. It is the 
highest dam in Turkey. The consortium was led by ERG Insaat, it included four Swiss 
and one Russian firms and it was funded by foreign credit. The construction of the 
Muratli and Borcka projects started in September 1999, which were undertaken by 
Turkish and Austrian companies on a full-financing basis with international finance. 
The consortium of Borcka Dam was led by Yuksel Insaat which has undertaken 15 
HEPP projects in total. The construction of Artvin HEPP was started in 2011 by the 
Dogus Group and completed by the end of 2015. Four domestic banks have supplied 
long-term project investment credits worth 540$ million. The Deriner project being the 
largest, the second largest project Yusufeli was considered to be the most economically 
and technically feasible option (DSI, 2006).  
Figure 5-12: Coruh Development Plan according to Actors and Funding Sources 
 
The feasibility study of Japan International Cooperation Agency was based mainly on 
construction costs and storage parameters (JICA, 1997). The design of the Yusufeli 
project as a rockfill dam has been calculated to create the highest benefit per cost unit 
(2.11). The original feasibility report included the cost of the dam and its 
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complementary structures, relocation roads and transmission lines. Nevertheless, the 
costs of resettlement were excluded. The construction of Yusufeli Dam requires the 
resettlement of the district of Yusufeli, including 19 villages of which the total 
population is over 15.000 people. In July 2005, a new relocation site for Yusufeli was 
selected by the Turkish government at Yansiticilar. The resettlement of Yusufeli project 
includes the establishment of new houses by TOKI and the alignment of relocation 
roads (mainly the Artvin-Bayburt route) which adds an additional cost of 427 million 
USD to the state budget which was not included in the original cost-benefit analysis.39 
The first tender was made for the Yusufeli project in 1997 and an international 
consortium was established between Turkey and France under the Bilateral Energy 
Agreements between the governments. On February 19, 2002 a lawsuit was opened 
claiming that the project did not follow the tender rules, an environmental report was 
not prepared and the social cost of the project would result in decreasedpublic welfare. 
While the lawsuit was continuing, the consortium left the project because it could not 
supply the necessary international credit according to the framework determined by the 
Treasury. In 2005, the Council of State decided that the objections were legitimate and 
stopped the dam construction. In 2007, a change was made to Law No: 4283 and, 
thanks to the amendment that allowed the transfer of the investment to another 
consortium without changing the requirements, the project was given to Doğuş, 
ALSTOM (Switzerland, France, Brazil), Coyneet Bellier (France) and Dolsar (Turkey) 
for 711 million dollars without announcing a new tender. The consortium obtained its 
licence from EMRA in 2010 and a bilateral energy agreement was signed with Georgia. 
Later the project was excluded from the scope of Bilateral Energy Agreements and on 
13 August 2012, Kolin-Limak-Cengiz won the new tender for 487 million TL.  
It is important to note that the decrease in the cost of the project has been made 
possible by transferring the cost of resettlement to the Treasury, including the cost of 
new road construction at $250 million. It has been decided that the DSI 26. Regional 
Directorate will be responsible for the expropriation process. In 2009, the Turkish 
Court of Accounts prepared a report revealing that the construction of Yusufeli and 
                                                 





Deriner HEPPs resulted in 461 million dollars public loss due to failures in project 
management.40 The construction of Yusufeli HEPP was started in 2005 and it remains 
under construction, with the new opening date set for May 29, 2018. The design of the 
project has changed almost entirely. In the original feasibility report, it was designed as a 
rockfill dam, but later its construction was started as an arch dam without changing the 
feasibility report. Its construction had some social impacts as it required resettlement of 
16,000 people living in the Yusufeli region. 
The construction of the Boyabat HEPP started in 1998, but due to a lawsuit and failures 
in obtaining foreign credit, the project has stopped. Samsun 2. Administrative Court 
halted the project due to the absence of an Environmental Impact Assessment Report 
(EIA), but later it was decided that the project should be excluded from the requirement 
to provide one. In 2012, its construction was completed by the Dogus Group (34% 
partnership) with long-term project investment credits worth $750 million supplied 
from four domestic banks. The completion of the dam required extra transmission lines 
worth 100 million TL which were supposed to be financed by the investors according 
to original project, but half of the expenses were paid by the state transmission 
company, TEIAS.  
The financing problems that occurred in the implementation of the Ilisu HEPP Project 
and Coruh Development Plan have been solved with the help of the state, and the 
projects have continued. As of May 2017, Ilisu HEPP is still under construction, while 
of the five HEPPs in Coruh Development Plan are in operation. The biggest HEPP in 
the Plan, Deriner HEPP is responsible for 0.8% of all electricity produced in Turkey in 
2016.41 The emphasis on the state’s involvement in the sector is to show how different 
actors are affected differently from the processes of commercialisation given the clear 
commitment of the state’s alignment with the private sector interests. It is not however, 
emphasised to question if the industrial success of the sector could have been 
accomplished without the help of the state. It is argued in Chapter 4 that the economy 
has been going through a restructuring process after the 2001 crisis, increases in the 
investments in the electricity generation segment constituting an aspect of this. The 
privatisation experience, within this context, plays a role in the changing of 
                                                 
40 http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/diger/191522/Hukumeti_korkutan_rapor.html  
41 General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works website (www.dsi.org.tr). 
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organisational relations within the sector at the level of productivity by allowing for 
loose price targets to be met by both big scale (higher productivity-higher investment) 
and small scale (lower productivity-lower investment) firms given the depressed level of 
wages during the period. At this level, the state’s involvement matters only to the extent 
that the industry stays profitable enough for commercial relations to exist. It should be 
noted that privatisation does not necessarily lead to financialisation, although it does 
lead to an increase in the scope of commercial relations. The next section will discuss 
the role of finance within the sector to discuss these issues more in detail.  
5.6. Financialisation or What Role to Finance? 
In some core countries, the privatisation of utility sectors has been followed by an 
intense securitization of assets and debts and the use of such instruments as financial 
investment tools. This was observed, for example, in water provision in the UK after 
the privatisation of Ofwat in 1989 (Bayliss, 2014a). As argued before, the stable and 
regular revenue streams in the utilities sectors depending upon customers’ bills 
contribute to this process. Nevertheless, this phenomenon corresponds to a certain 
level of development of the commercial relations within the economy and should be 
understood in relation to the specific depth and nature of the financial system in which 
such securitisation is taking place. In Turkey, market creation within and around the 
electricity sector is relatively new and underdeveloped. In this context, finance played a 
traditional role in the form of long-term bank credits for project investment. This 
section will investigate the role of finance in and around the electricity industry and 
energy sector. By doing so, it first explains how the investments described above are 
financed. Second, it discusses whether the tendencies outlined by the financialisation 
literature elaborated in Chapter 2 are observed.  
As Figure 5-13 illustrates, the total domestic cash loans given to the energy sector have 
increased substantially from 678,250 thousand TL (0.6 % of all domestic cash loans) in 
2004 to 122,514,120 thousand TL (6.38% of all domestic cash loans) by the end of first 




Figure 5-13: Comparison of Textiles, Electricity and Construction Industries according to their 
Shares in Total Domestic Credits 
Source: BRSA  
CBRT and BRSA statistics show that although the energy sector receives substantial 
credit from abroad, it is still primarily financed by equity and by domestic bank credits 
in foreign exchange, making it vulnerable to foreign exchange shocks. The majority of 
domestic loans given to the electricity generation, natural gas and hydraulic resources 
industry were long term FX loans, as illustrated in Figure 5-14. 42 
Figure 5-15 shows that the total cash and non-cash loans given to the energy sector by 
domestic banks in Turkey reached $36 billion by the end of 2014, with an annual 
nominal growth of $6.5 billion. Between 2013 and 2015, the energy sector in total 
(including the electricity, petroleum and coal and mining industries) used 12.8% of all 
domestic TL and FX credits issued on average. It has the second largest share after the 
manufacturing sector, which has used 42.3% of all domestic TL and FX credits. 
 
 
                                                 
42 The majority of these long-term loans are in fact medium-term with maturities varying from two 
to ten years, which is why the classification of Banking Regulation Supervision Agency (BRSA) 
illustrated in Figure 5-15 shows a lower quantity of long-term loans. BRSA classifies loans with 
maturities of two to ten years short-term, under the title “Short and Medium-Term Cash Loans”, as 
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Figure 5-14: The Breakdown of Total Cash Loans Given to Electricity Generation, Natural Gas and 
Hydraulic Resources Industry according to Maturity and Currency Type 
Source: CBRT Company Accounts 
Figure 5-15: The Breakdown of Domestic Credits Given to Electricity Generation, Natural Gas and 
Hydraulic Resources Industry according to Maturity and Loan Type 
Source: BRSA 
The volume of the Turkish energy sector’s long-term loans from abroad also increased 
substantially by 150 per cent in 12 years, reaching nearly $12.5 billion compared to $5 
billion in 2002, according to data released by the Central Bank in 2015. As Figure 5-16 
shows, the electricity and the natural gas sector received $9.1 billion from abroad (as 
opposed to total domestic bank loans amounting to $36 billion), doubling the amount 
in 2002, which was $4.2 billion. Other industries within the energy sector that are 
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and mining industry. Loans to the mining and quarrying industry increased four times 
climbing to $2.1 billion (domestic bank loans were $6.5 billion) from 2002's volume of 
$439 million.  Refined petroleum products and the coal industry received $1.2 billion 
worth of loans from abroad, as opposed to $292 million in 2002 (while the value of 
domestic banks loans given to the refined petroleum products and the coal industry 
were $3.3 billion). Among total foreign credits given to the industry, the energy sector 
has the second largest share by 25% after the manufacturing sector’s share of 68%.43  
Figure 5-16: Total Amount of Foreign Credits Obtained by the Energy Sector (billion $) 
Source: CBRT 
The next section will move on to a more detailed investigation of the financing practices 
of electricity firms, by using the corporate financial statements listed in the Company 
Accounts Statistics, collected by the CBRT.  
5.6.1. Corporate financial statements analysis and firm financing 
As discussed in Chapter 2, one of the most well established arguments of the 
financialisation literature is the impacts of increasing shareholder value orientation 
which moves firms towards short-termist planning practices and a subsequent decrease 
in real investment (Orhangazi, 2008; Stockhammer, 2005; Onaran, 2009). Crudely, in a 
financialised economy, the firms are expected to rely less on external funding such as 
bank credits and hold less fixed assets as opposed to liquid assets and overall have lower 
                                                 

















levels of gross capital formation (Levy-Orlik, 2012; Tori & Onaran, 2015). This section 
provides an investigation of these trends with the help of balance sheet information of 
firms operating in the electricity, natural gas and hydro resources industry collected by 
the Central Bank of Turkey between the years 1999 and 2016.  
It should be noted that the analysis is not to provide a perfect representation of the 
sector based on a representative firm, but rather to discuss how balance sheet items in 
aggregate change over time to identify the financing trends within the industry. It has 
been argued before that the productive capacity within the electricity industry has 
increased since 2002, in line with the more general capital restructuring process, 
although the degree and nature of the commercial relations around electricity have 
changed substantially. This section supports the argument that the financialisation trend 
underlines an increasing depth and extent of commercial relations within the economy 
which are not necessarily developing at the expense of industrial production.  
The balance sheet data for electricity industry come from the financial statements of 
firms operating in these sectors as aggregated in CBRT Company Accounts statistics, 
which is the most systematically kept data available for sectoral level developments. 
Company Accounts statistics are prepared since 1990 by the CBRT based on the 
voluntary participation and cooperation of firms that send comprehensive and 
systematic financial statements. The data are released yearly, each year covering the 
previous three-year period. The panel data for the national statistics are unbalanced as 
not all firms have participated in the survey throughout the 1999-2015 period. 
Therefore, it should be noted that this dataset cannot present a representative firm, but 
rather it gives a general picture of the industry with the entry and exit to the survey 
being compatible with the general development of the sector itself. The first Company 
Account Statistics report published in 1999 covers the period between 1996-1999, based 
on the financial statements of 7445 firms, 4764 of which are joint stock corporations, 
58 are holding companies, 2036 are limited liability corporations, 158 are general 
partnership corporations, 323 are individually-owned private companies and 84 are 
state-owned enterprises. The latest statistics, published in 2016 (covering the period 
between 2013-2015), aggregate 9341 firms. The first publication covers 12 main and 18 
sub-sectors while the number increases to 18 main and 42 sub-sectors in 2016.  
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Among total firms, the total number of electricity firms is 38 in 1996, while it increases 
to 307 in 2015 as shown in the Table 5-6 below. Among total firms operating within the 
electricity generation, natural gas and hydraulic resources industries, the majority are 
small- and medium-sized.  
Table 5-6: CBRT Company Account Statistics Number of Firms according to Sizes Operating in 
Electricity Generation, Natural Gas and Hydraulic Resources Industry 
Years 
Total # of 
firms 
Total # of firms in 
electricity industry SMEs Big 
1999 7445 38 31 7 
2000 7604 38 32 6 
2001 7537 42 35 7 
2002 7729 44 38 6 
2003 8007 45 40 5 
2004 7507 50 42 8 
2005 6667 40 35 5 
2006 7103 46 40 6 
2007 7308 47 41 6 
2008 7249 53 47 6 
2009 7352 132 123 9 
2010 8080 176 169 7 
2011 8576 179 165 14 
2012 8925 234 213 21 
2013 9468 260 240 20 
2014 9115 257 239 18 
2015 9341 307 291 16 
Electricity industry consists of electricity generation and distribution, natural gas and hydraulic resources. 
On the liabilities side, Figure 5-17 below shows that shareholders’ equity increased 
steadily until 2012, and decreased slightly after that year. Short-term liabilities, on the 
other hand, reached a peak in 2009, most probably due to the global contractionary 
pressures around that time. The most striking item is, however, long-term liabilities, 
which increased almost exponentially especially after the completion of the privatisation 
process in 2012.  
A closer look into the individual items further supports that the balance sheet structure 
of the firms reflects a traditional, bank-based industry. The disaggregated shares of 
shareholders’ equity and bank loans in total liabilities illustrated in Figures 5-18 and 5-19 
suggest that while there is a cyclical trend in changes in shareholders’ equity, the share 
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of short-term and long-term bank loans started to increase steadily as a share of total 
liabilities after 2010.  
Figure 5-17: Firms’ Liability Structure (Listed Electricity Industry Companies) 
 
Figure 5-18 shows that between 1996 and 2002, the share of shareholders’ equity 
hovered at around 40%, increased to over 50% after 2003. It dropped to almost 30% of 
all liabilities in 2009, only to reach a peak at 50% in 2012. Its share decreased to 25% of 
all liabilities in 2015. Bank credits, on the other hand, had a share around 35% of total 
liabilities between 1996 and 2003, then showed a decreasing trend until 2010, as 
illustrated in Figure 5-19. After 2010, due to the increased availability of funds, which is 
discussed in the previous chapter, the share of bank loans in total electricity firm 
liabilities started to increase up to over 40% in 2015. This suggests that firms rely on 
both internal and external funding resources, although the balance has changed in 
favour of external funding in the form of long-term foreign exchange credit since 2010-
2012. This trend is in line with the increasing private sector indebtedness trend since 
2012, as explained and discussed in Chapter 4.  
Figure 5-20 shows that trade finance has improved significantly after 2004, but then fell 
back to previous levels. The share of accounts payable increased to 30% of total 
liabilities from less than 10% in 1996 while accounts receivable followed a similar trend, 
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Figure 5-18: The Share of Shareholders’ Equity in Total Firm Liabilities (Listed Electricity Industry 
Companies) 
 
Figure 5-19: The Share of Bank Loans in Total Firm Liabilities (Listed Electricity Industry 
Companies) 
 
Figure 5-20: Trade Accounts (Listed Electricity Industry Companies) 
 
When we look at the assets side, Figure 5-21 below shows that fixed assets constitute a 
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total assets has been higher than 70%. Although it has decreased after 2005 until 2009, 
it increased again to over 70% of all assets in 2015.  
Figure 5-21: The Composition of Assets according to Durability (Listed Electricity Industry 
Companies) 
 
Figure 5-22 shows that the share of total financial assets in total assets has increased 
substantially between 2004-2010, then decreased after 2010 until 2015. The increase was 
mostly due to the improvements in the trade accounts receivables as shown in Figure 5-
20. As Figure 5-23 shows, the share of total cash, cash equivalents and marketable 
securities in total assets has decreased from an average of 9% between 1996 and 2001 to 
an average of 5% between 2002 and 2015. Figure 5-23 also illustrates that the share of 
marketable securities is negligible among total financial assets.   
Although the total quantity of securities is negligible, the breakdown of securities in 
Figure 5-24, however, shows an important trend. It seems that the highest share of the 
public sector bonds and notes is replaced by a higher share of derivative items after 
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Figure 5-22: The Share of Total Financial Assets in Total Assets (Listed Electricity Industry 
Companies) 
*Total financial assets consist of cash and cash equivalents, marketable securities, trade receivables, other 
receivables and long term financial assets items.  
Figure 5-23: The Share of Total Short-Term Financial Assets in Total Assets (Listed Electricity 
Industry Companies) 
*Trade Account Receivables item is not included in total short-term financial assets item. 
Figure 5-24: The Breakdown of Marketable Securities Item according to Types (Listed Electricity 
Industry Companies) 
*Other marketable securities include derivative contracts such as repurchase agreements, profit sharing or 
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Figure 5-25 below shows a decreasing trend of the share of tangible fixed assets in total 
assets, which could be indicative of decreasing productive capacity at first glance. 
However, when the individual items within the total tangible fixed assets are examined, 
it can be seen that the decrease is mostly due to the decrease in land improvements item 
until 2001. On the other hand, the share of the plant, machinery and equipment item 
increased dramatically from 13% to 66%, from 2000 until 2006. As discussed, this 
period was the beginning of the privatisation of generation process, when the new 
investors started to operate in the industry. After 2006, the share of plant, machinery 
and equipment in total assets started to decrease down to the 30% level in 2015. This is 
line with the pattern of technical progress in the industry, considering that once the 
initial investments are made, the firms can operate for a long period without requiring 
new physical investment.  
Figure 5-25: The Share of Tangible Fixed Assets in Total Assets (Listed Electricity Industry 
Companies) 
 
To conclude, this section underlines that the emergence of a secondary circuit of capital 
has shown evidence for financialisation developing in a context of substantial 
organisational change in Turkey. There were increases in the industrial capacity within 
the electricity industry based on a heavy dependence upon long-term bank credits with 
















































This chapter provided a political economy of electricity provision in Turkey since the 
1980s. Its first aim was to reflect how the industry has changed through time, with 
respect to the increasing depth and scope of commercial relations in and around 
electricity as a wage good. The second aim was to show how these relations, existing 
along a continuum, could be conducive to the emergence of a secondary circuit of 
capital given the ease of securitization when there are secure revenue streams based on 
customer bills.  
There is a wide literature on both privatisation and financialisation in economics and 
human geography with different analytical focus and emphasis. While the discussions 
on privatisation in the economics discipline changed through time with respect to the 
impacts of different modes of regulation practices on prices/revenues/investment, 
recent discussions in human geography focused upon the impacts of ‘neoliberalisation’ 
or ‘financialisation’ on natural resources and the incompatibility of the delivery of 
human needs with a profit motive. Distinguising financialisation as such from the 
increasing degree of market relations within these industries, this chapter provides an 
interdisciplinary approach to the understanding of these relations, connecting the 
increasing marketisation taking place in the Turkish electricity industry to the 
developments taking place in core economies outlined by the financialisation literature, 
surveyed in Chapter 2. 
It suggests that the financialisation process initially involves the extension of 
commodity relations to a broader base of the population. This is discussed in the 
context of the privatisation process. At a later stage, regular payments from this base 
contribute to the emergence of a secondary circuit of capital through the securitisation 
of stable revenue streams. This aspect is discussed with the help of electricity industry 
balance sheets provided by Company Account Statistics by the Central Bank of Turkey 
between the years 1999-2015. In Turkey, although the securitisation has so far stayed 
negligible, the process suggested a direction towards increasing commodification, 
facilitated by the gradual privatisation experience since the early 1980s. These 
developments went hand-in-hand with the increases in long-term infrastructural 
investment, especially in traditional hydropower, financed by domestic banks in foreign 
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exchange, indicating that market-based provision might not necessarily be associated 
with short-termism in investment.   
Privatisation of electricity in Turkey presents a mixed picture to interpret. It has been 
negative in terms of its distributional impacts, given the initial costs were directly 
reflected on the consumer bills while there were substantial incentives provided for the 
private sector to operate in the industry.  During the transition period from 2001 until 
2006, the state-owned wholesale company, TETAS, bought all electricity produced 
from newly established privately-owned generation companies at high initial costs. 
TETAS had to combine expensive electricity it bought from private producers with 
cheaper electricity from public producers in order to sell it to the market at a uniform 
price. This was reflected, especially for industry, low levels of competition in the 
industry and increased end-prices which are among the highest in Europe as 
emphasised by Atiyas et al. (2012) and Guney (2005). Although this should be accepted 
as an expected result of the early process of an industrial expansion, the important point 
to emphasise is the state’s decision in terms of the financing of the costs. For example, 
the price equalisation mechanism adopted in 2008 to address regional supply-demand 
imbalances and high loss-theft ratios was designed in a way that while the costs of losses 
and theft were directly reflected on consumer retail prices, any improvements beyond 
set targets for losses and theft could be appropriated by the private firms.  
Loss-theft ratios are substantially high in Turkey and the regional discrepancy is striking. 
In 2014, 75% of total electricity sold by the company responsible for the electricity 
distribution on the southeast region could not reach final consumers. That is assumed 
to arise partly from the political conflict in the southeast and east regions and partly 
from the private companies’ investment choices. Although the initial privatisation plan 
authorized the Ministry of Energy to choose the location of power plant investments, in 
the actual implementation private firms were given the freedom to choose their 
geographical areas of activities which resulted in unbalanced electricity production 
across regions. In order to transfer electricity from excess supply to excess demand 
regions, transmission lines had to be lengthened which contributed to transmission 
losses and extracted extra funding from the public budget. There were also some 
implementation problems during the privatisation process. The promotion of 
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hydropower strategy was challenged by serious financing problems, especially after the 
withdrawal of international finance institutions due to many projects’ poor feasibility 
and environmental reports. In particular, the implementation of the biggest projects, 
such as the Ilisu, Yusufeli and Deriner dams, required substantial transfers from the 
public budget to be completed.  
In addition to the negative impacts of discretionary state policies on the distribution of 
costs, this chapter also points towards another, successful, aspect of privatisation. This 
is to emphasise at an abstract theoretical level that the private sector could operate in the 
industry with sufficient profitability as well as investment levels, irrespective of the 
degree of external support such as the state incentives exemplified above. This is 
understood in line with the general restructuring process from labour-intensive sectors 
to capital intensive sectors, as discussed in Chapter 4, in the context of manufacturing 
sector restructuring. It suggests that during a process of intensified re-organisation, the 
traditional boundaries between the sector lowers down with the impact of technical 
development and links between different sectors play an important role in the re-
organisation. 
In Turkey, there were close links between construction and electricity industries, with 
many actors operating in both of the sectors. This is reflective of and contributed to the 
process of concentration of capital in a structure while fewer firms engage in more 
technologically advanced (higher productivity) investments, small firms could compete 
only given the availability of cheap labour force and sub-contracting arrangements 
especially in construction. This was observed in the simultaneous increase of big and 
small scale hydropower investments in the form of big HEPPs as well micro-sized run-
of-river hydro facilities. From that perspective, the organisational relations along 
electricity is in line with what has been discussed in Chapter 4, where a capital 
restructuring from low capital intensity to higher capital intensity signals an easier 
adoption of new technologies and lowering of the traditional boundaries between the 
sectors, which might explain the relative success behind the privatisation experience in 
terms of providing sufficient levels of profitability, irrespective of whether the state or 
the industry itself provides funds for investment.  
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 It is also this level of higher abstraction, where the deeper workings of the economy in 
a continuous movement summarised in Chapter 1 underline how the electricity is 
produced both as a use value and value. The movement towards concentration, at the 
level of capital in general, includes reductions in the labour component of production 
and decreasing value of labour power as a fixed bundle of use values (wage goods such 
as electricity and water). This tendency is in contradiction with a counter-tendency that 
allows firm or sectoral level productivity increases to extract surplus value from other 
capitals in competition, with the help of financial sector allowing money surplus moving 
in and out of sectors. At this level, competition leads towards differentiation of single 
production process requiring more specialisation and a more advanced division of 
labour. The counter-tendency allows money wages to command more use values hence 
the living standards to increase, corresponding to decreases in the prices. In this 
framework, the specific organisational relations that determine how electricity is 
produced and consumed as a wage good, is also a signal of how the economy organises 
itself with respect to the use of its productive forces. The next chapter will discuss these 
issues in the context of housing provision in Turkey.  
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Chapter 6                                                                                               
The Political Economy of Housing Provision in Turkey 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter will provide a political economy of housing provision in Turkey since the 
1980s, investigating both production and consumption dynamics and shedding light on 
how the sector evolves as a whole. On the basis of the theoretical premises explained 
before and adopted in the previous chapter on electricity provision, it serves the 
purposes of this thesis in two ways. The first is to discuss how the organisational 
relations in and around housing have changed through time along an increasing scope 
and depth of commodity relations, without necessarily indicating a withdrawal of the 
state, similar to the case of electricity. As explained, this concerns in part how labour 
power is reproduced materially as a use value. Second, it discusses how these relations 
evolve with respect to the increasing presence of finance in general and interest-bearing 
capital in particular, further contributing to a financialised accumulation regime through 
expanding the base for the realisation of circuits of interest bearing capital created 
elsewhere, and/or enabling the creation of new circuits through relative ease of 
securitisation where there are regular payments i.e. mortgage securitisation. In the 
context of housing, the continuation of the circuits through revenue generation is 
deeply connected to the intervention of landed property as a specific commodity form 
and the social relations that determine the contribution of this commodity form to 
revenue generation processes as a factor of production.  
Financialisation has probably been discussed most extensively in the context of housing, 
especially with respect to the second aspect mentioned above, following the unfolding 
of the global financial crisis in 2008, both in international political economy and 
economics (Aalbers & Christophers, 2014; Dymski, 2009b, 2009a, 2010; Montgomerie 
& Büdenbender, 2015; Wray, 2008). In economics, the focus has been on how finance 
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intervened in housing systems especially with respect to the increasing prevalence of 
owner-occupation followed by increasing housing demand with certain repercussions 
on the macro-determinants of the economy. For example, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
Toporowski (2009) argues how owner-occupation made it possible for people to 
depend on asset wealth gains and engage in speculative activities through borrowing 
money against rising housing prices and paying the debt when the assets are sold at a 
higher price. Similarly, but from a more political economy perspective, Montgomerie 
and Budenbender (2015) emphasise how asset-based welfare systems contributed to 
increasing household indebtedness and inequality through favouring a minority who 
could benefit from welfare gains.  
The impacts of increasing dependence on welfare gains from holding housing assets 
have been given significant importance, without always referring to the unique 
characteristics of housing. For many, including Dymski (2009b, 2009a) however, there 
was also a unique nature of housing due to its geographical aspects that led to highly 
risky asset generation processes based on spatial segmentation through the expansion of 
mortgage issuance to previously excluded areas, which was disguised by an apparently 
homogenous global process of risk distribution. According to him, spatial location, 
informed by each area’s historical and institutional background, played an important 
role in the generation of the crisis, as risk is after all determined by who has access to 
which financial services at what price, despite being homogenously distributed in return. 
In the discipline of human geography, Harvey (2003, 2012) also emphasises the spatial 
aspects of housing, albeit from a different angle, and argues how they determine the 
necessary monopoly conditions for centralisation of capital and give way to a specific 
accumulation pattern named as ‘accumulation by dispossession’. In that sense, Harvey’s 
approach differs from others by focusing more on the productive determinants of the 
housing system, which will be discussed more in detail in the section below on Marx’s 
theory of rent in an urban context.  
As Ball (1983) argued more than two decades ago, most of these studies traditionally 
reflect a disproportionate emphasis on the consumption dynamics in the study of the 
housing system, which is more or less still present in the literature today. In fact, this 
tendency was even reinforced through the latest subprime crisis, as the process showed 
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how the asset price appreciations induced by ever-increasing consumption demand 
triggered a Ponzi-financing structure with the intervention of a great variety of actors 
including developers, real estate agents, and especially various forms of intermediary 
financial institutions such as structured investment vehicles. 
As Wray (2008, pp. 52–52) explains in the context of the subprime crisis: 
Developers, real estate agents, and appraisers worked together to maximize 
home prices. Often the developer worked directly with a mortgage broker so 
that sufficient funding for inflated prices would be forthcoming; this also 
required complicity of appraisers to ensure home prices would warrant the 
mortgage foisted on the borrower. The broker also added the first set of 
enhancements, such as early-payment penalties. Mortgages were then passed 
along to investment banks that would add further enhancements, such as those 
provided by credit agencies and insurers. “Trash” was thereby transformed into 
highly rated securities available for purchase by investors such as pension funds. 
It was the perfect system to fuel rising home prices, ever-increasing debt ratios, 
and deteriorating portfolios of unsuspecting investors: the incentives of 
developers, home sellers, and real estate agents were oriented to maximizing 
home prices.  
It was argued that such price-maximising structure in order to obtain capital gains was 
conducive to structural instability along the lines of Minsky’s hypothesis, triggered by 
the allocation of debt-associated risks to the balance sheets of secondary financial 
institutions such as structured investment vehicles as well as households, which operate 
in fundamentally different ways from banks (Dymski, 2010; Wray, 2008). As a result, 
attention was directed exclusively to asset price appreciation in housing markets, which 
was believed to reflect the degree of fragility for the overall economy, along with the 
balance sheets of the financial institutions (Borio & Drehmann, 2009; Toporowski, 
2010). Although these insights are indispensable for an understanding of financialisation 
in a more systemic way, this way of theorising provides only a partial picture for the 
entirety of organisational relations involved in housing systems, by treating it primarily 
as a distributional issue, detached from its productive aspects (Ball, 1983, p. 13). 
In Turkey, the housing system developed in a way that, despite substantial increase in 
speculative activities following the entrance of new actors, such as real investment trusts 
234 
 
which facilitated securitisation, price appreciations were not observed to a universal 
extent. This was most probably due to the limited extent of the speculative activities 
contained within a more or less traditional financial system, but also due to special 
productive characteristics of the housing system itself. There was a construction boom 
that contributed to price stability, arising from increasing housing supply, as well as the 
growth of the energy sector as discussed in the previous chapter. As Table 6-1 shows, 
the construction sector’s share in total fixed capital investment has been very high, if 
trailing the manufacturing and transportation sectors, at 13.2% in 2015 and 14.3% in 
2016.  
Table 6-1: Fixed Capital Investments Made by Different Sectors 
Sectors 
Fixed Capital Investment (Nominal 




(predicted) 2015 2016 
2017 
(predicted) 
Agriculture 14,814 15,713 18,823 3.7 3.6 3.8 
Mining 11,701 11,086 12,844 2.9 2.5 2.6 
Manufacturing 119,478 131,573 145,720 29.6 29.9 29.3 
Energy 13,040 12,929 14,818 3.2 2.9 3.0 
Transportation 90,285 100,407 112,888 22.3 22.8 22.7 
Tourism 19,183 14,051 13,751 4.7 3.2 2.8 
Construction 53,222 63,175 73,068 13.2 14.3 14.7 
Education 23,976 25,187 29,377 5.9 5.7 5.9 
Health 20,543 21,614 25,271 5.1 4.9 5.1 
Other 37,865 45,024 50,575 9.4 10.2 10.2 
Source: Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Development 
Figure 6-1 shows that there was also a dramatic increase in the annual building supply 
(according to construction permits), considering 71.3% of all construction was made for 
residential purposes.1 Supply increase was substantial especially after the restructuring of 
the state institution, TOKI (Housing Development Administration) between 2002-2004 
and the enactment of the Mortgage Law in 2007 that exempted housing credits from 
banking and insurance transactions tax worth up to 5% of the total loan. During the 
period between 1998 and 2014, annual construction investments increased cumulatively 
by 80.6% (Erol & Unal, 2015). In 2015, the number of total housing unit starts by 
permits was 878,490 (803,507 of which were given to the private sector), as opposed to 
                                                 
1TURKSTAT Annual Construction Statistics 
(http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=21759). Also see Figure 6-1 for total annual 
building starts in terms of permits since 1980. 
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161,920 in 2002 (TURKSTAT). The share of the private sector in total housing starts 
increased from 70 per cent in 2000 to 92 per cent in 2015 (TURKSTAT).  
Figure 6-1: Annual Building Construction Permits Issued in Turkey 
Source: TURKSTAT (divided by periods according to author’s own choice) 
As discussed in earlier chapters, this thesis attempts to bring a comprehensive 
theoretical framework for the study of provision goods and their particular relevance 
for the processes of financialisation through providing relatively secure, continuing 
revenue streams. In the context of housing in particular, this aspect is reflected even 
more strongly due to the specific nature of housing as a commodity connected directly 
to the social relations around landed property. More specifically, this chapter will argue 
that revenues in housing systems can be boosted, incorporating increases in capital 
gains, without necessarily accommodating a corresponding globalised increase in the 
property or stock prices on the sectoral level. In this light, the chapter will emphasise 
how the intervention of landed property as a special factor of production can be 
conducive to continuation of circuits, and therefore capital gains, by using the example 
of Turkey.  
In order to support this argument, in line with the ‘systems of provision’ approach to 
housing, inspired by Michael Ball’s (1983) ‘structures of provision’ method to study 
housing systems, it will incorporate a wider scope of issues that cannot be addressed 
through the price and/or distribution systems alone. First of all, it will incorporate how 
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housing markets function with respect to their productive characteristics, as housing 
prices are strongly associated with how housing is produced as a commodity, above 
other economy-wide considerations, such as the risk allocation practices of banks. 
Second, these distributional issues are further complicated in the context of housing, 
given its production as a commodity through the intervention of landed property.  
Section 6.2 will outline Ball’s structures of provision approach in the context of housing 
provision in Britain in order to lay out some productive characteristics of housing 
markets as well as to locate the Turkish case in a comparative context. Specifically, it 
will emphasise how the differences between the technical characteristics of 
housebuilding and land development markets have been determining for the emergence 
of a speculative market based on mercantile productive activities in Britain since the 
1970s, which resulted in the restriction of output, and hence new house stock price 
increases (1983, 2003).  
Section 6.3 will introduce Marx’s agricultural theory of rent in order to explain how 
speculative mercantile activities can be conducive to revenue generation, through 
creating above-average monopoly profits appropriated in the form of rent, especially in 
the urban context through localised ‘development gains’. A theoretical explanation for 
this phenomenon, however, does not suggest universal applicability. Instead, the 
contingent nature of rent relations in general is emphasised, underlining that the above 
explanation holds true only in the presence of certain contingent factors, such as the 
conditions governing access to land, appropriate regulation mechanisms and labour 
arrangements. 
Building upon these, Section 6.4 will introduce the Turkish case. As mentioned, output-
restriction and price appreciation were not observed in Turkey unlike the case of Britain, 
despite evident increase in mercantile activities, such as the establishment of real estate 
investment trusts and mortgage securitisation, albeit from a very low base. In contrast, 
there was a supply boom, facilitated through the state’s ownership of land, and its active 
involvement through a state-owned institution, the Housing Development 
Administration (TOKI) that incorporated land markets into the circuits of productive, 
mercantile (and later interest-bearing) capital. The section will discuss how (the relative 
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absence of) the intervention of landed property in Turkey partly contributed to the 
limited price appreciation in Turkey (along with other factors, such as the limited base 
of contributions from consumers or limited risk transfer from banks to other 
'secondary' financial institutions). Even so rent revenues have been facilitated through 
state intervention especially in inner urban areas through creation of development gains 
based on a revenue-sharing programme since 2006 and large scale urban regeneration 
projects. Nevertheless, a crucial point to emphasise is that such processes are taking 
place without necessarily disrupting supply and hence being reflected in prices.  
Sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 will provide a historical account for how this process unfolded 
and how the housing industry developed in such a way as to be conducive to 
accumulation, also with strong links to the energy sector. Section 6.5 provides an 
empirical investigation of financial statements of firms operating in the industry to give 
more detail on their productive and financing characteristics. Finally, Section 6.6 will 
discuss how housing is consumed, and further explain why a ‘financialised’ (boom-bust, 
speculative) housing system in the way it is described in the literature is not observed, 
on the basis of Turkey’s development trajectory with respect to its overall financial 
system as explained in Chapter 4 and the productive characteristics of the housing 
system mentioned above. Section 6.7 concludes by emphasising how the production 
and consumption characteristics of housing are analysed as a whole, which can shed 
light on how the economy organises itself with respect to the use of its productive 
forces. 
6.2. Production Matters in a Comparative Context: Housing Provision in Britain 
This section discusses the British housing system, to lay out some of the ways in which 
housing markets function with respect to their structural productive characteristics, and 
also later to introduce the developments in Turkey in a comparative context. It draws 
exclusively upon the work of Robertson (2014) and Michael Ball, who studied British 
housing markets extensively. The emphasis being upon his earlier studies on ‘structures 
of provision’, Ball’s studies are used in this section to provide elaborate theoretical 
aspects of housing production in general, and the empirical aspects of the British 
housing system in particular. The productive characteristics of the housebuilding 
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industry that are emphasised through the empirical case of Britain are cyclicality, low 
economies of scale and high production costs. As Ball (2003, 2006) uses these 
productive characteristics to explain the limited housing supply in Britain especially 
since the 1970s, the Turkish case is later introduced to claim how the same productive 
characteristics might lead to a housing supply boom given the availability of land. 
Robertson’s (2014) study on British housing markets is introduced, in order to explain 
how this might relate to an understanding of Marxian theory of rent.  
In one of his more recent studies, Ball (2003) talks about prime functional aspects of 
housing development: which can be grouped as production characteristics, land supply, 
market conditions, regulatory constraints and institutional structures, with great variety 
observed in different institutional structures across countries being largely explained by 
the economic factors such as production characteristics and land supply. The typical 
production characteristics of the housing industry can be summarised as follows. 
Usually, labour-intensive techniques prevail in an industry structure consisting of a large 
number of small firms. The labour-intensive methods make firms ‘flexible’ to supply 
shocks. Together with high competition and the relative ease of entry and exit into and 
out of the industry, these production aspects give the industry a strongly cyclical 
characteristic with low economies of scale, possibly explaining the small size of firms. 
Profitability is mostly tied to supply constraints, with long-run risk-adjusted returns 
closely reflecting the improvements in the marginal costs of inputs. Construction inputs 
play a great role, as for example while timber-rich countries in North America and 
Scandinavia developed industries with timber-framing systems and extensively use pre-
assembled internal house fittings, Netherlands and France rely more on concrete off-
site house structures, determining the backward linkages of the sector accordingly (Ball, 
1983). 
While the cyclical effects push the mark-ups during the boom and lower them during 
the busts, technological advancement towards capital-intensive structures is prevented 
through easy entry and exit, as long as there are suppliers who are willing to cut prices 
during the periods of busts further contributing to the cyclical nature of demand. 
During the 1950s and 1970s, the extensive social housing building in Europe increased 
housing demand and smoothed output fluctuations, resulting in the emergence of large 
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housing suppliers. Nevertheless, scale economies stayed at low levels and large suppliers 
disappeared as soon as public funding ceased (Ball, 2003). Thus, while in many 
industries international differences in macroeconomic cycles have encouraged firms to 
globalise, this has not occurred in housebuilding because of the low scale economies 
and the importance of local information in land and housing markets. As a result, the 
cycles of housing investment in each country have tended not to coincide (Ball & Wood, 
1999). In his later studies, Ball (2003, 2006) emphasises that it is such cyclicality and low 
scale economies (together with the regulation principles, land planning and labour 
practices) that can to a large extent create flexibility in stock adjustment practices and 
explain the great variety of institutional settings across countries despite the highly 
competitive characteristic of the industry.  
Here, land planning practices require special emphasis as planning regulations have 
significant impacts on the overall housing supply (Ball, 1999, 2011). This is mostly 
because in contrast to the labour-intensive characteristics of the housebuilding industry 
described above, land development and planning require substantial capital investment, 
and returns in the land development industry should be correspondingly higher in order 
to compensate for costs and uncertainty. Moreover, these initial investments tend to be 
risky due to the commodity (form) characteristics of land. The specific, ‘unchanging’ 
location of land makes the land plots imperfect substitutes for each other and ties the 
investments to the location of particular land plots, for which the demand depends 
upon a wide range of determinants incorporating non-market elements, and making 
capital investments on land riskier, especially in the urban context. The theoretical 
significance of the particular characteristics of land markets will be discussed in greater 
detail in the next section on the theory of rent.  
What should be emphasised at this point is that the differences in relative risks and 
returns in these two markets create a simple division between land planning and 
housebuilding industries, characterised by riskier and higher capital investments in the 
former and lower returns, lower risks and more competition in the latter, for example, 
as observed in the USA housing markets (Ball, 1983, 2003). This simple division is, 
however, altered significantly when land supply is restricted, as in the case of Britain. 
When landowners hold significant market power, and are not in a position to be ‘forced’ 
240 
 
by the market to sell their properties, housebuilders who have their own land banks gain 
advantage in terms of determining the timing of land development to be followed by 
housing construction and then sell it at a time of boom (Ball, 1983). This gives rise to a 
“speculative” nature of housing markets with output-restricting characteristics, which 
has been a primary characteristic of the British housing market especially since the 
1970s. After a bust of the market in 1973, the British housing system witnessed the 
centralisation of ownership in the hands of a few large housebuilders with access to 
their own land banks, as it was not possible to respond to the fluctuations in the 
demand through an expansion of output without acquisition of a large selection of land 
plots. As the holders of residential land sites develop a degree of monopoly power 
through the land they own, which functions as a debt-free wealth source during housing 
market upswings, firms find it cheaper and quicker to acquire land by taking over 
another builder and its land bank than through direct purchase in the land market itself 
(Ball, 1988).  
It should be noted that whether land banks played a determining role in the current 
formation of speculative housebuilding industry is subject to considerable debate and 
no detailed information exists on the extent of land bank practice, as British land 
markets have complex ownership structures that are far from being transparent (Ball, 
1983; Robertson, 2014). Nevertheless, the division between land development and 
housebuilding industries is mentioned to underline how it might give rise to mercantile 
activities, which forms the basis of a theoretical argument posed by Ball (1983).  
This is that, although occasionally changing demands for housing create new market 
segments in which specialist firms can thrive on monopolistic conditions such as the 
inner city luxury apartment market, the emergence of mercantile activities with different 
profit-making strategies than productive activities signal the following of a strategy of 
output restriction, as seen in Britain where new construction constituted only 14% of all 
houses sold in the market in 1978 (Ball, 1983, p. 50).  
Ball (1983, pp. 50-51) explains this process as follows:  
In speculative building, the profit-making process is different and in it 
development profit predominates. Development profit is achieved by a judicious 
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purchase of land and conceiving of the appropriate residential scheme for the 
site. The predominant risks to assess are the marketability of houses built on a 
site, the price paid for the land, the timing of the development, and the overall 
scale of housebuilding appropriate for the firm’s resources in the context of the 
current state of the market. This is a very different management function from 
that of the contractor.  
In other words, when landowners have a certain degree of control over the timing of 
their market activities, speculative housebuilders with sufficient land banks gain 
advantage over other firms, in terms of responding appropriately to the fluctuations of 
the market. Yet, Ball (1983, 1988) argues that these differences in management 
techniques would not exist if the productivity gains allowed firms to operate in a 
competitive environment with decreasing costs. In other words, he suggests that once a 
speculative formation occurs, it reinforces itself through obstructing cost decreases.  
The productive characteristics of speculative building are found to be significantly 
different than ‘productive’ housebuilding. First of all, the turnover of capital is much 
longer as the capital for development has to be invested in land many years in advance 
of construction. Second, a larger quantity of capital has to be sunk into infrastructure, 
with no revenues flowing until houses are built and sold. Last but not least, in addition 
to the structural characteristics of land development as an industry, planning and 
development in Britain is empirically a very lengthy and bureaucratic experience with 
significant delays. In an empirical study based on a sample of 180 construction sites, 
Ball (2011, p. 358) finds that despite the government data suggesting that almost 70 per 
cent of all major planning applications are processed within thirteen weeks, only 40 per 
cent of the sample was approved on the first application and the average time of 
processing after the approval was substantially higher, 41% of the sites taking over a 
year, 17% taking over 100 weeks and 6% over 150 weeks.  
As a result, building costs increase substantially, and Ball (1983, p. 18) finds the origins 
of many periods of rapid housing price inflation as a consequence of the attempts of 
housebuilders to raise their profits and to minimize the conversion of land development 
gain into land rent appropriated by others. He uses a global construction cost index for 
Cost of New Construction (CNC), based on changes in wages, the price of materials 
and labour, the ratios in which those materials are used, productivity in the building 
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process and the size of building firms’ mark-ups, to show that there were not cost 
improvements in the speculative housing markets (1983, p. 122). A fixed bundle of 
labour and materials was assumed and price variations for each component of the 
bundle fed into the index with periodic crude adjustments made for changes in 
productivity, overheads and profits. He finds that there were no cost improvements, 
simply because productivity improvements were almost non-existent in speculative 
housebuilding. This was also empirically observable for example in that, while in the 
mid-1950s the average house took eight months to build, it took twenty months in the 
1980s due to much higher costs. In his own words (1983, p. 100): 
The sharp rise in construction costs explains why the output of new owner-
occupied housing has slumped so dramatically over the past fifteen years […] 
Large increases in house prices are now needed to induce any substantial new 
housing output. The inter-linkage between rising housing prices, escalating 
building costs and declining housebuilding is a key indication of a growing crisis 
in the present structure of owner-occupied housing provision. All three elements 
feed off each other. Cost increases lower the profitability of housebuilding so 
housebuilders cut back on their output; over time that increases the shortage of 
housing which forces up prices; and from the demand side the instability of 
demand creates production problems for housebuilding which gradually pushes 
up building costs. There is no single cause for these factors; the problem is a 
structural one inherent in the present form of owner-occupied provision.  
Casual working practices with sub-contracting and loss of skilled workers also played a 
significant role in stagnant productivity. On the other hand, he claims that despite much 
vaunted claims to the contrary, land prices and physical shortages of land and other 
inputs seemed to have little effect on the overall level of output Ball (1983, p. 97). He 
rejects ‘Ricardian rent theory’ that introduces the land constraint as a factor in 
production, as he claims the techniques of production are determined prior to the 
distributional issue over rent, indicating that the ability of landowners to limit the supply 
of land to builders is essentially an empirical question rather than a theoretically 
demonstrable one of universal validity, although in modern Britain, certain conditions 
exist to create such a situation.  
Overall, he concludes his analysis by saying that two factors that move industries 
towards technical change, which are first, standardisation and continuity of production 
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and second, economies of scale, are structurally absent in the housebuilding industry in 
Britain, which might explain the housing crisis that still prevails today. Although 
agreeing with its point of departure, which is the emergence of speculative housing 
markets due to context-specific land planning and supply restrictions in Britain, 
Robertson (2014) does not agree with the conclusion of the argument that this structure 
necessarily leads towards a decrease in the housing supply. Although in line with Ball’s 
findings during the 1980s, Robertson (2014) finds that the contemporary housing 
system in Britain continues to preserve its output-restricting character, but this should 
be interpreted as a contingent development. Between 2000 and 2007, when housing 
prices reached a peak before the crisis, housing prices increased 173%, mortgage credits 
increased 182%, but housing completions only increased 17% in Britain (Robertson, 
2014). After the crisis, Britain had recovered quickly and by early 2010 house prices had 
recovered to roughly 11% below their previous peak and have since begun to rise again.  
The important issue is, as she claims, the role of landed property in the emergence of 
this structure. Robertson (2014) argues, because housing production was low and outer 
city expansion was limited due to restricted land availability, monopoly rent was 
generated by the excess of demand locally within man-made islands of scarcity in inner 
cities, contributing to overall surplus to be appropriated both in the form of profits of 
speculative housebuilders, as well as capital gains of consumers, intermediary financial 
institutions and other actors in the industry. There is great regional mismatch signalling 
the impact of scarce urban land in price determination. In the first quarter of 2014, the 
average house price in London was £362,699 while in the North of England it was 
£119,702 (Robertson, 2014).  
For producers, the channel for rent appropriation through increasing prices was 
mercantile capital activities such as speculative housing trading based on potential profit 
expectations from land price increases. For consumers, appropriation from monopoly 
rent took the form of capital gains incorporated into sales prices or future rental streams. 
Indirectly, Robertson (2014) argues that the monopoly rent increases also contributed 
to aggregate capital gains from secondary markets by generating extra sources of 
revenue within the sector. These developments were mostly affected by finance’s 
involvement in the sector that enabled producers to combine mercantile and productive 
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activities through the incorporation of land at the level of production, before revenues 
are distributed in the form of profits, wages and rent. The next section will introduce 
Marx’s theory of agricultural rent in order to discuss such issues in greater theoretical 
detail.  
6.3. Production upon Landed Property: Marx’s Agricultural Rent Theory  
This section discusses capital accumulation in the presence of landed property in 
agriculture to form the basis for a theory of landed property in urban settings to be 
developed in the next section. As Ball (1980) also questioned, whether rent is a 
theoretically distinguishable category from profits has been subject to debate at least 
since Jevons suggested that Ricardo’s intensive margin theory offered a general theory 
of price. As a theoretical category, rent has been an exclusive product of political 
economy as, in neoclassical theory, land is not treated differently than any other fixed 
capital input. The theoretical framework adopted in this chapter relies heavily upon the 
interpretation of Marxian rent developed by Fine (1979, 1980, 1982a) including the 
responses to the concerns raised by Ball (1980). 2  According to that interpretation, 
surplus generation and distribution mechanisms in agriculture are different from those 
of industry which might impede (or contribute to) the accumulation of capital through 
land. This has implications for capital restructuring through housing as it is tied to 
urban land.  
The classical Ricardian interpretation of rent is based on the assumption that the 
hierarchy in land fertility is given and is ‘independent of capital’ because of the 
indestructibility of land as a fixed capital input (Kurz, 1978; Fine, 1982). In Marx, 
however, rent is a separate category not because land has special characteristics as a 
means of production, although such characteristics further determine the nature of 
production with landed property, but because it is extracted by landlords at the expense 
of industrial capitalists. It should be noted that this process does not refer to a “cause of 
the creation of such surplus profit, but is the cause of its transformation into the form 
of ground-rent” (cited in Fine, 1986, p. 123).  
                                                 
2 For more details within the context of an extensive debate: see Fine (1979), Ball (1980), Fine (1980). 
For a neo-Ricardian partial equilibrium in a multi-sectoral model interpretation, see Kurz (1978). For 
a neoclassical critique of the category of rent, see Samuelson (1992). 
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From that perspective, the source of rent is the historical development of agricultural 
production within the capitalist economy that tended to rest upon land 
commodification through private ownership as one of the prerequisites for capitalist 
production in agriculture. Once capitalist production in agriculture emerges, rent 
relations reproduce themselves through the class division between landowners and 
industrial capitalists:  
[T]he form of the landed property which we shall consider is a specifically 
historical one, a form transformed through the influence of capital and of the 
capitalist mode of production, either of feudal landownership, or of small-
peasant agriculture as a means of livelihood, in which the possession of the land 
and the soil constitutes one of the prerequisites of production for the direct 
producer, and in which his ownership of land appears as the most advantageous 
condition for the prosperity of his mode of production. (Marx, cited in Fine, 
1986, pp. 121-122).  
In that sense, Marx’s starting point for theorising rent is its historical nature and his 
emphasis is on the implications of such a historically-determined category for capitalist 
accumulation compared to Ricardo’s emphasis on rent as a technical category. In other 
words, Marxian rent is not a theory of soil but of relations of production attached to 
soil. Nevertheless, in addition to historical grounding, Marx also acknowledges land as a 
means of production with some peculiar characteristics in the sense that it cannot be 
capitalistically reproduced, and some of the material properties that go into production 
of agricultural goods (such as fertility and location) are naturally conditioned and cannot 
be readily replicated elsewhere. Together with the social relations of landed property in 
capitalism, the relatively permanent technical properties of land have an impact upon 
both the determination of market values and prices of production and the four different 
categories of rent, as listed below. These distinct categories arise from unique intra- and 
inter-sectoral competition dynamics at different stages of accumulation (Fine, 1979):3  
1) Differential Rent I (DRI): Extensive rent, arises from equal applications of 
capital to lands of different quality (in terms of fertility, location) 
                                                 
3 Please note that these distinctions are made for expositional purposes to explain the distinction of 
AR from simple monopoly price conditions at the level of entry, and DRI and DRII exist 
independently of these qualifications. 
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2) Differential Rent II (DRII): Intensity rent, arises from different applications 
of capital to lands of same quality  
3) Absolute Rent (AR): Arises from the barrier of landed property to inter-
sectoral competition, depending exclusively upon the flow of capital onto 
new lands.  
During the normal course of capitalist production, market values are established 
through simultaneous determination of average productivity (determined through intra-
sectoral competition) and normal size of capital invested (determined through inter-
sectoral competition). In agricultural production however, because each land has its 
own individual characteristics, it is not possible to determine simultaneously both 
average productivity and normal size of capital. Because a payment must be made to the 
landowner at all times, agricultural capitalists must be able to create surplus value which 
might explain why even the worst land in cultivation is able to appropriate surplus in 
the form of rent.  
According to Ricardian intensive margin theory, the existence of rent payments gives 
rise to an undifferentiated technical rent category arising from the difference between 
productivity of different lands and that of marginal investment. In the analyses of Marx, 
however, it is well known that it is the average production technique that determines the 
market values, and not the marginal unit of investment. The procedure for determining 
the average production technique, however, is distinct from the averaging of most and 
least favourable techniques, and rather it refers to the sufficiently weighty technique in 
the industry. In the context of agricultural rent, the historical underpinnings for 
determining the most common production technique are revealed, as it is not possible 
to follow the same procedure due to the intervention of landed property that obstructs 
the simultaneous determination of average production technique (and size of the capital) 
in the industry.  
The process of accumulation in agriculture can be explained as follows. In abstract, 
producers can extract surplus either through application of equal size of capital to lands 
of different quality, which gives rise to the deduction in the surplus in the form of DRI, 
or through application of different sizes of capital to lands of same quality, which gives 
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rise to DRII. As mentioned before, these two categories are not simply empirically 
additive but qualitatively different, because DRII never exists in its pure form, but 
always exists given the basis of DRI. Because of the indestructible nature of the soil, 
technical improvements that alter the normal size of capital on a given land, can also 
improve the quality of land, destroying the equal quality assumption. In other words, if 
more capital giving rise to DRII improves land quality permanently, it is also a 
differential improvement, determining new conditions for DRI.4 Nevertheless, the equal 
quality assumption is made to qualitatively determine the source of a different category 
of rent that is necessarily a product of improved production conditions. Because DRII 
also permanently alters DRI, producers’ avoidance of DRII would mean they would 
prefer investing extensively rather than intensively. As a result, this would reduce the 
incentives for technical change. In other words, the existence of DRI and DRII does 
not only imply a transfer of the surplus produced to landlords in the form of rent, but 
also a distortion in the formation of market value (Fine & Saad-Filho, 2010). 
The distinct categories of differential rent correspond to differences in the mechanism 
of surplus generation in relation to technical properties of land. If DRII impedes, or 
modifies, the pace of accumulation, or the technical progress in agriculture, the organic 
composition of capital in agriculture would be systematically low in relation to industry, 
as agricultural production expands extensively rather than intensively. In a dynamic 
economy, where the pace of accumulation is slower in agriculture in relation to industry, 
there is a separate category of absolute rent (AR) which implies, in addition to distortion 
of the flows between individual capitalists in agriculture, the flow of capital into 
agriculture is further distorted at the level of inter-sectoral competition (for capital to 
flow onto new lands) by the impact of landed property.  
Because the OCC is systematically lower in agriculture, to the extent that accumulation 
is impeded by landed relations, where there are equal profit rates across sectors, 
agriculture produces more surplus value compared to industry. Therefore the prices of 
production would be lower than the value in the absence of landed property. However, 
landed property charges a rent and increases the prices of production above value. In 
                                                 
4Harvey (1982, p. 356) claims, “in the case of a relatively permanent improvement that change the 
equal fertility assumption, DRII is converted directly into DRI”. This would be a misleading 
interpretation of DRII, as its existence already presupposes improved conditions of technical change.  
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the limit, that difference between values and prices of production in agriculture 
corresponds to AR. As Fine (1979) shows this limit is not arbitrary but the extent to 
which the lower OCC reflects the choice of pursuing profit through accumulation on 
new (DRI) as opposed to existing (DRII) lands.  
Nevertheless, this would appear be a static interpretation which would imply any 
industry with a lower OCC or monopolistic entry conditions would be able to generate 
rent. It is important to emphasise the source of AR is the low OCC in agriculture, 
dynamically determined by the existence of DRII. Agriculture necessarily produces 
more value the excess of which can at most be appropriated as rent at the level of 
determination of prices of production. But this is not a disproportionate monopoly 
excess as AR cannot exceed DRII and disappears if all land were leased or the 
composition of capital in agriculture were equal to that in industry (i.e. land did not 
intervene in the accumulation process). In other words, “if all land suitable for agriculture in 
a certain country were leased” landed property would have ceased to act as a barrier for entry 
for capital and AR would disappear. Similarly, “if the average composition of agricultural capital 
were equal to, or higher than that of the average social capital, then absolute rent would disappear.” 
(Marx, cited in Fine, 1986, p.133). 
The conditions for the disappearance of absolute rent indicate that absolute rent is not 
solely the static difference between value and prices as the result of monopolistic entry 
conditions to land markets, but the dynamic result of the intervention of landed 
property to accumulation by changing the technical conditions of production and 
potentially reducing the incentives for technical change. In that sense, the basis of AR 
comes from the extension of capital onto new lands rather than intensive cultivation of 
existing lands which would form the basis for surplus appropriation for DRII (Fine, 
1980). AR cannot exceed DRII, because DRII is necessarily a product of rising OCC in 
agriculture and if AR exceeds DRII, intensive cultivation replaces extensive cultivation, 
leading to a rising OCC in agriculture.  
Nevertheless, because of the permanency of production conditions, and the social 
relations surrounding landed property, such differentiation is primarily made not to 
imply the existence of a general theory of rent, but to trace the sources of rent and show 
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the impact of landed property on capitalist accumulation for agricultural production. In 
principle, there cannot be a general theory of rent as there is not a simultaneous 
determination of DRI and DRII on the basis of normal capital size and average 
productivity in agriculture as this is contingent on how landed property intervenes in 
capital accumulation within and on the land. In other words, unlike industry, it is not 
pre-determined in agriculture whether intra- and inter-sectoral competition will lead to 
the determination of market values on the basis of the application of average size of 
capital with average productivity, as these do not exist. Instead, the prices of production 
will correspond either to the total application of capital to the worst land (least 
productive), while at other times it will correspond to the productivity of an additional 
unit of investment (Fine, 1980). 
In addition to the three rent categories discussed above, there is an additional rent 
category described as “determined by neither the price of production of the 
commodities nor by their value, but rather by the demand of the purchasers and their 
ability to pay” by Marx (cited in Robertson, 2014, p. 104). This is monopoly rent, which 
is a price category whose source lies in the circulation of revenues rather than the 
circulation of capital. In other words, monopoly rent is not a value, but a pure price 
category, and hence, instead of being price-determining, it is price-determined. Still, it is 
treated within the category of rent as, although its relation to production differs from 
other rent categories, its recipient is still the owner of land as such, which has been the 
primary preoccupation of Marx’s treatment of landed property. Monopoly rent plays a 
crucial role in urban settings as will be discussed in the next section. 
6.3.1. Rent in urban settings 
When rent is conceptualised in an urban setting, it requires a separate theorisation as the 
range of activities conducted on urban land varies widely potentially exceeding the 
technical determinants of production associated with landed property in agricultural 
production. This is, for example, acknowledged by the prominent Marxist scholar 
Harvey (2003, 2012) who conceptualised a specific contemporary capitalist 
accumulation pattern based on rent appropriation through urban transformation: 
namely ‘accumulation by dispossession’. In it, he referred to a relatively undifferentiated 
nature of rent relations in the urban context on the basis of land use for the sake of 
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financial gains as accumulation proceeds. His theorisation of urban transformation is 
based upon his interpretation of rent theory developed in Limits to Capital (1982) where 
he claims, with the increasing pace of accumulation, as monopolisation obscures supply 
and demand dynamics, land starts to be traded as a pure financial asset, and “[a]ny 
stream of revenue (such as an annual rent) can be considered as the interest on some 
imaginary, fictitious capital. For the buyer, the rent figures in his accounts as the interest 
on the money laid out on land purchase, and is in principle no different from similar 
investments in government debt, stocks and shares of enterprises, consumer debt and 
so on. The money laid out is interest bearing capital in every case” (p. 347). Although 
this would be a theoretically misleading analogy, revealing the monopoly elements in the 
rent creation in urban context is important to emphasise further possible implications.  
The monopoly elements in the urban land markets have been widely discussed also in 
non-Marxist contexts, including Neil Smith (1979, 1987) who explains the process of 
gentrification on the basis of a ‘rent gap’ that is created by the mismatch of supply and 
demand in expanding cities. The rent gap theory claims that the durability of fixed 
capital on land ‘locks’ the intensity and type of land use over years as the city expands 
and creates a rent gap that ‘forces’ cities towards gentrification. In an expanding city, 
potential land rent for a given piece of land will increase over the long run. Initial 
development will involve an intensity of fixed capital investment and a land use 
appropriate for the procurement of potential land rent i.e. actual land rent will equal to 
potential land rent. Nevertheless, with increasing intensity of fixed capital, potential land 
rent is likely to rise above current rent given the durability of fixed capital. Clark (1988) 
claims such demand corresponds to an overall rent category which is not limited to 
actual payments to separate landowners, but an extraction from all actors undertaking 
all types of activities over land in the form of increased land prices. It should be noted 
that, similar to Harvey’s theorisation, ‘rent gap’ theory by Smith (1987, 1979) refers to a 
monopoly price formation due to a restriction of access to entry, and as such is not 
specific to the intervention of landed property as a special factor of production.  
The processes through which landed property obscures capitalist accumulation in 
agricultural production were discussed in the previous section. Agricultural rent arises 
partly because landed property exists as an obstacle to entry by setting monopolistic 
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entry conditions, but also because rent categories in the agricultural context have the 
capacity to distort both market values and processes of production as they determine 
the basis for technical conditions for agricultural production. In an urban setting, the 
sources of rent might be located differently as technical qualities of land itself do not 
always go into the production conditions of the commodities produced on urban land. 
For example, although the location of land has a role in determining the price of the 
dwellings built on it, location does not generate differential rent in an urban setting 
unless production of buildings is cheaper because of spatial characteristics of that 
particular land i.e. closeness to a train station that makes transportation of inputs easier. 
Second, in an urban context, conditions that determine land quality are not contingent 
upon the indestructible properties of land such as fertility, but rather upon demand 
(Robertson, 2014).  
At this point, it might be necessary to re-emphasise that rent appears as a distinct 
category from profits, not because of the necessity of permanent surplus profits or 
technical qualities unique to land, but because rent is appropriated by landowners 
instead of the industrial capitalist. There cannot be a general theory of rent with pre-
determined impacts on accumulation as any analysis regarding the relations of landed 
property should be conceptualised within the specific historical conditions of landed 
property as well as in relation to the activities conducted on that land. This context-
specificity is the reason why Ball (1979) argues that rent relations cannot form a 
separate category to discuss the developments within a theoretical context. As explained 
in Chapter 1, however, theoretical categories of Marxist political economy are formed 
incorporating the empirical elements, and this discussion on the category of rent is a 
good exercise to emphasise this aspect. Because of this, rent appears to be separate 
category that can be either price-determining or price-determined, or some combination 
of the two, depending on the context.  
The differentiation occurs at two stages as first, access of capital to land is differentiated 
from access to industry. Second, there is a further differentiation over the range of 
activities that can be conducted on land, because whether naturally given or not, how 
technical qualities of land affect surplus creation and appropriation is also contingent 
upon the form of activities. For example, the use of land by capital for mining purposes 
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refers to a process of intervention of landed property in a significantly different way, as 
the ‘indestructible’ qualities of land are not observed, which raises questions over 
whether royalties paid for the mining industry should be classified as rent or not (Fine, 
1982). Leaving these wide-ranging issues aside, what this section emphasises is that how 
landed property actually intervenes in the accumulation process is an empirical question 
and should be answered as such.  
It is within that empirical context rent relations are discussed, even more so in an urban 
environment as the range of activities upon urban land varies greatly. Here, it is useful 
to discuss David Harvey’s ‘accumulation by dispossession’ concept based on urban rent. 
In his conceptualisation, there are two situations in which the category of monopoly 
rent comes to the fore. The first arises because social actors control some special quality 
resource, commodity or location which, in relation to a certain kind of activity, enables 
them to set monopoly prices. In the realm of production, the most obvious example is 
the vineyard that produces wine of extraordinary quality that can be sold at a monopoly 
price. In this case, monopoly price creates the monopoly rent. The spatial version of 
that would be the proximity to some highly concentrated activity (such as a financial 
centre). In the second case, the land or resource is directly traded upon and scarcity is 
created by withholding the land or resource from current uses and speculating on future 
values. Monopoly rents are both created and reduced by competition at the same time. 
The more commodification leads to less monopoly power, nevertheless, at the same 
time, the fiercer the competition, the faster the trend towards monopoly because of the 
tendency of centralisation of capital (Harvey, 2002).  
Because globalisation has significantly diminished the monopoly protections given 
historically by high transport and communication costs, Harvey (2012) claims spatial 
competition provides the monopoly conditions necessary for a secure base for 
centralisation as it has always included some natural monopolistic elements within it. 
While mobile capitals (financial, commercial and productive capital with different 
surplus appropriation capacities) were engaging in a ‘race to the bottom’ in which the 
cheapest and most easily exploited labour power drives the capital mobility and 
investment decisions, the competitive power of spatial investments has depended on 
factors such as long-term investments in built environments which are by definition 
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geographically immobile. For Harvey, urbanisation further commodifies urban land 
because the relatively permanent fixed capital assets associated with it are highly 
localised in their distribution, creating scarcity. He then claims, “[b]ecause rent is a 
transfer payment to a scarce factor of production, then the urbanisation process also 
multiplies the opportunities for realising rent” which creates a basis for rent-seeking 
activities associated with urban transformation as a general method for overcoming the 
overcapacity crises of capitalism (1982, p. 64). As posed by Engels’ in his famous series 
of articles regarding the ‘housing question’ in 1872, this refers to an ever-expanding 
urban transformation: “[t]he breeding places of disease, the infamous holes and cellars 
in which the capitalist mode of production confines our workers night after night, are 
not abolished; they are merely shifted elsewhere! The same economic necessity that 
produced them in the first place, produces them in the next place.” (quoted in Harvey, 
2012, pp. 16-17).  
Like absolute rent, monopoly rent depends upon the barrier of landed property at the 
level of inter-sectoral competition arising purely from supply and demand interactions. 
Nevertheless, it is also distinct from absolute rent that its formation depends purely 
upon supply and demand conditions, with no relation to the composition of capital in 
production upon landed property. Based upon the conceptual framework developed by 
Robertson (2014), this thesis argues that the theoretical significance of monopoly rent is 
not universal, but arises only under specific historical contexts in which there are 
development gains and such gains contribute to the restructuring of productive and other 
types of capitals through the incorporation of landed property, or there are more 
generalised monopoly rent increases due to demand-side factors such as ease of 
regulation and mortgage expansion.  
Development gains occur when a new investment on a specific land improves the 
quality of surrounding lands. Ball (1883, p. 143) defines development gain “as the 
difference between house price and the cost of constructing the dwelling (including site 
servicing)”. The gain is divided between the landowner and the builder: while the 
former gets a price for their land, the latter appropriates profit from housing 
development on that land. By giving the example of a train station construction, 
Robertson (2014) argues that there might be two reasons why a train construction might 
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increase the prices of land plots in the surrounding area. The first is that it makes the 
area more desirable and the demand increases accordingly. Nevertheless, this would 
ultimately be limited, creating a contingent imbalance between demand and supply. A 
permanent change would occur only under the conditions when the train station 
contributes to the increases in productivity in the surrounding plots by lowering the 
costs of production, for example, through reducing the transportation costs for 
capitalists producing in the vicinity. As a result, above normal surplus value is produced 
on the land surrounding the train station, some of which is appropriated as 
development gain (Robertson, 2014, p. 119). Development gains are important to 
emphasise how the productive conditions surrounding landed property are context-
specific, and despite the tendency, organic composition of capital in production through 
landed property might increase on new or existing land to pursue development gains. 
As suggested, development gains provide localised monopoly rent increases due to 
increases in demand following land development in a specific area. Nevertheless, these 
gains could also be generalised if they are incorporated into circuits that affect the 
demand on a sectoral level, such as through ease of land planning and development 
regulation or the increased availability of finance through mortgage expansion. While 
the revenue increases as a result of these factors accrue as capital gains to certain actors, 
they partly contribute to rent revenues in the form of monopoly rents, not only to be 
extracted by landlords, but to be extracted from the social pool of revenues.  
The following sections will seek the presence of this phenomenon in the context of 
Turkey, with the help of focusing on a state institution, TOKI (Housing Development 
Administration). TOKI has absolute monopoly control over public land, which 
constitutes more than almost half of all land in Turkey, and is the biggest single actor in 
land markets by holding approximately 16-17% of all land available for use. Following 
its restructuring during the period 2002-2004, which gave it exclusive ownership rights 
on the Treasury estates along with planning and zoning authorities, TOKI adopted a 
revenue-sharing strategy that provided high value inner city land for lower than market 
prices to the private developers. This structure was favourable for larger firms with 
strong links to energy to engage in housebuilding activities, as they could enjoy 
monopoly profits gained through a merger of housebuilding and land development 
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activities in a land-constrained environment, especially in inner city urban areas that 
would otherwise be unavailable for housebuilding. As a result, development gains could 
be made, giving rise to a ‘speculative’ housebuilding character with joint activities of 
mercantile and productive capital, as was the case in Britain.  
This is not to reject Ball’s (1980) claim that developments that determine the 
intervention of the landed property are in the end contingent, and are not subject to 
universal theorisation, such as through a general rent theory. Marx’s theory of 
agricultural rent is exactly about how the intervention of landed property is contingently 
incorporated into the theory as a unique factor of production. In that sense, David 
Harvey’s (2003) accumulation by dispossession theory is criticised for offering a 
generalised revenue generation process on the basis of rent as monopoly price, despite 
its many insights. Instead, it is argued that how rent relations (universally to a certain 
extent in creation of AR, and both generalised and localised in creation of monopoly 
rents) might contribute to overall revenues which might in turn contribute to the 
realisation of circuits of interest-bearing capital. Following the easier entrance of finance, 
interest-bearing capital also entered the industry in the form of securitisation activities 
pursued by the Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) since 1996-1998, albeit at a low 
base, see below. 
Another important point to emphasise is that, output was not restricted in Turkey 
following the emergence of a speculative housing system, as opposed to what Ball (1983) 
suggests as the natural result of mercantile activities. Instead, a housing boom was 
observed, which will be discussed in the following section. The next section will give a 
general account of the industry in the current period and describe how it relates to the 
rest of the economy. The following sections will describe how this process unfolded, 
locating it within the historical context of urbanisation.  
6.4. The Dynamics of Housing Production in Turkey: A Construction Boom 
Facilitated through State Institutions 
As mentioned in earlier chapters, the construction sector has been considered as one of 
the ‘driving engines’ of accumulation during the post-2001 period in Turkey. (Karatepe, 
2016; KPMG, 2017). It should be noted that the sector cannot alone account for the 
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success of the accumulation, especially considering that the majority of investments by 
the sector were in residential housing, characterised by low-scale economies. 
Nevertheless, it is also characterised by strong inter-sectoral linkages, among the highest 
compared to other sectors, especially through contribution to infrastructure (World 
Bank, 1984). Therefore, not surprisingly, the developments within the housing (hence 
construction) industry have been closely linked to the developments within the energy 
sector in Turkey.  
In earlier studies, inspired by Kuznet’s (1952) pioneering study on the comparison of 
different industries in the formation of gross capital formation, the relationship between 
overall economic development and the corresponding contribution of the construction 
sector has been stressed. In a global study including countries with a population over 
one million, Strassmann (1970) found that the contribution of the construction sector 
to GDP changes significantly according to the country’s development level, increasing 
from an average of 4.6% in lower-income countries to over 7% in middle-income 
countries (See Table 6-2 below). That was because, while the manufacturing sector was 
given a boost during the early stages of development, construction follows to keep up 
with the infrastructural needs of industry when countries experience rapid 
industrialisation at the middle-income level. Low productivity and higher wages, 
however, slow down the growth of industry as the economy advances, which is why the 
rapid expansion of the construction sector is famously described by Strassman (1970) as 
a “middle-income country bulge”.  
Table 6-2: Strassmann’s findings regarding the relationship between construction and economic 
development 
Income per capita 
($) 
Contribution of 
construction to GDP 
(%) 
Employment in construction in total 
labour participation (%) 
80-350 4.6 3.9 
350-900 7.1 6.7 
over 900 7.1 7.2 
Source: Strassmann (1978) 
Ball (2003) also confirmed that between 1956 and 2000, for Germany, France, Canada, 
the USA and the UK, housing investment shares have never risen above 7-8% of GDP 
even when there were chronic shortages. The typical share of housing investment in the 
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annual national income of an advanced economy with a moderately expanding 
population would seem to be around 4-5% with the extra percentage point depending 
on the social attitude to the housing conditions of lower-income groups (Ball, 2003). 
Ofori (1990) points to possible areas for improvement through globalisation, in which 
housebuilding industries can contribute more to overall development through 
benefiting from internationalisation of production. As mentioned before, however, 
internationalisation in the housebuilding industry remains limited due to its informal, 
local-information driven and low economies of scale character (Ball & Wood, 1999). 
Figure 6-2: Comparison of Construction Sector Growth and Real GDP Growth in Turkey 
Source: TURKSTAT 
Turkey has been no exception to this rule, and the share of the construction sector in 
total GDP rose from 4.6% in 2000 to 6% in 2016, while its contribution to employment 
increased from to 6.3% to 7.3% (TURKSTAT). The share of construction in GDP has 
been highest in 2007 at 6.5%, and has been around 6% on average between 2004 and 
2015 (TURKSTAT). Figure 6-2 shows that the changes in the construction sector 
growth patterns were very much in line with the changes in overall GDP. The average 
growth rate of the sector reached a peak in 2010 at 18%. After that peak, it has started 
to decline. In the first three quarters of 2014, the growth rate each year has been 5.1 per 
cent, 2.8 per cent and 1 per cent, respectively. The state’s involvement in the sector has 
been significant and, during the period when public investment in construction has 
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6.7% to 4% of GDP and the construction sector shrank by 22.4% cumulatively 
(Coşkun, 2015). Nevertheless, more than 70% of all investments were made by the 
private sector.  
Figure 6-3: Domestic Bank Credits Given to the Construction Sector in Turkey 
Source: BAT 
As Figure 6-3 illustrates, the credits given to the sector also increased significantly in 
line with sector growth, from 13,228,670 thousand TL in January 2005 (6.3% of all 
domestic credits) to 286,790,800 thousand TL (the amount of cash-credits has been 
164,707,410 thousand TL) in June 2017. While the share of cash-loans given to the 
sector constituted 8.4% of all cash loans in June 2017, its share increased to 10.6% 
when non-cash loans were also included. Among its total credits, non-cash loans 
constituted a significant portion, as 42.6% of all credits were non-cash loans in the same 
period. Figure 6-3 below shows the increasing trend of credits given to the construction 
sector. Disaggregated data for credits extended for the purpose of construction of 
residential buildings do not exist, but as over 60% of the construction sector is based on 
housing,5 the developments within the construction sector as a whole can signal the 
production dynamics of housing to a large extent. 
As mentioned, The Housing Development Administration, (TOKI), had a significant 
impact on the supply boom through incorporating land markets into the circuits of 
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productive and mercantile (as well as interest-bearing) capital and easing the land 
planning process. More precisely, its impacts on the housing system were through four 
channels. First, its direct housing supply for low- and middle-income households 
smoothed the supply in an industry that is structurally cyclical. Second, it facilitated 
demand (and contributed to the creation of monopoly rent in the form of development 
gains) through its large-scale urban regeneration projects, especially in inner city areas. 
Third, it also contributed to the generation of development gains through its large-scale 
revenue-sharing projects which provided high urban value land to private developers 
who could enjoy localised monopoly profits together with other actors in the industry in 
a highly competitive industry characterised by low economies of scale. Last but not least, 
it expanded capital markets through establishing real estate investment trusts, and acting 
as a ‘state-owned securitisation agent’, similar to the case of the National Mortgage 
Corporation, Cagamas, in Malaysia (Rethel, 2010).  
In discussing the housing systems in Turkey, this chapter draws attention to these 
aspects that resulted in a supply boom since the early 2000s that is not observed in 
many developed countries, and as such not discussed extensively in the literature on 
financialisation with respect to housing. The next section will locate these developments 
within a historical context.  
6.4.1. A history of housing provision in Turkey within the context of urbanisation 
This section will discuss how the housing system developed in Turkey within the wider 
context of urbanisation and determined how housing is produced and consumed as a 
commodity. The first mass housing construction programmes for low- and middle-
income groups in Turkey date back to the early 1950s, when urbanisation accelerated 
after the end of World War II.6 Prior to that period, the spatial setting had remained 
almost the same since the decline and fall of the Ottoman Empire, which was shaped 
on the basis of ethnicity with strict segregation among neighbourhoods with no central 
organisation (Faroqhi, 1984). There was a lack of well-developed transportation and 
road systems, which also contributed to the lack of central control over urban spaces 
especially over the outlying parts of the cities. When the nation-state emerged, one of its 
                                                 
6 Three million people migrated to urban areas between 1950 and 1960 increasing the urbanisation 
rate from 25% to 34% (http://www.tuik.gov.tr)  
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key strategies was to establish an urban structure based on centralisation. Especially 
with the étatist policies after 1930, there was a conscious effort for urbanisation and to 
expand the railway network to the neglected parts of the country; a strategy pursued 
through the selection policy of location for state economic enterprises.  
In an agricultural economy mostly based on cereal products produced in the vast farms 
of inner Anatolia with extremely limited transportation links and a small number of 
workforce due to war losses and population exchanges, the state’s industrialisation 
attempts in the early years of the Republic focused on opening factories in medium-
sized Anatolian cities that were along the existing railway links to create a better 
functioning transportation system, but also a more homogenised nation-state with the 
help of urbanisation (Chaudhry, 1993). As a result, urbanisation developed in a centrally 
organised way, based on the choice of location of state enterprises.7 Given the limited 
infrastructural capacity of big cities, migration especially to Istanbul was not wanted by 
the state authorities and such enterprises facilitated the organisation of social life around 
factories in inner Anatolia, which also had the purpose of creating an industrial labour-
force based on a nation-state citizenship identity (Arnold, 2012). 
After World War II, there was shift in both the motives and experiences of urbanisation 
as the étatist policies declined in importance under the open economy conditions of the 
1950s. Şengül (2003) defines the second distinct phase of urbanisation between 1950 
and 1980 as the urbanisation of labour power in the context of rapid migration from 
rural areas in which the main concern was the reproduction of the labour force to 
sustain a labour-intensive import-substitution accumulation system. In accordance with 
the principles of the Marshall Plan, modernisation was promoted in agriculture, leading 
to the first massive influx of rural population to cities at the end of the Second World 
                                                 
7 As also mentioned in Chapter 4, Arnold (2012) argues that this choice was primarily political, 
without much attention being paid to economic feasibility based on a report written by Thornburg 
in 1949. The report stated that economic considerations have played little or almost no role in 
selecting sites of state enterprises, leading towards a direction of geographical development that was 
difficult to sustain. The report defined the Karabuk Iron and Steel Plant, which is the first iron and 
steel factory of the Republic, as an ‘economic monstrosity’ that it had neither the necessary labour 
supply nor the technical equipment to transfer iron from iron ore deposits. When Karabuk Iron and 
Steel Factory was built in 1938, Karabuk city was an incredibly small village with less than twenty 
households with no railway or any other transport connections, but it was relatively close to the 
Zonguldak coal mines and railway station and it was decided that it would be a good strategic point 
in terms of protecting the factory from future military attacks. 
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War. During this period, the state made minimum investment in the built environment, 
and the newcomers in the cities transformed the urban space towards an expansion of 
illegal squatter housing (gecekondus).8  
Gecekondus played an important role in determining the primary housing consumption 
culture in Turkey as, during the 1960s, urban areas were characterised by the intensity of 
unplanned squatter neighbourhoods. By the time the Squatter Law was passed in 1966, 
squatter settlements constituted more than half of the total population of the large cities 
(Şengül, 2003). Bugra (1998) states 59% of the population in Ankara, 45% in Istanbul 
and 33% in Izmir lived in squatter settlements in the first half of the 1960s. In the 1980s, 
these percentages were 55%, 70% and 50%, respectively. This was also the period when 
an urban middle class was emerging, increasing the housing demand in inner urban 
areas.  
The mass housing need emerged in this period, in the context of increasing polarisation 
and fragmentation between the inner urban areas and the peripheries characterised by 
the squatter settlements. The first period of mass housing projects was initiated by the 
economically liberal government of Adnan Menderes, in collaboration with housing co-
operatives and municipalities in the early 1950s. In 1952, the Social Security 
Organisation (SSO) began to provide housing credits for low- and middle-income 
households. Between 1950 and 1965, a total of 374 co-operatives produced 32,862 
dwellings, 25,000 of which were financed by the SSO. Later, the legal framework for 
mass housing by co-operatives was first set by the Co-operative Law in 1969 and later 
by the Mass Housing Law (Law No: 2985) in 1984.  
Home-ownership has traditionally been the primary tenure culture in Turkey, as there 
has been no official state support for rental social housing provision as in the housing 
allowances to lower income renters such as in the UK, France or the Netherlands 
(Sarioglu-Erdogdu, Balamir, Pellenbarg, & Terpstra, 2012). 2011 census data show that 
68% of all households owned their own homes. In the absence of such rental 
mechanisms that would require a limited amount of monthly payments instead of 
savings, legalising unauthorised land appropriations was the only way to provide 
                                                 
8 ‘Gecekondu’ means ‘built in one night’ in Turkish.  
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housing to the poor (Oncu, 1988; Tekeli, 1982), while the legal framework for 
occupation was mostly aimed at benefiting the urban middle class rather than the urban 
poor by extending home-ownership to new households through increased credit 
availability. During the 1980s and 1990s, membership of co-operatives has been an 
important means of access to ownership, as the number of dwelling units provided by 
cooperatives has risen from 8.7% of all dwelling units according to occupancy permits 
in 1980 to 25-30% during the second half of the 1980s and 1990s (TURKSTAT). 
Nevertheless, home-ownership through membership of cooperatives was an 
opportunity only for households with permanent employment in the formal sector 
(Bugra, 1998). For the lower income groups, ownership came through illegal channels 
where the occupiers were allowed the property rights of lands they ‘enclosed’ through a 
series of amnesty laws in a quasi-legal market (Bugra, 1998).  
 It is important to note that it was the high percentage of urban public land that enabled 
ownership through ‘enclosures’, because in contexts where the land belongs to private 
individuals, property owners can often take measures against illegal occupying, as argued 
by Keleş (1972, 1990). In line with this argument, Bugra (1998) remarks that 75% of 
illegal settlements in Istanbul, 88% in Ankara and 80% in Izmir were made on enclosed 
urban public land, which could not have been made possible in the presence of private 
landownership. Although the property right distribution to illegal settlers through quasi-
legal ways created an unusual opportunity for clientelistic and populist policies and 
contributed to a fragmented urban structure in the absence of socio-political 
mechanisms to integrate the urban poor (Oncu, 1988), this practice had some 
redistributive impacts with the active involvement of the state albeit indirectly given the 
lack of legal framework.  
In line with the change of accumulation strategy from domestic import substitution to 
export orientation on the basis of low wage levels in the 1980s, the central state body 
further withdrew from direct engagement in housing policies. During the 1980s, the 
primary built-in investments of the state have tended to be more in infrastructure, 
especially communication and transportation, while the housing need was satisfied 
through a combination of market and quasi-market arrangements as mentioned above.  
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Municipalities became one of the most important actors after the establishment of 
metropolitan municipalities and the enactment of the Law on Land Development, 
Planning and Control (Law No: 3194) in 1985, which empowered them with plan 
making, subdivision and approval on public land. The Mass Housing Law established a 
Housing Development Fund and also The Housing Development Administration 
(TOKI). Each year 5% of the Treasury budget was allocated to the Housing 
Development Fund that was to be used by The Housing Development Administration 
(TOKI) to provide housing supply and also housing loans for approximately one 
million housing units. The establishment of this institution and its development requires 
special attention, as it later acquired a dominant position in the housing system and had 
an impact especially with respect to the relationship of land and construction markets 
after 2004. The next section will cover how this process unfolded.  
6.4.2. The rise of a state institution in transition towards market-based provision: 
TOKI (Housing Development Administration)  
Without doubt, TOKI is the most important actor in the Turkish housebuilding 
industry today, through a variety of different channels: engaging in direct land sale; 
creating development gains through public-private partnerships and big-scale urban 
transformation projects; and lastly, smoothing the supply through engaging in direct 
housing supply for low- and middle-income groups. Today, among TOKI’s total 
housing projects, 40% is addressed for middle-income families, 23% is for low-income 
families, 6% is housing in risk-prone zones and 15% for urban development projects. 
85% of urban regeneration projects consist of affordable housing, while 15% of funds 
are used for luxury housing.9 Its sales alone, worth 4.8 billion TL, constituted 86.3% of 
all sales of state-owned institutions in 2015.10 While 92.8% of its sales revenues come 
from direct land sale, 6.5% comes from a revenue-sharing programme.  
As mentioned, between 1984 and 2003, the primary aim of the Housing Development 
Fund and the administration has been to facilitate individual home-ownership for 
lower- and middle-income segments through low interest rate housing credits. During 
                                                 





this period, 5% of the state budget each year was transferred to the Housing 
Development Fund and 940,000 housing units were financed through TOKI’s loan 
originator banks, Emlak Bank, Pamuk Bank and Vakif Bank. During the late 1980s and 
the early 1990s, commercial banks also started issuing mortgage loans, mostly 
denominated in foreign currency, as part of their consumer lending activity. 
Nevertheless, the extent of mortgage issuance remained limited, as the macroeconomic 
environment was very volatile, and it was difficult to protect the value of the loans in a 
highly inflationary environment (tilt effect), given the devaluation of the Turkish Lira in 
1994, when inflation also reached a peak level at 119% (Erol & Patel, 2004). 
After the crisis in 1994, all private mortgage lending activities came to a halt in 1995. As 
a result, Emlak Bank (The Real Estate Bank of Turkey) continued as the leading 
housing credit lending institution through TOKI, and in 1998, it also introduced an 
index-linked programme (wage-indexed and consumer price-indexed) besides a 
traditional fixed rate mortgage programme (Erol and Patel, 2004). Between 1984 and 
2002, 43,145 housing units were produced by TOKI, while credit support was provided 
for 940,000 dwellings.11 Approximately 90% of total loans were given to the housing 
co-operatives. As mentioned, the co-operatives have played an important role in 
providing housing supply through membership, reaching a peak during the 1992-1993 
period, by providing just over 30% of all dwellings according to occupancy permits. 
Later, this ratio decreased to 5.6% in 2011 (TURKSTAT).  
The decreasing importance of co-operatives coincided with the rising importance of 
TOKI (The Housing Development Administration) not only as an institution for credit 
support, but also a central body for public land-planning and subdivision. Given the 
acceleration of urbanisation during the 2000s,12 the previous methods of urban planning 
based on individual plot generation by municipalities could not provide sufficient land 
for expanded production. Land supply seems to play a determining role in housing 
markets in Turkey, given that urban land through subdivision had not been firmly 
regulated by Urban Development Law. The Law states that municipalities are 
                                                 
11 TOKI website (www.toki.org.tr).  
12  The Association of Real Estate and Real Investment Companies (GYODER) estimates an 
urbanization rate at 78% in 2015 compared to 44% in 1980, indicating the population of urban areas 
will increase to 71 million in 2023 from 60 million. In the last decade, Turkey’s urban population has 
grown three times faster than its overall population. 
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responsible for land provision through public subdivision up to 40 per cent of the city 
land. Nevertheless, some municipalities did not want to engage in parcel creation as it 
was costly, and left the task of plan making to landowners and house-builders (Turel & 
Koc, 2015). As a result, the land development process in Turkey has not been uniform, 
and shows great variety according to bureaucratic and financial choices of individual 
municipalities.  
The creation of larger urban plots was necessary to facilitate a less costly and faster 
method for housing construction. For this purpose, the Housing Development Fund 
was removed in 2001, along with Emlak Bankasi (The Real Estate Bank of Turkey) with 
real estate operations and assets transferred to TOKI. The tasks and assets of the Urban 
Land Office were also transferred to TOKI. After the removal of the fund, in 2003, 
The Emergency Action Plan for Housing and Urban Development was passed, giving 
TOKI more responsibilities and liabilities. The goal of the plan was set to build 250,000 
housing units through renovation, transformation and production by the end of 2007. 
In 2007, Mortgage Law No: 5582 was passed. Following the legislation, TOKI stopped 
providing housing credits, but its other activities continued. 
2004 was the year of the most extensive legislation regarding the responsibilities and 
duties of the Administration, especially with respect to landownership and planning. In 
May 2004, Law No: 5162 and in December, Law No: 5273 were enacted, amending the 
previous legislation. The articles regarding the income, expenditures, duties and 
responsibilities of the Administration included within the Housing Development Law 
were re-regulated. 
Two amendments in particular were significant. First was the amendment made in 
Article 4 of Law No: 1164 that stated, except for estates that were allocated to public 
institutions, upon TOKI’s demand to the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of 
Environment and Urban Planning, all Treasury estates could in principle be transferred 
to TOKI at no cost. This resulted in TOKI increasing its land bank from 16.5 
million m2 to 65 million m2 (approximately 16-17% of total land available for use), 
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following the first five years of the regulation.13 The second amendment was made in 
Law No: 2985, which authorised TOKI to conduct planning and zoning activities on 
Treasury estates, without requiring further permission from local or central governing 
bodies, as long as the plans were not in conflict with the activities of municipalities 
within their jurisdiction. Again, this was a great expansion for TOKI in terms of 
authority, as it made the institution the single most important decision-making body for 
land planning. As the Chamber of City Planners declared in a press release in 2008, this 
gave TOKI exclusive land planning authority, without proper checks and balances.14 
Indeed, the Ministry of Finance Turkish Court of Accounts Audit Report in 2015 
revealed that there were some breaches of the legislation in the practice of estate 
transfers as, although the Law only allowed for the transfer of the estates that had not 
undergone land development, some land plots that were already suitable for 
housebuilding were also transferred.15  
During the 2000s, 78 laws and 10 by-laws were made concerning the production of the 
built environment most of which were aimed at making urban planning more flexible 
and removing obstacles created by land for both private and public sector actors 
(Balaban, cited in Topal et al., 2015, p. 43). The role played by land development and 
regulation was discussed in previous sections. In that sense, these developments 
contributed to the emergence of a housebuilding industry in Turkey, where the market 
power of the state in land markets contributed to the emergence of a dual structure, in 
which while the majority of small competitive housebuilding firms entered the market, a 
minority of large firms, with strong connections to the energy sector, could also enjoy 
some degree of monopoly power through ‘development gains’, especially in high-
demand inner city areas.  
This was made possible, first, through a revenue-sharing programme that started in 
2006, based on TOKI’s public land sale to private developers. A case study conducted 
by FESSUD on urban development in Ankara also supports the view that TOKI’s 
                                                 
13http://www.radikal.com.tr/ekonomi/toki-5-yilda-65-milyon-808-metrekare-lik-alani-mulkiyetine-
gecirdi-879732/  






strategic role has been to facilitate the participation of private developers in housing 
markets through providing valuable inner city land for luxury house building at lower 
than market prices in order to cross-subsidize affordable mass housing to lower income 
segments (Topal, Celik, & Yalman, 2015).  
TOKI explains the system as a build-and-sell model which it adopted to close the gap 
between its short-term investment expenses and long-term receivables.16 The revenue-
sharing mechanism can be summarised as follows. First, TOKI calls for an open tender 
that is not regulated within the legal framework of Public Procurements and Tender 
Laws. While TOKI provides the land subject to tender, bidders offer a ratio of total 
probable revenue of the project and are responsible for construction, infrastructure, 
marketing and sales upon the land. Usually, high value inner city public land is offered 
below its market value, so that the extra revenues generated can be shared among the 
private investors and TOKI participant companies (the share of the private sector 
usually has been around 30-40% of total revenue) (Topal et al., 2015). It was through 
this revenue-sharing system that the state has been facilitating private accumulation 
through housing production by providing highly demanded inner city public land at low 
prices. Table 6-3 below shows some examples of the highest-value revenue-sharing 
projects of TOKI in collaboration with private sector developers.17  
By June 2017, there were forty-one revenue-sharing projects still under construction. 
This process is carried out by TOKI itself, and its participation companies, Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs), which were first established between 1996-1998. The total 
                                                 
16 See TOKI website (www.toki.org.tr ) 
17 To emphasise the inter-linkages between the construction and energy sector, Soyak Holding that 
undertook the Istanbul Kucukcekmece projects shown in Table 6-3, also made substantial 
investments in electricity generation between 2008-2011. Among these projects were Bayramhacili 
HEPP in Nevsehir, Gullubag HEPP in Erzurum province, Hasanlar HEPP in Duzce, with a total 
capacity of 152 MW, worth $350 million in total. Similarly, among Nurol Holding’s electricity 
investments were Nurol Goksu HEPP located in Konya province, with a capacity of 10.8 MW, as 
well as the TOR license for Ceyhan HEPP for 49 years, with a capacity of 63 MW installed power. 
Nurol Holding also owns one of the thirty-one real estate investment trusts in Turkey, named Nurol 




value of REITs that are listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange has increased from $1.84 
billion in 2009 to $8.33 billion in 2013 (BIST).18 
Table 6-3: Selected Revenue-Sharing Projects of TOKI according to Tender Values 






Halkali (Olympiakent) Soyak Insaat JSC 59,678,946,00 1364 
Istanbul Kucukcekmece 
Halkali Stage II Soyak Insaat JSC 96,772,432,00 2228 
Istanbul Kucukcekmece 
Halkali Zone IV. 
Ozsaya Ins. JSC & Guner Ltd. 
Co. 78,857,100,00 1368 
Istanbul Kozyatagi Baytur Ins. JSC 56,760,000,00 800 
Istanbul Halkali Mass 
Housing Project Artas JSC & Gun-erLLC 87,000,500,00 1044 
Istanbul Atakoy Zone VI Mutlu Insaat JSC 223,692,204,00 950 
Istanbul Bahcesehir 
(UpHillCourt) Varyap Varlibaslar Teknik Co. 118,944,000,00 682 
Istanbul Bahcesehir Zone 
T2 
Gulkelesoglu Insaat & Ifas 
Yapi & Ar-Ke Insaat & 2M 
Insaat & Gul Insaat Joint 
Project 180,510,000,00 600 
Istanbul Bakirkoy 
Zeytinlik 
Ozyazici Ins. Elekt. Mak. Ltd. 
Co. & Karadeniz Orme Joint 
project 447,150,000,00 527 
Istanbul Sisli Mecidiyekoy  
Nurol REIT & Nurol Insaat 
JSC 111,800,000,00  
Ankara Cankaya Beytepe Turkerler Insaat JSC 397,000,000,00 800 
Ankara Cankaya Dikmen  
Meka Mesken JSC & Akturk 
Yapi JSC & Emlak Paz. Joint 
project 304,500,000,00 1832 
Source: TOKI 
By 2017, there were 31 REITs in total, seven of which were participation companies of 
TOKI. Among them, Emlak Konut REIT is the largest subsidiary, funded by the assets 
transferred from the liquidated Emlak Bank in 2002 (Topal et al., 2015). Emlak Konut 
REIT is among the thirty largest companies (sixth place) listed on the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange with a market value just over $3 billion in July 2017 (BIST). Besides engaging 
in primary buying and selling real estate activities, REITs also engage in “purchasing 
foreign real estate on the condition of obtaining ownership and investment in real 




estate-backed foreign marketable securities” (Erol and Tirtiroglu, 2011, p. 185). As Erol 
and Tirtiroglu (2011) note, currently, REITs must invest a minimum of 50% of their 
portfolios in real estate asset-backed securities.  
This is an important development, signalling an entrance of interest-bearing capital into 
the housebuilding industry, albeit to a limited degree which will be discussed in Section 
6.6, the theoretical significance of which has been discussed before. As discussed by 
Rethel (2010), a similar process was observed in Malaysia, where a quasi-public agency, 
Cagamas (National Mortgage Corporation), did not only establish a primary mortgage 
market, but also contributed significantly to the corporate bond market through issuing 
mortgage-backed securities. Although established privately, its biggest shareholder 
remains Malaysia’s Central Bank with a share of 20%, Cagamas was founded to become 
a “credible issuer of secondary mortgage securities” and now is the largest issuer of 
asset-backed securities in Malaysia with a market share more than 50% (Rethel, 2010, p. 
499). Although the aggregate extent of secondary mortgage issuance in Turkey is very 
limited, virtually non-existent, the establishment of REITs signals an important 
transition followed by many countries including Malaysia as mentioned above.  
TOKI reports to have delivered 88,593 units under its shanty transformation 
programme between 2003 and 2014 and reports that 392,327 units were built for low 
and middle income groups in total.19 Between 1984 and 2002, the total supply of TOKI 
was 43,145, which is 2% of total housing starts according to permits. After the 
restructuring of TOKI, this picture changed drastically, as Turel and Koc (2015) state 
that during the period from 2003 to 2012, Turkey had one of the highest volumes of 
housing production in Europe, housing starts by TOKI accounting for nearly 11% of 
all national starts. As stated earlier, despite its increasing share in housing supply, 
TOKI’s primary function has been the incorporation of land markets that could enable 
profitability to be maintained in the highly competitive housebuilding markets. Above 
all, this should be considered to be a factor behind the housing boom. TOKI’s direct 
housing supply, however, also contributed to this: first, through smoothing supply 
fluctuations by low- and middle-income housing production; and second through its 
                                                 
19 World Bank Report (2014) Turkey’s Transition. (www.toki.gov.tr).  
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large scale urban transformation projects that increased demand structures especially in 
big cities.  
To give some examples, among these projects have been Basibuyuk Project that covers an 
area with approximately 20,000 lower-income gecekondu inhabitants on the Asian part of 
Istanbul and Tarlabasi Renewal Project covering 20,000 m2 of land with 278 certified 
historical buildings and amongst the largest urban transformation projects (Kuyucu & 
Unsal, 2010). Located at the very centre of Istanbul, the Tarlabasi Project has been the 
symbol for the rapid urban transformation process taking place in Turkey since the early 
2000s, with a tender worth $500 million won by Calik Holding in collaboration with 
Beyoglu Municipality in 2007. 20  Implemented in 2006-2007, both projects have 
encountered significant resistance from inhabitants. In 2014, whilst the Administrative 
Court reversed the judgment for expropriation in the area for not being in accordance 
with the public interest, nevertheless the process still continues.21  
Another contested urban regeneration project has been Sulukule, located on the border 
of the historical peninsula of Istanbul, with an area of 8000 m2 with 571 households. Its 
regeneration has been a joint project of The Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, The 
Fatih Municipality and TOKI. The tender was won by Ozkar Insaat in 2006, worth 
62,675 thousand TL.22 By 2009, all the buildings in Sulukule has been demolished, and 
its population had been displaced, 80% of whom were ethnically marginalised and 
underprivileged Romani people (Uysal, 2012). By July 2017, 187 urban regeneration 
                                                 
20 The CEO of Calik Holding in 2007 was Berat Albayrak, the son-in-law of President Tayyip 
Erdogan, who has been an MP since June 2015 and currently serves as the Minister of Energy and 
Natural Resources since November 2015. Calik Holding also has substantial investments in the 
energy sector including electricity generation and distribution industry and established international 
collaboration with companies such as Rosneft, General Electric, Qatar Holdings and Mitsubishi. It 
owns Aras EDAS (Eastern Anatolia) and Yesilirmak EDAS (Northeastern Anatolia) electricity 
distribution companies and has been involved in the construction and management of eight power 
plants in Turkey; including Cankiri Thermal Power Plant (TPP), Yatagan TPP, Kizkayasi 
Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP), Adacami HPP,  and four other power plants based on renewable 
(solar and wind) energy (www.calikenerji.com). It also has electricity generation investments abroad, 
including the construction of eleven simple cycle power plants in Turkmenistan.  
21 Decree: 6. Daire 2011/7160 E., 2014/2910 K. http://emsal.danistay.uyap.gov.tr. 
22 Similarly, Ozkar Insaat operates under the umbrella of Ozdogan Group, which also has multiple 
investments in energy. Among them, the biggest is the Ayvali Dam and HEPP project, located on 
Coruh River in Erzurum, with an installed capacity of 135 MW. It also completed the Ankara-Sivas 
High Speed Rail Road project in 2017, which will start its service in 2018.  
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projects have been undertaken by TOKI since the reconstruction, 102 of which are still 
under construction.  
As explained, TOKI has exclusive responsibilities for housing, settlement and land 
development issues, and does not operate in a competitive environment. It has no share 
capital, it cannot be declared bankrupt and its assets are immune from attachment. 
When TOKI started to build on and provide public land in the early 2000s, the previous 
actors such as co-operatives and private land-owners were unable to compete as the 
private land market had become functionally ineffective (Turel, 2010). 
As a result, the state’s involvement in the sector has worked in a way to facilitate 
accumulation through the incorporation of land markets into circuits of capital, 
incorporating productive, mercantile and interest-bearing activities. The next section 
will provide an empirical investigation of firms’ financial statements to answer whether 
such changes in production patterns were reflected accordingly.  
6.5. An Investigation of Financial Statements of Listed Construction Sector 
Companies in CBRT Company Accounts Statistics 
This section will investigate the financial statements operating in the construction sector, 
based on annual data released by Central Bank of Turkey Company Account Statistics.23 
Table 6-4 below shows disaggregation of the firms listed in the CBRT Company 
Account Statistics according to size, between 1999 and 2015. It should be noted that 
this is a sectoral level dataset which is not restricted to residential housing, but 
considering 70% of all construction is made for residential purposes, the sectoral level 
developments also give an indication for the housing system. In line with the general 
characteristics of the industry, the great majority of the firms operating in the industry 
and listed by the CBRT are small- (649 firms in 2015) and medium-sized (528 firms in 
2015), as opposed to big (30 firms in 2015).  
 
                                                 
23  See the previous chapter on electricity for details on the collection of Company Accounts 
Statistics by CBRT. All descriptive statistics provided in this section are my own calculations based 
on Company Accounts Statistics, unless otherwise stated.  
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Table 6-4: CBRT Company Account Statistics Construction Sector Listed Firms: Disaggregated 
According to Size 
Years Small Medium Big 
1999 576 288 66 
2000 689 264 40 
2001 653 311 40 
2002 662 296 27 
2003 623 267 32 
2004 498 236 28 
2005 438 236 27 
2006 428 259 32 
2007 398 269 43 
2008 388 271 41 
2009 392 298 43 
2010 428 330 40 
2011 468 389 44 
2012 492 409 39 
2013 570 389 35 
2014 479 453 30 
2015 649 528 30 
The purpose of this section is to show that the impacts of the supply boom were also 
reflected on the balance sheet of the listed firms24 operating in the sector, suggesting 
different production dynamics than the British housing system, despite the increasing 
prevalence of mercantile and interest-bearing activities. As mentioned before, by April 
2016, after trade and retail, the sector had the second biggest share from the total 
credits given to the real sector at just above 8 per cent. As Figure 6-5 shows, the 
construction sector primarily depended on FX short-term credits between 2005 and 
2007. After 2008, in line with the increase in the share of long-term liabilities in total 
liabilities, long-term foreign exchange credits constituted the biggest share in total 
domestic credits given to the sector.25  
Figure 6-5 also illustrates that the share of long-term credits in total liabilities increased 
from just below 5% between 2003-2007 to above 20% in 2015. Although this might 
increase the vulnerability of the firms to foreign exchange shocks given the larger share 
of foreign exchange denominated loans, long-term bank credits obtained by the sector 
                                                 
24  Please note that throughout the chapter the term ‘listed firms’ refers to firms listed in the 
Company Account Statistics. 
25 See Figures 6-4 and 6-5. 
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increased substantially. Figure 6-6 shows that the short-term liabilities of the firms 
decreased in total following the restructuring of the sector, from above 60% in 2004 to 
just above 40% on 2015.  
Figure 6-4: Credits Held by Listed Construction Sector Firms 
  
Source: BRSA 
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Figure 6-6: Listed Construction Sector Firms Liability Structure 
 
Similar developments were also observed on the asset side. Figure 6-7 shows that 
although the share of liquid assets in total assets is still significantly higher than the fixed 
assets, reflecting the labour-intensive character of the sector, it decreased from just 
above 70% in 2007 to below 60% in 2015. On the other hand, the share of Plant, 
Machinery and Equipment item decreased from above 9% of all assets in 2004 to below 
4% in 2015, while the share of land stayed more or less at the same level, fluctuating 
between 4-6% of all assets (Figure 6-8). The increase in the share of the buildings item 
from below 5% in 2005 to 8%, on the other hand, contributed to the increase in the 
share of fixed assets in total assets.  
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Figure 6-8: Share of Land, Buildings and Plant, Machinery and Equipment Items in Total Assets 
 
The decrease in the plant, machinery and equipment item might be a reflection of 
housebuilding sector’s structural inability to move towards higher economies of scale in 
a competitive environment and easy entry and exit conditions, as discussed in the 
section on housing provision in Britain (Ball, 2003). In Britain, the problem of 
decreasing profitability due to increasing costs has been found through a merger of land 
development and housebuilding industries that would enable housebuilders to control 
(and restrict) supply in a land restricted environment. Nevertheless, as discussed in the 
previous section, the solution to that problem in Turkey came through a quasi-market 
intervention of the state that enabled sufficient profitability, without a requirement to 
merge more capital-intensive land development and labour-intensive housebuilding 
industries through holding large land banks.  
As a result, the competitive nature of the housebuilding industry was protected, and the 
majority of the firms have remained small and medium-sized. Nevertheless, a small 
number of big firms could also emerge with strong linkages to the energy industry. 
Forty of these companies were listed among the globe’s 250 largest construction 
companies prepared by the prominent contractors’ magazine ENR (Engineering New 
Record) in 2015, taking the second place after China which had 65 firms on the list. This 
most probably indicated a degree of monopolisation, given the average firm size in the 
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Below are the seasonally and calendar adjusted turnover and production indices 
prepared by TURKSTAT, showing an almost secular increase in both except for a short 
period during the 2009 financial crisis.  
Table 6-5: Construction Seasonally and Calendar Adjusted Turnover Index 
Years Seasonally and calendar adjusted turnover index (2010=100) 
Annual 
average 
 Q-I Q-II Q-III Q-IV  
2005 70.1 72.3 76.0 80.6 74.7 
2006 89.6 94.8 103.5 105.0 98.2 
2007 107.8 108.6 109.1 116.1 110.4 
2008 117.7 120.5 126.3 119.6 121.0 
2009 113.7 109.4 99.8 101.9 106.2 
2010 95.6 101.7 101.3 99.2 99.4 
2011 105.0 105.5 104.8 108.3 105.9 
2012 105.0 109.2 114.1 122.6 112.7 
2013 127.2 127.3 132.6 125.6 128.2 
2014 163.2 128.6 130.5 127.2 137.4 
2015 136.9 126.1 135.4 138.4 134.2 
2016 141.9 152.9 143.9 152.4 147.8 
Source: TURKSTAT Construction Turnover and Production Indices 
 
Table 6-6: Construction Seasonally and Calendar Adjusted Production Index 
Years 
 
Seasonally and calendar adjusted production index (2010=100) 
Annual 
average 
 Q-I Q-II Q-III Q-IV  
2005 86.6 83.9 87.0 91.4 87.2 
2006 97.4 102.3 106.0 107.6 103.3 
2007 107.2 109.8 111.3 108.5 109.2 
2008 104.4 103.9 99.6 95.1 100.7 
2009 88.3 80.3 80.6 88.1 84.3 
2010 95.6 98.1 101.4 104.8 99.9 
2011 108.5 110.7 112.5 113.2 111.2 
2012 110.5 110.7 112.5 115.5 112.3 
2013 118.8 119.9 121.7 122.9 120.8 
2014 126.5 125.3 124.8 121.5 124.5 
2015 123.5 127.1 129.0 126.1 126.4 
2016 131.4 134.9 128.3 126.5 130.2 
Source: TURKSTAT Construction Turnover and Production Indices 
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In a recent empirical study conducted in eight cities, Turel and Koc (2015) find that 
there was an excess supply of housing in Western region cities as the housing starts and 
completions had been much greater than the housing demand. In cities Aydin, Malatya, 
Antalya and Denizli, they find at least 27 per cent difference between housing starts and 
the number of newly-formed households, while the trend was reversed in Southeastern 
and Eastern cities, Malatya, Gaziantep and Van. Turel and Koc (2015) claim that the 
supply difference was significantly higher in cities where municipalities undertake land 
subdivision, underlining the importance of land development regulation.  
It could be suggested that the supply boom was made possible by a decrease in the 
costs through suppression of wages and increase of working hours. Although formal 
employment statistics cannot reflect the labour characteristics of the sector, as it is 
highly informal and depends heavily on sub-contracting practices, Table 6-7 shows that, 
while the hours worked in total decreased substantially gross wages and salaries 
increased. It is not, however, possible to find a better proxy for employment 
characteristics, without a thorough list of subcontractors. Sozen and Kucuk (1999) find 
that there are about 20,000 subcontractors in the industry which is twice the number of 
the registered contractors. In an empirical study they conducted with 33 subcontractor 
organisations operating under the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, in addition to 
primary subcontracting, the practice of secondary subcontracting was also found 
prevalent, further complicating the labour relationships within the industry and 
indicating the high degree of informality.  
Table 6-7: Construction Total Hours Worked and Gross Wages and Salaries Indices 
Years 
Hours worked index 
(2010=100) 
Gross wages and salaries 
index (2010=100) 
2010 100 100 
2011 101.6 114.2 
2012 102.1 131.7 
2013 95.8 144.4 
2014 84.3 148 
2015 76.3 153.1 




In summary, this section outlined the productive characteristics of the listed 
construction firms in Company Accounts Statistics, which suggest a typical 
housebuilding industry with a highly competitive nature due to easy entry and exit 
conditions. Profitability, however, was protected through increasing informalisation for 
smaller enterprises and inter-sectoral linkages with the energy industry for larger 
enterprises, due to its contribution to infrastructure. There was also the contribution of 
monopoly rent gains to profitability, facilitated through quasi-market state interventions 
as well as active programmes such as revenue-sharing since 2006, as explained in the 
previous section. The important point to emphasise is that the emergence of a demand-
driven speculative industry and the overall boost to revenues was not necessarily 
disrupting for housing supply, given the appropriate set of contingent conditions.  
6.6. The Dynamics of Housing Consumption in Turkey in the Context of 
Increasing Household Indebtedness 
Until now, this chapter has not discussed financialisation as such as understood and 
applied within the literature. As mentioned before, understanding in the context of 
housing primarily focuses on how housing as a commodity (form) is consumed, which 
is strongly linked to how it is produced as discussed in the previous section.  
As this thesis argues, the most important recent development with respect to housing 
consumption has been the increasing dependence on individual homeownership, in line 
with the tendency of the value of labour power to decrease. Most visible in the World 
Bank’s documents, the shifts in global scholarship and policy rhetoric throughout the 
1990s-2000s tended to evolve around how such commodification processes could in 
fact contribute to static efficiency concerns: without the state in the former period, and 
with the state in the latter. As Van Waeyenberge (2015) finds, in 1993, the World Bank’s 
advice for governments in that regard had been “to abandon their earlier role as 
producers of housing and to adopt an enabling role of managing the housing sector as a 
whole” (p. 1).  
In this World Bank document, the objective being the elimination of public subsidies in 
housing provisioning and creating replicability by the private sector in order to target 
efficiency and profitability in housing markets, the most important pillar for the strategy 
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of enabling markets was defined as supporting the inclusion of intermediary financial 
institutions within housing systems that could issue long-term mortgage loans to low- 
and moderate-income households (pp. 55-56). As a result, during the 1990s, the Bank’s 
housing loans increased fourfold in constant terms, to account for 15 per cent of the 
Bank’s housing portfolio, up from 2 per cent during the 1980s (Van Waeyenberge, 
2015). 26  Later, the state’s direct involvement was encouraged through public-private 
partnerships, similar to the evolution of the same rhetoric around electricity 
privatisation. As the thesis argued in the previous chapter on electricity, the state has 
always been involved in social provision, irrespective of the shifts in scholarship and 
policy rhetoric. Although the forms and means of intervention change through time, 
commodification processes especially after the late 1990s went hand-in-hand with the 
increasing involvement of the state in social provision (Fine and Saad-Filho, 2016). As 
discussed earlier, this was especially true of the Turkish economy, in which individual 
home-ownership was facilitated through a supply boom, owing much to non-market 
elements.  
As discussed more in detail in Chapter 4 on Turkish political economy, especially after 
2003 when amendments were made to the Consumer Protection Act (Law No: 4077), 
easing the regulations for consumer loans and credit cards, a rapid demand-driven 
increase was observed in consumption credits. Household debt increased sevenfold 
reaching 49 per cent of disposable personal income in 2012, in line with the trend in 
other developing economies (Karacimen, 2014). Among total consumption credits, the 
share of housing credits increased substantially from below 5% in 2001 to 34.4% by 
March 2017.27 Nevertheless, as Figure 6-9 shows, the share of the number of housing 
loan borrowers in total consumer loan borrowers stayed more or less the same, and the 
greatest increase in all consumption credits has been observed in personal finance 
credits, which constitute 63.5% of all household credits in March 2017.  
 
                                                 
26  For World Bank policy documents on housing see World Bank (1993), “Housing: Enabling 
Markets to Work”; World Bank (2006), “Thirty Years of Shelter Lending: What Have We Learned?”, 
World Bank (2009), “Housing Finance Policy in Emerging Markets”. 
27 BAT (The Banks Association of Turkey) consumer and housing credits statistics (www.tbb.org.tr). 
Also see Figure 6-9. 
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Figure 6-9: Housing Credits as a Share of Total Household Credits and Number of Housing Loan 
Borrowers as a Share of Total Loan Borrowers in Turkey 
Source: BAT (The Banks Association of Turkey) 
In a comparative context, the housing credit growth also has been high, and as Figure 6-
10 shows, Turkey experienced the globe’s fastest real credit growth, by 17% in 2015. In 
2016, real credit growth has been 9%, following the fastest growth rates in Mexico, 
Philippines, Slovak Republic and China.28 
Figure 6-10: Real Credit Growth in Housing in 2015 (annual percentage change) 
Source: IMF Global Housing Watch 
                                                 






















As also discussed earlier, these developments with respect to the increasing 
consumption demand in housing markets are mostly discussed with respect to their 
destabilising impacts on overall accumulation, by leading to a breakdown of asset price 
bubbles, facilitated by intensive securitisation to earn capital gains through price 
appreciations (Dymski, 2010). In a Minskyian framework, Dymski (2010) notes that it is 
not the asset price inflation per se, but the underlying investment cycles that lead to 
downturns, due to a shift in the financing character of the actors in the economy from 
hedge-financing towards Ponzi-financing. This mechanism is tightly related to the 
overall depth of the financial markets in an economy, as Ponzi-financing necessarily 
follows the shift of the associated risks from the balance sheets of banks to intermediary 
financial institutions and consumers, which reduces banks’ incentives to take action 
against risky lending. This process has been discussed extensively in the literature 
(Dymski, 2010; Nesvetailova & Palan, 2013; Tavasci & Toporowski, 2010; Wray, 2008), 
and this section will not go into further details. In line with the theoretical framework 
adopted in this thesis, however, it emphasises that such preoccupations necessarily 
restrict the analysis of change in housing markets to economies where financial markets 
are already deep and the consumer base is wide enough to lead to such an economy-
wide outcome.  
As Cerutti et al. (2015) also underlines, a systemic study of housing markets then 
becomes only relevant for countries where financial and asset markets are well 
developed, for example in the UK, Netherlands and Switzerland, where mortgage debts 
reached up to over 80% of GDP by 2011. When the Mortgage Law was passed in 
Turkey in 2007, the share of mortgages in total GDP did not even reach 1% and the 
share of total housing loans did not exceed 4% by March 2016.29 In the first quarter of 
2016, while consumer loans amounted to 11.9 per cent of the GDP, the value of 
housing loans constituted only 3.5 per cent of total GDP. Compared to many 
developed countries, mortgage markets in Turkey still are underdeveloped especially 
considering that the fundamental levels of primary mortgage interest rates are still too 
high to establish a wide primary mortgage market (Erol & Çetinkaya, 2009). Hence, risk 
accumulation is low and the sector is not heavily reliant on secondary mortgage markets 
                                                 
29 The Banks Association of Turkey (BAT) www.tbb.org.tr  
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through the issuance and trade of collateralised debt obligations that practically did not 
exist until recently (Erol, 2015; Erol & Çetinkaya, 2009).  
As a result, substantial residential price increases in Turkey were also not observed 
compared to other developing countries, such as Brazil and India, where prices 
cumulatively have increased by more than 76% in Brazil and 50% in India from end-
2007 to end-2014.30 In 2014, residential prices in Turkey increased by 6% in real terms,31 
which might indicate the early stages of an access problem according to Coskun and 
Watkins (2014). Price to rent ratio also increased from the base in 2010 (=100) to 139 
by the second quarter of 2015.32 The increase in this ratio is the highest among OECD 
countries in 2015, as the average OECD average price to rent ratio has only risen to 103 
in 2015 from the base in 2010. Nevertheless, these indicators do not signal an unstable 
housing market, as the price/income ratio can still be considered to be relatively low in 
Turkey, as Figure 6-12 illustrates. In line with the paragraph above, Erol (2015) finds 
that most of the price changes in the residential properties in Turkey can be explained 
by endogenous factors and do not signal a speculative boom, although the increasing 
trend in prices since 2010 cannot be denied. 
Figure 6-11: Price-to-Rent Ratio in Housing (2015: Index 2010=100) 
Source: IMF Global Housing Watch  
                                                 
30 BIS Residential Property Price Statistics. Detailed dataset can be retrieved from 
http://www.bis.org/statistics/ 
31 BIS Residential Property price Statistics. 

































































































































































Figure 6-12: Price-to-Income and Price-to-Rent Ratios around the World (March 2014) 
  
 
There are a number of factors that were argued to have contributed to such an increase, 
and as discussed throughout the chapter, easier access to housing credit was one of the 
primary factors. Topal et al. (2015) also point to the increasing presence of foreign 
investors, as real estate sales to foreigners were made possible with an amendment of 
the Land Register Law (Article 35) in 2003. Between 2003 and 2013, the property sales 
to foreigners in forms of housing and land reached 25 billion USD, corresponding to 13% 
of the tourism revenue earned in the same period (Topal et al., 2015). Yirmibesoglu 
(2008) claims declining household size from 4.14 in 1990 to 3.85 in 2000 was another 
factor behind the growing housing demand.  
In other words, the growth of housing credits seems to be endogenous to the 
operations of the markets contained in the industry, unlikely to create significant risk for 
the overall accumulation pattern. This does not suggest a ‘financialised’ picture in a 
traditional sense. Nevertheless, as discussed, the industry is subject to considerable 
change through the promotion of individual ownership, as well as increasing activities 
of mercantile and interest-bearing capital activities. What this chapter in particular, as 
well as the thesis in general, is interested in is the investigation of this multifaceted 
change in its own right, without exclusive attention given to the possible destabilising 
impacts, which may or may not be present. The next section will investigate whether 
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another financialisation argument, which is increasing dependence upon ‘predatory 
lending’ to the poor, prevails in the Turkish context.  
6.3.1. Housing consumption: Who consumes how much? 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a particular stream in the financialisation literature claims 
that in many countries, maintaining relative levels of consumption by means of 
borrowing when real wages have stagnated has been an integral macroeconomic factor 
sustain aggregate demand (Dos Santos, 2013). In that sense, market-based provision of 
health, education and most commonly housing, has been an important demand strategy, 
also incorporating poorer households through ‘predatory lending’ (Dymski, 2009b, 
2009a). Dos Santos (2013) claims that credit extension to lower-income group segments 
has replaced the initial expansion of credit to middle-income groups and in some 
middle-income countries, for example in Brazil and Malaysia where commercial banks 
were specifically required to meet targets of mortgage loans to lower income 
households.  
Karacimen (2014, 2015) supports this argument in the context of Turkey, and finds that 
predatory lending practices were prevalent as around 42 per cent of all household 
credits were given to people below median monthly income level (earning less than 
1000TL a month) during 2009-2011. In 2010 and 2011, the amounts of loans borrowed 
by the lower income half of the population constituted almost 60 per cent of their 
income (Karacimen, 2014). In 2014, 27% of all household credits were given to 
households below 1000TL monthly income level while their share in total credits was 
18%.33 Considering these groups are the most vulnerable at times of crisis, Karacimen 
(2015) argues that the increasing indebtedness of the lowest income groups increases 
social vulnerability in the presence of financial volatility, to which deteriorating labour 
market conditions have been conducive.  
                                                 
33 27% of all household credits were given to households between 1000TL-2000TL income level, 
constituting more than half of all households credits together with the lowest income group (their 
share in total credits was 40%). 
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Table 6-8: Percentage of Household Credit Borrowers according to Income Groups  
Percentage of Loan Borrowers By Income Groups 
Years 0-1000TL 1001-2000TL 2001-3000TL 3001-5000TL 5000TL + Unspecified 
2010 41.6 27.9 11.4 6 6.3 6.5 
2011 42.9 25.8 11.7 5.6 5.4 8.5 
2012 38.1 25.1 13.1 6.4 6.6 10.5 
2013 32.7 27.6 14.5 7.4 9 8.5 
2014 27.4 27.2 13.1 7.3 14.8 9.8 
Source: Karacimen, 2014 
Given the assumption households spend up to 30% of their income on housing credits, 
Turhan (2008), however, predicted that only the top 10% would be able to use 
mortgage credit given interest rates of 1.5% a month and typical maturity of 7-10 years. 
Topal et al. (2015) also claim that 44% of mortgaged purchases were made in the 
biggest four cities, indicating mortgages were mostly accessible by the metropolitan elite.  
Figure 6-13 shows that the share of low-income group households in total number of 
credits increased, the amount of credits given to households below median income level 
decreased. In fact, after 2004, the average share of the lower-income half of the 
population from total credits decreased from well above 60% of all household credits to 
20% in 2016. 2004 was the year when there was rapid demand-driven increase in total 
housing credits because of an extension of maturities and a rapid drop in the monthly 
interest rate from 2.57 per cent in mid-2004 to 0.99 by the end of 2005 (Karacimen, 
2014). Although disaggregated data on housing credits according to income groups do 
not exist, the decreasing share of credit amount given to households below median 
income level suggest that credits given to below median income households are more 
likely to be lower-value personal finance credits, which constitute the highest share in 





Figure 6-13: The Amount of Credits Given to Households below Median Income Level (As a Share 
of Total Household Credits) 
 Source: BAT 
The latest statistics collected by The Banks Association in Turkey in March 2017 show 
in Table 6-9 that among total household credits worth 54,645 million TL, 16,171 million 
TL (29.6% of all household credits) was given to the upper-income group earning 
5000TL and above, as opposed to 11,135 million TL (20.3%) given to the income group 
earning up to 1000TL a month, and 6,980 million TL (12.7%) to the income group 
earning between 1000-2000TL a month. Table 6-10, however, shows that among the 
total number of credits issued, the lowest-income group below the median income level 
receives the highest share. Among 2,533,205 credits issued, 712,725 are undertaken by 
the income group earning below 1000TL a month, which constitutes the highest share 
according to the numbers of loans issues, as opposed to the amount. As mentioned, this 
probably reflects an increase in personal credits, as a simple credit category distinct 
from interest-bearing capital as such. The next section will give a brief summary of the 

















Table 6-9: Amount of Credits Issued according to Income Groups (million TL) 












5.001 +      
TL 
Un-
classified Total Period   
 
2016 TL 7,781 6,790 5,361 6,012 8,150 3,851 37,945 
March FX 2 0 0 1 2 0 5 
  Total 7,783 6,790 5,361 6,013 8,152 3,851 37,949 
 
2016 TL 8,861 7,243 6,188 7,820 9,777 4,046 43,935 
June FX 0 0 0 0 6 0 7 
  Total 8,861 7,243 6,188 7,821 9,783 4,046 43,942 
    
  2016 TL 8,654 6,550 5,710 7,337 8,490 4,358 41,099 
Sept FX 0 0 0 0 3 0 4 
  Total 8,654 6,550 5,710 7,337 8,493 4,358 41,103 
 
2016 TL 13,009 8,946 8,299 11,573 12,739 6,054 60,621 
Dec FX 0 0 0 1 4 0 5 
  Total 13,010 8,946 8,299 11,574 12,743 6,054 60,626 
 
2017 TL 11,305 6,980 6,044 8,402 16,173 5,740 54,645 
March FX 0 0 0 1 4 0 5 
  Total 11,306 6,980 6,044 8,403 16,178 5,740 54,650 
         
Table 6-10: Number of Loans Issued according to Income Groups (million TL) 















5.001 +      
TL 
Un-
classified Total Period   
2016 TL 616,693 590,824 305,761 244,472 347,149 226,248 2,331,147 
March FX 12 2 2 9 23 0 48 
  Total 616,705 590,826 305,763 244,481 347,172 226,248 2,331,195 
2016 TL 660,599 598,679 346,536 302,337 378,090 250,234 2,536,475 
June FX 0 0 3 11 40 1 55 
  Total 660,599 598,679 346,539 302,348 378,130 250,235 2,536,530 
2016 TL 656,515 532,515 308,975 272,800 308,639 247,781 2,327,225 
Sept FX 1 1 3 3 32 1 41 
  Total 656,516 532,516 308,978 272,803 308,671 247,782 2,327,266 
2016 TL 772,820 585,245 365,122 358,202 377,143 299,840 2,758,372 
Dec FX 3 0 1 18 33 1 56 
  Total 772,823 585,245 365,123 358,220 377,176 299,841 2,758,428 
2017 TL 712,724 477,929 278,634 261,097 499,863 302,915 2,533,162 
March FX 1 1 0 8 33 0 43 





This chapter provided a political economy of housing provision in Turkey since the 
1950s, along the increasing scope and depth of commodity relations in the chain of 
activities from production to consumption. As mentioned, this investigation has a 
theoretical relevance for investigating the tendency of capitalism towards lowering the 
value of labour power (while it is also redefined through money wages’ increasing 
capacity to buy necessarily cheapening wage goods, or through expansion of credit as in 
the case of cheapening mortgages, for example), which is partly constituted by the 
consumption of housing as a use value. As such, its relevance for the study of 
financialisation is twofold: while the existence of regular revenue streams through 
consumption provides the necessary base for the attachment of the circuits of interest-
bearing capital through the provisioning of wage goods, this in turn decreases the 
simple value embodied in these commodities. Also as discussed in earlier chapters, 
however, this process refers to a simple abstract tendency, which is only observed in 
various forms, mediated through the interaction of counter-tendencies as well as 
contingencies. In other words, the impacts of financialisation become an empirical 
question to be contextually investigated for each wage good across different countries.  
Housing provides a good case for further explaining why this is the case, due to the 
intervention of landed property which is absent as a leading factor in other wage goods, 
such as electricity. Within the housing studies literature and the financialisation literature 
in particular, the analytical focus has traditionally been on the mechanisms through 
which a transition towards market-based provision could affect more macro 
determinants, as in the case of asset price inflation following a shift in the financing and 
saving practices of market actors, including the consumers and the financial institutions. 
Most of these studies are interested in locating housing within a systemic context, but 
with the trade-off that the relevance of housing becomes no more than a distributional 
issue, for example due to the impacts of racial segregation on asset risk generation 
process, or the participation of a wide pool of actors including a variety of special 
purpose entities, mortgage brokers and so on that influences how risks are allocated 
(Dymski, 2009b, 2010; Wray, 2008). 
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In line with the principles of the ‘systems of provision approach’, which is also inspired 
by Ball’s (1983) housing studies, this chapter argued that the housebuilding industry is 
characterised by some structural productive features, which affects how these revenues 
are distributed through housing. These characteristics are discussed in the context of 
British housing, which explains why a speculative housebuilding industry emerges, due 
to some distinct productive constraints within housing.  
Specifically, it explains how housebuilding and land development develop as two 
structurally distinctive industries due to significant differences in risk and return 
structures: while the former is a low-scale, labour-intensive industry with lower risks and 
lower returns, the latter is characterised by significantly higher risks and higher returns, 
making the industry more capital-intensive. As a result of this simple division, it is 
argued that the housebuilding industry is structurally unable to move towards technical 
progress and economies of scale, because it is characterised by the activities of a large 
amount of small firms in easy entry and exit conditions, in other words, a highly 
competitive environment with significant cyclicality (Ball, 1983, 2003). In this context, a 
‘speculative’ housebuilding industry emerges in countries where land supply is limited, 
and landowners have a degree of monopoly power in their decisions to sell; such as in 
the UK, where bigger firms with sufficient land stocks could engage in stock-adjustment 
against increasing costs arising from failure to facilitate productivity increases, and adopt 
an output-restricting character in order to protect profitability through buying and 
selling (Ball, 1983, 2003).  
While acknowledging the importance of the emergence of speculative housebuilding 
industries characterised by mercantile activities, this chapter then argued that for this 
structure to be successful in expanding supply, output-restriction and the consequent 
price appreciations would need to be absent, which is partly contingent on a different 
role to be played by the intervention of landed property which contributes to 
profitability at the level of revenue generation. This was discussed in the context of 
Marx’s theory of agricultural rent, which explained how the intervention of landed 
property contributes to the continuation of the circuits, not only as a barrier to 
production at the level of entry, but also as a special factor of production due to the 
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presence of social relations that separated landowners from industrial capitalists 
historically.  
It was also emphasised that rent theory does not suggest some predetermined path, but 
partly explains why extra revenues in housebuilding industry might exist, contributing to 
the explanation as to why the industry attracts the wide pool of actors, at the level of 
distribution in the first place. Indeed, the historical development of the Turkish 
construction industry since the 1950s suggests that speculative elements were 
incorporated without obstructing supply, after the restructuring of a state institution, 
the Housing Development Administration (TOKI) during 2002-2004 and the dramatic 
decline in the monthly interest rates in mortgages from around 2.5% to 1% in 2004. It is 
important to note that revenue boosting processes through mercantile activities went 
hand-in-hand with a housing supply boom, and the construction sector investments 
increased cumulatively by more than 80% between 1998-2014 (Erol & Unal, 2015), over 
60% of which was made for residential purposes. 
First of all, crucial to note is that land markets are characterised by state-ownership in 
Turkey, and TOKI is the single biggest actor with 16-17% of all land available for use. 
It has absolute control over its land bank, and its projects are exempted from the 
lengthy bureaucratic processes of land development usually carried out by municipalities. 
As a result, TOKI could contribute to the emergence of a housebuilding industry, 
which was both output-facilitating and speculative, through various channels. First, it 
smoothed the fluctuations in supply through engaging in low- and middle-income 
housing production especially in the outer areas of cities where housing demand is low. 
Second, it facilitated demand through large-scale urban transformation and regeneration 
projects especially in Istanbul and Ankara. Third, given that the firms in Turkey did not 
have large land banks, as the sector’s development prior to the post-2001 crisis period 
had been limited without an established land development market, TOKI’s revenue-
sharing projects on high-demand inner city state estates have provided localised 
development gains that could contribute to higher than average profits appropriated as 
rent by all actors in the industry. This strategy was particularly in favour of the bigger 
firms with sufficient capital to engage in riskier land development investments, 
especially with inter-linkages to the energy sector. Another strategic importance of 
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TOKI has been the introduction of real estate investment trusts operating under its 
umbrella, which contributed to the deepening of capital markets, albeit from a very low 
base compared to many other countries.  
In short, a speculative housebuilding industry was established, contributing to revenues 
(hence capitals gains to be distributed) for all actors in the industry, without this being 
reflected as price appreciations, partly due to the intervention and availability of landed 
property, and the limited extent of consumer base and the participation secondary 
financial institutions, in line with the development trajectory of Turkey. Moreover, the 
inter-sectoral linkages with the energy sector also helped larger firms to protect 
profitability without output-restricting, and continue operating within a highly 
competitive and low-economies of scale industry.  
Therefore, this chapter did not particularly aim to detect whether the changes taking 
place within the housing industry in Turkey could contain themselves or be transmitted 
to have an impact on overall accumulation. Instead, it examined change in its own right, 
following the increasing dependence on owner-occupation to satisfy housing need. 
Despite the great differences between the British and Turkish housing systems, there is 
a common element in both countries, which is the promotion of individual home-
ownership. From its peak at 31% in 1981, the percentage of households in social 
housing in Britain fell to 19% in 2001 while owner-occupation, by contrast, reached 
above 70% (Robertson, 2014). Similarly, the homeownership level reached 68% in 
Turkey in 2011 (TURKSTAT), which traditionally did not accommodate a social 
housing system. This chapter is organised around the investigation of housing as an 
increasingly commodified use value in line with the widening discrepancy between 
means of production and items of consumption, which is itself a reflection of broader 
value relations of the economy along with financialisation. The next and final chapter 
will further emphasise this aspect in light of what has been discussed throughout, and 
will conclude the thesis.   
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Chapter 7                                                                                   
Conclusion 
7.1. Introduction 
This thesis provided a political economy of electricity and housing provision in Turkey, 
in light of the financialisation literature. Its purpose is to establish a theoretical link 
between the commodification of wage goods and the financialisation processes since 
the late 1970s and early 1980s that have been widely associated with a diverse range of 
empirical processes such as intensified debt and equity-based securitisation and financial 
profit seeking, slowing down of real accumulation, stagnant wages and widening income 
inequality, and/or a set of policies such as deregulation in labour and financial markets. 
By theorising financialisation as the material base for a distinct phase in mature 
capitalism when money capital acquires a distinct quality (use value) to expand itself 
independently from the processes of production (as interest-bearing capital) and 
investigating this contextually in the provisioning of wage goods, it was concerned with 
two interrelated issues. First was to locate the developments within the electricity and 
housing markets in Turkey within a systemic theoretical framework through the use of 
the concept of financialisation. Second, and more broadly, the thesis investigated how 
the individual cases from Turkey provided insight for an understanding of 
financialisation in particular and the workings of the economy in general. This chapter 
will conclude the thesis in light of these primary concerns, which will be discussed once 
again in Section 7.2 through a brief summary of its main findings as well as contribution. 
Section 7.3 will conclude by identifying some further issues for future research.  
7.2. Main Findings and Contribution 
As mentioned above, this thesis had two interrelated concerns, the first of which was to 
understand how the organisational relations with respect to the production and 
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consumption of electricity and housing in Turkey have changed over time, by making 
use of the concept of financialisation as the increasing presence of interest-bearing 
capital as self-expanding money capital (or more widely referred to as the emergence of 
the secondary circuit of capital).  
This first concern is more or less straightforward and self-explanatory, and it seeks to 
address the individual cases through the use of concepts employed in Marxist political 
economy, the emphasis being upon a specific interpretation of financialisation. In that 
respect, the empirical cases of electricity and housing provisioning in Turkey were 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 with respect to their move towards market-based forms 
of provisioning, reflected in the increasing scope and depth of commodity relations 
across the vertical chain of activities from production through to consumption. As 
emphasised, the commodification process was readily associated with the promotion of 
individual final consumption of these goods, without this necessarily being 
accompanied by the withdrawal of the state. In contrast, the thesis provided empirical 
evidence that both electricity and housing were increasingly produced (and consumed) 
through the market as items of final consumption in Turkey since the 1980s, together 
with an active involvement of the state. The involvement of the state was evident in the 
increased budget transfers during and after electricity privatisation and the choice of 
cost recovery regulation mechanisms to favour private enterprises over end-users in the 
electricity system.  
In the housing system, the state was heavily involved in the promotion of a private 
housebuilding industry through the establishment of primary (and later secondary) 
mortgage markets as well as contributing to land provision, directly through the 
restructuring of a state institution during 2002-2004, the Housing Development 
Administration (TOKI) which had a monopolistic position in land markets in terms of 
ownership and access, and indirectly through easing land development and planning 
regulations. It was argued that although the commodification process does not directly 
suggest a financialised structure, in which revenues are securitised and bought and sold 
without a direct relationship to the processes of production, it contributes to it by 
expanding the base of consumer revenues with significant regularity as well as 
contributing to the realisation of circuits by generating consumption demand.  
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The thesis aimed at understanding these processes empirically at their early stages in 
Turkey, in line with the specific development trajectory of Turkey as a transition 
economy. Chapter 4 on the political economy of Turkey emphasised that, in line with 
its specific stage of development, the trajectory of financialised accumulation in Turkey 
has followed a different path than developed economies. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
financialisation is mostly discussed within the context of developed economies with 
respect to its destabilising and stagnationary impacts on production, growth and 
distribution. As a result, financialisation in developing and emerging economies 
emerged as a separate literature, as discussed in Chapter 3, by emphasising how the 
depth and scope of financial markets are themselves responsible for the emergence of 
developed country cases of financialisation, which is absent in developing countries. 
Instead, the developing country financialisation literature focuses upon how the 
destabilising impacts or sources of the primary financialisation in the core are ‘imported’ 
by the developing countries through capital account liberalisation and monetary policy 
imports, which restrain the policy choice of developing countries and reinforce and 
reproduce the uneven and dependent nature of  international development.  
Drawing upon the empirical evidence for the manufacturing sector restructuring from 
low-technology labour-intensive sectors towards higher-technology capital-intensive 
sectors after the 2001 crisis, the thesis argued that there was a national economy level 
structural change in Turkey since 1980. This contrasted with the prediction of the 
literature on financialisation towards global managerial short-termism and impatient 
finance, as the increases in productive capacity went hand-in-hand with the increasing 
commodification of electricity and housing and the emergence of secondary circuits of 
capital in Turkey, especially after a typical foreign exchange induced developing country 
crisis in 2000/2001. It should be once again noted that the thesis does not sharply 
contrast with many of the findings of the financialisation literature, and instead draws 
upon it, especially with respect to the emphasis given to the issue of distribution in 
systemic analyses of accumulation. It was however, emphasised that the maintenance of 
capital inflows through high interest rates and their channelling into domestic 
borrowing through new issuance of government debt instruments during the 1990s, 
which was a common developing country practice, did not signal a structural shift to 
short-termism as a result of financialisation. Instead, the period of financial deepening 
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through the state-issued securities was followed by a more positive macroeconomic 
outlook during the 2000s, characterised by improving labour productivity and a move 
towards capital-intensive production techniques across the economy (counterbalanced 
with increasing informalisation in more traditional sectors), along with increasing 
household and private sector indebtedness. In that respect, the private sector’s heavy 
reliance on government securities during the 1990s reflected domestic producers’ 
attempts to protect the value of their capital in a macroeconomic environment 
characterised by chronically high levels of inflation. Meanwhile fiscal expansion 
contributed to aggregate demand during a period when private demand was insufficient. 
 The crisis of 2001 and the subsequent financial sector restructuring has been a crucial 
turning point, in terms of eliminating small banks engaging in riskier borrowing and 
lending activities with weak balance sheet structures. The crisis had differentiated 
impacts on different actors in the economy, as while the larger actors with tight links to 
the financial sector were not affected, the access to credit for smaller enterprises was 
restricted following the financial sector restructuring. As a result, profitability was 
maintained across the economy in a dual structure, in which considerably bigger 
medium-low and medium-high technology sectors had to channel their production into 
exports through external borrowing, in the face of shrinking domestic demand, given 
their less flexible production conditions to keep up existing production levels (and 
adopt technologically more advanced techniques), while the smaller low technology 
industries turned towards increasing informalisation and subcontracting practices. This 
was most visible in the rising export share of the automotive sector as a medium-high 
technology industry within the manufacturing sector as opposed to the traditionally 
strong textiles industry. In this respect, the macroeconomic trajectory was favourable 
for the growth of the capital-intensive energy sector together with horizontal inter-
sectoral linkages to the highly cyclical and informal construction sector that was 
facilitated by, and further facilitated, commodification of electricity and housing as 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.  
These findings contributed to an understanding of the individual cases of electricity and 
housing provisioning in Turkey in terms of their place within the overall accumulation. 
As also mentioned above, however, the second concern of the thesis is to understand 
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how the individual cases provide insight for an understanding of financialisation in 
particular and the workings of the economy in general. As emphasised throughout, 
irrespective of the result of (but causal in the emergence of) these sectors’ overall 
contribution to successful accumulation, this concern is located at a deeper level of 
analysis and reflects some methodological principles outlined in Chapter 1. First of all, 
these principles are based upon the conceptualisation of the categories of exchange to 
reflect the simultaneous circulation of use values as the concrete material commodities 
(or commodity forms) and values as the abstract labour time embodied in (and 
necessary to reproduce) these commodities.  
Distinct from the ahistorical concept of utility employed in contemporary economics, 
the concept of use value emerges when commodities reflect the underlying social 
relations through their material properties. This aspect first appears in Marx’s analysis of 
money acquiring a ‘universal’ use value to monopolise exchangeability. Apart from its 
particular use values to satisfy human needs and provide utility, it is this universal aspect 
of money that separates it aside from the mass of commodities, as acknowledged widely 
within the tradition of Marxist political economy. Many of the theorists suggest, 
however, use values lie outside the scope of political economy as once commodities 
leave the sphere of the unity of production and circulation, they are no longer governed 
by its laws. Among these are Hilferding as one of the most well-known theorists of 
Marxist political economy, who claimed “[t]o be a use value is evidently a necessary 
prerequisite of the commodity, but it is immaterial to the use value whether it is a 
commodity. Use value as such, since it is independent of the determinate economic 
form, lies outside the sphere of investigation of political economy. It belongs in this 
sphere only when it is itself a determinate form.” (cited in Rosdolsky, 1977, p. 74).  
For others, including Rosdolsky (1977), Weeks (1983) and Fine (1994), on the other 
hand, although it is true that individual use values are no longer determined by the laws 
of capitalist accumulation once they leave the circuit of capital as commodities, the use 
value investigation is indispensable for the analysis of capitalist exchange in general. For 
Rosdolsky (1977, p. 84), “the most important determinations of the exchange value 
derives precisely from use value and from the relation between the two of them: for 
instance, ground rent [deriving from the use value of landed property], the minimum 
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level of wages, and the distinction between fixed and circulating capital” which have the 
most direct influence on the determination of the exchange categories, such as prices.  
At the most general level, the distinction between fixed and circulating capital is crucial 
as capitalist exchange concerns how the mass of value of capital grows not only in 
absolute terms, but also how the mass of value of capital (embodied in the production 
process as constant capital) grows in relation to the variable capital as living labour, 
(re)produced through the individual consumption of use values outside the circuit. 
Indeed, one of the primary distinctive characteristics of capitalism from the previous 
modes of production is the structural separation between the means of production 
produced and owned by the capitalists as constant capital and the items of final 
consumption which constitute the labour power as the variable capital. While the value 
of constant capital in relation to variable capital grows as accumulation proceeds, it 
means that the items of productive consumption dominate the circulation quantitatively, 
although the majority of net income is consumed through wages (Fine & Leopold, 
1993).  
In addition, this process is far from arbitrary, and the increasing production of items of 
consumption as commodities and their subsequent removal from the circuit of capital is 
proportional to the extent of the expulsion of living labour from the production process 
(Fine, 1994; Fine & Leopold, 1993; Rosdolsky, 1977; Weeks, 1983). Meanwhile, the 
social reproduction of labour power through individual consumption of wage goods 
represents an inversion of the logic of value, where exchange relations are represented 
as undifferentiated relations between money wages and use values, without reflecting 
the underlying social relations that govern who consumes what and how much.  
As summarised in Chapter 1, ‘the systems of provision’ approach to social reproduction 
draws upon such fundamental principles. It concerns how specific use values as final 
consumption items are produced increasingly through the market as commodities, 
reflecting the tendency of capitalist accumulation to reduce the value of labour power. 
Meanwhile, however, the items of final consumption necessarily cheapen and money 
wages (despite stagnant in the recent period) can buy more commodities, helping satisfy 
a minimum living standard. Nevertheless, as the final consumption is maintained 
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outside the circuit of capital, the previously established norms of consumption gradually 
disappear, most visible in the erosion of public services as necessary constituents for the 
functioning of the society as whole, of which the economy is a part.  
As suggested however, by no means this tendency suggests a linear process, as the 
tendencies and counter-tendencies exist in contradiction and the success of 
accumulation depends whether these can co-exist simultaneously as the realm of 
commodity production necessarily expands itself. As such, the investigation of 
tendencies and counter-tendencies in the actual operation of the economies becomes an 
empirical question, conducted contextually through how the balances between value 
magnitudes and use values are maintained. In maintaining such balances, not only the 
laws of capitalist production, exchange and distribution play a role, but the intervention 
of the state, the extent of domestic labour and the socially-constructed meanings 
attached to the consumption of specific use values are determining.  
Apart from its empirical contribution, the most important contribution of this thesis is 
to provide a theoretical alternative to study financialisation through a simultaneous 
investigation of use values and values. This preoccupation is made explicit whenever 
possible, for example in the distinction of the approach adopted in this thesis from 
Keynesian analyses in general, with respect to the latter’s not assigning a separate use 
value for the labour power and treating the product of living labour as the revenue 
share of workers. Similarly, the emergence of IBC as a logically distinct category is 
emphasised in Chapter 2, only once money acquires a specific use value to expand itself 
as money capital.  
In Chapter 6 on agricultural rent, the use value of landed property to be used by 
landowners to appropriate a part of social surplus without landed property being 
produced by capital relation was mentioned. In that respect, Chapter 6 on the political 
economy of housing provision in Turkey explained how the existence of rent revenues 
in housebuilding industry could be conducive to revenue generation, through creating 
above-average monopoly profits appropriated in the form of rent, especially in the 
urban context through ‘development gains’, without necessarily resulting in universal 
price appreciations and output restriction, as in the case of many developed countries 
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within the context of which housing markets are mostly discussed. Chapter 6 found 
evidence for the emergence of a speculative housebuilding industry in Turkey, following 
the increasing dependence on owner-occupation since the early 1980s. It found that 
some new actors such as the real estate investment trusts and other secondary financial 
institutions entered the industry, with extra rent revenues being facilitated through the 
state’s active involvement in the land markets.  
It is crucial to note that the land markets are characterised by the heavy presence of 
state ownership in Turkey, and therefore the state’s active involvement significantly 
shaped the productive characteristics of the industry. Its involvement took various 
forms. First, it smoothed supply fluctuations in a highly cyclical industry through 
engaging in direct housebuilding for low- and middle-income groups. Second, it 
facilitated land development for all actors by easing regulation and planning. Third, it 
provided Treasury estates and contributed to rent revenues especially in central urban 
areas through the creation of development gains based on revenue-sharing programmes 
since 2006 and large scale urban regeneration projects. Fourth, it established Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs) under its umbrella, which facilitated the formation of 
secondary mortgage markets based on asset-backed securities, albeit from a low base.  
In a comparative context, it was found that the state-ownership of land (hence the 
relative absence of impediment through) the intervention of landed property in Turkey 
partly contributed to the explanation for limited price appreciations in Turkey. Other 
factors were also determining, such as the limited base of contributions from consumers 
as well as the limited risk transfer from banks to other 'secondary' financial institutions, 
which are considered to be crucial in leading to the emergence of a Minskyian asset 
bubble. As the thesis did not restrict its focus upon the destabilising impacts of housing 
markets on overall accumulation, the developments within the housing industry in 
Turkey were investigated in comparison to the developed country case of Britain, in the 
absence of (excessive) price appreciations and output restriction in the former.  
The developments within the housebuilding industry are also discussed in relation to 
the developments within the electricity system, discussed in Chapter 5. In that respect, 
although electricity is not only a final item of consumption, but also an intermediary 
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product, Chapter 5 firstly discussed the commodification of electricity as a use value 
within the context of gradual privatisation since 1984. It argued that the experience has 
been mixed in terms of its results for the industry as well as consumers. It was negative 
in terms of its distributional impacts, given the initial costs were directly reflected on 
consumer bills, whereas there was no regulation mechanism to include the cost 
improvements on retail prices despite the substantial incentives provided for the private 
investors. During the transition period from 2001 until 2006, the state-owned wholesale 
company, TETAS, bought all electricity produced from newly-established privately-
owned generation companies at high initial costs and sold it to the market at a uniform 
price. This was reflected as low levels of competition in the industry and increased end-
prices, for both consumers and the industry, which were among the highest in Europe 
during the period. Although this was a result of an early process of industrial expansion, 
the chapter emphasised the state’s regulatory decision in terms of who finances these 
initial costs. There were also substantial public budget transfers, particularly in the 
implementation of the biggest projects, such as the Ilisu Hydroelectric Power Plant 
(HEPP) in Southeastern Anatolia, and Yusufeli and Deriner HEPPs in Northern 
Anatolia.  
Nevertheless, another important finding of the chapter on electricity provision in 
Turkey was that during the process of intensified re-organisation of capital as discussed 
in Chapter 4, the traditional boundaries between the sectors lowered, and the 
strengthening horizontal links between different is another indicator of the direction of 
re-organisation, signaling that the economy was moving towards intensified 
centralisation of capital and economies of scope. In the case of Turkey, both economies 
of scale of scope were evident in the energy sector; reflected respectively in the 
intensified energy production through greater competition while fewer firms engaged 
larger scale higher-productivity investments through combining operations in energy 
and construction sectors. Profitability was also maintained for smaller firms, as long as 
they could compete given the availability of a cheap labour force and casualised sub-
contracting arrangements especially in the construction sector. From these perspectives, 
the organisational relations within these sectors were in line with the findings of 
Chapter 4, which suggested that the capital restructuring from low-capital intensity to 
higher-capital intensity within manufacturing signalled an easier adoption of new 
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technologies and the dissolution of the traditional boundaries between the sectors at an 
overall economy level. 
The next section will discuss further issues arising from the findings and conclude the 
thesis.  
7.3. Further Issues and Concluding Remarks 
As mentioned in the introduction, the theoretical approach adopted in this thesis 
necessitated a highly abstract methodological and theoretical discussion in early chapters 
to derive the categories employed in the highly concrete empirical analyses of Chapters 
5 and 6. This meant that the thesis had to deal with many issues to cover a broad scope, 
ranging from the theoretical implications of different conceptualisations of the value of 
labour power to the current retail prices of electricity in Turkey. As a result, the 
coverage was highly selective to provide the necessary analytical framework within the 
limits of a thesis, and some aspects that could be valuable for the individual analyses of 
housing and electricity systems, and financialisation, as well as their inter-relations, are 
left behind or investigated only cursorily.  
One of the most important of these aspects is at the level of macroeconomic policy 
investigation concerning whether the processes of financialisation can be regulated, and 
through which macro policy mechanisms, which was not covered in this thesis at 
sufficient length. It should be noted that this choice was deliberate to a certain extent, as 
the focus of this thesis was sector-specific and the policy implications were discussed 
with respect to the choice of regulation mechanisms within the individual sectors that 
had a direct impact on the end-prices as well as the distribution of costs and benefits 
across different actors participating in these markets. Nevertheless, a further analysis of 
Turkey’s financialised accumulation path could be a more detailed macro level 
investigation of the implications of different policy choices from a comparative 
perspective.  
In a very interesting article, Milor (1990) discusses the state planning experiment of 
Turkey during the early 1960s, inspired by French indicative planning. Despite the 
political suspicions arising with the connotations of planning, the Dutch economist 
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Tinbergen and his assistant Koopman were invited to Turkey in April 1960, the latter to 
stay further to conduct preliminary research for a five-year development plan. In May 
1960, the Democrat Party (DP) government of Adnan Menderes was thrown out by a 
military coup, and the young technocrats who worked with Tinbergen and Koopman 
were appointed to found the State Planning Organisation (SPO) in September 1960. 
The members of SPO continued to work along Tinbergen’s suggestions, which aimed at 
introducing a type of planning that would not interfere extensively, but enable the 
private sector through the promotion of capital-intensive techniques and maximisation 
of labour productivity. During the two-year process of plan preparation, Nicholas 
Kaldor was also invited to Turkey, who proposed a comprehensive agricultural taxation 
reform which would put incentives for farmers towards mechanisation. He suggested 
that because taxation on agricultural products was very low, and farmers did not 
basically pay any taxes for products above average, there were no incentives towards 
mechanisation and as a result, land was underutilised which prevented the sector from 
developing (Milor, 1990).  
The agricultural reform package and the promotion of capital-intensive techniques in a 
systemic manner were not met with enthusiasm by the military officials, due to concerns 
over job losses as well as migration movements especially from the agricultural Eastern 
provinces. There were also pressures on planners to arbitrarily change and manage their 
calculations, for example to increase the growth expectations for the first year of the 
plan from 6.5 per cent to 7.6 per cent of GNP for reasons of optimism. As a result of 
the tensions that arose between the planners and the military officials, the founders of 
the SPO resigned collectively, right after the adoption of the First Five-Year 
Development Plan (1963-1967) in 1962, signalling that the planning experience did not 
go according to the initial expectations. Milor (1990) questions whether the 
development trajectory in Turkey could have been different given the extensive state 
interventionism during the period of import substitution of 1960s could achieve 
sufficient quality in terms of institutional coherence and coordination among state 
organisations as well as selectivity of policies that focused upon strategic sectors and 
industries. He states that given 60 per cent of all industrial investments were made by 
State-Owned Enterprises, their inefficiency in terms of lacking selectivity played an 
important role for the overall state of the economy in the following decades.  
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Indeed, this issue has also been discussed extensively within the context of formerly 
planned economies especially in Central and Eastern Europe (Kornai, 1986, 2000). For 
the Hungarian economist Kornai (1986), who wrote extensively on the issue, the Soviet 
State-Owned Enterprises were structurally inefficient due to their ‘soft budget 
constraints’ and detachment from cost considerations which led to the emergence of 
chronic shortage economies in the region. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Gabor (2012b) explains that these countries went through a substantial transition in two 
phases, first between 1989 and 1994, when the planned economies shifted their 
production strategies from a strictly vertically-integrated structure to a market-driven 
system, and then a seemingly successful integration into the global economy from 1995 
onwards, on the basis of fighting against the inherited repressed inflation. She argues 
that the chronic shortage narrative advocated by Kornai (1986) and others, supported 
by the IMF’s monetarist policy suggestions based on income policies and devaluations, 
was far from reflecting the structural character of the planned economies based on the 
benefits of vertical integration. Instead, it became instrumental for a transition to 
financialised accumulation in the following period as monetary restriction to fight 
against excess demand protected financial over productive interests.  
The difference of the planned economies, as Gabor (2012b) suggests, was the absence 
of commodified social provisioning, which made incomes policies redundant as wages 
only represented a small proportion of the production costs (they are not contained 
enough in the costs of production). Moreover, the costs of imported intermediate 
goods increased through repeated devaluations, hampering production. On the other 
hand, Turkey followed a different trajectory with a different (yet similar) set of policies, 
and a further research idea would be to locate it within a more detailed comparative 
context in the neighbouring region.  
I will conclude by repeating the main argument of the thesis. Commodified social 
provisioning indeed represents a detachment of the (re)production of labour power as a 
commodity from the production process, and is in line with intensified financialised 
accumulation. As President Erdogan said in 2013, quoted at the beginning of the thesis, 
there is clearly an element of ideology in favouring construction projects (contributing 
to individualised owner-occupation and accumulation) over the protection of 
304 
 
archaeological findings (or other societal considerations). Nevertheless, the outcomes of 
this choice remain highly historical and contingent, depending upon a collection of 
many other choices, as the thesis explored. In that respect, Milor’s question with respect 
to the failure to implement a comprehensive industrial reform in the 1960s also remains 
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